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A paper of this thesis titled “The climate change and freshwaters nexus: possible 
implications for water treaties on the transboundary tributaries of the Congo River (a study 
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While it is widely predicted that climate change will cause a significant decline of water 
availability in diverse regions of the planet, it is also established that the same phenomenon 
will cause frequent and intense floods in many other regions of the globe, including the 
Congo River basin, in Central Africa. This basin, which houses the second-largest tropical 
rain forest in the world is under threat of seasonal floods due to climate change. Studies 
concerning the impact of climate change on the basin’s hydrology have revealed that the 
phenomenon will cause an increase of approximately 10 to 15 percent of the run-off of the 
basin, and a rise of about 11 to 17 percent of the Congo River’s discharge, by the year 2050. 
The Congo River is the main outlet of the Congo basin. It discharges approximately 45,000 
cubic metres of waters per second in the Atlantic Ocean, of which one third are the waters 
from the Congo River’s transboundary tributaries. Eleven to seventeen percent in addition to 
what already exists suggests a higher likelihood of intense seasonal floods across the Congo 
River basin. The 1997 United Nations Convention on the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses has required water cooperation across river basins in order to 
jointly adopt the appropriate measures including the laws, to address the predicted impacts 
of climate change. However, the consulted literature has given very little interest in this 
matter as far as the Congo River basin is concerned. Furthermore, no previous study has 
examined the legal implications thereof. This thesis has, therefore, tried to comprehend the 
implications that these climate change impacts on the hydrology of the Congo River basin 
will have on the laws that govern the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries. This 
thesis has at first assessed the legal framework that governs the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries against Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework, which verifies the 
integration of the climate change dimension in transboundary water treaties. At a second 
stage, this thesis has undertaken a comparative analysis of the said regime with the flood 
management regime that is in place in the Rhine River basin. From the analysis undertaken 
in this thesis, it has transpired that the legal regime that governs the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries has not adequately integrated the climate change dimension. 
Furthermore, it is deprived of any flood management provision or mechanism, thus 
suggesting an alarming vulnerability to floods along the Congo River especially. Inspired by 
the Rhine flood management regime, and having elucidated the hydro politics at play across 
the Congo River basin, this thesis has formulated some critical recommendations that aim at 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which the legal framework that governs 
the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries has integrated the climate change 
dimension. Such an investigation will be done with the aim of identifying possible gaps in 
the legal regime that governs this transboundary water system, and from there formulate 
some appropriate recommendations in order to equip the Congo River basin with climate-
proofed transboundary water treaties. With a flow rate estimated to approximately 45,000 
cubic metres per second, the Congo River, in the central region of Africa, ranks the first water 
richest river of Africa, and the second of the world after the Amazon River, in South America. 
As the climate change phenomenon continues to impact negatively the planet’s freshwater 
resources, mitigation and adaptation measures are being taken worldwide in order to limit the 
negative effects of climate change on people and societies. Regarding the impacts of climate 
change across the Congo River basin, the predictions announce a significant rise of up to 17 
percent of the river flows of the basin, by the year 2050, thus suggesting a strong likelihood 
of frequent floodings during the wet seasons in the basin’s flood-prone areas particularly. It 
is, therefore, due to such prediction that there is a pressing need for ensuring that the legal 
regime that governs the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries are climate-proofed 
and address in a specific way this prediction of climate change impact across the basin. An 
adequate flood management agendas centred around the Congo River and its transboundary 
tributaries may contribute to mitigate significantly these predicted impacts of climate 
change across the basin. In addition, such programs may offer the opportunity to better 
manage the predicted excessive seasonal waters that will be flowing through the Congo 
River and its tributaries, for the purpose of water transfer towards some surrounding water-
stressed regions northwards and southwards the Congo River basin. The agreements that 
were negotiated on transboundary water resources before the advent of climate change were 
generally negotiated to promote peace, cooperation, and economic development among the 
signatory states. Because of climate change, it is recommended that these categories of 
agreements may include suitable mechanisms that will help the signatory states to 




1.1 Background of the study  
In recent years, the impacts of climate change on water resources have received 
considerable attention from scholars and actors interested in this topic.1 A large and 
growing body of literature has established that the changes that are observed in the planet’s 
climate system, which are generally referred to as “climate change” have significant 
impacts on the planet’s freshwater resources.2 Impacts are the effects of climate change on 
lives, ecosystems, and livelihoods.3 Phenomena such as rainfall variabilities and 
instabilities, decreasing levels of river runoffs, freshwater depletion, floodings and 
droughts, to name only these few, that are increasingly observed worldwide, have all been 
linked to the climate change phenomenon.4  
There is a wide consensus among scientists that the disproportionate 
emission of anthropogenic greenhouse gases from all over the world has, to a greater extent, 
caused the current episode of climate change.5 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC)6 has reported that anthropogenic emissions have already caused around 1.0 
                                                 
 
1 The Intergovernmental Pannel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations Organisation (UN) and some 
of its specialised agencies (FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO), the World Bank, to name but a few, have all 
a series of annual reports that discuss the water resources and climate change nexus. See section 2.2.6 below 
for details on climate change and waters; In the sense of this thesis, and unless otherwise specified, “Water 
resources” or “waters” will always refer to freshwaters. 
2 See section 2.2 below for further details. 
3 B. Bates et al. Climate change and water (2008) Technical Paper, 3. 
4 IPCC (2014) (c) Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution 
of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(2014), 1048. 
5 See section 2.2 below; B.E.C. Jiménez et al.  ‘Freshwater resources’ in C.B. Field et al. (eds.) Climate 
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of 
Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) 
229, 234-235; J.K.Casper Greenhouse gases: worldwide impacts (2010), 10. 
6 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Hereinafter IPCC] is a cosponsored independent scientific 
body, established in 1988 and consisting of over 2000 scientific and technical experts from around the world, 
which collect scientific information on the causes of climate change, its potential effects and possible mitigation 
strategies. The IPCC publishes every 7 years a report entitled ‘Climate change Assessment Report’ (AR), which 
informs on the drivers of climate change, its impacts, future risks, and on its adaptation and mitigation strategies. 
See for further details: https://www.ipcc.ch/organization.shtml, accessed on 12 February 2018. 
 
 
degrees Celsius of additional global warming above the pre-industrial levels; and will 
continue doing so until reaching approximately 1.5 degrees Celsius, between the years 2030 
and 2052 in a business as usual scenario.7 While climate predictions announce an increase 
of the global temperature of nearly 3.3 degrees Celsius in the horizon 2100,8  recent 
discoveries have established that every additional degree Celsius to increase in the global 
temperature will cause a drop of approximately 20 percent in the availability of freshwaters 
for 7.0 percent of the planet’s population.9 The detection of such a correlation between the 
planet’s climate system and water resources is regarded as one of the most vital discoveries 
of this modern epoch.10  
Analysing the relationship between the climate change and the planet’s water 
resources, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) found that it will be through 
water quantity and quality that people from all over the world will experience most the 
negative impacts of climate change.11 This is nothing less than disturbing if one can only 
consider the importance of freshwaters in human lives and societies, and yet being negatively 
                                                 
 
7 IPCC (2018) (f) Summary for Policymakers in: Global warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the 
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission 
pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable 
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (2018),  6. 
8 The National Determined Contributions [ hereinafter NDC] is a strategy under the 1992 UNFCCC and 
reiterated in the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change for the reduction of global CO2 emissions. See 
section 2.2.5 for further details; A. Brisman et al. Water, crime and security in the twenty-first century: Too 
dirty, too little, too much (2018), 54.  
9 D. Arjoon et al. ‘Sharing water and benefits in transboundary river basins’ (2016) 20 (6) Hydr&ESySc, 
2135, 2136; J. C. Sanchez & J. Roberts Transboundary Water Governance: Adaptation to Climate Change. 
(2014), XV; Jiménez et al.  (note 5 above; 229-232). 
10 IPCC 2014 (b) Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change  (2014), 1761.  
11 The UNDP is a United Nations Institution which was established in the 1950s. Its mandate is to eradicate 
poverty while protecting the planet. See for more details on the UNDP  https://www.undp.org/ accessed on 
15 July 2019; WWAP (a) The United Nations World Water Development Report: Managing Water under 
Uncertainty and Risk (2012), 10. 
 
 
impacted due to the continual deterioration of the earth’s climate system.12 According to the 
World Water Assessment Programme (WWAP),13 there are already 2 billion people 
worldwide who live in countries that experience higher water stresses, and around 4 billion 
who suffer severe episodes of water scarcity for at least one month a year. Because of a falling 
availability and a continually rising demand, the WWAP announced a global water deficit of 
around 40 percent by the year 2030.14  
While it is widely established that climate change will cause a significant 
decline of water availability in several parts of the planet, it is equally predicted that the 
phenomenon will be causing floods in some flood-prone parts of the world, during the wet 
seasons especially.15  These floods will be caused by excessive rainfalls. It was on that basis 
that the UN announced that by the year 2050, there will be worldwide around two billion 
people who will be vulnerable to floods.16  
In Africa, for instance, reports say that floods are already causing significant 
damages, including an increasing number of human displacements, and important material 
damages.17 In 2009, there were around 2.5 million displaced people across the continent 
                                                 
 
12 UNEP (a) Transboundary River Basins: Status and Trends (2016), 1; F. Hans ‘List the Top 5 Natural 
Resources’ available at https://sciencing.com/list-top-5-natural-resources-8179774.html, accessed on 23 
March 2019. 
13 WWAP (c) The United NationsWorld Water Development Report: Leaving No One Behind (2019), 1.  The 
The United Nations World Water Development Report (WWAP) is a report produced by UN-Water, which 
is a UN Agency that coordinates the efforts of all UN entities and other international organisations that work 
on the field of water and sanitation.  
14 WWAP (b) The United NationsWorld Water Development Report: Water for a Sustainable World (2015), 11. 
15 Coulibaly et al. ‘The 10 impact of climate change and extreme events on agriculture in Africa’ (2019) We In 
Gr & Sus 261; Bischiniotis et al. ‘The influence of antecedent conditions on flood risk in sub-Saharan Africa’ 
(2018) 18 (1) Nat Haz & Ear Sys Sc 271-285; See Gemeda et al. ‘The impacts of climate change on African 
continent and the way forward’ (2015) 10 (7) J’l of Ec & the Nat env 256; Brisman et al. (note 8 above; 54). 
16 UNU ‘Two Billion People Vulnerable to Floods by 2050’ (Press Release, June 13, 2004), available at 
http://www.unu.edu/news/ehs/floods.doc, accessed on 07 July 2019. Deforestation and demographic 
expansion in flood-prone regions are other factors that exacerbate communities vulnerability to floods.  
17 See P. Schewe ‘Fatal Floods in Africa’(December 16, 2010), available at https://phys.org/news/2010-12-
fatal-africa.html, accessed on 23 March 2019. 
 
 
because of floods.18 Schewe19 reports that more than 15,000 Africans died due to floods 
between the years 2000 and 2009,  although some of these casualties were not directly 
associated with the flood itself, but with the phenomenon's aftermath. 
Whether water-scarce conditions or massive displacements of people across 
state’s boundaries because of floods or any other reason are all feared because of the 
potential to nurture water competitions, tensions, and escalating violence among water 
users. The recent conflict in the Darfur, in South Soudan, offers compelling evidence to 
this.20 That is why the climate change-freshwaters nexus has become a cause of concern, 
in transboundary contexts in particular. 21 
Be it for floods or decreasing water availability, river basins are predicted to 
be the epicentres of most of the above negative impacts of climate change on water 
resources.22 There are worldwide nearly 310 international river basins.23 They represent 
47.1 percent of the planet’s land surface and are home to 52 percent of the world’s 
population.24 Because of such sizes of land surface and population, Sanchez25 claimed that 
the impacts of climate change would be particularly severe in transboundary contexts. 
                                                 
 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid.  
20 United Nations Security Council Report of Meeting 7818 (November 22, 2016), 2. 
21 J. Fried ‘Book Review’ in S. Sangam et al. (eds) Climate Change and Water Resources (2014), ix; A nexus 
means “an important connection between the parts of a system or a group of things” see definition in 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/nexus , accessed on 20 June 2018.  
22 See IPCC (c) (note 4 above; 1048); M.A. Palmer et al. ‘Climate change and the world's river basins: anticipating 
management options’ (2008) 2 (6) Front in Eco & Env 81, 83; Sanchez & Roberts (note 9 above; XV); Jiménez et 
al.  (note 5 above; 229-232). 
23 M. Mccracken & A.T. Wolf ‘Updating the Register of International River Basins of the world’ (2019) Int 
J of Wat Res Dev 1, 2-3; In the consulted literature, transboundary river basins are sometimes referred to as 
international river basins. See sections 2.3 and 2.4 below for further discussions on both concepts. 
24 The consulted literature is not constant on the number of transboundary river basins worldwide; The figure 
of 310 river basins includes Lake Basins; See J. W. Dellapenna The Customary International Law of 
Transboundary Fresh Waters (2001) 1 Int J Glo Env Iss 264, 265; See U.N.Water Transboundary Waters 
(2013), 26. See section 2.4 for further details on transboundary waters. 
25 Sanchez & Roberts (note 9 above; XV). 
 
 
Having considered the central role of the law in human societies, Nukulchai26 
recently declared that there was a growing need to identify what would be the implications 
of the impacts of climate change on the laws that govern the transboundary water resources. 
Somewhat in the same logic, Perlman27 stressed the necessity of understanding and preparing 
anticipatively riparian states to the effects of climate change on transboundary water 
resources. Similar as Perlman, the IPCC28  claimed on its side that understanding 
anticipatively the effects of climate change at river basin level could motivate riparian states 
to adopt joint mitigation and adaptation measures concerning a shared water resource, thus 
contributing to the promotion of peace, cooperation, sustainability, and development across 
transboundary river basins.29  
The call from both the IPCC and Perlman were critical since most of the 
transboundary river basins of the world are not equipped with water treaties that are 
responsive to climate change.30 In a study on the interplay between climate change and 
water resources, Bates31 noticed that half of the world’s transboundary river basins were 
uncovered with any water agreement, whereas the agreements that were in place failed to 
take climate change into account. In the same order of ideas as Bates, Wouters32 found that 
two-thirds of the world’s river basins were uncovered by any water agreement. In Africa, in 
particular, Bakker33 found that only 25 of the continent’s 63 transboundary river basins were 
covered with some water agreements, of which almost all did not deal with climate change.  
                                                 
 
26 Fried (note 21 above; ix). 
27 P. Perlman et al. ‘International water conflict and cooperation: challenges and opportunities’ (2017) 2 (42) 
Wat Int’l 105,117. 
28 See IPCC (c) (note 4 above; 1048). 
29 See section 2.2.5.1 below for more details on adaptation and mitigation.  
30 S. Blumstein et al. ‘Water and climate diplomacy: Integrative approaches for adaptive action in transboundary 
river basins’ Working Paper (2016), 6. Available at www.adelphi.de, accessed on 03 October 2018. 
31 Bates et al. (notes 3 above, 3) ; Ibid. Blumstein at 16.  
32 P. Wouters ‘Dynamic Cooperation’—The Evolution of Transboundary Water Cooperation’ in M. Kidd et 
al. (Eds.) Water and the Law: Towards Sustainability (2014) 13, 63.  
33 M.H. Bakker & A.J. Duncan ‘Future bottlenecks in international river basins: where transboundary 
institutions, population growth and hydrological variability intersect’ (2017) 42 (4) Wat Int’l 400, 407-408. 
In this Article, Bakker & Duncan speak about 64 River basins instead of 63 as adopted in this thesis.  
 
 
The Congo River basin, in the central region of Africa, is one of the 63 
transboundary river basins of Africa.34 It is shared by nearly ten riparian countries, has a 
flow rate of approximately 45,000 cubic metres per second, and carries about 32 percent of 
the continent’s freshwater resources.35 In spite of that, observers have raised the fact that 
the Congo River and its tributaries were among the most poorly regulated transboundary 
river systems in the world, with only limited consideration given to the predicted impact of 
climate change on the waters of the basin.36   
Haensler et al.37 studied the impacts of climate change on the hydrology of 
the Congo River basin and found that the phenomenon would cause an increase of up to 10 
percent of the waters of the basin. Beyene et al.38 also analysed the Congo basin’s 
hydrology and predicted an increase of approximately 10 to 15 percent of the run-off of the 
basin, besides an increase of 11 to 17 percent of the Congo River’s discharge, by the year 
2050. Both Haensler et al. and Beyene’s findings suggest higher flood risks throughout the 
Congo River basin, and in particular in the basin’s flood-prone areas.39 That is the reason 
why the riparian states of the Congo River and its tributaries are to take the necessary steps 
to adopt the appropriate legal measures whether at the basin or at country levels, to improve 
the preparedness of the basin to the impacts of climate change as predicted above.40  
The other thing is, there has been since a certain time, a growing pressure 
from some African regional forums on the DR-Congo to accept the transfer of its water 
resources to the Chad Lake to replenish this last.41 The DR-Congo’s waters to be transferred 
                                                 
 
34 See chapters 8 and 9 below. 
35 UNEP (a) Africa Water Atlas (2010), 41; A.H. Conley ‘The need to develop the water resources of Southern 
Africa’ In  Conference of Southern African Society of Aquatic Scientists, Zimbabwe (1996), 41. 
36 See section 6.3.2. below for more details. 
37 Haensler et al. ‘Assessment of projected climate change signals over central Africa based on a multitude 
of global and regional climate projections’ In A. Haensler et al. (eds.) Climate Change Scenarios for the 
Congo Basin (2013), 23 & 32. 
38 T. Beyene et al. ‘The potential consequences of climate change in the hydrology regime of the Congo River 
Basin’ in A. Haensler et al. (Eds.) Climate Change Scenarios for the Congo Basin (2013), 41. 
39 Ibid Beyene, 18-20. 
40 Ibid. 
41 The Democratic Republic of the Congo [hereinafter DR-Congo] is a state in the central region of the African 
continent. See further details on the DR-Congo in section 6.4.2 below. 
 
 
to Lake Chad are to be drawn either from the Congo River or from one of its transboundary 
tributaries. The DR-Congo and a few other co-riparian States are reluctant to such an 
initiative, whereas some other riparians are supportive of it.42  
In a study on conflicts over water resources in river basins, Roy43 found three 
ways under which disagreements may arise among the riparian States of a river basin, 
including the situations where one riparian State transfers or projects to transfer waters 
from the basin without prior agreement with the other riparian states. In the same order of 
ideas, Ashton44 shows that in Africa, water disputes often related to accusations that a 
transboundary water resource and its benefits are not equitably shared among the riparian 
states.45 Roy and Ashton’s findings recall that a transboundary context where there is no 
existing agreement or institutional mechanism to share water resources or the benefices 
thereof becomes conducive to conflicts.46  
The ongoing Bolivia vs Chile case seems to offer an eloquent illustration in 
this regard.47 Pressed by water shortages, the two countries are currently pending before 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over the ownership of the Silala River.48 The Silala 
conflict is occurring even though both countries are among the water-richest countries in 
                                                 
 
42 On the positions of the riparian states of the Congo River, see section 6.4 below. 
43 D. Roy et al. ‘Ecosystem Approaches in Transboundary Integrated Water Resources Management: A 
Review of Transboundary River Basins (2011) Int’l Inst for Sus Dev 1, 16; UNEP et al. Africa water atlas Vol. 
1 (2010), 42. 
44 P.J. Ashton ‘Disputes and conflicts over water in Africa’ (2007), 4. 
45 Ibid. 
46 UN-Water ‘Transboundary waters: sharing benefits, sharing responsibilities’ (2008) Thematic Paper 20, 9-11. 
47 See ICJ ‘Chile Institutes Proceedings against Bolivia with Regard to a Dispute Concerning the Status and Use 
of the Waters of the Silala’ No. 2016/16 (June 6, 2016) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/162/19018.pdf , accessed on 7 October 2018; See also C.R. Rossi ‘The Transboundary dispute 
over the waters of the Silala/Siloli: Legal vandalism and Goffmanian Metaphor’ (2017) 53 Stan j int’l l 55, 56.  
48 The ICJ is the main judicial organ of the United Nations Organisation (UN). It was instituted in June 1945, 
under the UN Charter, and began its operations in April 1946. It has replaced the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. The ICJ seats is in The Hague, Netherlands, at the Peace Palace. The ICJ is the only 
principal organ of the UN, which is not located in New York, USA. Its mission is to settle, in accordance 
with the International Law, any legal disputes, which is submitted to it by the member States of the 
Organisation, and to give advisory opinions on legal matters, which may emanate from UN organs and 
specialised agencies. Information available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ , accessed on 14 April 2. 
 
 
the world,49 and that for decades they have both peacefully shared the waters of the 
contested river. As argued by Kidd,50 the Bolivia vs Chile case highlights the forms that the 
looming water crisis may take worldwide in the near future. This Bolivia vs Chile conflict 
seems to recall that in the absence of climate-proofed agreements on shared water 
resources, conflicts are likely to burst even between states that have in their history shared 
water resources peacefully.51  
Although the predictions of climate change across the Congo River basin 
announce in general seasonal overabundance of waters and high risks of floods in the 
basin’s flood-prone areas as mentioned earlier, the legal framework that governs the Congo 
River and its transboundary tributaries deserves a particular attention, as the basin will need 
to improve its overall preparedness to floods management. 
1.2 Problem statement  
Under climate change circumstances, Beyene et al.52 predict an increase of approximately 
10 to 15 percent of the run-off across the Congo River basin, and an increase of 11 to 17 
percent of the Congo River’s discharge, by the year 2050. These increases will be 
particularly high during the wet seasons, as compared to the dry seasons.53 The same 
authors predict an increase in the basin’s run-off of approximately 23 to 27 percent, against 
an increase in the Congo River’s discharge of approximately 18 to 73 percent at the end of 
the current century.54 Both predictions suggest that there is a strong likelihood of frequent 
floodings across the Congo River basin. This thesis will, therefore, address a threefold 
problem that relates to these series of findings as far as the legal regime that governs the 
                                                 
 
49 See Total renewable water resources World Factbook (2016) available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2201.html (this publication has listed 
Bolivia and Chile among the water-richest countries in the world, yet engaged in a transboundary water conflict).  
50 M. Kidd & L. Feris 'Introduction’ Water and the Law—Towards sustainability’ in M. Kidd et al. (eds) 
Water and the Law: Towards sustainability (2014). This study has noted various reports proclaiming fresh 
water as the environmental crisis of the twenty-first century.  
51 World Factbook (note 49 above ); See Chapter 5 for further details on the Congo River and its riparian states. 
52 Beyene et al. (note 38 above; 17-20). 
53 Ibid. at 18. 
54 Ibid. at 18-20. 
 
 
Congo River and its transboundary tributaries is concerned. Firstly, the Congo River and 
its transboundary tributaries seem legally ill-equipped to cope with the predicted impact of 
climate change on the waters of the basin. Secondly, from the available review of literature, 
no previous investigation has been carried out on the legal implications of flooding across 
the Congo River basin as an impact of climate change. Thirdly, the possibility of 
undertaking water transfer from the Congo River or its transboundary tributaries under 
adequate flood management regime.  
1.3 Research objectives  
Against this background, the thesis sets out to investigate the extent to which the legal 
framework that governs the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries has integrated 
the climate change dimension. In that perspective, this thesis will: 
1. examine the existing agreements which apply to the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries;  
2. assess the adequacy of the agreements on the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries in addressing the predicted impacts of climate 
change on the waters of the Congo River basin;  
3. formulate recommendations regarding the legal regime that governs the 
waters of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries for more 
responsiveness to the predicted impacts of climate change across the Congo 
River basin. 
1.4 Research questions  
The central question which this thesis will investigate is: “To what extent has the legal 
framework that governs the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries taken into 
account the climate change phenomenon and its impacts on water resources in the Congo 
River basin?” To answer its central question, this thesis will focus on the two following 
sub-questions: “Have climate change considerations been adequately integrated into the 
existing agreements on the waters of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries?”, 
and, “How far has the legal framework that governs the waters of the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries dealt with the predicted impacts of climate change on the waters 
of the Congo River basin?”  
 
 
The central question and sub-questions of this thesis are approached with 
the view of formulating recommendations towards the adoption of a regime for the waters 
of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries, which will be responsive to the 
predicted impacts of climate change on the basin’s waters.  
1.5 The interest of this study 
This study has two interesting aspects. First, freshwater is one of the natural resources that 
the Congo River basin is exceptionally endowed with, because it carries approximately 32 
percent of Africa’s total volume of freshwaters. Climate change is expected to significantly 
increase water availability within the Congo River basin while decreasing water in some 
neighbouring river basins. Such abundant water resources result on the one side in higher 
risks of floodings across the Congo River basin, and on the other side in growing 
solicitations for water transfers from the waters of the Congo River basin to supply some 
water-stressed neighbouring river basins.55 However, the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries are ill-equipped in terms of climate-proofed transboundary water 
agreements, for which this study sets out to contribute. Second, the study will contribute to 
the clarification of the legal status of the Congo River, the main outlet of the Congo River 
basin. This is because the lack of consensus regarding the status of the Congo River among 
the states of the Congo River basin has in one way or the other contributed to the lack of 
adequate water agreements targetting the Congo River.  
Because of the geographical configuration of the Congo River, its status has 
long been confusing, as it has its source and mouth within the territorial boundaries of the 
DR-Congo only, which country the River traverses without ever crossing its national 
boundaries.56 No previous study has investigated this issue under climate change 
circumstances, and neither has any research considered the impacts of climate change on 
the agreements the riparian states of the Congo River have signed touching the Congo River 
and its transboundary tributaries. This research, therefore, provides a timely opportunity to 
advance understanding in that regard. Lastly, the integration of the climate change 
dimension in the legal framework that governs the Congo River and its transboundary 
                                                 
 
55 See section 5.6.2 below. 
56 See Annexe 6 and Map 6: The Congo River born and dischaging from within the territory of the DR-Congo. 
 
 
tributaries will make a significant contribution both in treaty stability and in the promotion 
of peace and cooperation among the states of the Congo River basin, a region characterised 
by recurring political and military conflicts.  
1.6 The gap to be addressed and the original contribution  
In general, the Congo River basin has been given only a little attention by scholars in the 
past decades, and even much lesser attention regarding the legal implications of the impacts 
of climate change on its water resources.57 After intensively researching on climate change 
adaptation in transboundary river contexts in Africa, Goulden et al.58 concluded that there 
was need for future studies to review the appropriateness of existing legal frameworks and 
institutional structures for transboundary water treaties in the context of climate change, 
and to find new approaches to transboundary water treaties that are better suited for non-
stationary hydrological conditions. To the researcher’s best knowledge, very few 
publications were found in the literature that addresses the issue raised by Goulden et al.59  
for the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries. None of the rare studies that were 
found envisaged the legal implications of the impacts of climate change on the waters of 
the Congo watercourse.  
Therefore,  this thesis constitutes an original contribution to fill the above 
gap as raised by Goulden et al. concerning the Congo River and its transboundary 
tributaries. This thesis will also improve the understanding of the status of the Congo 
watercourse, for which there has already been an episode of conflict between the DR-
Congo and the Republic of the Congo, in the 1970s.60 A clear and shared understanding of 
                                                 
 
57 CSC Climate Change Scenarios for the Congo Basin (2013), 1; On the list of the scarce literature dealing 
with the Congo River in the post-colonial period, one has to mention T. Maluwa (a) ‘The origins and 
development of international rivers in Africa: a study of the international legal regimes of the Congo and the 
Niger rivers from 1885 to 1960’ (1982) 29-3 NILR 368; M. Mubiala L’évolution du droit des cours d’eau 
internationaux à la lumière de l’expérience africaine, notamment dans le bassin du Congo/Zaïre (2014), 
XIX-XXI; M. Mubiala ‘Le regime juridique du bassin du Congo/Zaire’ (1994) 47 (5) Stu dip 53, 72.  
58 M.Goulden et al. ‘Adaptation to climate change in international river basins in Africa: A review’ (2009) 
54 (4)  Hy.Sc.J’l 805, 824. 
59 CSC (note 57 above; 1). 
60 On the conflict between the two Congos on the Congo River, See details in section 6.2.4 below. 
 
 
the status of the Congo River among its riparian states will contribute to setting the right 
socio-political environment across the basin for the adoption of and implementation of 
climate-proofed water agreements. At last, through the improvement of the regime that 
governs the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries, this thesis will contribute to the 
sustainability of the environment of the basin, and to its political and social stability.61  
1.7 Limitation of the study and reasons for selecting the units of analysis and choosing 
the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries 
This thesis will focus on the legal regime that governs the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries. Groundwaters do not constitute the focus of this study; neither 
does the Tanganyika Lake basin, despite its connection with the Congo River through some 
in-between water flows.62 Also, this thesis will only consider the non-navigational uses of 
the Congo watercourse, and analyse only the legal principles that apply to transboundary 
water resources, as enshrined in the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses and its related instrument, which is the 
1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes. This is because, at the time of the drafting of this thesis, the 1997 
United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses is viewed as the most important and legitimate multilateral instrument to 
have offered a clear, coherent, and comprehensive codification of the customary 
international law in the field of the transboundary watercourses and river basins. 
There is a set of reasons that have led to the choice of the Congo River basin: 
Firstly, its strategic position, from an environmental perspective, being the water-richest 
river basin in Africa, and the second in the world, after the Amazon, in South America. 
Secondly, the lack of adequate climate-proofed water Agreements to govern the waters of 
the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries. 
The transboundary rivers that are chosen for the comparative analysis 
include the Rhine and Danube Rivers. These Rivers are selected for two reasons, First, 
under the European Union Directives on water resources of 2000, and the 2007 Directives 
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on flood management, both rivers seem well equipped with an adequate flood management 
regime, in comparison to the regime of the Congo River. Second, both the Rhine and 
Danube Rivers share with the Congo River basin similar predictions concerning floods, as 
a result of climate change disruption on the basins’ hydrology.63 However, due to the fact 
that the Rhine and the Danube Rivers have the same flood management regime, the Rhine 
River will constitute the primary context concerning the comparative analysis. 
1.8 Research methodology 
This thesis is a desktop study. It includes a content analysis of treaties, official reports and 
statistics from both national and international authoritative institutions, especially those 
that are influential to the regimes of transboundary watercourses in the targeted river basins. 
This thesis also undertakes a content analysis of relevant scholarly literature and 
comparative analysis of transboundary water regimes. The transboundary water regime that 
is chosen for the comparative analysis is principally the flood regime that is in place in the 
Rhine River basin. However, whenever the need will be to do so, this thesis will make 
references to some other river basins such as the Danube River basin.  
1.9 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is comprised of four parts, with at least two chapters each. Part I provides some 
generalities towards the thesis. It comprises an introduction (chapter 1) and a review of the 
key concepts of the study (chapter 2). Under chapter 2, this thesis undertakes some 
foundational discussions around a few key concepts, including climate change, 
transboundary watercourse, transboundary river basin, and water treaties. Part I further 
introduces the concepts of water cooperation and politics, to display the challenges posed 
by the Anthropocene on riparian States relation. Part II explores the theoretical and legal 
frameworks underpinning this thesis. Chapter 3 outlines the genesis and evolution of the 
legal frameworks that govern the transboundary water resources, whereas the doctrines, 
theories, and legal frameworks thereof are discussed in chapter 4. Under Part III, chapter 5 
discusses the hydrography of the Congo River, while chapter 6 discusses the legal regime 
governing its transboundary waters. The understanding of the Congo River’s hydrography 
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is a condition towards the building of an effective model of transboundary water 
governance across the basin. Part IV comprises chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 7 introduces 
Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework for treaty assessment regarding the integration of the 
climate change dimension. Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework will be referred to in 
chapter 8 for the assessment of the regime that governs the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries. Part V is comprised of chapters 9 and 10. Chapter 9 undertakes 
a comparative analysis between the regime that governs the waters of the Congo River and 
its transboundary tributaries and the regime that governs the waters of the Rhine River basin 
regarding the management of floods. Chapter 10 concludes this thesis, summarises its main 




2 KEY CONCEPTS OF THE STUDY 
2.1 Introduction  
The field of waters law has numerous traditional and emerging concepts, which 
environmental law scholars and practitioners are called to make regular use of. While some 
of these concepts are simply resurfacing, sometimes with new meanings, others are just 
making their entry in the jargon of international water law. This chapter briefly overviews 
some of these concepts, with a particular emphasis on the evolution that has led to reaching 
the current understanding thereof. The objective of this chapter is to provide an enhanced 
understanding of each of these concepts, including climate change, river basin, and 
watercourse. Concepts that are purely legal such as treaties or Agreements will be 
introduced by this chapter, but only briefly, as the second part of this thesis will be 
dedicated to them. Discussions regarding these concepts are crucial in a study that is 
focused on the legal implications of the impacts of climate change on transboundary water 
resources. However, as much as it will not be possible to review all these concepts, it will 
also not be helpful to discuss only superficially those that are the most pertinent to this 
thesis. The discussions in this chapter are arranged in four sections. The first section will 
provide an overview regarding the climate change science; it will discuss its discovery, 
definition, impacts, and the reasons for concern in the field of the law of transboundary 
water resources. The second section will be an attempt to inquire about the river basin 
concept, which is sometimes referred to as the hydrographic basin, or the drainage basin. 
The third section will discuss the watercourse concept, which is somewhat a novel concept 




2.2 Climate change science 
2.2.1 Background information  
Climate change refers to changes in the climate system, which is generally defined as a 
highly complex system consisting of the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the cryosphere, the 
lithosphere, the biosphere, and the interactions between them.64 These changes add to the 
natural variability of climate and are attributed directly or indirectly to human activities.65  
A recent countries survey by the Pew Research Centre (PRC) has presented climate 
change as the most significant international threat facing the current epoch.66 Half of the 
surveyed countries by the PRC (13 out of 26 countries) have reported global warming to 
be a top national security concern. Although scholars such as Baer & Singer 67 and some 
others established that the climate of the planet has never been static throughout history, 
scientists are convinced that the level, magnitude, and speed of the current changes have 
never happened before in the earth’s climate history.68  
                                                 
 
64 See definitions of climate change in section 2.2.3 below. 
65 Ibid.  
66 The Pew Research Center (PRC) is an apolitical non-partisan think tank whose objective is to inform the 
public about attitudes, issues, and trends dominating the world. See for further details on the PRC: 
https://www.pewresearch.org/about/, accessed on 23 July 2019; For similar statements about climate change 
being the biggest threat of our time, see António Guterres ‘Climate change is the biggest threat to global 
economy’ (25 January 2019), available at https://unfccc.int/news/antonio-guterres-climate-change-is-biggest-
threat-to-global-economy, accessed on 15 August 2019; A. Bannister ‘Climate change dominates biggest global 
threats in 2019’ (17 January 2019), available at https://www.ifsecglobal.com/borders-infrastructure/climate-
change-dominates-biggest-global-threats-2019/, accessed on 15 August 2019; M. Nevitt ‘We must think bigger 
and bolder about the national security threats posed by climate change’ (2019), available at 
https://www.justsecurity.org/63673/climate-change-our-greatest-national-security-threat/, accessed on 15 
August 2019. 
67 H.A. Baer & M. Singer The anthropology of climate change: An integrated critical perspective. (2018), 9; 
J.L. Blois et al. ‘Climate change and the past, present, and future of biotic interactions’ (2013) 6145 (341) 
Science 499, 499; G.C. Nanson et al.  ‘Wetting and drying of Australia over the past 300 ka’ (1992) 9 (20) 
Geol 791, 791; G.M. Hallegraeff ‘Ocean climate change, phytoplankton community responses, and harmful 
algal blooms: a formidable predictive challenge 1." (2010) 46 (2) J of phycol 220, 220. 
68 IPCC 2014 (d) Climate Change: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Chang (2014), 96 & 1257. 
 
 
Overwhelming paleoclimatic evidence has suggested that more than once in 
the past, the planet already experienced episodes of critical climate change, which were 
characterised either by higher or by lower temperatures in comparison to the then 
averages.69 Scientists claim that climate change has caused at different epochs in the past 
several disasters, species extinction, and civilizations collapse. It is even believed that 
species such as dinosaurs, now extinct, lived some sixty-five million years ago in a 
predominantly tropical planet, with palm trees growing in the Antarctica, and alligators 
swimming in Greenland. However, due to climate change, such paradises went eventually 
through complete upheavals, which even caused species disappearance.70  
In their permanent quest for evolution and progress, human societies, which 
began some 12,000 years ago, evolved from small hunting and gathering groups to larger 
settlements in a geological context that was characterised by small climatic shifts at the 
global level,71 which context the geologists refer to as the Holocene.72 When viewed from 
this perspective, one can conclude, as did Bhandari,73 that climate change science has “a 
relatively long history” with humans and their environment, even though there is no clarity 
on the exact time when the phenomenon was detected in the course of history.  
Many scientists argue that climate change has played a significant role in the 
formation of human society. Baer74 pushes his conclusions even further, admitting that 
climate change has always been a significant factor influencing all life on Earth, including 
human beings, their lifestyles, and behaviours, and in that sense, the phenomenon is also to 
                                                 
 
69 Ibid. Blois, at 499; Ibid Nanson at 791; Ibid. Hallegraeff at 220. 
70 Baer (note 67 above; 1-2).  
71 Ibid. 
72 The “Holocene Epoch” is sometimes referred to as the “Anthropocene Epoch”. It is the current period in the 
geologic time. The Holocene/ Anthropocene begins 12,000 to 11,500 years ago at the decline of the Paleolithic 
Ice Age, and continues running down through today. Its anthropic reference comes from the fact that the primary 
characteristic of this epoch is the changes that were caused and are still being caused by human activities. Yet, 
the term can be misleading, because modern human establishments were already effective long before the 
Anthropocene epoch began; See for further details S.L. Lewis & A.M. Maslin ‘Defining the anthropocene’ 
(2015) 519  (7542) Nature 171, 171; See also M. Bagley ‘Holocene Epoch: The Age of Man’ available at 
https://www.livescience.com/28219-holocene-epoch.html, accessed on24 May 2019. 




be looked at from a positive perspective. For scholars such as Yoffee and others,75 the early 
civilizations were vulnerable to several constraints including short episodes of climate 
change, which led to their decline and collapse.76  
2.2.2 A historical overview of the discovery of climate change  
Varying opinions exist among scholars concerning climate change discovery and history. 
For Longwell,77 it was the geological explorations that constituted the first steps towards 
climate change detection, whereas for Bhandari78 it was through both geology and 
geography that the scientists began the exploration of climate variations and changes. 
Theses few opinions are all supportive of the fact that climate change as a phenomenon is 
not novel in the climatic history of the earth. However, as supported by the IPCC and 
numerous scholars,79  what is indubitably new in the current episode of climate change is 
its anthropogenic dimension.  
In the dawn of the 20th century, scientists from different fields set out to 
investigate the occurrence of the greenhouse phenomenon (GHG phenomenon). Their 
interest in this matter was fuelled by Arrhenius’s discovery, a few years before, who 
discussed in a paper the influence of the atmospheric Carbon dioxide (CO2) on the 
                                                 
 
75 L. Giosan et al. ‘Fluvial landscapes of the Harappan civilization’ (2012) 26 (109) Proc of the Nat Acad of 
Sc. 1688,1688; P.A. McAnany & N. Yoffee Questioning collapse: human resilience, ecological vulnerability, 
and the aftermath of empire (2009), 109. 
76 J.C. Woodward et al. ‘Reach-scale river dynamics moderate the impact of rapid climate change on floodwater 
farming in the desert Nile’ (2013) 41 (6) Geology 695, 698; T.R. Kidder et al ‘The alluvial geo-archeology of the 
Sanyangzhuang site on the Yellow River floodplain, Henean province, China’ (2012) 27 Geoarchlogy 324, 336. 
77 C.R. Longwell ‘Origin of the word climate’ (1954) 3113 (120) Science 355, 356. 
78 “Geology” means in Greek “the Earth and its speed”. “Geography” is a composite word meaning “geo” for 
the earth, and “grapho” for “to write”. The Greek noticed early the inclined position of the Earth and analysing 
its atmospheric variations through Geology and Geography. See for details Bhandari (note 73 above; 5).  
79 Baer (note 67 above; 1-2); A.B. Pittock ‘Climate change: turning up the heat’ (2017), 2; The IPCC confirms 
with 95 percent of certainty that the current episode of climate change is human induced. See IPCC (2014) 
(e) Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the IPCC (2014), v. 
 
 
temperature of the Earth. Arrhenius80 confirmed the existence of the Green House Gas 
effect and opened the way to further investigations. Before Arrhenius, Fourier81 proposed 
in 1824, a theory according to which the gases present in the terrestrial atmosphere 
increased the temperature on its surface. There was also Tyndall82 who argued that changes 
in the proportion of the atmospheric gases could play a significant role in the variation of 
the earth’s climate. 
A few decades after the works of Arrhenius and its predecessors, Keeling83 
began a systematic recording and analysis of the concentration of atmospheric CO2 at 
the Mauna Loa Observatory, in the United States of America.84 Keeling85 published in 
1960, his findings, which confirmed that the CO2 atmospheric concentration was higher 
during the day than at night. He attributed this phenomenon to human activities, which are 
ordinarily intense in the daytime than at night. Keeling’s discovery hence offered the 
necessary back up for the launching of the first global alert concerning the anthropogenic 
face of the observed global warming. Based on keeling’s discovery, scientists pursued 
investigations on global warming. They eventually uncovered the existence of a more 
                                                 
 
80 For more details see D. Bodansky ‘The history of the global climate change regime’ (2001) IRGCC 23, 24; 
S. Arrhenius ‘On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the Earth’ (1897) 9 Pub 
of the Astr Soc of the Pcfic 9, 14. 
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Espaces Planétaires’ (1824) 27 Annu de Chim et de Phys 569, available at : 
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82 J. Tyndall ‘On the absorption and radiation of heat by gases and vapours, and on the physical connection 
of radiation, absorption, and conduction’ (1861) 22 (4) Phil. Mag Ser. 169, 194. 
83 Keeling (note 81 above; 200). 
84 The Mauna Loa Observatory (MLO) is an atmospheric baseline station of the Earth System Research Laboratory 
(ESRL), Global Monitoring Division (GMD) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
of the USA. The MLO has been continuously monitoring and collecting data related to atmospheric change since 
the 1950's. Further details on the MLO at https://www.esrl.noaa.gov, accessed on 10 April 2019. 
85 Keeling ( note 81 above; 200). 
 
 
complex phenomenon, which was responsible for the changes they were observing in the 
earth’s climate system, which complex phenomenon they called “climate change”. 86 
2.2.3 Definitions  
Two definitions are used to explain what the climate change is: the one is referred to as the 
“political definition”, and the other is referred to as the “scientific definition”, suggested 
by the IPCC,87 and the “political definition”, enshrined in Article 2 of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.88 The UNFCCC (political definition) defines 
climate change as “A change of climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human 
activities, which alters the composition of the global atmosphere, and adds to natural 
climate variability, observed over comparable time periods.”89  Whereas for the IPCC 
(scientific definition), climate change refers to “A change in the state of the climate that 
can be identified by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and which 
persist for an extended period, typically decades or longer.”90 References to climate change 
in this thesis will imply both definitions. 
                                                 
 
86 Besides the changes observed that led to the discovery of climate change, analysis of the global climatic 
data of the past 100 years clearly shows that there is a shift in the climate system. Between 1906 and 2005 
for instance, the global mean temperature rose by some 0.74 degree Celsius. The same variable is predicted 
to rise by 1.4 to 5.8 degree Celsius between the years 1990 and 2100. See for details IPCC 2014 (d) (note 68 
above; 96 & 1257). 
87 Ibid. IPCC 2014 (d) at 1255. 
88 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is discussed in detail in section 2.2.5.1 below. 
89  See Article 1. 2 of the UNFCCC; ‘The atmosphere of the earth consists of some 78% of nitrogen (N2), 
20% of oxygen (O2), and a mixture of small amounts of many other ingredients such as carbon dioxide (CO2), 
vapour of water (H2O), methane (CH4), sulphur dioxide (SO2), as well as carbon monoxide (CO). 
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internal processes within the climate system (internal variability), or to variations in natural or anthropogenic 
external forcing (external variability)’ See for details: IPCC 2014 (d) (note 68 above; 1257). 
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Scholars have often critically discussed these two definitions.91 Gupta,92 for 
instance, noticed the substantial differences that existed between the two definitions, which 
she found to have stemmed from an evolution of the climate change concept itself. Gupta93  
argues that the earlier approaches to climate change were more environment-centred, unlike 
the later approaches, which trend to includes some non-environmental considerations. The 
author further found that unlike the IPCC’s definition, the UNFCCC’s definition refrained 
from insisting on the natural causes of climate change in order to motivate the state’s action. 
For her, states would have been less motivated for climate action if the political definition 
of climate change insisted on the natural origins of the phenomenon.94  
2.2.4 Greenhouse gases emission, global warming, and climate change 
In the space of two centuries, human activities have released around 566 billion metric tons of 
CO2 into the atmosphere, causing a rise of the global mean temperature by some 0.74 degrees 
Celsius between 1906 and 2005.95 CO2 is the largest component of anthropogenic GHG 
emissions.96 It is released during the combustion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and gas as well 
                                                 
 
anthropogenic factors in provoking the contemporary climate change phenomenon. Unlike the IPCC 
definition, the UNFCCC definition has proven stable despite many waves of critics and calls for its 
amendment. It has remained unchanged. 
91 Pielke for instance noticed “serious inconsistencies” between the two definitions. See AR. Pielke ‘Misdefining 
“climate change”: consequences for science and action’ (2005) 8 (6) ES & P 548 at 549; Hardy reported a selective 
use of the two definitions by scientists: the UNFCCC’s definition was used when referring to the post-industrial 
era (after 1850), whereas the IPCC definition was used when referring to the pre-industrial era (before 1850). See 
JT. Hardy ‘Climate change: Causes, Effects, and Solutions’ (2003) John Wiley & Sons at 4.  
92 J. Gupta ‘History of international climate change policy’ (2010) 1 WCC 636 at 636-637. 
93 Ibid. 
94 For further comments on the two definitions of climate change, see: A. Kiss & D. Shelton International 
Environmental Law 3rd Ed (2004), 512. 
95 Baer (note 67 above; 1-2). 
96  The other GHG gas and their contribution to global warming include 1)The Methane (CH4, 16 percent); 2) 
Nitrous Oxide (N2O, 6 percent); 3) Per Fluorocarbons (PFCs) & Hydro Fluorocarbons (HFCs) (about 2 percent). 
It is because of such preponderance that scientists have adopted the carbon dioxide as the reference GHG, and the 
“Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Emission” (CO2-eq) as the metric unit for GHG emissions measurements. See for 
details in IPCC 2014 (d) (note 68 above; 1257); NASA ‘How is Today’s Warming Different from the Past?’ 
available at https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/GlobalWarming/page3.php, accessed on  5 April 2019.  
 
 
as the production of cement.97 CO2 is not a climatic or an environmental pollutant as such; it 
accounts for approximately 76 percent of global warming. Other Key GHGs include Methane 
(CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N2O), and Hydro Fluorocarbons (HFCs).
98  
The global emission of GHG is still aggravating despite the introduction three 
decades ago of an international regime of CO2 emission mitigation under the UNFCCC and 
its subsequent instruments.99 As a result, climatic predictions announce further temperature 
rises ranging from 1.4 to 5.8 degrees Celsius to occur before the end of the current century.100 
Scientists lament that such level, magnitude, and speed of temperature rise have never 
happened before in the earth’s climate history. 101 From being as little as 280 ppm in the 
period between 1750 and 1850, the CO2 atmospheric concentration reached 400 ppm in 
2010,102 before crossing over that bar of 400 ppm three years later, in 2013, for the first time 
in millions of years.103 More recently, in January 2019, the NOAA observatory reported a 
continual upward trend of the global atmospheric concentration of CO2, which the source 
valued to some 409.92 ppm. For the IPCC, such speed of temperature rise is ten times higher 
than the average level of rising that occurred during the ice age.104 
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9 Biogeosciences 5125, 5126. 
98 Ibid. Houghton. 
99 Baer (note 67 above; 1-2). 
100 Baer (note 67 above; 1-2). 
101 IPCC 2014 (d) (note 68 above; 96 & 1257). 
102 T.M. Letcher Climate change: observed impacts on planet Earth (2015), xxiii; IPCC (2014) (e) (note 79 above; 
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accessed on 15 Mars 2019. 
104 IPCC 2014 (d) (note 68 above; 96 & 1257); NASA ‘How is Today’s Warming Different from the Past?’ 
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If global warming and climate change are no longer debatable because of all 
the evidence outlined above,105 there are still some political and scientific contradictions 
around both phenomena, mostly in the developed world, and the USA especially.106 In this 
country, public debates on climate change are increasingly centred on the US government’s 
contribution to the global financial mechanisms aimed at responding to climate change. 
Part of the US public opinion seem pessimistic on such contributions and fear for the 
impacts of the US National Determined Contributions (NDC) strategy on the USA’s 
economy.107 Also, there are still some American scientists that continue to give opposing 
views on the causes and origins of climate change despite  that fact that with more than 99 
percent of certainty, statistical analysis have halted any hypothesis of a natural cause of 
climate change,108  and have confirmed with 95 percent of certainty the hypothesis of a 
human-induced phenomenon.109 Yet, these scientists still advocate that the current episode 
of climate change has a natural rather that an anthropogenic origin.  
2.2.5 Genesis and evolution of the institutional response to climate change 
The Institutional responses to climate change refer to the legal and institutional mechanisms, 
which have been set up to organise the global, regional, or local responses to the threats of 
climate change.  Prior understanding of climate change and its endorsement by states were the 
conditions before states involvement in the global response to the phenomenon. Three 
                                                 
 
105 For scientists consensus on climate change, see N. Oreskes ‘The scientific consensus on climate change’ 
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Climate Change: Highlights of National Academies Reports’ (2008). 
106 See generally A. Leiserowitz et al. Climate change in the American Mind: Public support for climate & 
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107 See L. Rajamani & J. Brunnée ‘The Legality of Downgrading Nationally Determined Contributions under 
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108 Scientists continue claiming that the following factors as the possible causes of climate change: i. The 
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Volcanic activities; iv. The Atmospheric Aerosols; v. Agriculture; vi. Surface solar radiation; vii. Space 
weather and cosmic Ray effects.  See for more details: R.P. Tuckett ‘The Role of Atmospheric gases’ in  T.M. 
Letcher (ed.) Climate change: observed impacts on planet Earth (2015) 375, 375; See also IPCC 2014 (e) 
(note 79 above; v); McGill ‘Is global warming just a giant natural fluctuation?’ (April 2014) available at 
https://www.mcgill.ca/newsroom/newsroom/node/20598, accessed on 09 January 2019.  
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Multilateral Agreements have been adopted and are regarded as the key instruments that define 
the current global regime to curb climate change. These instruments include the 1992 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, (its second commitment, which runs from January 1, 2013, until 
December 31, 2020), and at last, the 2015 Paris Agreement, adopted in December 2015.110 
Firmer initiatives that led to the current climate change regime took place in 
the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Before that, there was the year 1972, which is regarded 
as a milestone year because of the organisation of the first United Nations World 
Conference on the Global Environment. It was this conference that gave birth to the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP)111 and the 1972 Stockholm Principles on the human 
environment.112  
The UNEP and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO),113 
established the IPCC, in 1988, to provide governments at all levels with accurate scientific 
information that they are in need of to develop climate change-related laws and policies.114 
After its establishment, the IPCC played a significant role in the negotiations and adoption 
of the international climate change regime, mentioned earlier.  
                                                 
 
110 See section 2.2.5 below. 
111 The UNEP is the United Nations’ leading global environmental authority, which sets the global 
environmental agenda within the UN system, and promotes a coherent implementation of the environmental 
dimension of sustainable development. UNEP’s mission is to provide leadership to environment stakeholders 
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Three contributions are regarded as “major”, in the sense that they have been 
highly influential towards the formation of the international institutional response to 
climate change. These are first, the discovery of the stratospheric “Ozone hole” in 1987, 
and the legal regime that followed in response to the phenomenon.115 Second, the release 
of the Brundtland Commission report in 1987 under the title “Our Common Future”.116 
Third, the early enough UN Resolution 43/53 recognizing in 1988, climate change as a 
“common concern to the mankind”. The regime instituted by the 1985 Vienna Convention 
and its 1987 Montreal Protocol to phase out the Ozone-depleting substances that caused the 
“Ozone hole” played a significant referral role during the drafting of the UNFCCC.117 The 
1987 Brundtland Commission report inspired the organisation of the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, which produced 
the 1992 UNFCCC and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).118 By 
recognizing climate change as a “common concern of mankind”, the UN Resolution 43/53 
put the climate change early enough on a high profile agenda at the global level,119 which 
                                                 
 
115 The Ozone hole is “a severe depletion of stratospheric ozone in late winter and early spring in the 
Antarctic”. See D.W. Fahey et al.  ‘Twenty Questions and Answers about the Ozone Layer 2010 Update: 
Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion 2010’ (2011) WMO, 27. 
116 Report available at http://netzwerk-n.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/0_Brundtland_Report-1987-
Our_Common_Future.pdf , accessed on  18 March 2019; Bodansky (note 80 above; 23). 
117 “The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer [Hereinafter the 1985 Vienna Convention] 
was adopted in 1985, on the 22nd of March. It entered into force on September 22, 1988. Its objectives is to promote 
cooperation by means of systematic observations, research and information exchange on the effects of 
anthropogenic activities on the ozone layer, and to adopt corrective legislative or administrative measures. In 2009, 
the 1985 Vienna Convention became the first convention to achieve universal ratification, with 197 countries 
parties. The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer [Hereinafter the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol] implements the 1985 Vienna Convention. Its mandate is the phasing out of some conventionally 
identified ozone depleting substances. The regime established by the 1985 Vienna Convention and its Protocol 
stands as one of the most successful examples of international cooperation to tackle a major global environmental 
threat. Further information on both treaties are available at http://ozone.unep.org/en/treaties-and-decisions/vienna-
convention-protection-ozone-layer, accessed on  11 April 2019. 
118 The Conference was held from 3 – 14 June 1992 under the aegis of the UN. Report on the conference 
available at http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html, accessed on 16 July 2019. 
119 ‘The 70th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly of the 6th December 1988, entitled “Protection of 
global climate for present and future generations of mankind” declares: “… Recalling also the conclusions of 
the meeting held at Villach, Austria, in 1985, which, inter alia, recommended a programme on climate change 
 
 
highly contributed towards the organisation and coordination of an international response 
to the phenomenon.  
2.2.5.1 The United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change Regime of 1992 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the primary 
framework convention that organises the climate change response at the global level. It was 
adopted in May 1992, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to enable countries to cooperatively design 
and implement actions to curb global warming and avoid further negative impacts of the 
phenomenon on the planet and its inhabitants.120 The Convention entered into force on the 
21st of March 1994, with universal support, as reflected by its 197 states ratification. Such 
universal support constituted a good signal about the trust country parties put in the 
Convention’s goal. It also suggested that countries found necessary to have in place a 
mechanism of coordination of a global response to climate change. Article 2 of the 
UNFCCC provides: 
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that 
the Conference of the Parties (COP) may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilisation of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be 
achieved within a time frame that is sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”121 
In response to climate change, the UNFCCC adopted two sets of critical 
measures, which are the mitigation and adaptation measures. The “Mitigation measures” 
                                                 
 
to be promoted by governments and the scientific community with the collaboration of the WMO, the UNEP, 
and the ICSU, convinced that climate change affects humanity as a whole and should be confronted within a 
global framework so as to take into account the vital interests of all mankind, 1. Recognizes that climate 
change is a common concern for mankind, since climate is an essential condition which sustains life on earth”.  
See UNGA Resolution 43/53 A/RES/43/53, 6 December 1988, United Nations Organisation. Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/43/53, accessed on 10 February 2019.   
120 Information available at https://unfccc.int/about-us/about-the-secretariat , accessed on  20 April 2018.   
121 Article 2 of the UNFCCC.   
 
 
broadly refer to human interventions to reduce the sources of GHGs, or enhance the sinks 
thereof, whereas the “adaptation measures” roughly refer to changes in processes, practices, 
and structures to moderate the potential damages or to benefit from opportunities that are 
associated with climate change.122   
Based on the Common but Differentiated Responsibility Principle,123 the 
UNFCCC has created a differentiated regime of general commitments and specific 
commitments for the reduction of the emissions of GHGs. Under the UNFCCC, developed 
countries, which are mainly the countries members of the OECD, are identified as Annex 1 
countries,124 along with the states of the former Eastern Europe bloc. The rest of the countries 
are regarded under the Convention as developing countries. The convention’s general 
commitments are enshrined in its Articles 4 (1), 5, 6, and 12 (1). They are mainly qualitative, 
and apply to all the parties, despite some nuances depending on whether a country is a 
developed or a developing one.125 Specific commitments are enshrined in Articles 4 (2), 4 
(3), and 12 (2), and apply only to developed countries. They address issues of the sources and 
sinks of the GHG, technology transfer from the developed countries to the developing ones, 
and also issues relating to the finances needed to organise the global riposte to climate change. 
                                                 
 
122 IPCC (2014) (e) (note 79 above; 117, 118 & 125). 
123 The Common but Differentiated Responsibility Principle [ hereinafter CBDR] is one of the major concept 
of the international climate change regime. It can be described as a way of dissecting the proportional 
obligations that countries have vis a vis the planet’s, in all justness and fairness. See further details in K.L. 
Mbeva & P. Pauw ‘Self-Differentiation of Countries' Responsibilities Addressing Climate Change through 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions’ (April 2016) Discussion Paper Deut Inst für Entw, 5. 
124 ‘The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was established on December 
14, 1960. Nevertheless, it became operational on 30 September 1961, when its establishing convention 
entered into force. The OECD has 35 member countries worldwide. They regularly turn to one another to 
identify discuss and analyse problems, and discuss and promote policies that may be put in place to solve 
them’ Information available at http://www.oecd.org/about/history/, accessed on 09 August 2019. The 
preamble of the UNFCCC states: “Noting that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of 
GHG has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still 
relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet 
their social and development needs.” 
125 See Articles 4 (1), 5, 6, and 12 (1) of the UNFCCC.  
 
 
In December 1997, five years after the adoption of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted, under which developed countries were committed 
to reducing their GHG emissions “by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the 
commitment period 2008 to 2012”.126 With its system of emissions limitations, the Kyoto 
Protocol was the first comprehensive international agreement that was aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gases globally. The Kyoto Protocol had two commitment periods: a first one, 
which runs from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2012, and a second one, which has been 
running from 1 January 2013 and will expire on 31 December 2020.127  
Despite all the above instruments and strategies, global emissions continued 
to grow dangerously.128 This situation eventually brought back a long-standing question of 
whether binding emission limitations should be extended to developing countries as well.129 
In the meantime, increasing voices arose against the UNFCCC, advocating for a regime 
replacement.130 For these observers that raised their voices, the failure of the UNFCCC 
regime was the consequence of its lack of “specific emission reductions measures”. It was 
in such a context of crisis that the “unsuccessful” COP15 was held in Copenhagen, 
Denmark.131 Initially set up to “save the planet”, the  Danish COP failed to deliver what it 
                                                 
 
126 Article 3 (1) of the Kyoto Protocol.  
127 Information available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php, accessed on  10 May 2019.   
128 A. Manne & R. Richels ‘US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol: the impact on compliance costs and CO2 
emissions’ (2004) 32 (4) Ener Pol 447, 451. 
129 D. Bodansky ‘The Paris climate change agreement: a new hope?’ (2016) 110 (2) Amer J of Int L 288, 302-
302; O. Widerberg & P. Pattberg ‘International cooperative initiatives in global climate governance: Raising 
the ambition level or delegitimizing the UNFCCC?’ (2015) 1 (6) Glob Poli 45, 46; S. Barrett ‘Climate treaties 
and the imperative enforcement. (2008) 24 Oxf Rev Econ Pol 239, 258; R. Magnusson et al. ‘The Kyoto 
Protocol: implications of a flawed but important environmental policy’ (2000) Can Pub Pol/Anal de Pol 347, 
347-348; H. Winkler ‘Measurable, reportable and verifiable: the keys to mitigation in the Copenhagen deal’ 
(2008) 8 Clim Pol 534, 534-536. 
130 IISD ‘Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7-19 December 2009’ (2009) 12 (459) 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2, 1; Engel & H. Kirsten ‘Mitigating global climate change in the United States: 
a regional approach’ (2005) 14 NYU Envtl. LJ 54. 
131 Widerberg & Pattberg (note 129 above; 46); See T. Hale ‘How the UNFCCC Can drive climate ambition in 
advance of a treaty: record, review, reinforce, recruit’ (2013); D. Bodansky ‘The international climate change 
regime: The road from Copenhagen’ (2010) Viewpoints Series; C. Bhushan ‘After 25 years of failure, we should 
 
 
promised, evidencing through that a deep crisis in the multilateral climate change 
governance. However, COP15 paused the basis for a new climate change regime, intending 
to limit the increase of the global temperature to 2 Celsius degrees, and that would apply to 
all parties to the UNFCCC.132 
2.2.5.2 The 2015 Paris Agreement: Ambitions, hopes, disappointments, and fears 
The Paris Agreement came as an answer to the voices against the regime of the UNFCCC. 
It was adopted on December 12, 2015, during the 21st Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC,133 which was held in Paris, France. The Paris Agreement entered into force on 
November 4, 2016.134 Many viewed COP 21 as the most successful climate change 
conference in history.135 One hundred ninety-five country parties to the UNFCCC gathered 
with the intention to adopt either a “protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome 
with legal force under the UNFCCC which applied to all parties.” an objective consecrated 
by the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, in 2011.136  
Article 2.a. of the Paris Agreement has set a target of limiting the global 
temperature increase to "well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels" but 
encourages the state members to pursue efforts to stay below 1.5 degrees Celsius of 
                                                 
 
abandon the UNFCCC’ (March 2019), available at https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/03/27/25-years-
failure-abandon-unfccc/ , accessed on 01 Mars 2019. 
132 R. Knutti et al. ‘A scientific critique of the two-degree climate change target’ (2016) 9 (1) Nat Geosc 13, 13. 
133 The Conference of Parties [ COP] also known as COP, is the decision-making entity, which is responsible 
for the monitoring and the review of the implementation of several United Nations Convention, including the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Article 7 of the UNFCCC provides with more 
details about the institutional mechanism of the UNFCCC COPs.   
134 Information available at http://unfccc.int/focus/ndc_registry/items/9433.php, accessed on 10 February 2019.   
135 F. Harvey ‘Paris climate change agreement: the world's greatest diplomatic success’, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-diplomacy-developing-
united-nations, accessed on01 Mars 2019; C.G. Dure ‘Paris Agreement: Success or Failure, and What Next?’ 
available at http://climatica.org.uk/paris-agreement-success-failure-next, accessed on 01 Mars 2019. 
136 Decision 1/CP.17 of the UNFCCC COP 17 instituted the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, with a mandate 
to “develop another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention which would be 
applicable to all parties. The Durban Platform offered the indicated platform for the negotiation of the Paris 
Agreement. Information available at https://unfccc.int/adp-bodies-page, accessed on 5 February 2019. 
 
 
temperature increase at the end of the current century.137 To reach such an ambitious target, 
the treaty has established a set of binding commitment to all its state parties to undertake 
as ambitiously as possible domestic emission reduction efforts under countries’ National 
Determined Contributions.138 However, there seems to be no significant progress regarding 
GHG emission reduction at the global level. Recent compilations made by different 
observers reveal that the world is globally in a dangerous track of going beyond 3.3°C by 
the end of the current century.139  
Even if fully implemented, the current emissions reduction targets, as 
reflected in the aggregation of all the NDCs, are still likely to lead the world to a 3.3 Celsius 
degree of additional temperature by 2100.140 Scholars such as Bodansky141 and Bodle142 to 
mention only these foresaw in the non-binding character of the Paris emissions reduction 
scheme a significant shortcoming, which could lead to the failure of the Paris’ regime.  
In 2018, the IPCC issued a further warning to states regarding the devastating 
consequences of the continual increase of anthropogenic GHG emissions worldwide.143 What 
seems even more of concern is the low level of ambition of the global NDC. Even if the 
                                                 
 
137 See Article 2 of the 2015 Paris Agreement. 
138 Article 3 of the 2015 Paris Agreement provides: “As National Determined Contributions [NDC] to the 
global response to climate change, all parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as defined 
in Articles 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 with the view of achieving the purpose of this agreement as set out in Article 
2. The efforts of all parties will represent a progression over time, while recognising the need to support 
developing country parties for the effective implementation of this Agreement” more details on NDC 
available at https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-
contributions-ndcs, accessed on 22 February 2019. 
139 IPCC (2014) (f) (note 7 above); Information available at https://climateactiontracker.org/, accessed on 22 
February 2019; The Climate Action Trackers is an independent body of three research organisations created 
in 2009. It has specialised in tracking the global climate action, especially the progress towards the objective 
of holding global warming well below 2°C, and further pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. 
140 UNEP (c) The Emissions Gap Report (2018), 21; See M. Rocha et al. Paris Agreement in force, but no 
increase in climate action (2016), 1-2.  
141 Bodansky (note 129 above; 301). 
142 R. Bodle et al. ‘The Paris Agreement: Analysis, Assessment and Outlook’ (2016) CCLR, 8. 
143 IPCC (2018) (f) (note 7 above). 
 
 
chances of such a call to be followed seem very narrow, calls are being made for more 
ambitious NDC, and for a decarbonised world in the middle of the current century.144  
2.2.6 The climate change and water nexus 
The above picture opened the way to discussions on the impact of climate change on 
freshwaters. McCaffrey145  has given a wonderful summary of the contemporary issue 
associated with water resources: finite supply, but growing demand. Found in the 
biosphere, the geosphere, and the atmosphere, water is a vital resource provided by Mother 
Nature. Water is generally defined as “a colourless, transparent, tasteless, scentless 
compound of oxygen and hydrogen, in a liquid state, convertible by heat into steam and by 
cold into ice.”146 At no time in human history, have the importance and centrality of water 
resources in lives and societies ever been questioned.147 Without water, neither life nor 
human activities are conceivable. Water enters the biological composition of all the living 
beings, in both the vegetal and animal reigns. A human being, for instance, is made of 65 
percent of water as an adult against 97 percent while fetus, whereas animals are made of it 
for 65 to 95 percent, and plants between 78 to 95 percent.148  
There is a large consensus among scientists on the fact that water is the 
primary channel through which climate change is influencing the Earth’s ecosystems, 
livelihood and welfare.149 As mentioned earlier, climatic predictions state that by the year 
                                                 
 
144 See generally M. Fay et al. Decarbonizing development: Three steps to a zero-carbon future (2015); UNEP 
(c) (note 140 above). 
145 S.C. McCaffrey (a) The law of international watercourses 2nd Ed. (2007), 2; For the UN, water is the most 
basic and essential natural resource on the planet, see FAO ‘Water – the most basic resource but also the most 
essential’ (2014), available at http://www.fao.org/zhc/detail-events/en/c/231215/, accessed on 22 April 2019. 
146 available at https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/pdf, accessed on 19 October 2018. 
147 D.A. Caponera & M. Nanni (c) Principles of water law and administration: national and international 3 
ed. (2019), 1-2; G. Van Den Velde et al. ‘Living rivers: Trends and challenges in science and management’ 
(2006) 565 (1) Hydrobiologia 359, 360; UNEP (a) (note 12 above; 1). 
148 A.M. Helmenstine ‘How Much of Your Body is Water’, available at https://www.thoughtco.com/how-
much-of-your-body-is-water-609406, accessed on 22 April 2019. 
149 UN-Water Climate change adaptation: The pivotal role of water (2010), 2-3; E. Ansink & A. Ruijus ‘climate 
change and the stability of water allocation agreements’ (2008) 2 (41) Env’l & Res Econ 249, 250; SEG-CC 
Confronting Climate Change: Avoiding the Unmanageable and Managing the Unavoidable (2007), v, avaialble 
 
 
2025, the current figure of 700 million people living worldwide below the water stress 
threshold of 1,700 cubic meters per person per year, will rise to approximately 3 billion 
souls because of climate change.150 It is further predicted that 7 percent of the global 
population will be exposed to a drop of more than 20 percent of their available water 
resources as a result of every additional degree of the global temperature.151 
In a recent assessment of the risks and hazards associated with worlds that 
are 1.5 and 2 degrees Celsius warmer than the pre-industrial era, Döll152 concluded that 
significantly wetter or drier conditions are smaller in a 1.5 Celsius degree world than in a 
2 Celsius degree world. Suggesting as also did O’Neill153 that there would be more water 
vulnerability in a warmer world. The global climate system is a highly complex and 
interactive thing, which comprises all sorts of elements, including waters, snow and ices, 
lands, and all sorts of living things that are therein.154 What happens to the global climate 
influences each one of these elements and the living things that are therein;155 that is the 
reason why water resources are highly dependent on the global climate system and 
vulnerable to climate change.156  
The IPCC has developed a “climate change and reasons for concern” 
framework, to inform discussions that aim at implementing the long-term objective of the 
                                                 
 
at http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-
files.org/unf_website/PDF/climate%20_change_avoid_unmanagable_manage_unavoidable.pdf ; Gleick 
P.H. Water: the potential consequences of climate variability and change for the water resources of the 
United States (2000);  Jiménez et al.  (note 5 above; 233). 
150 UNDP (a) Human Development Report 2006. Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water 
Crisis (2006), 14; IPCC (2014) (e) (note 79 above; 39 – 54). 
151 Arjoon et al. (note 9 above; 2136); Sanchez & Roberts (note 9 above; XV); Jiménez et al. (note 5 above; 232). 
152 P. Döll et al. ‘Risks for the global freshwater system at 1.5 C and 2 C global warming’ (2018) 4 (13) Env 
Res Let 044038, 9-10. 
153 B. C. O’Neill et al. ‘IPCC reasons for concern regarding climate change risks’ (2017) 1 (7) Nat Clm Ch, 31. 
154 Bhandari (note 73 above; 6). 
155 F. Ludwig et al. ‘Perspectives on Climate Change Impacts and Water Security’ in C. Pahl-Wostl et al. 
(eds.) Handbook on water security (2016) 139, 139-140. 
156 Blumstein (note 30 above; 2). 
 
 
UNFCCC as mentioned earlier.157 A closer look at these “reasons for concern” shows that 
they all relate to water resources in one way or the other. Almost all of the climate change 
extreme events are conveyed through water resources. That is why, any disruption of the 
earth’s climate system results in increased frequency and intensity of those extreme events, 
with all the associated negative impacts. 
Most of the above figures are evidence of the quantitative impact of climate 
change on water resources. However, climate change causes also negative impacts on water 
quality. For Bruch,158 it is more likely that many countries will start facing water quality 
problems long before they begin experiencing significant water availability issues. Some 
studies have demonstrated the water pollution from sewage, industrial chemicals, wastes, 
urban runoff, agricultural fertilisers, and pesticides, to name but a few will become more 
intense under climate change.159 In a growing number of contexts, the overdrawing of water 
resources contributes also to water quality concerns.160  
2.3 The River Basin  
2.3.1 Background information 
Intense debates took place about the use or not of the River basin concept during the lengthy 
rounds of negotiations of the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Non-navigational 
uses of International Watercourses (1997 UNWCC). The negotiations took place under the 
International Law Commission161 and the Sixth Committee of the UN General 
                                                 
 
157 The IPCC reasons for concern regarding climate change include: i. unique and threatened ecosystems and 
species; ii. the increase in the frequency and damage from extreme weather events; iii. the greater climate 
change vulnerability of homes of poorer communities; iv. the growing economic costs caused by the impacts 
acquired over time by increased atmospheric concentrations GHG; and v. the growing possibility of the 




161 The International Law Commission [Hereinafter ILC] is a body of experts established in 1947 by the United 
Nations General Assembly [hereinafter UNGAS] under Article 13 (1) (a) of the Charter of the United Nations to 
"initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ... encouraging the progressive development of 
international law and its codification". Details on the ILC at http://legal.un.org/ilc/, accessed on 10 May 2019. 
 
 
Assembly.162 States’ mistrust vis-à-vis the river basin concept was so strong that the 1997 
UNWCC refrained from making any reference to it.163 However, as argued by Alcega,164 
the adoption of the 1997 UNWCC was not the abolition of the river basin concept. Some 
water treaties signed after 1997 referred to the river basin concept, sometimes as the core 
concept of the treaty, thus confirming the resilience and the capacity of adaptation of the 
concept mentioned by Teclaff. 165   
2.3.2 Defining “river basin” and “international river basin” 
The river basin is an old concept, which sometimes is referred to as the hydrographic basin, 
the drainage basin,  or even the catchment area.166 Under Article 2.13 of the European 
Union Water Framework Directive of 2000, a river basin is defined as: “The area of land 
from which all surface run-off flows through a sequence of streams, rivers, and, possibly, 
lakes into the sea at a single river mouth, estuary or delta.”167A river basin becomes 
                                                 
 
162 The Sixth Committee of the UNGAS is the primary platform for the consideration of legal matters in the General 
Assembly. All the country members of the United Nations Organisation are entitled to representation in the Sixth 
Committee. Further details available at https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/, accessed on 22 July 2019; See S.S. Alcega 
‘The Hydrographic Basin in the Convention on the Law of non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 
21 May 1997’, available at http://www.forumfed.org/library/the-hydrographic-basin-in-the-convention-on-the-
law-of-non-navigational-uses-of-international-watercourses-21-may-1997/, accessed on 12 June 2019. 
163 See section 4.4 below for further details on the 1997 UNWCC. 
164 Alcega (note 162 above). 
165 The example of treaties that were signed after the year 1997, but still made reference to the river basin 
concept are i. the Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the SADC (Article 7), which was concluded on August 
7, 2000, three years after the adoption of the 1997 UNWC, and ii. the SADC Revised Protocol of 2005, whose 
Article 3 (8) (a) made also reference to the river basin concept. This Article provides : “Utilisation of a shared 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner within the meaning of Article 7(a) and (b) requires taking 
into account all relevant factors and circumstances including: (i) geographical, hydrographical, hydrological, 
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L.A. Teclaff (d) ‘The river basin concept and global climate change’ (1990) 8 Pace Envtl L Rev 355, 361. 
166 A “drainage basin” is bounded by watersheds which drain into a river, a basin, or a reservoir. A “drainage 
basin” is synonymous to “catchment area” and to “drainage area”. Information available at 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/drainage-basin, accessed on 20 May 2019. 
167 The European Union (EU) is a political and economic union, which comprises 28 member states that are 
primarily located in Europe. See for further details: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu_en , accessed 
on 10 August 2019. See Article 2.13 of the European Union Water Framework Directive of the year 2000. 
 
 
“international” or “transboundary” when its boundaries intersect with the boundaries of at 
least two states.168  
The French geographer Buach169 became in 1752 the first scientist to have 
attempted to define what a “river basin” is. For Buach,170  river basin was “the set of all the 
slopes on which falls the waters that converge to the same river or creek”. Although 
Buach’s definition is outdated and distant from the contemporary meaning of the concept, 
it nevertheless made a significant contribution on the road to its understanding. Buach’s 
definition also threw light on the evolving character of the content of the river basin 
concept. After Buach’s effort, several other contributors attempted to define the river basin 
concept from different perspectives.171 For Sadoff,172  for instance, the concept of river 
basin applies to both the land area from which all surface run-off flows and to the flowing 
waters. Sadoff’s definition is close to that of the European Union. 
2.3.3 Genesis and evolution of the river basin concept 
2.3.3.1 The genesis of the concept 
Establishing a precise date or epoch for the birth of the River Basin concept seems unclear. 
Nevertheless, historical records put the first attempts to formally use the river basin concept 
only at the epochs when humans began (i) navigating along watercourses, (ii) controlling 
flood activities, and (iii) practising irrigation.173 History has confirmed the existence of 
                                                 
 
168 See McCaffrey (a) (note 145 above; 41). 
169 F. Molle (b) Planning and managing water resources at the river-basin level: Emergence and evolution 
of a concept. vol. 16 (2006), 3. 
170 Ibid.  
171 See more discussions on river basins in A.K. Biswas ‘Management of transboundary waters: an overview’ 
in Management of transboundary rivers and lakes (2008) 1, 7; See A.T. Wolf et al. ‘International river basins 
of the world’ (1999) 4 (15) Int J of Wat Res Devpmt 387, 389; N.P. Gleditsch et al. ‘Conflicts over Shared 
Rivers: Resource Wars or Fuzzy Boundaries?’ (2004) working Paper, 4; Article 3.5 of the 2004 Berlin Rules 
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interconnected waters, the surface waters of which normally share a common terminus.” 
172 For Sadoff, the term “International River basin” generally refers to “surface flows, groundwater, rainfall and 
soil moisture within a watershed.” By this definition, Sadoff equated river basin with the waters they contain, 
which is somewhat erroneous. See Sadoff et al. Share – Managing water across boundaries (2008), 15. 
173 Ibid. Sadoff; For more details about the historical evolution of the concept, see Molle (b) (note 169 above). 
 
 
practices that testifies about people’s early awareness regarding the existence of river 
basins.174 Records signal concept use for times as far as during the hydraulic civilisations.175 
The pressing necessity to exercise control over water resources, which characterised 
ancient societies led them to discover the extent of the water system that they were part of. 
Hydraulic civilisations also developed water cooperation, but in struggles, because of the 
frequent attempts of political expansionism that were expressed by some kingdoms and 
empires. The political expansionism of the early epoch was often motivated by the desire 
to exercise supreme control over shared water resources.176  
Early civilisations, or, as Wittfogel177 referred to them, the ‘hydraulic 
civilisations’ began at locations where water was of easy access. They developed 
sophisticated means of data collection over water resources, and had basin-wide managerial 
practices and cooperation, proving their awareness of the interdependence of water 
systems.178 This is why Teclaff, 179 was convinced that human understood and took into 
consideration the functional unity of the river basin long enough before they even reached 
as such a better understanding of the river basin concept. This legacy of understanding the 
interdependence of water systems has been passed on to future generations. That is why in 
several parts of the world, political institutions which developed in the course of history, 
took into consideration the functional unity of river basins. 
With the understanding of the interdependence of water systems came the 
rise of consciousness on the existence of a community of interests on the shared water 
resources, which is regarded as the next step towards the development of the river Basin 
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concept.180 The rise of consciousness opened the way to various forms of relationship and 
cooperation around shared water resources,181 consolidated the recognition of the 
hydrographic unity of river basins, and contributed to the birth of the river basin concept.182  
For Teclaff,183 such consciousness has ultimately led to the formation of the two modern 
central systems of water law: the domestic water law, and the transboundary water law.184  
2.3.3.2 The evolution of the concept before the 1911 Madrid Declaration 
One of the things that helped consolidate the river basin concept in the contemporary epoch 
is the 1911 Madrid Declaration released in Madrid, in Spain, on April 20, 1911, by the 
Institute of International Law.185 The 1911 Madrid Declaration was an interim normative 
instrument, which aimed at filling a gap in the international law regarding the regulation of 
the use of international watercourses for purposes other than navigation. It raised the 
concept of the river basin to the level of a central operational concept in the field of 
international water management.186 The 1911 Madrid Declaration states: 
“Riparian States with a common stream are in a position of permanent physical 
dependence on each other which precludes the idea of the complete autonomy of 
each State in the section of the natural watercourse under its sovereignty.” 187 
From the antiquity down to the middle of the nineteenth century, scientific 
knowledge on water developed considerably.188 Some of the modern States which formed 
progressively during the middle age showed support to the river basin concept. The rivers of 
Europe supported intensely the blooming industrial development of the middle of the 
nineteenth century.  
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Because of that, the river basin concept was granted a high political 
recognition, to the extent of receiving an institutional consecration. The French 
government, for instance, proposed in 1851, a plan to regroup the country’s departments in 
22 regions, with the boundaries of the departments matching geographically those of the 
river basins in which it laid.189 In England, the whole country was divided into drainage 
districts by legislation in 1930.190 In Germany, the government adopted the river basin 
concept and instituted a unitary approach for the management of the Ruhr River basin to 
stop the rise of industrial-born water pollutions. 191 The USA conservationist movement 
showed themselves very vocal on the unitary character of river basins, and supported the 
concept mainly for environmental purposes.192  
Despite all the support given to the concept, the communities of riparian 
states continued using transboundary water resources without putting in place the relevant 
legal rules to that end. Perhaps, as argues Teclaff,193 states did not yet see issues concerning 
the non-navigational uses of the shared watercourses, as it is the case currently. 
From the time the Madrid Declaration was issued, the river basin concept 
started benefiting from a broad recognition by states who generally recognised it as a unit 
for water operations and decisions.194 Molle195 noticed that after the 1911 Madrid 
Declaration, activities such as water supply, hydroelectricity generation, irrigation and 
flood control were the first to come to minds while thinking about river basins. River basins 
were seen as the indicated platforms whereby to discuss the design and application of the 
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laws and politics of natural resources and ecosystems protection, with diverging views, in 
passing hitting each other, in search for optimality.196 
2.3.3.3 The period after the 1911 Madrid Declaration in western countries 
A few decades after the 1911 Madrid Declaration, the river basin concept went through a 
short crisis of recognition, as many western countries temporarily refrained from 
supporting the concept.197 It was only later that states decided to resume their support to 
the concept.198 States did so through the rise of the movement of basin-wide development 
projects.199  
The US government established the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 
1933. The TVA pioneered the establishment of river basin authorities worldwide.200 The 
TVA was conferred with authority to achieve a comprehensive and regional socio-
economic development, which would be centred on the Tennessee River basin. The TVA 
was a USA domestic institution. However, its creation marked the birth of the concept of 
autonomous basin-wide entities, primarily referred to as “valley authorities”. After the 
experience of the TVA, the US federal government signed the Water Resources Planning 
Act, in 1965 under which it instituted other river basin commissions throughout the country. 
Riparian states in several international river basins created river basin joint commissions, 
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based on the TVA model, and agreed to cooperate around the management of their common 
transboundary water resources. Examples to confirm this include the Columbia,201 the 
Mekong,202 and the Indus river basin.203  
A similar move of river basin institutions was noticed in Europe. The French 
government, for instance, signed the 1964 Law on the Regime and Distribution of Water 
resources and their protection Against Pollution, under which it established river basin 
institutions, which were to operate under a national committee.204 Great Britain remained 
very supportive of the river basin concept for a long period. On several occasions, the 
government overhauled its national water administration in the quest for more 
consolidation of river basin management, as testified by Section 32 of the 1948 British 
River Boards Act.205  
Besides the 1911 Madrid Declaration, the 1966 Helsinki Rules gave 
significant support to the river basin concept. The 1966 Helsinki Rules became the first 
international non-binding instrument to broadly recognize and attempt to equip the river 
basin concept with a legal definition. 206 The 1966 Helsinki Rules defined an international 
drainage basin “a geographical area extending over two or more States determined by the 
watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface and underground waters, 
flowing into a common terminus.”207 Nonetheless, it appears as if the appetites of many 
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stakeholders were not satisfied by the definition of the concept which was proposed by the 
1966 Helsinki Rules.208  
Because of that, some countries began retreating from the concept. The 
British, for instance, privatised their river basin institutions in 1989.209 The USA abolished 
a bit earlier the basin commissions, which the country established under the 1965 Water 
Resources Planning Act.210 Whereas in many other western countries, water transfer 
projects that were discussed later on made no mention of the river basin concept any longer, 
thus confirming a serious political abandonment of the concept.211 However, the concept 
survived its “death sentence”, perhaps thanks to the broadening of its meaning, which 
included several other resources apart from waters.  
The adoption of the ecosystem approach by American environment activists 
helped consolidate the river basin concept. The American environment activists included 
environmental and developmental aspects in the river basin concept.212 It was in this context 
that the Dublin Statement on water and sustainable development also known as the “Dublin 
Principles” was proclaimed.213 The Dublin Statement was followed with the conception of 
the Integrated Water Resources Management approache, and later the adoption of the 2000 
Water Directives of the European Union.214 All these instruments referred to the river basin 
concept, thus proving a concept recovery and a renewed trust from the states.215 
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2.3.3.4 The river basin concept in developing countries  
The Evolution of the river basin concept, which took place in the western hemisphere, as 
highlighted above did not much include the developing world because most developing 
countries were still under colonisation. Colonial powers would nevertheless make use of 
the river basin concept in regions such as Africa, Asia, and the Americas, in the same sense 
as they did back in Europe. The enormous potential of irrigation, which they remarked in 
large African rivers, raised great interests in them to the extent that they discussed the 
possibilities of undertaking basin-wide development projects. This is why Molle216 could 
argue that the developments that took place around the river basin concept in the developing 
countries were children of colonialism.  
In countries such as India, Egypt or Sudan, massive works were undertaken 
by the colonial powers, 217 who were perhaps motivated by the US and European success 
stories, whereby miracles of large-scale land reclamation, irrigation, flood control, and dam 
construction took place.218 The end of World War II led to a spread of the establishment of 
basin authorities in several developing countries worldwide.219 The US TVA model 
discussed above became a model for many of the basin authorities that were established.  
The Niger River Authority, Senegal, and the Nile river basins were all 
established during this post World War II cohort, with the task of promoting basin-wide 
integrated development on the basis of water cooperation.220 But these ‘clones’ of the US’s 
TVA as Warner221 would later call them, mainly served as supporting institutions for the 
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building of dams, instead of pursuing the holistic development of river basins, as did the 
TVA.  
2.3.3.5 The river basin concept in the contemporary epoch 
Due to the current environmental challenges, there is a general regain of interest in the river 
basins concept. Goal number 6 of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals of the United 
Nations, for instance, institutes the river basins concept as the physical and operational unit 
for water resources development at national and international levels.222 Approaching the 
river basin as a whole is proven vital, because it contributes more effectively to ecosystem 
integrity, preservation, development and climate change adaptation, than a fragmented 
approach.223  
For Warner,224 the river basin approach is the best in addressing the current 
environmental crisis, whereas Sadoff225 found that the approach offered higher efficiency and 
benefits in terms of water developments. Within the same river basin, some parts may be 
either more inclined or naturally favourable to some types of activities than others. Activities 
such as fisheries, food, fibre production, hydropower generation, recreation or navigation, for 
instance, cannot be conducted evenly and with similar results in different locations of a single 
river basin. Approaching river basins as whole allowed water planners to find better locations 
for specific activities, based on sites potentialities and comparative advantages across the basin.  
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There is even a newer consideration, according to which the river basin 
concept should be approached with a look beyond the sole and limited prism of water 
resources.226 Modern trends in water governance recommend multi-stakeholder platforms 
the Integrated Water Resource Management strategy (IWRM), which they should ideally 
apply at the river basin level.227 The IWRM is defined as “A process which promotes the 
coordinated development and management of water, land, and related resources, in order 
to maximise the resultant economic and social welfare equitably without compromising the 
sustainability of vital ecosystems.”228  
Under the IWRM principles, water management is supposed to take place 
under autonomous basin-wide administrations well known as “River Basin Commissions”. 
Despite an existing propensity to clashes between the IWRM principles and the countries’ 
perception of the principle of states sovereignty over natural resources, River Basin 
Commissions are to be put in place in a cooperative way by riparian countries, because the 
IWRM principles maintain river basins as natural units for water management.229 The 
principles have also enriched the river basin concept with the dimension of ecosystem 
management, which means that there included in the concept a broader set of other natural 
resources. 
2.3.4 Transboundary river basins in the climate change era 
Whereas there are river basins that are shared by only a few numbers of states, others are 
shared between several states. River basins that have a high number of riparian states are 
usually complex to manage, in comparison to river basins that have smaller numbers of 
basin states. It is predicted that climate change would exacerbate such complexity if the 
appropriate legal measures are not preventively adopted. Scientists have claimed that “river 
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basins” will be the surface units that will witness most of the impacts of climate change on 
water resources.230  
There are worldwide 310 international river basins,231 which are home to 
more than 45 percent of the world’s population, and cover about 47 percent of the planet’s 
surface, while accounting for up to 60 percent of the river flows globally.232 Africa has 63 
transboundary river basins; these basins carry about 93 percent of the continent’s 
freshwaters and are home to 77 percent of its population.233 
The current figure of 310 International river basins was a finding of 
McCracken & Wolf, 234 in 2018. As Biswas235 observes, scholars did not give due 
consideration to the river basin concept over the last three decades, and because of that, 
precise data could not be generated on that particular landscape as it is the case currently. 
Before the year 2000, the only available source of data on international river basins was a 
1970 edition of a 1958 UN panel report on Integrated River Basin Development.236 Table 
1 below displays the evolving number of transboundary river basins over the years. 
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Table 1: The evolving number of transboundary river basins from 1958 to 2018 
 






percentage of the 
world’s land 
surface 
1970 Edition to a 1958 UN panel report  166 - 
1978 Register UNCNRET 214 47.0 
1999 Update by Wolf et al. 261 45.3 
2010 Update by De Stefano et al.237 276 46.1 
2014 Hydro-Political Dependency Study238 456 47.7 
2016 TWAP, UNEP-DHI Study 286 46.2 
2018 Update Wolf et al  310 47.1 
   Source: McCracken & Wolf239  
 
The table above reveals a growing number of international river basins over 
the years. The main explanatory factors are first the methodologies used each time the 
estimations were made, and second, the evolution of the number of the states over time. 
State unification or states dismantling. has represented whether a drop or an increase in the 
number of transboundary river basins. Examples of state dismantling that have provoked 
an increase in the number of River basins can be drawn from the dislocation of the former 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the nineties. The implosion of the former 
Yugoslavia between the year 1991 and 2008 can also be mentioned in the same view.240  
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2.3.5 The river basin concept and states boundary 
International law is erected on the concept of the state,241 which in turn, is built upon the 
pedestal concept of national sovereignty, which itself rests on the tangibility of a state’s 
territory. The territorial boundaries define a state’s territory; it thus brings to a state the 
guarantee of its geographical existence.242 Boundaries are defined as: “the outer edges of a 
territory within which a state can exercise exclusive power”.243 They are the point of the 
line that marks the territorial space within which a state exercises its sovereignty.244 State 
boundaries are politically decided, whereas the river basin’s boundaries are naturally 
determined.245 It is, therefore, much common to see a state’s political boundaries not 
matching a river basin’s boundaries, that the opposite.246 
The delineation of a river basin consists of indicating the exact position of 
its boundaries, which in most cases intersects states’ political boundaries. This delineation 
has, in general, proven to be a complex exercise, be it in political or in cartography terms.247 
A glance at the Map of the international river basins gives an idea about the explexity of this 
task, as there are approximately 145 countries that form the 310 transboundary river basins of 
the world. Thirty-three of these has as much as 95 percent of their territories immersed within 
transboundary river basin’s boundaries. The DR-Congo, Chad, Niger, and Zambia are of this 
category. The Parnu and Seine River basins are two examples that are very close to the river 
                                                 
 
241 M.N. Shaw International Law 5 ed (2003), 409. 
242 Ibid. 
243 V. Prescott & G. D. Trigg International Frontier and Boundaries, Law, Politics and Geography (2008), 140. 
244 N.A. Lantera Assessing The Efficacy Of African Boundary Delineation Law And Policy: The Case of 
Ethio–Eritrea Boundary Dispute Settlement” (Unpublished PhD thesis, Golden Gate University, 2016), 23.  
245 McCaffrey (a) (note 145 above; 41). 
246 See procedure of determining river basins in note 246 above.  
247 The delineation of a river basin is an activity that is realised by steps. “The first step is to define the point 
where the main outlet leaves the basin. The second step is to define the primary drainage network. The third 
step is to add additional tributaries.  The fourth step is to define the adjacent drainage networks (streams and 
rivers). The fifth step is to locate hilltops and ridges between drainage basins. The sixth step is drawing the 
divide, by connecting the dots, follow the contours and staying along the ridges.” See further details in 
http://www2.ivcc.edu/phillips/geology/db_divide/step6.htm, accessed on 12 April 2019. 
 
 
basin fully contained within a single state’s territory.248 Parnu is for up to 99.9 percent in 
Estonia, whereas the Seine is 99.9 percent, French. 
States mistrust towards the river basin concept, as said earlier, came also 
from the fact that river basins define their own natural perimeter, in complete ignorance of 
states political boundaries. In comparison to states boundaries, the boundaries that are 
naturally defined by river basins can be either transboundary or contained within a single 
state. Say state A and state B are neighbours and are both included in the same 
transboundary river basin, if there is across such a river basin a river that flows exclusively 
across State A and does not enter into State B, and if state B does not have any tributary 
that discharges into State A’s river or vice versa, the river basin thus formed by these two 
states is still considered as an international river basin.249 This, in substance, is what Article 
3 of the 2004 Berlin Rules meant by defining an International Drainage Basin as: “a 
drainage basin extending over two or more States”.250  
The explanations above imply that country B will be considered as part of 
the international river basin alongside country A. The membership of a state to an 
international river basin is geographically determined.251 All that is needed is that all the 
downhill drains, rains or snow melts from such a state may be drained topographically 
towards the river basin’s final outlet.252 Despite state B being part of the river basin which it 
forms with state A, state B would not be regarded as a riparian state to the watercourse 
stemming from such river basin, if such watercourse flows exclusively through state A, with 
no water inputs from state B. In other words, the fact that the political boundaries of the state 
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B overlap or intersect at some points the river basin’s boundaries justifies the inclusion of state 
B in the transboundary river basin but does not make of it a riparian state to the transboundary 
river that flows through the same river basin, but exclusively through State A.253  
Also, the distinction established between river basins and watercourses 
implies that a state may be part of an international river basin without being a riparian state 
to the basin’s transboundary watercourse.254 This precision was crucial to bring more light 
between the river basin concept and the watercourse concept to be discussed in the next 
section. Understanding this distinction is crucial because of the differences in the legal 
implications of these two situations that are explained above. 
2.4 “International”, “transboundary”, and “shared” river basins and watercourses 
References to river basins (or watercourses) that are common to more than 
one state in this thesis will often be done by using interchangeably the concepts 
“international”, “transboundary” and “shared”.255 Therefore, it seems relevent to briefly 
discuss them, in order to highligh the similarities and variences thereof, and the probable 
implications of using either of these concepts within the context of the Congo River basin. 
The concept “transboundary” means what is “moving or having effect across 
a boundary or boundaries”. 256  In the context of international water law, it is generally used 
to refer to a river basin (or a watercourse) that cross over a state’s borders into the territories 
of at least another state.257 It can also be used in case of a watercourse defining a border 
between at least two states. Owing to the definition of what constitute “international” as 
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different from “national”, a river basin (or a watercourse) that crosses, form, or intersects 
states’ boundary becomes an “international”/ “transboundary” river basin or watercourse.   
“Intrenational” is defined as “what exists, occurs, or is carried on between 
nations”.258  Both “international” and “transboundary” suggest the existence of political 
boundaries or borders between the intersected States.259 In water treaty practice, some 
States are favourable to the use of the concept “transboundary”, rather than “international” 
because the concept “international” would give the impression that the watercourse that is 
targeted by such treaty had an international status, which in other words implies that such 
water body is owned in common.  
At a national level, a State is entitled to a full jurisdiction over all its water 
resources, provided these waters originate in and discharge from the State’s own territory, 
without crossing over or forming a border with another state.260 Otherwise, the resource 
will become “transboundary”, with an obligation to be shared in total or in part with the 
other states that are traversed. Even though river basins generally include several natural 
resources, water is the only resource on which a shared sovereignty can be applied, because 
of its natural mobility.261 The other resources cannot be targeted as they generally have a 
static nature.  
To “share”  means to possess, use, occupy, or enjoy in common with another 
or others”.262 Something (such as water resources) that is “shared” is “possessed, used, 
occupied, or enjoyed in common with another or others”.263 The fact that a river basin (or 
a watercourse) crosses over a state’s border to join the territory of another state implies that 
such river basin (or a watercourse) is shared by the two states, and the sovereignty over its 
waters “shared” between the states that are thus traversed by its flows. Such shared 
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sovereignty will apply whether on the whole watercourse, or only on part of it, depending 
on the hydro-geographical characteristics of the watercourse in concern.264  
In general, States of the Congo River basin are not yet engaged into signing 
water treaties between them, as it will be discussed further.265 While drafting water treaties 
in future, it is more likely that the States of the basin will have to operate a choice between 
either of these concepts. The cautious use of both the “transboundary” and “international” 
concepts in the notorious 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes can inspire treaty makers within the 
Congo Rivers basin. While the concept “international” might be restrictively refered to 
because of its apparent flavour of an international status being attached to the considered 
water body, the concept “transboundary” might receive more approbation as it only 
captures the crossing by a river of states’ political boundaries, as explained above. 
2.5 The Watercourse 
2.5.1 Background information  
The whole architecture of the 1997 UNWCC and its international regime on the non-
navigational uses of transboundary water resources seem to be resting mainly on the 
concept of “watercourse”. Watercourse as a concept was preferred to river basin by the 
majority of states during the long years of negotiations of the 1997 UNWCC. States judged 
the watercourse concept to be more suitable for the 1997 UNWCC than the river basin 
concept.266 They wanted to be reassured that the regime of the 1997 UNWCC, once in 
power, would apply to water resources only, and not extend to or affect any other natural 
resource. States’ concern was right, because as discussed earlier,267  the river basin concept 
has a broader meaning, and includes several other natural resources besides water resources. 
This implies that all the other resources were to be equally affected if the concept of river 
basin was to be adopted by the 1997 UNWCCC instead of the watercourse concept as it did. 
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2.5.2 Defining “watercourse” and “transboundary watercourse” 
Article 2.a of the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses defines a watercourse as: “a system of surface waters and 
groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and 
normally flowing into a common terminus”268 During the negotiations that led to the 1997 
UNWCC, several alternative concepts were proposed by states. The watercourse concept 
is the one that was eventually retained.269 States were conscious that the concept to be 
chosen would occupy a central position in the 1997 UNWCC regime, and in addition, a 
core position in international water law. That is why States took the time to decide on which 
concept suits better the upcoming water convention.270 
Watercourses are either domestic or international. Domestic watercourses 
are the watercourses that do not cross over a state’s territorial boundaries.271 Their sources 
and mouth are both located within the boundaries of a single state. The regulation of a 
domestic watercourse falls on the state that owns it. The transboundary watercourses are 
the watercourses that cross over a state’s national boundary and enters another state’s 
national territory. Transboundary watercourses are either contiguous or successive.272 The 
contiguous are transboundary rivers that define a border between the states which they 
separate; they are sometimes referred to as border-creator rivers.273 The successive are 
transboundary rivers that flow straight from one country into the other without forming a 
border between them.274 Between these two main types, Dinar275 identified thirteen other 
types, which have each the potential to raise particular legal problems. 
The 1997 UNWCC has adopted the equivalent concept of “international” 
watercourse, to the concept of “transboundary” watercourse. Article 2(b) of the 1997 
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UNWCC defines an International watercourse as “a watercourse, parts of which are 
situated in different States.”276 Transboundary watercourses are regulated by international 
law, and has to be conjointly managed by the riparian states of the transboundary river, in 
consistence with mutually agreed regulatory instruments. 
The internationality of a watercourse is politically decided, based on 
hydrographical factors, when states boundaries have been established. It follows from the 
above definition of an international watercourse that, will be considered part of an 
International watercourse any river, water flow, tributary, lake, or groundwater that is 
linked to such International watercourse, even if such river, water flow, tributary, or lake 
are entirely located within only one riparian state.277  
 Under the 1997 UNWCC, once a watercourse crosses a state’s political 
boundary, in total or in part, it takes on an international status.278 As Bearden observes279 
the decision to include in the watercourse concept a river’s tributaries, and any lake and 
groundwaters that may connect to it constitute an important innovation in the 1997 UN Water 
Convention and its regime. The analysis of several transboundary water agreements has 
revealed that tributaries and groundwaters to the river upon which the agreements were 
signed were often not taken into consideration.280 
2.5.3 Genesis and evolution of the watercourse concept 
The watercourse concept is not new, as recalls the ILC.281 The concept has a long existence 
in states practices particularly and was referred to in several international treaties on 
navigation in international waterways, under its operational equivalent that is river 
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system.282 The 1919 Versailles Treaty, for instance, used the water “system concept” which 
is an equivalent to the watercourse concept.283  
Article 331 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles provided: 
“The following rivers are declared international: the Elbe (Labe) … the Danube 
from Ulm; and all navigable parts of these river systems which naturally provide 
more than one State with access to the sea, with or without transhipment from one 
vessel to another; together with lateral canals and channels constructed either to 
duplicate or to improve naturally navigable sections of the specified river systems 
or to connect two naturally navigable sections of the same river.”284 
In the River Oder case, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)285 held that, 
under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, the international status of the Oder River was to be 
extended to:  
“all navigable parts of these river systems ... together with lateral canals or channels 
constructed either to duplicate or…to improve naturally navigable sections of the 
specified river systems.”286 
However, the difference between the modern watercourse concept and its historical 
equivalents stems from the fact that under the 1997 UN Water Convention, the concept 
includes groundwater resources.287 
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The history of the entry of the watercourse concept in the language of 
international water law can be traced back to the 1970s when the Sixth Committee of the 
UNGAS issued a request to the ILC to consider a "Progressive Development and 
Codification of the Rules of International Law Relating to International Watercourses."288 
The ILC became aware of the efforts it had to deploy in order to successfully deal with the 
geographic dimensions of the international rivers because the subject matter was one of the 
major impediments towards the codification of the law of the non-navigational use of the 
international water laws which was in progress.289  
In 1976, the ILC launched a special survey with the aim of gathering states' 
opinions on the concept of the international drainage basin as to whether it could be the 
appropriate core concept of the future 1997 UN Water Convention, which at that time was 
still being studied. Many states responded to the survey showing their objection to the use of 
the international drainage basin concept in the transboundary water regime that was in 
incubation. The motive was that the scope of the drainage basin concept could include not 
only water resources, but also the lands, and possibly other resources that are present in river 
basins.290 Countries such as Brazil, Afghanistan, Peru, the USSR, and Iraq were among those 
who firmly opposed, in particular, the use of the drainage basin concept.291 Brazil opposed 
the concept to protect its continental power. Brazil has enormous river basin linkages with its 
neighbouring countries and therefore feared that external influences through the drainage 
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basin approach would have found a way to interfere with the country’s approach to water 
resources management.  
The rich discussions that took place among the members of the ILC and the 
sixth Committee during nearly twenty years eventually led to the adoption of the 
watercourse concept. Schwebel, the ILC's second special rapporteur, was, in 1980, the first 
to mention the term watercourse.292 Schwoebel used at that time the concept watercourse 
system instead of the watercourse,293 which he described as “a refined form of the drainage 
basin concept",294 which included a broad network of tributary flows, groundwaters, and 
associated runoffs without including the other resources.295 It also satisfied the will of states 
to continue viewing water resources in their natural unity and interconnectedness, 
especially those that flow within a single river basin. That is why the concept of 
watercourse system received great support from states and referred to it as the closest 
substitute to the rejected drainage basin concept.296  
This is better understood once one considers the fact that polluted surface 
waters will most often contaminate the groundwaters with which they are in connection 
and vice versa. Besides, disproportionate underground water withdrawals have the potential 
to affect the rate of surface water flows, whereas a reduced recharge from the surface can 
contribute to drying an underground water body.297  This is the reason why the approach 
that was chosen by the 1997 UNWCC concerning the watercourse concept had to echo 
states’ call for further attention to the natural interconnectedness existing between all the 
parts of a hydrographical system within a river basin.298  
As opined by the Republic of Finland while replying to ILC’s inquiry on the 
account of the codification of the international law of the non-navigational uses of the 
transboundary waters: “Due to this coherence, there exists, irrespective of the political 
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borders, a legally relevant interdependence between the various parts of the watercourse 
belonging to different states.”299 States are to understand that any significant effect on either 
part of such interconnected system, whether surface or underground, have the potential to 
spread around and touch other parts of the system, which may be in other countries.300  
2.5.4 The watercourse concept in the heart of the 1997 UNWCC Regime  
As noticed by McCaffrey,301 it may feel natural to think that a watercourse is the equivalent 
of a "river", whereas, in reality, it is not. There are sharp contrasts between the two 
concepts. The sense given to a watercourse under the 1997 UN Water Convention is much 
broader to what a pure river means. In “watercourse” are included several other water 
bodies such as aquifers, glaciers, lakes, rivers, canals, reservoirs, wetlands, and floodplains, 
provided these are interconnected with each other to form a single water system, referred 
to as a watercourse.302  
The inclusion of the other water bodies such as groundwaters in the 
watercourse concept was dictated by some hydrological factors, including the concern of 
taking into account the place occupied by the groundwaters in the total amount of the 
planet’s freshwaters.303 Scientists’ evidence established that most of the world’s 
freshwaters were underground waters and that these were often in communication with 
surface waters, with which they formed an interconnected system.304 The total volume of 
Freshwaters is divided between ice form and snow cover (68.7 percent),  groundwater (29.9 
percent), and river systems, lakes, and reservoirs (0.26 percent).305   
After the adoption of the watercourse concept during the ILC discussions, 
the most crucial problem remained its geographical scope.306 In other words, to what extent 
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the tributary rivers that discharge into the main water body of a river basin has to be 
considered as part of an international watercourse? Moreover, what would it imply to both 
such tributary and the state wherefrom such tributary originates?  
As one may notice, despite the consensus that states ultimately secured on the 
watercourse concept, they could not agree with each other any further and find a consensus 
that pleased all of them on the international application of the watercourse concept, which 
they agreed upon. The fact that they could any longer agree left a stern shadow zone around 
the legal implications that were attached to the watercourse concept in transboundary 
contexts.307  
When the time finally came to decide on what to include in the international 
watercourse concept, the ILC special rapporteur recommended the abandonment of a vital 
section of a proposition from some member states that was earlier submitted for 
consideration. This is in substance what the abandoned vital section was reading: 
“To the extent that parts of the waters in one State are not affected by or do not 
affect uses of waters in another State, they shall not be treated as being included in 
the international watercourse system. Thus, to the extent that the uses of the waters 
of the system have an effect on one another, to that extent the system is 
international, but only to that extent; accordingly, there is not an absolute, but a 
relative, international character of the watercourse.” 308  
For the special rapporteur, what was curious in this proposition was the 
concept of the relative international character of a watercourse, whereas that “formula” 
was used to create a contrast between the parts of a watercourse that could be approached 
as international, against the others that could remain domestic. The special rapporteur 
recommended the abandonment of the whole paragraph but considered only the definition 
of the watercourse concept, which was proposed alongside the dropped paragraph.309  
Despite its abandonment, this paragraph carried a strong opinion from states, 
which perhaps the ILC should have analysed further instead of dropping because a careful 
look on what is stated therein reveals a fundamental problem which today may be one of 
                                                 
 
307 ILC Year Book of 1991 (1991) Vol. 1, 50. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Adopted by the ILC 32nd session, in 1980. See Ibid. ILC at 108. 
 
 
the contributing factors to the distancing of the states vis-à-vis the 1997 UN Watercourse 
Convention. In Wescoat’s310 opinion, there seems to be a wide-reaching discomfort on the 
regime of the 1997 UNWCC, despite its recent entry into force, as it will be discussed 
below.311 The Congo watercourse is highly concerned by this particular discomfort. As it 
will be discussed below, the implications of applying the “international watercourse” 
concept to the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries constitute one of the blockages 
towards successful water cooperation across the Congo River basin.312 
2.5.5 The physical and geographical configurations of transboundary watercourses  
Two factors are considered in this section, namely the physical and the geographical 
configurations of the transboundary watercourses. Transboundary watercourses hardly 
have similar physical characteristics;313 they differ from each other not only in hydrological 
terms but also in their hydrographical configurations. As posits McCaffrey,314 “knowledge 
of the general characteristics of the Earth’s water system is necessary for an understanding 
of the effect of legal rules governing  the use of freshwater.” As a consequence, the legal, 
political and institutional mechanisms that are adopted for the management of these types 
of waters have to be designed on the basis of the rivers’ hydrographical and hydrological 
specificities. Owing to this, Sadoff315 draws attention to the unique character of the 
challenges posed by each process of sharing waters and the benefits thereof between 
riparian states and recommends that each transboundary watercourse may be approached 
as a particular case. 
The geographical configurations of the transboundary watercourses hold to 
the upstream-downstream positions of riparian states. This configuration poses generally the 
same types of problems at the global level. The problems they pose have become particularly 
crucial because of the impacts of climate change on the shared water resources. As will be 
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discussed later,316 the regime defined by the 1997 UNWCC is struggling to find support from 
some states, due in part to a series of upstream-downstream problems. There exist some pre-
existing problems between upstream and downstream riparian states in several transboundary 
rivers across the globe, which the adoption of the 1997 UNWCC did not solve.
 
The most advantaged states often do not press for a water treaty. To such a 
state, a treaty may mean a relative loss of the control which they are having on the shared 
resources. Concerning water quality, the geographical factor is decisive. When, for 
instance, an upstream state pollutes or diverts a transboundary river, the consequences of 
its action will have to be managed by the downstream state as well.317 Therefore, the advent 
of a water treaty in such a circumstance would often not be welcomed by upstream states, 
as it would mean either preventive and corrective actions, or obligation to compensate the 
downstream state for any damage.318 The example that Lowi319 cites here is the Tigris and 
Euphrates River basin, where Turkey has become the principal obstacle to water cooperation 
across the basin, because of its favourable position on both rivers, in comparison to Syria or 
Iraq. The example of the Egyptian and the Nile river can also be added. 
However, different reasonings can be developed that will be focused on the 
downstream state as well, as it can also happen that a downstream state is the one 
geographically sitting in an advantaged position. The world’s four oldest civilisations, 
namely China, Egypt, India, and Mesopotamia are the best example of this.320 These 
civilisations have developed on the lower sections of transboundary rivers and have over 
time produced countries such as Egypt and Iraq, located downstream a shared river.321 
These countries often exercise hegemonic control over the transboundary rivers they 
depend on. Egypt and the Nile offer a perfect illustration. Egypt exercises its hegemony 
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over the whole course of the transboundary Nile River, whereas it contributes towards the 




This chapter has reviewed some of the key concepts that underpin this thesis. The 
understanding of these concepts was crucial before considering the involvement of the law 
in this particular field of transboundary water resources. Concepts such as climate change, 
river basin, watercourse have been discussed with sufficient details to ensure a better 
understanding and informed use thereof throughout this thesis. As the impacts of climate 
change on water resources continue to grow in complexity, issues concerning 
transboundary watercourses and river basins will be increasingly discussed. Climate change 
is here and will remain for times that are not yet specified. There is a consensus that the 
phenomenon will continue occurring for centuries, even if its causing effects were entirely 
removed. Minimising the adverse impacts of climate change will require diverse strategies, 
including the legal strategies for states preparedness for impact absorption, particularly in 
the field of transboundary water resources. Chapter two has, in particular, helped clarify 
the fundamental differences which exist between the concepts of river basin and 
watercourse. Although these two concepts have many similarities, they also have crucial 
differences. Although there were some scholars that raised the fundamental differences that 
exist between the two concepts, the consulted literature often referred to them 
interchangeably. However, the discussions that were dedicated to these two concepts in this 
chapter have helped clarify this state of affairs. The next part of this thesis (Part 2) will 
overview the evolution and current stage of the theoretical bases of the laws governing 
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PART II  






3 AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE BIRTH AND 
EVOLUTION OF THE LAWS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATERCOURSES.  
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter 3 sets out to trace back the birth and evolution of the international law and 
principles that govern transboundary water resources from a historical perspective. The 
investigations in this chapter will be done with the aim of understanding the legal and non-
legal dynamics that have presided in the formation of the laws and principles that govern 
transboundary water resources at the international level. Such an exercise is essential 
because it brings this thesis back to the historical, geographical, and legal context of the 
formation and evolution of the laws and principles in this field of law. The legal discipline 
being an evolving one, it seems crutial to understand the contextual dynamics that explain 
the genesis and the evolution of the international law of transboundary watercourses in the 
past. In the current context, climate change is seen as the driving force that is dictating the 
design and adoption of a new generation of climate-proofed laws and agreements, it is 
imposing a paradigm shift in all the sectors of human knowledge, thus representing the next 
motive of evolution of the law of transboundary watercourses. In such circumstances, it 
becomes essential to have an outlook on history, and discover how comparable prevailing 
factors that presided in the past, have contributed to shaping of the current regime. 
However, it seems necessary to specify that unlike the next chapter (chapter 4), which will 
concentrate on introducing and discusing the substantial characteristics of the legal 
framework that defines the international water law, this chapter will focus and all naturally 
not go beyond the historical aspects thereof. That is the reason why this chapter will 
comprise five sections. The first section defines water law, discusses its objective, and 
overwiews some salient water law systems that developed over the years. The second 
section describes the evolution of states’ practice of transboundary water treaties until its 
emancipation as an autonomous discipline. The third section outlines the particular 
evolution of transboundary water law in Africa, discusses its current stage and the way 
forward uner climate change circumstances. Before concluding this chapter, a last section 




3.2 Historical backgrounds  
This section is concerned with the laws and principles of the transboundary water resources. 
Yet, the laws and principles of the transboundary watercourses in their present form, are 
the culmination of a process that began with primitive laws, which were first general laws, 
before becoming at a later stage the laws of the water sector. That is why it will be 
advantageous to make a short historical investigation to discover the foundations of this 
branch of law. 
3.2.1 Definition of water law 
Water law is generally defined as “a system of enforceable rules that controls the human 
use of water resources”.323 Caponera324 refers to water law as “the branch of law that 
governs water use, administration, and conservation, and further regulates water demand, 
and controls the consumers' effect on water resources to prevent harmful occurrences such 
as water pollution”. However, “Law” does not refer only to the written, promulgated texts 
of legal rules; it also includes all forms of regulations of human activities, even the 
customary.  
3.2.2 The early stages of water law  
In all times and societies, water has always been shared between different users and uses, 
on the basis of various laws and principles, which were set in place to be observed for the 
good of all.325 Ancient communities and civilisations could not stably settle in locations 
where there was no enough freshwater for their present and future needs.326 People 
migrated continually from place to place until they spotted suitable water flourished 
locations whereby they decided to settle; they even fought if necessary to conquer a well-
watered place that was already occupied.327 Once established in a place, they established 
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rules for water use and distribution.328 The early civilisations were forced to regulate access 
to water due to both the growing size of the water users and the diversification of its uses.329 
They also set in place sophisticated legal codes to administer the complex networks of 
water systems, which they created as they developed.330 
Historical evidence suggests that at first, the laws were general and did not 
specialise as such on water issues.331  Records give accounts on several notable water laws 
that have developed in almost every region of the planet. Nevertheless, under such general 
law texts, there were provisions that focused on water resources, even if these laws tended 
to be centred and limited to some fundamental issues, such as water billing, use, protection, 
or diversion depending on the contexts.332 Enhanced water law objectives only came with 
the practice of signing interstate water treaties, which has specific aims, whether in quality 
or quantity terms.333  
However, in the Anthropocene, water law is supposed to do two more things 
than in the traditional past. These are first, to “adapt itself” to climate change, and second, 
to create appropriate management and policy contexts for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation at all levels and sectors, ranging from local, national and international, in the 
water sector.334 At this early stage, the transboundary aspect of waters did not yet attract 
much attention from the lawmakers. The regulation of the use of transboundary water 
resources between different communities and states only appeared at a later stage.335  
The analysis of notable water laws that developed in almost every region of 
the planet confirms the failure of these primitive laws to deal with the transboundary aspect 
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of water resources.336 These laws include the Code of Hammurabi, in Mesopotamia, dated 
1738 BCE.337 This piece of law was so well-elaborated that some of its features are still in 
modern legal codes.338 Despite such a praised elaboration, the Code of Hammurabi was an 
empty text regarding transboundary waters resources. The famous Hindu Arthashastra of 
300 BCE was limited too. 339  The Law of Moses (ca. 1000 BCE) and the Laws of Manu (ca. 
200 BCE), to name only these few, can also be mentioned, in the same order of idea.340 Despite 
their limitation, these laws offered the bedding ground for the construction of the future 
laws of transboundary water resources within their respective contexts. 
Three intertwined factors have profoundly contributed to the weaning of the 
law of transboundary watercourses from being included in the general water laws to 
becoming a specialised discipline. These factors include the development and 
systematisation of the states’ political boundaries, the recognition by the riparian states of 
the existence of a community of interest over the waterbody they all shared, and the 
progressive development of the international law.341  
Neither a state nor its national sovereignty can be active without the pre-
existence of states’ political boundaries as discussed earlier.342 The development of 
international law brought stability to the principle of state sovereignty and offered to state 
mechanisms of conflict resolution over shared water resources. In addition, states’ practice 
of treaties determined the progressive design of autonomous regimes to govern shared 
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water resources.343 The second contribution came from the recognition by states of the 
existence of a community of interest over a transboundary waterbody, even if such 
recognition could not be formalised before the consolidation of state national territories. 
The third contribution came from the progressive development of the international law, 
itself synchronised on the multisectoral developments that occurred within the community 
of independent sovereign states.344 
3.3 The practice of transboundary water treaties by riparian states 
3.3.1 Definition of transboundary water treaties 
A treaty, a convention, or accords, an agreement or a protocol, are all interchangeable concepts 
and constitute the primary sources of rights and obligations at the international level.345 Article 
2 (a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as: 
“an international agreement concluded between states in a written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two 
or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” 346 
Applied to transboundary watercourses, a transboundary water treaty would mean “an 
agreement on a transboundary watercourse, concluded between its riparian states, in a 
written form, and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument 
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” A 
transboundary water treaty can be either bilateral or multilateral. A treaty is bilateral when 
it involves only two signing states; it is multilateral when it involves more than two signing 
parties.  
In the heart of the definition above lays the idea that a transboundary water 
treaty intends to create international legal obligations and rights between its signing 
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parties.347 In general, the obligations and rights that are created were existent before the 
negotiation and signing of the treaty that institutes them. However, it can also happen that 
a treaty formalises an existing right or obligation, which was already observed by the 
signing parties, but in unwritten or customary form.348  Hence the superiority of treaties 
above the international customs.  
Treaties on transboundary watercourses can be negotiated for diverse 
motives and be assigned diverse functions.349 Besides the concept “agreements”, The 
UNECE 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes introduces the concept “arrangements”, which, in the spirit of the 
Convention refers to lesser types of agreements, including other forms of formal water 
cooperation and mutual understandings that Riparian states of a common watercourse may 
have between them.350 Therefore, in the sense of the UNECE 1992 Convention, “other 
arrangements” should not be regarded as “non-committal instruments”, especially since 
several provisions of the Convention refer to it equally as“agreements”.351 
There are around 145 water treaties on the non-navigational uses of the 
transboundary watercourses that were signed in the period between the years 1874 and 
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1996. Hamner & Wolf352 found that 86 percent of those agreements were bilateral, whereas 
14 percent of them were multilateral. Conca et al.353 came to a similar conclusion as they 
noticed that bilateral treaties were the most common type of water agreements in 
international river basins worldwide. 
3.3.2 The early state's practice of transboundary water treaties 
The transcending of a state’s territorial boundaries by watercourses has often resulted in 
complex webs of legal, environmental, political, and security concerns. If already in the 
ancient times the transboundary character of some watercourses was a source of problems 
regarding water management, the situation seems to have not significantly evolved ever 
since.354 The root of the very English word “rival” is the Latin word “rivals,” which initially 
meant: “using the same river” (rivus).355 Indeed, the practice of water treaties have been 
contributory in the prevention and settlement of water disputes between states and 
communities, from times that go as far as around 3000 BC,356 nevertheless, there are still 
many issues to be settled, especially at the current epoch. 
The oldest agreement in the record on transboundary waters is the treaty 
between the two Sumerian city-states of Lagash and Umma, which was signed to end a 
water disagreement along the Tigris River.357 The law to regulate the transboundary water 
resources has been developing in tandem with the evolution of the human society, both in 
natural, economic, and political terms.  
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The industrial boom of the nineteenth century propelled international trade and 
commercial exchanges, which in turn fuelled the intensification of the navigation industry. As 
a result, a growing number of people and goods travelled by waterways from state to state, thus 
creating the need to set in place some regulatory framework for the waterways, which was to 
be observed at the international level.358 The regulatory framework had to apply to the water 
users also, and favour formal cooperation around the shared waterways, to accompany the 
growing activities.359 Authors such as Biswas360 found in this situation the explanation as to 
why the first attempts to regulate international rivers were focused on navigation. 
The European continent was the only advanced continent in regulating 
waterways in this manner. Indeed, besides international trade, the colonial adventure must 
have contributed to stimulating the Europeans to adopt these water treaties. Nevertheless, 
the first modern treaties on transboundary waters were adopted in the space of time which 
is between the early 19th century and the mid-19th century.361 These treaties were signed 
between the riparian countries of the Rhine River362 and aimed at establishing navigation 
rules, fish harvests division, and water withdrawal along the Rhine River.363  
Some notorious early European contributions towards the law of shared 
watercourses include the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, Austria, of 1815, the 1885 
Berlin Final Act on the Congo and Niger Rivers, and the 1921 Barcelona Convention and 
Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern.364 The 1815 
Vienna treaty established the freedom of navigation principle and the primacy of the 
navigation over the other users of the transboundary watercourses, the 1885 Berlin Final 
Act extended the principle of freedom of navigation on Congo and Niger Rivers, which are 
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two African waterways.365 The 1921 Barcelona Convention is also mentioned as an attempt 
to codify the principle of freedom of navigation.366  
3.3.3 The transboundary water treaties in the late 1940s and early 1950s  
Despite all the above developments, the formation of the international law on the non-
navigational uses of international watercourses would have to wait until the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, after states practices in the field matured enough to inform the international 
law for codification in this field.367 A close examination of some transboundary water 
conventions signed during this period suggests that this body of law emerged from 
principles that were the reflection of a set of earlier substantive and procedural rules about 
sharing transboundary water resources.368  
The International Law Association (ILA)369 and the Institute of International 
Law (IIL)370  which are two bodies of law scholars have significantly contributed towards 
the advent of the international law of transboundary water resources. The ILA began to 
work on international water law in 1954, after the establishment of what was called the 
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“Committee on the Uses of the Waters of International River”.371 The contributions of these 
two bodies of experts are discussed below.372   
References to the principles of freedom and primacy of navigation declined 
in the 1950s and 1960s and eventually stopped in states practice of transboundary water 
treaties.373 Yet, the mechanisms of international law that were in place in that period failed 
to identify and adopt some of the emerging rules in order to regulate states’ non-
navigational uses of international watercourses.374 In the absence of an international 
agreement on transboundary water resources, and the lack of some recognised and 
dominant principles in the field, there was a legal vacuum that was felt by states, and which 
contributed to feeding a significant volume of transboundary water disputes, for which the 
international mechanism of dispute resolution was not adequately equipped.375  
After World War II, the global trend in transboundary water laws turned 
towards two things. Firstly, the effort to extend the law to include the various other forms 
of use of international water resources; secondly, the approach to commonly manage 
transboundary water resources.376 The non-navigational uses of international waterways 
did not attract much attention from the field of international law and politics.377 That is the 
reason why, after the decline of the principle of freedom of navigation on international 
waterways, closer attention had to be put on the non-navigational uses in order to equip the 
international law community with adequate instruments to deal with this specific issue. 
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There were a few arbitral and judicial decisions already awarded by some 
International Justice Bodies.378  However, these arbitral and judicial decisions only covered 
some aspects of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. Besides, they were 
unclear and sometimes contradicting each other. 379  Some water conventions that applied 
emerging rules and principles were in place, but signed by a few countries only, implying a 
limited treaty authority. Issues these treaties addressed were also limited in most of the cases.380  
Allouch381 noticed that diverse non-navigational uses of shared 
watercourses were already addressed by many pieces of law during the 1950s and 1960s, 
even if sometimes, they were addressed only in a marginal way, through issues such as 
flood protection, water allocation, or water quality.382    
3.3.4 The formation of the doctrines on transboundary water resources  
Four major doctrines have progressively developed around the rights and duties of the states 
regarding the non-navigational uses of international rivers, namely the absolute territorial 
sovereignty, the absolute territorial integrity, the limited territorial sovereignty, and the 
community of interest doctrine.383 These doctrines were either based on state practice in 
the field of water law or on the works of scholars and experts in the field.384 The next 
chapter (chapter 4) is the part of the thesis which will provide much details on these 
doctrines, despite  a brief overview of the genesis thereof which is outlined in this section.  
The first doctrinal opinion to be expressed concerning transboundary 
watercourses was the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty, also known as the 
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Harmon Doctrine.385 This doctrine was worded for the first time in 1895 by M. Harmon, 
who was at that time the Attorney General of the United States.386 It claimed complete 
liberty of a riparian state to utilise as he needs the portion of a transboundary watercourse 
that passes through its territory, regardless of the consequences to the other riparian 
countries. It also claimed that impactful water utilisations could be undertaken even without 
prior consultation with a downstream country, even if this country was likely to be 
negatively affected.387 The Harmon doctrine was an intransigent expression of state 
sovereignty, according to which a State is so much in control of its territory and its natural 
resources, that it feels allowed to use them in whatever way it pleases the state.388 
For the record, Mexico and the USA are both co-riparian states to the Rio 
Grande River.389 After a series of water diversions undertaken by the USA from the Rio 
Grande River to irrigate the states of Colorado and New Mexico, the government of Mexico 
complained that those US diversions reduced significantly the inflow of water in its 
territory. The Mexican communities downstream the Rio Grande River, on the other side 
of the boundary, became particularly affected. The Mexican communities began using the 
waters of the Rio Grande hundreds of years before the USA diversion occurred.390 Mexico 
demanded that the two countries signed an agreement on the waters of the Rio Grande River 
to avoid future unilateral undertaking on the shared waters from either country, declaring 
“incontestable” its right to continue having access to the same amounts of waters from the 
Rio Grande as per history.391 
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After analysing Mexico’s claim, the then US Secretary of State requested 
from the US Attorney General a legal opinion as to whether the USA indeed violated 
Mexico’s rights as per International Law.392 Harmon, who was the US Attorney General 
replied to the US Secretary of State, denying that the general principles of international law 
imposed on the USA any obligation to restrict its use of the portion of the Rio Grande River 
which was situated within the USA territory.393 For Harmon, such an exercise of a 
sovereign right could be maintained irrespective of whether it caused adverse effects 
downstream in Mexico. Harmon claimed that "the rules, principles, and precedents of 
international law impose no liability or obligation upon the United States."394 Moreover, 
Harmon added:  
"... the fundamental principle of international law is the absolute sovereignty of 
every Nation as against all others within its own territory ... all exceptions, 
therefore, to the full and complete power of a Nation within its own territory must 
be traced up to the consent of the Nation itself. They can flow from no other 
legitimate source… The immediate, as well as the possible consequences of the 
right asserted by Mexico, show that its recognition is entirely inconsistent with the 
sovereignty of the United States over its national domain.” 395 
So eventually concluded:  
"to yield to the Mexican claim would be entirely inconsistent with the sovereignty 
of the United States over its national domain."396  
Birnie397 and many others are convinced that the Harmon Doctrine was not reflexive to the 
International water law, despite its little development at that time. Emphasising on how 
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irrelevant the Harmon Doctrine was, Birnie398 went on reporting an additional part of the 
statement of M. Harmon:  
“The fact that the Rio Grande lacks sufficient water to permit its use by the 
inhabitants of both countries does not entitle Mexico to impose restrictions on the 
USA which would hamper the development of the latter’s territory or deprive its 
inhabitants of an advantage with which nature had endowed it and which is situated 
entirely within its territory. To admit such a principle would be completely contrary 
to the principle that the USA exercises full sovereignty over its national 
territory”.399  
However, the absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine was followed by the absolute 
territorial integrity doctrine, which, in the view of many scholars,400 was conceived in order 
to counterbalance the Harmon doctrine. It seems easy to notice that each of these two 
doctrines reflected the claims and counterclaims of either downstream riparian states or the 
upstream ones over a successive transboundary river. The “absolute territorial sovereignty” 
doctrine sought to favour upstream riparian states, whereas the “absolute territorial 
integrity” doctrine sought to favour downstream riparian.401  
In general, the absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine is seen as the first 
step towards the emergence of the customary international law of transboundary 
watercourses.402 For Tarlock,403 the international custom of transboundary watercourses 
developed as a replica to block the absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine emitted by 
Harmon, which for the author, after its expression, quickly found its place in the graveyard 
instead of prospering. 
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3.3.5 The development of the principles of transboundary water law 
Most of the first modern rules of law touching international watercourses developed to 
protect transboundary rivers from pollution and over-extraction.404 These rules were 
generally adopted in an ad-hoc basis, to respond to imminent concerns regarding shared 
rivers, lakes, or other water bodies.405 Principles applicable to the law of transboundary 
watercourses were primarily found in bilateral treaties (in reflection to states practice in the 
field), in domestic laws and decisions from international tribunals, such as the PCIJ and the 
ICJ, and in some international arbitration awards applicable to the sector. 406 The Works of 
public and private organisations such as the ILC, ILA, IIL, and IDI, produced relevant non-
binding instruments, including the 1966 Helsinki Rules, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, 
the 1992 Rio Principles, and the ILA’s non-binding rules on water pollution in international 
basin drainages of 1982.  
Even though all of these institutions and instruments made significant 
contributions in assembling the modern emerging principles of international water law, 
only some are regarded as having provided the foundational steps towards the constitution 
of the modern principles of the law of transboundary watercourses.407 The PCIJ’s 
judgement regarding the River Oder case is one of these foundational steps. In the River 
Oder case, pronounced as early as in 1929, the PCIJ ruled in favour of the community of 
interest over a shared watercourse and held that the use of both the flows and the river that 
have an international status were subject to international law. 
“This community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common 
legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian 
states in the use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any 
preferential privilege of anyone riparian state in relation to the others.”408 
Although taken from a navigational perspective, the PCIJ’s decision in the River Oder case 
was the consecration of the community of interest of the riparian states in a shared 
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transboundary water system. For the tribunal, such a community of interest had to be 
regarded as the basis of a common legal right to all of the riparian states of a transboundary 
river. 70 years later, the ICJ revisited the same paragraph, and extended its scope to include 
the non-navigational uses of the international watercourses, upholding that 
“modern development of international law has strengthened this principle for non-
navigational uses of international watercourses as well, as evidenced by the 
adoption of the convention of 21 May 1997 on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses by the United Nations General Assembly.”409 
The approach concerning the principles for the non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses as reflected in the above paragraph by the ICJ received wide support from 
states. They acknowledged in the majority that waters on which there exists “a common 
legal right” are not in a position of being unilaterally used by one state, to the extent of 
preventing or limiting the use that could be made by the other riparian states.410 
The PCIJ’s pronouncement in the River Oder case has consecrated a legal 
principle that subjected states to the obligation to exchange information, cooperate, and 
consult each other to reach adequate solutions in a project that is likely to affect either the 
quality or the number of international rivers.411 The principle of exchange of information 
and cooperation was already reflected in the Geneva Convention of December 9, 1923.412 
The Lake Lanoux case which also applied the community of interest principle brought in 
this principle some new understandings as the ICJ held that 
“France is entitled to exercise her rights, she cannot ignore Spanish interests. Spain 
is entitled to demand that her rights be respected and that her interests be taken into 
consideration”413 
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Despite the limited state of the customary law of transboundary water resources that 
characterised that epoch, the ICJ’s award designated the limits that international law 
imposes on states concerning the use of the natural resources that are shared between many 
states. It has further shown the limits that exist on the procedural obligations associated 
with the substantive rules of environmental conservation and protection.414 In a nutshell, 
the ICJ’s discussed awards contributed to the formation and consolidation of several 
principles of the international law of the transboundary water resources. 
Both the non-binding instruments, treaties, and the jurisdictional awards 
outlined above constituted the effective background of legal rules, principles, and concepts 
on which could lean the ILC for the codification of the international law of the non-
navigational uses of international watercourses. The 1997 UNWCC which will be 
introduced next is the product of the ILC’s efforts of codification in this field. Before the 
ILC’s efforts, there was no states’ formal attempt of codification. Indeed, there were works 
done by the ILA and the IIL, which are regarded as attempts to codify the international law 
in this field. However, being that both organisations were not given any mandate by the 
states to do so, their contribution can not be regarded as a formal codification. The ILC’s 
work was formal because it received states’ mandate to do so, through the UN General 
Assembly.415  
 The next section, which discusses the genesis of the international law of 
transboundary watercourses will rather be an account of the genesis of the 1997 UNWCC. 
3.3.6 Genesis and development of the international law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
the International Watercourses 
The rules and principles of international law that are applicable to the transboundary 
watercourses as they appear in the 1997 UNWCC are the outcomes of a lengthy process, 
whose genesis can be traced back to the second half of the twentieth century.416 At the dawn 
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of the 20th century, the non-navigational uses of the international watercourses grew in 
relevance in the field of International Law due to a series of factors as discussed above.417 
To such growing water worries added the global security concerns of the post-World War 
II (1945) period, as also an increasing number of neighbouring states became conflictual 
over shared water resources.418 The growing number of conflicts over shared water 
resources was partially nurtured by the absence of a regulatory mechanism in the field at 
the international level.419 Eventually, all the above issues constituted an alarm bell that 
called for the adoption of an international regime in the field of the non-navigational uses 
of international water resources.420 
In 1959, Bolivia made a proposition to the UNGAS requesting the UN 
Secretary-General to examine the legal problems attached to the use and consumption of 
international rivers.421 In 1963, the UN Secretary-General produced a report which pushed 
the UNGAS to recommend to the ILC, in 1970, to study the progressive development and 
codification of the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses.422  
Still in 1970, before the UNGAS’ recommendation to the ILC was issued, 
Finland submitted a project of resolution to the UNGAS, suggesting that the 1966 Helsinki 
Rules may be considered as a model for the international law of transboundary 
watercourses.423 Finland’s project was rejected. The major obstacle to Finland’s project 
was the fact that the 1966 Helsinki Rules were produced by a non-official organisation, 
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which had no mandate to represent the states, and did not associate the states during the 
preparation of the so-called Rules.424  The other motive of rejection was the fact that the 
1966 Helsinki Rules had adopted the drainage basin approach,425 which is synonymous to 
the river basin concept, that was already rejected by states as discussed earlier.426  
The rejection of Finland’s project was followed with a series of discussions 
among the UN state members concerning the rules of international law in the field of the 
non-navigational uses of transboundary watercourses.427 On December 8, 1970, the 
UNGAS voted a resolution recommending the ILC to “undertake the study of the law of 
the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, with the view of its progressive 
development and codification”.428 The 1970 UN Resolution launched the codification by 
the ILC in the field of the international law of the non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses, pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter.429 
It took the ILC approximately twenty years to produce a draft convention on 
the law of the Non-Navigational Uses of Transboundary Watercourses, which draft the ILC 
would discuss at its forty-third session, held from April 24 to July 19, of the year 1991.430 
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The period post-1991 was one of the most intense for the ILC’s codification mission 
because it was marked with stormy debates on the ILC draft report. Nonetheless, the ILC 
would produce a final format of the law of the Non-Navigational Uses of Transboundary 
Watercourses, which the UNGAS would finally adopt on May 24, 1997. 
One of the bones of contention between the states that were engaged in the 
discussions of the ILA was the inclusion of the river basin concept in the final format of 
the convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. 
Discussions in this regard began almost two decades earlier. It was in 1974, that the ILC 
sent a questionnaire to all the United Nations member states, soliciting their views on the 
river basin concept. By 1982, the 32 countries that replied,431 did not agree on the 
appropriateness of using the river basin concept in the upcoming convention. Half of the 
countries were supportive of the river basin concept, whereas the other half was either 
opposed or undecided. Amidst such opposing views, the ILC decided to start with the 
formulation of the general principles to govern the non-navigational uses of transboundary 
water resources, and thereafter discuss the controversial river basin concept. The ILC 
would eventually adopt the watercourse concept instead of the river basin.432  
In 1994, after 20 years of work and 15 reports produced, the ILC adopted its 
first draft entitled: “Draft of the law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses”.433 Based on the ILC’s 1994 Draft Articles, the UNGAS then decided to 
convene an ad hoc working group, whose aim would be to negotiate a Convention on the 
Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses.434 The ILC’s document 
had 32 draft articles. For many scholars, the ILC Draft Articles built upon the doctrine of 
limited territorial sovereignty.435 As per international law practice, the ILC Draft Articles 
were forwarded to the UN member states for comments and observations.436 In July 1994, 
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following analysis on the states’ feed-backs, crucial changes were made on the 1991 Draft 
Articles to meet states’ recommendations.437  
At this point, the Sixth Committee of the UNGAS took over the drafting task 
from the ILC and convened an ad-hoc working group tasked with the elaboration of a 
Framework Convention for the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, based 
on both the ILC Draft Articles and the written comments and observations from States.438 
The working group met in 1996 and 1997, shortly before the adoption of the 1997 UNWCC. 
After two years of negotiations, the final version of the 1997 UNWCC was submitted to 
the UNGAS for adoption. 439 
Upon a request made by Turkey, the UNGAS called for a vote to adopt the 
1997 UNWCC, on May 21, 1997, in  New York, USA, under resolution A/RES/51/229 of 
the UNGAS. Out of 133 voting states, 103 were in favour, 27 states abstained, whereas 
three others were opposed to the convention.440 The supporting states included Bangladesh, 
Finland, Jordan, Mexico, Nepal, USA, Slovakia, and Syria, whereas the opposing states 
included Burundi, China, and Turkey, and the abstentions came from countries such as 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda, India, Israel, and France, who subsequently joined the 
Convention.441  
Years after the adoption of 1997 UNWCC, the increasing water demand 
aggravated by the steady drop in the per capita water availability in many parts of the world 
challenged seriously all the developments that already took place in the field of the law of 
international water resources.442 The Water Resources Committee of the ILA officially 
recognised that the changes in the context of the international water law were so profound 
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that it became justified to revise both the 1966 Helsinki Rules and the supplemental rules 
thereof.443  
Scholars often advance three reasons to explain what led the ILA to analyse 
the state of the customary international water law after the adoption of the 1997 UN Water 
Convention.444 First, the absence of any agreement between the riparian states of all the 
most disputed international watercourses. Second, the slow speed of states ratification of 
the 1997 UNWCC, and the need to continue applying customary international law until its 
entry into force.445 Third, interrogations grew among the States at the global level as to 
whether the 1997 UNWCC did accurately reflect the customary international law in the 
field of transboundary water resources.446  
Gathered in Berlin in August 2004, the ILA adopted (almost four decades 
later) an update to the 1966 Helsinki Rules, referred to as the “2004 Berlin Rules”. They 
aimed at first, providing a clear, coherent, convincing, and compelling statement of the 
customary international law that applies to the waters of the international river basins. 
Second, deciding on the extent to which the customary international law applied to the 
waters that were situated entirely within a single state. Third, to incorporate or reflect a 
progressive character of the law that takes into account the emerging problems of 
international water management. 
On the view of Biswas,447 played a noteworthy moral and authoritative role 
during the time the 1997 UNWCC did not enter into force, despite the existence of a 
dissenting opinion from some members of the ILA Water Resources Committee (WRC) 
that did not agree with four aspects of the 2004 Berlin Rules. The problematic aspects 
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included i. the scope of the study, ii. the effect of inclusion of national waters, iii.  The 
treatmenet of the principle of equitable utilisation, iv. The inappropriate use of “shall”.448  
These three sets of rules in the space of nearly half a century have marked 
the genesis and the evolution of the law that governs the transboundary water resources. In 
addition, these rules have shown both a rapid evolution of the context of the law of 
transboundary water resources, which will undoubtedly need further adjustments of the 
legal framework thereof, due to the ongoing and the predicted challenges of climate change 
on the transboundary water resources.449 The 1992 UNECE Water Convention which is 
discussed in Section 4.5 below deserves being also mentioned here, being an instrument 
whose influence is increasing at a global scale. 
3.3.7 Transboundary waters law and principles under climate change 
The main contemporary challenge faced by international water law is climate change. The 
existing international customs and water law principles developed over the last centuries, 
whereas the current climate change did not yet pose a threat to shared water resources. 
States' treaty practices developed and matured in the absence of any climate disruption as 
it is the case currently. Historical states treaty practices often approached water resources 
from a stable perspective, as a resource beyond vulnerability. Today, climate change has 
changed this situation, and water resources have become one of the most vulnerable assets 
on the planet.450 That is the reason why Tarlock,451 argued that some rules of international 
water law will need a fundamental review because of climate change.  
Thinking on the adaptation to climate change at river basin, Tarlock452 
identified two major challenges, which are mainly of a legal order. The first is the practice 
by states of unilateral developments on shared watercourses, and the second is the issue of 
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state sovereignty over natural resources. Allouche453 qualified earlier the second challenge 
referred to by Tarlock as water nationalism. Climate change impacts on water resources 
will require the incorporation in treaties on transboundary waters some elements of 
adaptation to changing conditions, in order to create flexibility in the treaty. As it will be 
discussed below,454 treaty flexibility contributes to the responsiveness of a regime to the 
impact that climate change may have on waters. The absence of flexibility mechanisms in 
transboundary water treaty is likely to affect treaty resilience and applicability.  
From a historical perspective, the genesis and evolution of the law of 
transboundary water resources have shown both a progressive development and a 
somewhat capacity to adapt to changing contexts. The shift of interest that occurred earlier 
from the exclusivity of the navigational considerations to the inclusion of the non-
navigational is a piece of evidence to this. Whereas the early treaties on shared waters dealt 
with issues such as boundary demarcations and navigation, the latest treaties became more 
inclined towards the non-navigational uses of shared waters. Themes relating to water 
developments, conservation and protection in a context of environmental degradation were 
all included.455 The theory of sustainable development was also incorporated in 
transboundary water treaties when the environmental parameters required to do so.  
Such a capacity to evolve and adapt as it was shown in the past is much 
needed at present, and will probably continue to be needed in the foreseeable future because 
of climate change.456 Besides the significant changes that have already begun to occur, 
growing debates are underway concerning the scopes and the extent of the changes that are 
to take place to accommodate a hardly predictable phenomenon such as climate change, in 
the law of transboundary water resources, which is a field that requires sufficient 
predictability. As puts Zmak457 “We do not know how climate change will reshape 
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civilisation’s relationship with rivers, though we know it will. And, as it modifies the 
hydrologic system, pre-existing water agreements must modify accordingly.” 
From a societal perspective, Solomon458 noticed that most societies did not 
yet modify their patterns in terms of water use and consumption, in order to match the 
current climate-related constraints. Undoubtedly, the question of societies modifying their 
water use patterns should be approached differently, being that societies are differently 
challenged. It follows from such variance in climate change impacts that societies would 
differently respond to the phenomenon. Societies that will suffer floodings and those that 
will suffer droughts for instance will not respond to the phenomenon in an even way. 
Therefore, the question should be posed in terms of “what are societies already doing to 
adapt to the growing impacts of climate change on their water resources?”  
In this respect, scholars, such as Salomon459 and Drieschova & Eckstein460 
found several ways in which states and societies usually addressed the challenges posed by 
climate change on the transboundary water resources. Each of these practices is outlined in 
table 2 below. They represent a potential new wave of evolution for the law of 
transboundary water resources. 
 
Table 2: States practice to respond to the challenges 
of climate change on water resources 
 
Salomon’s approach Drieschova & Eckstein’s approach  
Not acting, and waiting for nature to self-
regulate. 
Ignoring the uncertainties. 
Adopting water-efficiency methods. Developing a complete contracts approach. 
Transfering waters from remote sources. Limiting uncertainties with different technics. 
Exploit groundwaters. Using open-ended approaches. 
Source: S. Solomon and Drieschova & Eckstein461 
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In a discussion on the fast emergence of new challenges associated with 
climate change, in the field of transboundary water resources, Peterson-Perlman462 
recommended that riparian countries may build up institutional capacities, and be 
anticipative with conflict-resolution mechanisms for better preparedness. Dinar463 warned 
that the fact of signing water treaties did not automatically promote riparian states 
cooperation, unless the treaty that is signed takes into consideration water variability, and 
is effectively implemented thereafter. As argues Hoffmann,464 States are to deploy 
additional efforts to establish a truly universal culture of sharing water resources in 
transboundary contexts. 
3.4 The particular evolution of the law of the transboundary waters in Africa 
The genesis and evolution of transboundary water principles and laws as outlined above 
generally occurred in the western hemisphere, where there were generally abundant water 
resources for all users.465 If the western countries were arid, there is a strong likelihood that 
the evolution of the law of transboundary water resources would have been different. In 
Africa, and perhaps in some other regions of the world, the law of the transboundary water 
resources has evolved differently, because of the continent’s particular context. The aim of 
this section is to throw lights on the particular evolution of this field of law in Africa. Such 
a light will with no doubt contribute to reaching the objective of this thesis. 
The laws and principles that govern the transboundary water resources that 
developed in the western hemisphere were initially applied in Africa to serve the interests 
of the colonial powers.466 After the independence of the African states in the 1960s, political 
conflicts, wars, violence, and atrocities, apart from chronic underdevelopment, replaced 
colonisation and settled in many parts of the continent, seemingly to never leave.  
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3.4.1 The prevailing context before and during the colonial period 
In general, colonialism is regarded as the event in history that introduced the practice of 
transboundary water laws on the African continent, through the introduction of the modern-
like boundaries to separate the colonial states that were formed on the continent.467 The 
forms of the African states before colonisation did not address transboundary waters issues 
in the same manner as after the colonisation settled on the continent. Goody468 claimed that 
in pre-colonial Africa, governing powers were mainly concerned with the people rather 
than the lands. States and empires were characterised by widely distributed populations and 
diffused boundaries to separate the governing powers.469 People practised extensive 
agriculture due to the underdevelopment of local technics and technologies, which often 
led the population to relocate into new settlements in the quest for better agricultural lands, 
to guarantee adequate food production.470 All the foregoing caused states’ boundary to be 
unstable. This is why Allott471 argued that “the territories of the rulers in pre-colonial Africa 
were defined by the limits of the spaces occupied by their subjects”. 
To draw the boundaries between their territorial possessions in Africa, the 
European colonial powers choose to involve to the possible extent the watercourses of the 
continent, which they used as natural boundaries.472 The western, central, and eastern 
regions of Africa were particularly concerned, as they all traversed by dense hydrographic 
networks.473 National boundaries were thus introduced in Africa, not to geographically 
define the tribal communities, kingdoms, or empires on the continent, whose territories 
were loosely demarcated, but to separate the European colonies on the African soil. In that 
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manner, 30 to 40 percent of African ethnic groups were split and assigned to different new 
states.474 Even if later, the European colonialism tried to rectify this historical error by 
importing on the continent the nation-state concept, consequences of upsetting numerous 
of the continent’s political and geographical organisations have had long-lasting 
consequences. 
3.4.2 Early experiences of water agreements on African transboundary rivers 
Written agreements on Africa's transboundary rivers appeared during the early stages of the 
European colonisation.475 During the colonial era, the watercourses that were considered 
international are those that crossed the territories under the control of one European colonial 
power into the territory of the other.476 In other words, boundaries that were considered 
international were the boundaries that separated the territories under the influence of the 
colonial powers instead of the boundaries that separated the African states.477  
In its early days of colonisation, the Niger river was regarded as an 
international river, on the ground that it crossed the territories controlled by the British and 
the French, which were two different European colonial powers.478 At the same time, the 
Senegal river was regarded as a domestic because it was entirely flowing through a French 
zone of influence, even though the French zone of influence it crossed comprised many 
African colonial states. The Senegal River basin accessed the status of an international river 
basin in 1958, after the Republic of Guinea, and three other riparian states gained their 
political independence.479  
The early water agreements that were passed between the colonial powers 
were mainly based on land acquisition and boundary demarcation; water resources were 
included only on a secondary basis.480 During the phase of colonial boundary demarcation, 
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Asiwaju481 noticed the water resources that once belonged to one community were cut off 
from them after the drawing of the boundary lines fell at the “wrong place”. Some colonial 
water treaties aimed at solving this issue, and facilitate the access of "native" to their 
ancestral water resources. The example here is the Exchange of notes in 1895, between 
France and Great Britain on the navigation and use of the waters of the Great Scarcies 
River.482 This agreement related to the “Great Scarcies River” also known as the “Kolenté 
River”, that is currently shared between the Republics of Sierra Leone and Guinea.483  
The motivation behind it was the acknowledgement by the two signatories 
that the boundary they were drawn on the map fell at a wrong place on the ground.484 The 
1895 Agreement was then signed with the view of correcting that mistake and allow the 
inhabitants who dwelled on the right bank of the river, to continue accessing their waters as 
usually, after these waters were cut off from them by the colonial boundaries in the area.485 
3.4.3 The post-Independence period 
The post-independence period runs approximately from the year 1959 to the year 1989. It 
covers the space of time between the first experiences of states' independence on the 
continent to the time of the arrival of the so-called democratic regimes in Africa. Most of 
the independences on the continent occurred between the years 1959 and 1965. The first 
agreement on transboundary waters signed between two independent African states was the 
“Agreement between the Republic of Sudan and the United Arab Republic for the Full 
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Utilisation of the Nile Waters” signed in Cairo on November 8, 1959.486 Lautze487 noticed 
that this agreement followed the trend of the agreements on transboundary waters that were 
signed during the colonial period. This seems "understandable" because African states were 
still young, and most of the leaders who accessed political positions had no experience in 
transboundary water matters.  
After the 1959 Cairo Agreement there came forth several other transboundary 
water treaties, whose objectives and contents were generally different from the trend of the 
colonial period. These new treaties were less concrete, but focused on joint management 
institutions and water allocation and waterworks, with widespread concerns regarding water 
developments other than the construction of dams.488  Gupta489 appreciated what she called 
“the commendable efforts” deployed by African post-colonial governments to develop 
standard rules in order to reach a level of institutionalised relations at river basin level, which 
at that time, constituted a significant contribution to peace and stability on the continent. 
The post-independences period seemed more favourable to water treaties 
than the period before. Some 72 water agreements were signed during the three first 
decades after independence, against 49 during the centenary of the colonial period.490 These 
treaties were generally motivated by territorial issues than by the sharing of water 
resources. The first generation of these type of treaties was negotiated either in water-scarce 
environments or in river basins characterised by high water developments, where water 
uses were relatively higher than water supply.491 Twelve treaties that covered river basins 
were signed during this period, against seven during the colonial period.492 These treaties 
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generally shifted from being bilateral to becoming multilateral. Sixty percent of the treaties 
were multilateral, of which 75 percent included nearly all the riparian states.493 
From a treaty content perspective, two-thirds of the treaties encouraged the 
exchange of information and hydrological data, whereas an increased consideration was 
given to the principle of “Equity”.494 African water treaties used for the first time the 
concept "equitable", as a basis for water agreement in the “Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project”, signed in Maseru on October 24, 1986, between the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho.495  
From a conflict resolution perspective, the transboundary water treaties 
signed during the post-independence period incorporated some provisions with conflict 
resolution mechanisms, which were generally an arbitration tribunal, whether the OAU or 
the UN. The Convention of Bamako adopted in July 26, 1963, between Guinea, Mali, 
Mauritania, and Senegal, or the “Act regarding navigation and economic co-operation 
between the states of the Niger Basin” adopted on October 26, 1963, between Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria, are good 
examples in this regard.496 
3.4.4 The late independence period 
This period runs approximately from the year 1990 to 2010 and is particularly productive 
for the African continent regarding the law of transboundary water resources. During this 
period, the size and the content of the law of transboundary water resources would improve 
significantly.497 The transboundary water treaties that were signed during this period often 
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comprised various other concerns, among which were found some issues that touched the 
economic development of entires river basins.498 Also, treaties’ responsiveness to emerging 
topics concerning natural resources governance would improve, apart from states trend to 
return to the practice of bilateral treaties instead of the multilateral. For instance, this period 
coincides with the rise of the sustainable development concept at the global level, which 
concept the United Nations would recommend to include in any project that would interfere 
with natural resources.499 Some authors argued that the inclusion of the sustainable 
development approach in development planning represented a significant paradigm shift in 
the field of natural resources governance, including water.500  
Contributions towards this evolution included the development of 
international and regional water laws. Multilateral agreements such as the 1997 UNWCC, 
the 1999 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Agreement on Shared Water 
Resources, and its revised protocol of the year 2000, were all adopted during this period.501 
Meanwhile, some 36 transboundary water treaties were also signed continent-wide.502 
While some of these treaties were an update of existing agreements on transboundary 
waters, others were just new agreements. The Congo River basin is among the basins that 
were equipped with a new basin-based water agreement during this period, in the year 
1999.503 All these treaties enriched the continent’s list of applicable instruments in the field 
which is being studied.  
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From a spatial distribution perspective, this period was marked by more 
treaties being signed southwards than north or westwards, as it was the case during the post-
independence period, or the colonial period.504 Twenty-seven percent of these agreements 
applied to the Orange River basin, with about 19 percent of them dealing with the waters 
of the Inkomati River Basin.505 The southwards predominance of the treaties of this period 
remains striking, even if one has to exclude the 1999 SADC Agreements on Shared Water 
Resources of its amendment of 2000.  
The percentage of treaties establishing hydrologic data exchange increased, 
whereas two-thirds of them were now referring to water quality. The already high 
proportion of treaties containing conflict resolution mechanisms in the previous period 
remained almost the same.506 Approximately three-quarters of the treaties of this period 
either assumed or created transboundary water management institutions, or even attempted 
to set up frameworks for future developments. 
From a state’s involvement perspective, the number of countries that 
participated in a single treaty decreased. Treaties of this period were less multilateral and 
more bilateral, with more than 50 percent of them being bilateral. Such a shift was revealing 
a significant move to return to the practice of negotiting water treaties from a state to state 
basis. In paralel to this remark, Nader507 noticed that hegemon states were comfortable 
signing bilateral treaties than the multilateral. Perhaps, as argued by this author,508 even for 
non-hegemon states, negotiating bilateral treaties on transboundary watercourse appeared 
more comfortable than negotiating the multilateral ones.509 The Republic of South African, 
which is the water hegemon of the Southern African region, managed, for instance, to 
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secure during this period a significant number of bilateral agreements on its shared water 
resources.510  
A further significant evolution during this period includes the fact that there 
seemed to be an increased reference to the concepts of "equity", whereas half of the 
agreements adopted criteria for water allocation between treaty signatories.511 The concept 
of Equity is referred to in these agreements, either as an overarching treaty principle or as 
a criterion for water allocation. As argues by Dellapenna,512 treaties signed after the year 
1997 were most probably influenced by the 1997 UNWCC, which for him has acquired the 
legitimacy of customary law. The SADC Protocol on shared watercourses of 2000 for 
instance offers an example of a regional water treaty that was amended on the basis of the 
1997 UNWCC.513 
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3.4.5 Current stage and way forward  
The general sense is that the African practice in the field of transboundary water treaties 
has revealed itself broadly evolutionary, and will more likely remain so in the foreseeable 
future, given the growing necessity for state adaptation in the water law sector. Passing 
Agreements on transboundary water resources has been practised on the African continent 
for some 150 years.514 Africa’s participation in the international water regime is judged 
satisfying by some scholars who found that the continent accounted for more than one-
quarter of the world's known transboundary water treaties.515 Such an infatuation has even 
surprised Lautz & Giordano516  for whom Africa has a reputation of being meagrely 
involved in international environmental platforms. 
The Sustainable Development Goal 6.5.2 on “Proportion of transboundary 
basin area with an operational arrangement for water cooperation” stresses the importance 
of water cooperation.517 As per the SDG 6.5.2, an arrangment is considered operational if 
it creates a joint body, some joint management plans or objectives,  institutes regular (once 
a year as a minimum) and formal communication between the riparian countries and 
exchange of data and information at least once a year.  
Despite the satisfying participation of the continent in the development of 
the international law of transboundary water resources, there seem to be some areas for 
improvement, which seem particular to the African continent. These areas include treaties 
implementation, which constitutes an area for improvement on the continent. Some of the 
African water treaties mentioned above were never implemented after the signature.518 
Adopting a treaty on shared waters is critical, but its implementation and institutionalisation 
seem even more determining and should, as such, attract more attention from scholars for 
an improvement.  
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The quasi dependence on public assistance to development constitutes a 
second area for improvement. African states are in the majority in a position of dependence 
on external assistance to equip their transboundary watercourses and river basins with 
adequate laws and policies.519 The evolution of the field of transboundary water treaties in 
Africa seemed synchronised with the evolution that occurred at the global level. The 
synchronisation was mostly based on the practice of public assistance to development, 
which is conditional assistance, depending on the donors’ objectives. 520  The evolution of 
the African transboundary water treaties was, therefore, influenced and perhaps oriented in 
a particular direction, depending on the donor’s objectives.521 The fear is that such oriented 
assistance (yet necessary on the continent) may result in watercourses and river basins 
treaties being off the mark, because of the pre-established results and objectives that come 
with the external assistance.  
Discussing on African hydro politics and treaty formation, Sadoff522 noted that 
the hegemonic behaviour on the continent would probably not be a limiting factor to future 
treaties. For Sadoff, the few African regional hegemons - Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa, 
that are involved in more than 55 percent of Africa's transboundary agreements, are likely to 
behave constructively. Even though they also enter in basin-wide water arrangements, African 
regional hegemons have a strategic preference for bilateral treaties, and will most probably 
keep the same reflex in future.523  
Regarding the climate change phenomenon, the African transboundary 
water resources will generally be affected. The negative impacts that are announced include 
significant changes in the hydrological cycles at several river basins, suggesting a paradigm 
shift in the current states treaty practices across the continent in the field of transboundary 
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waters.524 As argued by Bakker,525 the vast majority of water treaties that are currently in 
power on the continent were signed during the pre and post-independence periods, under 
more stable climatic and environmental contexts.  
The perpetually changing climatic conditions will drive a perpetual change 
of the context in which the riparian states will be signing new water treaties.526 A 
remarkable example here can be taken from the Columbia River Treaty, even if this one is 
a non-African river basin. The USA and Canada, who are the two signatory states of the 
Columbia River Treaty have planned to renegotiate this treaty in 2024.527 The treaty was 
initially signed in 1961. However, the treaty’s signatory states have noticed significant 
changes in the overall context of the treaty, between what the context used to be in 1961 
and what it has become currently. 
In a nutshell, the law of transboundary water resources has received a positive 
response from the African states, from the early times of states accession to independence down 
to the present. The African transboundary water treaties have been responsive to the 
developments of the global context. Under climate change, the African continent will need to 
assess its existing treaties on transboundary water resources with the view of including in treaty 
bodies the adequate mechanisms for regime responsiveness to climate change.528   
3.5 Special contributions towards the current international regime of transboundary 
watercourses  
The international regime of the transboundary watercourses as it stands today has received 
significant contributions from diverse factors and fields. The next section will discuss some 
of the crucial contributions the regime has received. These include the formation and 
consolidation of state boundaries at the global level, the Roman laws, the navigation law, 
the works of scholars in water associations, and some judicial and arbitral decisions from 
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the ICJ and the PCIJ. However, to stay consistent with the objective of this thesis, the 
discussions will only provide the outlines of each of these contributions, with references to 
further readings.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
3.5.1 The contribution from the Roman Law 
The Roman system of laws is the basis of many modern legal systems worldwide.529 The 
earliest legal texts found on the law of International waters are Romans. Roman law has 
profoundly contributed to the emergence of specialised branches of law, including the law 
of transboundary water resources.530 A principle such as the freedom of navigation emerged 
under Roman’s law.531 The Roman legal system has evolved during almost 1500 years, to 
which evolution water law was intrinsically related.532  
The spreading of the Roman water law across the globe took place after the 
fall of the Roman dominion; it was an essential step towards the formation of the modern 
laws of transboundary water resources.533 In general, three factors have contributed to the 
spreading of the Roman water law worldwide. These are first, the European colonial 
experience, secondly, the freedom of navigation principle and regime, and thirdly, the 
formation of modern independent states in the ancient European colonies in Africa and 
elsewhere.534  
The European colonial experience helped expand the Roman water law 
across the planet in Asia, Africa, and South America particularly.535 Depending on the 
context, whether water-rich or water-scarce, the Roman law then developed differently. 
The colonial regimes where Roman law landed acted also like driving forces in support of 
the local development of the laws to govern transboundary water resources.536  
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3.5.2 The contribution through the formation and consolidation of states boundary  
The initiation of states’ stable political boundaries marked the beginning of the formation 
of the international order.537 The existence of stable boundaries between states contributed 
in turn to the negotiation of treaties on rivers that crossed over state’s boundaries, as 
territoriality and sovereignty are two closely related concepts, which do not exist 
separately.538 However, the emergence of recognised and stable states' political boundaries 
took centuries to occur, and it was only recently that the state’s boundaries became the main 
feature of the global political geography.539  
Even if the exact time when state boundaries formed remains unclear as 
already mentioned,540 the concepts of territory and boundary as understood and observed 
nowadays, begun some 300 years ago.541 It is only through defining states territories and 
boundaries that it became possible to address the issue concerning water resources that 
crossed states’ political boundaries. Such an undertaking was both meaningless and 
unfeasible before. Once states became much organised politically and legally, the need 
increased for the regulation of issues associated with transboundary water resources at a 
supranational level. From an initial focus on single homogenous communities, water law 
evolved and started regulating transboundary water systems. 
In a debate on the `spatial logic' of past societies, Isaac542 argued that the 
rulers of ancient empires were not much interested in defining the boundaries of their 
domains.543 What mattered most for ancient rulers was the control of the people and cities. 
They were preoccupied with this issue to the extent that some cities were fenced up inside 
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fortresses.544 In the view of Teclaff,545 it was through the consolidation of state boundaries 
that the principles of the state's sovereignty and international cooperation and solidarity 
emerged. Every state needs to be “fenced up” and protected with defined boundaries, 
because, as puts Zaiotti,546 “the boundary is the beginning of every order and everything”. 
A sovereign state will, therefore, be entitled to full authority over and only within its 
territory.547   
3.5.3 The contribution from the law of navigation  
Men have practised navigation on waterways for millennia.548 In many societies, navigation 
has always been part of people’s lives. Societies have progressively developed the law of 
navigation on waterways, including those that traversed the territories of more than one 
state at once. In this section and in the rest of this thesis, navigation refers to “the use of a 
waterway by humans for the floating of any form of vessel”,549 whereas waterways are 
rivers, lakes, or channels through which flow the surface freshwaters.550 The law of 
navigation has contributed significantly towards the formation and development of the 
international law of the non-navigational uses of transboundary water resources.551 
Historically, the scope of the non-navigational uses of the international water resources was 
generally insufficient to cause disagreements between riparian states. It was navigational 
uses that caused more problems.552 It seems, therefore, logical that most of the early 
instruments and tribunal pronouncements in the field of international water law would have 
almost exclusively navigation as a central concern.553  
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Navigation is already present in the treaty of Munster and Osnabruck, signed 
respectively between France and the Empire and between Sweden and the Empire.554 This 
historical treaty decided the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and marked the beginning of the 
modern international legal system.555 Navigation regulation developed later, in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the boom of the shipping industry. The principle 
of freedom of navigation, which was already applied under Roman law, became one of the 
main features of navigation law.556 From Europe, the principle expanded in other parts of 
the world, before its rejection.557 
The re-establishment of the freedom of navigation under the Final Act of the 
1815 Congress of Vienna, was a substantial benchmark to this principle’s modern 
evolution.558 Also, the 1885 General Act of Berlin, which came later, brought on its side 
significant support to the principle freedom of navigation, by extending its application 
outside the European continent, in the Congo and the Niger Rivers, in Africa.559 Signed 
some three decades after the 1885 General Act of Berlin, the 1919 Peace Treaty of 
Versailles also perpetuated the same trend of freedom of navigation,560 but went further, 
addressing issues regarding hydropower production, irrigation, and water supply, which are 
all non-navigational uses of waterways.561  
After the world war I, nations that formed the essence of the “international 
community” at that time, excluding the defeated ones signed “The Convention and Statute 
on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern” on April 20, 1921, also 
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referred to as the 1921 Barcelona Convention and its adjacent Statute.562 These instruments 
provided for navigation while recognising the non-navigational uses of the international 
waterways.563 Article 10 (6) of the Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of 
International Concern of 1921 provided: 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, a riparian State may, 
in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, close a waterway wholly or in part 
to navigation, with the consent of all the riparian States or of all the States 
represented on the International Commission in the case of navigable waterways 
referred to in Article 2. As an exceptional case, one of the riparian States of a 
navigable waterway of international concern not referred to in Article 2 may close 
the waterway to navigation, if the navigation on it is of very small importance, and 
if the State in question can justify its action on the ground of an economic interest 
clearly greater than that of navigation.” 564 
The implementation of this provision provoked a progressive decline of both 
the principle of freedom of navigation and the primacy of navigational uses of the 
international waterways over others uses. Still, in 1929, the principle of freedom of 
navigation would be recognised as customary international law by the PCIJ in the River 
Oder Case565 and later reinforced and expanded under various international conventions, 
which generally aimed at favouring all the nations in the use of transboundary 
waterways.566 Even if the River Oder case was primarily concerned with issues regarding 
the rights of navigation, the PCIJ touched the non-navigational uses of the international 
watercourses while he concluded that  
“This community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common 
legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian 
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states in the use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any 
preferential privilege of anyone riparian state in relation to the others.”567  
The PCIJ’s judgement on the River Oder case would, therefore, become critical in shaping 
the international law of transboundary watercourses,568 as it would judicially consecrate 
several international water law principles, as it will be discussed further.569 
3.5.4 The contribution from scholars in law associations 
Two non-official bodies of scholars have been particularly active in the field of 
international water law. These two bodies of scholars are the Institute of International Law 
(IIL),570 and the International Law Association (ILA).571 Most of the principles of 
transboundary water law were formulated and proposed either by the ILA or the IIL.572 
Their contributions, which are even engraved in the preamble of the 1997 UNWCC are 
mentioned in this section.  
The International Law Association (ILA) begun to work on international 
water law in 1954,573 after the establishment of what was called the “Committee on the 
Uses of the Waters of International Rivers.”574 It was in 1956 that the ILA adopted its first 
set of principles of water law, which, it called “A Statement of principles upon which to 
base rules of law concerning the uses of international rivers”. This first ILA statement is 
also referred to as the “Dubrovnik Statement.”575 The Dubrovnik Statement was followed 
by the ILA Resolution of New York of 1958, whose Article 2 confirmed the right of a co-
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riparian state to be entitled a reasonable and equitable share of any benefit that may derive 
from the use of a shared water resource within a drainage basin.576 During a meeting in 
Kyoto, in 1964, the ILA would then discuss the principle of reasonable and equitable 
utilisation, which at that time was already enounced in the 1958 New York Resolution.577  
The IIL has been active in the field of the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses since the beginning of the twentieth century.578 The 
Organisation issued its first contribution to international watercourses in 1911 through a 
work that was entitled “International Regulations Regarding the Use of International 
Watercourses for Purposes Other than Navigation”, well known as the “Madrid 
Declaration”.579  For Salman,580 the 1911 Madrid Declaration was based on the doctrine of 
limited territorial sovereignty.  
The 1911 Madrid Declaration is doubtlessly one of the earliest and most 
significant contributions from the IIL. It used the concept “international watercourses” 
rather than “international rivers”, and introduced the “no-harm” principle, which is 
regarded as a cornerstone principle in the field of international water law.581 Having 
imposed the no-harm principle restrictions on the riparian states, the 1911 Madrid 
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580 Salman (d) (note 348 above; 13). 
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Declaration would prove to be a rejection of the absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine. 
This Declaration would also provide a distinction between the rivers that form states 
boundaries, and those that traverse states successively.582 Such distinction was an essential 
contribution because it offered the fundamental basis for thinkings regarding the 
transboundary watercourses.   
After the 1911 Madrid Declaration, the IIL issued its second resolution 
entitled “Utilisation of Non-Maritime International Waters (except for navigation)” of 
1961, also known as the “Salzburg Resolution”, which did target mainly on the non-
navigational uses of the transboundary watercourses. 583 
In 1966, the ILA would propose an updated format of the 1956 Dubrovnik 
Statement and its subsequent instruments, including both the 1958 New York and 1964 Kyoto 
Resolutions. The ILA’s update would be known as the “Helsinki Rules on the uses of the waters 
of international rivers of 1966”, abundantly referred to in this thesis. The ILA’s Dubrovnik 
Statement confirmed that any state had sovereign control over an international watercourse 
within its boundaries, but required from the said state to exercise such sovereignty with due 
consideration on its impacts upon the sovereignty, or the rights of the other riparian states.584 
From a substantial perspective, the Dubrovnik Statement was a rejection of both the absolute 
territorial sovereignty doctrine and the absolute territorial integrity doctrine. The Statement 
instead recognised the right that all riparian states had naturally over a shared watercourse. 
Sadly, the Dubrovnik Statement failed to provide any guidance as to how such rights of states 
could be defined and exercised among riparian countries.585  
The 1966 Helsinki Rules proposed by ILA were erected on the principle of 
equitable utilisation of international water resources.586 States and scholars’ consideration 
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vis-à-vis the 1966 Helsinki Rules grew considerably after the issuance of the rules. The 
1966 Helsinki ules were considered the most authoritative set of rules regarding the use 
and protection of the international watercourses before the codification of the international 
law of the non-navigational uses of the international watercourses. During that period, the 
principles established under the 1966 Helsinki Rules were regarded as reflecting customary 
international law in the field of transboundary watercourses.587 
Concerning flood management and control principles and guidelines, the 
ILA made an early and significant contribution through its “1972 Articles on Flood 
Control”, of which provisions had to be observed in transboundary contexts.588 Key 
principles such as the cooperation “with respect to flood control”, the communication of 
flood warning information and data between the riparian states “as soon as possible”, while 
ensuring priority in emergency cases, already occupied a central place in ILA’s instrument. 
According to the ILA, the expenses related to flood control measures at transboundary 
contexts had to be borne jointly by the basin States, which for this body of scholars are 
called upon to cooperate in such matters.589 
After the adoption of the 1997 UNWCC, the Water Resources Committee 
of the ILA officially recognised that the changes in the context of the internationally shared 
water resources were so profound and rapid, that it became justified to revise both the 1966 
Helsinki Rules and the supplemental rules thereof.590 In 2004, in Berlin, Germany, the ILA 
adopted an updated version of the 1966 Helsinki Rules, referred to as the “Berlin Rules on 
Water Resources” of 2004.591 
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3.5.5 The contribution from major international judicial decisions and arbitral awards 
In the period that preceded the 1956 Dubrovnik Statement seen above, there were very few 
judicial decisions or arbitral awards in the field of the non-navigational uses of 
transboundary watercourses. The consulted literature is generally convergent concerning 
four contributions from this area, including the River Oder case, the Trail Smelter 
arbitration case, the Lake Lanoux arbitration case, and the Corfu Channel case. The River 
Oder Case was pronounced by the PCIJ in 1929, the Trail Smelter case and the Lake 
Lanoux are two arbitration cases pronounced by the ICJ in 1941 and 1957 respectively, 
whereas the Corfu Channel case is the only judgment the ICJ issued, and it was in 1949.592 
The list of cases discussed in this section should not be approached as the only cases that 
have contributed to the formation of the international law of transboundary watercourses. 
The first contribution to be envisaged is the River Oder Case, which was a 
disagreement that opposed Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, and Sweden, the 
United Kingdom on one side, versus Poland on the other side.593  The case brought before 
the PCIJ related to whether under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, the jurisdiction of the 
International Commission of the Oder River extended as well to sections of the tributaries 
of the Oder River, which include the Warthe and Netze, two tributaries of the Oder River 
that stemmed from the Poland territory.594 Poland claimed that the jurisdiction of the Oder 
Commission excluded the sections of the tributaries in the Polish territory. The other six 
countries claimed the opposite. The Court ruled in favour of the six opponents to Poland 
and stated that the jurisdiction of the Oder River Commission extended to certain tributaries 
of the Oder River, which were situated in Poland.  
Though the case concerned questions of rights of navigation, the conclusion 
of the PCIJ supported the fact that states that share a transboundary watercourse are in a 
situation of “community of interest” vis-à-vis the waters of the common river. The PCIJ 
conclusion reads: “This community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a 
common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian 
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states in the use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential 
privilege of anyone riparian state in relation to the others.”595  
Scholars have often concluded that the PCIJ’s pronouncement on the Oder 
River case could be applied to a certain extent to the non-navigational uses of the 
transboundary watercourses. Lipper596,  for instance, found that the pronouncement of the 
court instituted perfect equality of all riparian states regarding their shared watercourse, 
whereas Lammers597 points out the fact that the PCIJ’s decision does not relate only to 
navigational concerns, but included the non-navigational as well. 
The second contribution is the Trail Smelter Arbitration case, which was an 
affair between the USA and Canada.598 The motive of the conflict was that smelting 
operations on the Canadian State of British Columbia by a private company caused the 
emission of significant amounts of sulphur dioxide fumes into the air. By that, it caused 
unintended damages to some USA citizens and to crops and timbers, on the other side of 
the border, in the State of Washington. The two countries established an International 
Commission under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty to settle the matter. The Commission 
assessed the damages that were caused to be around US $350,000, which Canada would 
pay to the USA. The recommendations of the commission were rejected by the USA.599 
The parties then decided to proceed with the matter into a further settlement.  
On April 15, 1935, the USA and Great Britain signed a convention, which they 
called “Convention for the Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operation of the Trail 
Smelter” This convention helped establish a three-member tribunal whose mission was to deal 
with the matter.600 In 1941, the Arbitration Tribunal on the Trail Smelter case concluded:  
“No state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as 
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
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therein when the case is of serious consequence, and the injury is established by 
clear and convincing evidence.”601 
Although it was not primarily concerned with the non-navigational uses of the international 
watercourses, the Trail Smelter case has been a significant contribution in the field by 
helping establish the principle according to which no state is entitled to cause or allow its 
territory to cause significant environmental damages to another state. 
The third contribution to be mentioned is the Lake Lanoux case,602 which 
was an arbitration between France and Spain, brought before the ICJ, in 1957. The case 
concerned a unilateral hydroelectric project proposal by the French government over the 
waters of Lake Lanoux. From a geographical viewpoint, Lake Lanoux is situated on the 
southern slopes of the Mounts Pyrenees on the French territory.603 Streams which originates 
from the French territory, run entirely in the French territory without crossing any of its 
boundaries before feeding the Lake Lanoux. The waters of the Lake emerge “only” by the 
stream called Font-Vive, which forms one of the upstream tributaries of the River Carol. 
The Font-Vive River flows approximately 25 kilometres from the Lake Lanoux within the 
French territory and crosses the boundary between Spain and France at the Puigcerda 
Town, from where it continues to flow through the Spanish territory for about 6 kilometres 
before discharging into the River Segre, which eventually flows into the Ebro River.  
However, before joining the Spanish territory, the waters of the Carol River 
feed the Puigcerda Canal, which is a property of the Puigcerda Town. The French government 
planned to embark on a hydroelectric project that would use the waters of the Lanoux Lake, 
but Spain opposed the project, claiming that it would result in adverse effects on its interests 
and rights. Spain evoked the Treaty of Bayonne of May 26, 1866, which the country signed 
with France, and also the Additional Acts adopted the same day. To settle this matter, the 
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tribunal recourse to several general principles of international law, including those that 
touched the non-navigational uses of the international watercourses. Among the most 
essential points of the court’s conclusions is the decision according to which the rights of 
downstream riparian countries should be respected, and also their interests should be taken 
into consideration in any upstream development occurring on a shared watercourse.604 Lake 
Lanoux also made the point that states must negotiate arrangements in good faith. However, 
the arbitration fell short of stipulating that the states had to agree an arrangement.    
The last contribution to be envisaged here is the Corfu Channel case,605 
which opposed the United Kingdome and the Republic of Albania. The origin of the case 
was an incident that took place in the Corfu Channel, territorial waters of Albania, as a UK 
warship struck mines in the Corfu Channel, causing a loss of the lives of many British 
officers. Based on the principle of harmless use of a territory, the ICJ concluded that every 
state should under international law not knowingly allow its territory to serve as the basis 
for acts that oppose the rights of other states. In the Corfu Channel case, the international 
legal responsibility of a state for any contravening act that occurred within its territory, and 
which has resulted in damages in another state (or party) was confirmed.606 In 1949, as the 
ICJ pronounced its judgment, the Republic of Albania was recognised responsible for the 
explosion of these mines and for the damages and loss of lives that resulted.607  
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has surveyed the birth and evolution of the international law and principles 
that govern transboundary watercourses. Similar to the resource it regulates, the law of 
transboundary water resources is seen, under this chapter, to be in perpetual motion. 
Beginning with the general laws enacted by the ancient civilisations, this branch of law 
would be shaped during the era of the development of the law of navigation, and eventually 
wean itself into a separate discipline in the last century. It was in the second half of the last 
century that the international law and principles of transboundary water resources turned 
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out to be more concerned in the non-navigational uses of transboundary water resources.608 
The investigations in this chapter have unearthed the distant and near factors that prevailed 
for the emancipation of this body of law. Factors such as the formation of state boundaries, 
the boom of the commercial navigation backed by the freedom of navigation principle, the 
inclusion of the sustainability concept in development planning, the environmental 
concerns globally are all some of the near element that have contributed to the formation 
of an international law to govern the use of transboundary watercourses. Contributions from 
diverse other sectors including the Roman and navigation laws, the works of the ILA and 
IIL, and the contribution made by some major international judicial decisions and arbitral 
awards. This chapter has also given a special attention to the evolution of the law of 
transboundary water resources that took place on the African continent because of its 
noteworthy particularities. The next step of this thesis will be the exploration of the 
substantial features of the doctrines, principles and rules that establish the current standards 
of the law of transboundary watercourses at the international level. 
  
                                                 
 




4 DOCTRINES, PRINCIPLES AND RULES ESTABLISHING 
STANDARDS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATERCOURSES 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has traced back the birth and evolution of the laws, principles and 
doctrines of the international law of the transboundary watercourses from a historical 
perspective. This chapter sets out to introduce and discuss the doctrines, principles and 
rules that establish the current standards concerning the international law of transboundary 
watercourses from a substantial perspective. A broad but careful consideration of the 
fundamental features of this field of law is crucial in the trajectory of this thesis towards its 
aim, which is to assess the extent to which the legal framework that governs the Congo River 
and its transboundary tributaries has taken into consideration the climate change 
phenomenon. As discussed in the previous chapter, the adoption of the 1997 UNWCC was 
a relatively long process that aimed at filling the legal vacuum that prevailed at the 
international level concerning the non-navigational uses of transboundary watercourses, and 
which caused a general uncertainty as to States’ rights and duties towards a transboundary 
watercourse. From being focused on single communities and states, the law of water 
resources has evolved progressively to the extent of covering multiple communities and 
states, and regulating complexe issues regarding the use of the transboundary watercourses 
shared by these communities and states. That is the reason why this chapter aims at 
discussing such doctrines, principles, and rules, and understanding how they apply to 
shared watercourses in general and the Congo watercourse in particular. 
This chapter comprises four sections. The first section introduces the 
concept of doctrine and discusses some fundamental doctrines that emerged in the field of 
transboundary water law. The second discusses some fundamental principles of the law of 
transboundary watercourses. The third section introduces and discusses the 1997 United 
Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of the International Watercourses, 
before briefly overviewing the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe of 1992, which now is accessible to all the member states of the United Nations.  
 
 
4.2 The major doctrines on transboundary watercourses 
4.2.1 Introducing the concept of doctrines of law 
Legal Doctrines are sometimes referred to as theories of law.609 They are the currency of 
the law, even if they are somewhat dire to define.610 Smith,611 noticed that “Although any 
jurist has some idea of what a legal doctrine is about, it is more difficult to define it” Article 
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is recognised as the statement 
of the sources of international law. It provides:  
« The Court shall apply 1. International conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting States; 2. International 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 3. The general principles 
of law recognised by civilised nations; 4, Subject to the provisions of Article 59, 
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. This 
provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et 
bono if the parties agree thereto. »612 
This provision requires the ICJ to apply international conventions, whether general or 
particular, that establish rules expressly recognised by the contesting states. It also requires 
the Court to apply international customs that reflect a general practice broadly accepted as 
law, and any general principle of law which is recognised by the civilised nations. 
Doctrines, as argued by Tiller & Cross,613 come from courts, as judicial opinions and 
decisions create standards, which the legal doctrines are made of.  
Even if doctrines are rarely mentioned “as such” in water agreements, they 
are the back mind of states and lead the whole process of negotiation around the shared 
water resources. Despite the emergence of the principles and laws of the non-navigational 
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uses of transboundary watercourses as it will be discussed further,614 many states still hold 
their own “national” convictions regarding the watercourses they share with others, which 
convictions Allouche 615 referred to as water nationalism.  
As discussed in previous sections, the increasing use of transboundary water 
resources and the widespread practice of water diversions by one riparian state on the 
expense of the others that characterised the last two centuries have generally compromised 
the peaceful relations among some riparian states across transboundary watercourses.616 
Claims and counterclaims often came from the riparian states that felt as if their water-
related rights were scorned.617 Faced with the absence of an international regime that could 
settle states disagreements concerning the non-navigational uses of the international 
watercourses, some doctrines emerged, that generally sought to fill the gap and address 
states’ issue in this field.618 It is believed that if there were in place a corpus of applicable 
laws and principles to govern transboundary watercourses at the international level, perhaps 
none of these doctrines would have emerged. Maybe, if they would have emerged, such an 
emergency would have been different from what it has been. 
A few doctrines developed concerning the rights of riparian states vis-à-vis 
an internationally shared watercourse,619 of which four are considered the most 
prominent.620 These include i. the absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine, also referred to 
as the Harmon doctrine, ii. the absolute territorial integrity doctrine, iii. the limited 
territorial sovereignty doctrine, and iv. the common management approach. Though 
incompatible, and sometimes opposed, these doctrines are generally built on the concept of 
the state’s sovereignty over natural resources.621 As argued by McCaffrey,622 the doctrines 
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in this field of law were of great interest before the formation of the current international 
regime that applies to the non-navigational uses of the transboundary watercourses.  
While the first water theory which developed, namely the Harmon doctrine, 
squarely undermined the rights of other sovereign riparian states as already mentioned, 
some of the latest theories, such as the common management doctrine, has undermined 
states sovereignty. This latest doctrine has embarked instead on a regime of community of 
good, which in substance is as questionable as was the Harmon doctrine. States trend to 
prevent water disputes by signing water agreements that recognise the mutual rights over a 
shared watercourse.623 Also, on its course of development, the International water law has 
codified principles of shared waters that champions good neighbourhood while promoting 
cooperation between riparian states around shared water resources. 
4.2.2 The absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine 
It was during the last two decades of the nineteenth century that problems began between the 
USA and Mexico, two co-riparian states to the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers.624 What 
caused the two countries to enter into such a dispute was the growing water diversions 
practised by farmers on the US side, which took significant volumes of waters from the Rio 
Grande River, thus reducing considerably the flow of waters that usually reached Mexico. 
Mexico protested. M. Harmon, the then USA attorney general evoked for the first time the 
absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine that ained at giving an answer to Mexico’s protest.625 
As discussed earlier,626 the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty also 
referred to the Harmon doctrine, claims complete liberty of a riparian state to utilise, as it 
                                                 
 
623 For instance the conflicts between India and Pakistan, to see generally P. Lyon Conflict between India and 
Pakistan: an encyclopedia (2008); Conflict between Austria and Germany (1950s); and between Chile and Bolivia 
(1920s), See water conflict chronology at http://www.worldwater.org/conflict/map/. Accessed on 24 June 2019.  
624 For instance, at the end of the nineteenth century, 1528 canals diverted waters from the Colorado River 
and its tributaries against 1,074 before the year 1880. See generally the USA International boundary 
commission Report of the Boundary Commission Upon the Survey and Re-Marking of the Boundary Between 
the United States and Mexico West of the Rio Grande, 1891-1896. Available at 
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1030/m1/1/  accessed on 12 July 2019.  
625 Ibid. USA International boundary commission. 
626 See section 3.3.4 above. 
 
 
needs the portion of a transboundary watercourse that passes through its territory, 
regardless of the consequences that might be caused to other riparian countries. The 
doctrine also claimed that impactful water utilisations could be undertaken without prior 
consultation with a downstream country likely to be negatively affected.627   
Even though the USA is the country where the Harmon doctrine was 
conceived, history recalls that this country would neither apply nor consider this doctrine 
in the state’s treaty practice.628 Although some US states have time to time argued to 
possess absolute sovereignty over the section of a transboundary watercourse located in 
their territories, the USA federal government has never supported Harmon’s theory. The 
“1906 Convention concerning the equitable distribution of the waters of the Rio Grande for 
irrigation purposes”, for instance, signed between the USA and Mexico, was based on the 
approach of “equitable and acceptable use of the shared watercourse”.629 In addition, the 
“1909 Treaty between the UK and the USA concerning the boundary waters and questions 
arising along the boundary between Canada and the USA” signed between the USA and 
Canada was substantially inconsistent with the Harmon doctrine, but in line with the 
“limited territorial sovereignty doctrine” to be discussed below.630  
At the end of the nineteenth century and the two first decades of the 
twentieth century, a few scholars gave support to the Harmon doctrine.631 Nonetheless, the 
doctrine has not received any significant support ever since. The Harmon doctrine has 
hardly reflected in dispute resolution, nor did states evoke it during diplomatic discussions 
concerning transboundary water resources.632 Be it that Attorney-General Harmon lived at 
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the end of the century in which he expressed his opinion, he would have perhaps, had a 
different opinion. However, despite its shortcomings, the Harmon doctrine is seen as the 
event that caused the emergence of the customary international law of transboundary 
watercourses,633 which for Tarlock,634 developed as a reaction to the Harmon doctrine.  
4.2.3 The absolute territorial integrity doctrine635 
Like the Absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine, the absolute territorial integrity doctrine was 
based also on the concept of state sovereignty. While the Harmon doctrine favoured upstream 
states, the absolute territorial integrity doctrine emerged as its exact opposite and favoured the 
downstream states on the expanse of the upstream ones.636 The core substance of the Absolute 
territorial integrity doctrine is the prohibition of any water development to occur in an upstream 
state, which would interfere with the natural flow of a transboundary watercourse. The doctrine 
confers the right to a downstream riparian state to demand the continuation in full of a natural 
flow of a watercourse from an upstream riparian state, both in quality and quantity terms.637 
However, the shortcoming of the Absolute territorial integrity doctrine was its lack of 
recognition of equal water rights to upstream and downstream states.  
The Absolute territorial integrity doctrine seems to have derived from the 
common law doctrine of riparian rights.638 The riparian rights doctrine claimed that an 
upstream riparian state should let the waters flow naturally downstream without any 
interference thereto, be it in quantity, or in its quality terms. The United Kingdom and the 
USA for instance already incorporated the riparian rights doctrine in their domestic water 
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laws.639 Similar to the doctrine of riparian rights, the doctrine of absolute territorial integrity 
tolerates only minimal water uses by upstream states.640 The riparian rights doctrine 
evolved and recognised eventually the right to each riparian state to use reasonably a 
transboundary watercourse.  
The 1911 Madrid Declaration recognised the Riparian States doctrine, which 
it sought to establish as a rule of international water law. In its statement of reasons, the 
1911 Madrid Declaration recognised: 
“The Riparian States with a common stream are in a position of permanent physical 
dependence on each other which precludes the idea of the complete autonomy of 
each State in the section of the natural watercourse under its sovereignty.”641 
Some scholars have argued that there was no practical need for an antidote-like doctrine, given 
that the upstream countries did not show any support to the Harmon doctrine, as mentioned 
earlier.642 Therefore, by constructing an antidote to the Harmon doctrine, with an imbalanced 
approach, the inventors of the Absolute Territorial Integrity doctrine created a new problem, 
which this time was the favour that the theory ensured to the downstream states.643 Unlike its 
predecessor, this doctrine received broad support, especially from downstream riparian 
states. Countries such as Argentina, Bangladesh, Egypt, Spain, and many Arab states have 
invoked the principle of absolute territorial integrity during water disputes.644 To these 
countries, the doctrine was more as a ‘tool of advocacy’ rather than a legal principle that 
had substantial features, with potential to assist states to resolve water conflicts.645  
The Republic of Egypt is one of the most consistent supporters to the 
Absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine, and one can understand why: up to 96 percent of 
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the waters that flow through the Nile River on the Egyptian territory originates from outside 
the country, whereas the country’s survival depends on the waters of the Nile for at least 
95 percent.646 That is the reason why the country could only be satisfied with a doctrine 
that comforts the rights of downstream riparian, even if, in its practice of water treaties, 
Egypt has concluded agreements that took a more balanced position vis-à-vis its upstream 
co-riparian states to the Nile River.647 The current tussle between Egypt and Ethiopia 
regarding the Renaissance Dam sufficiently illustrates the Egyptian support to the doctrine 
of absolute territorial integrity.648   
The Republic of Pakistan also offers an example that allows glimpsing the 
possibility that lies within a country to evolve from one initial doctrinal position to the 
other.649 Pakistan is the downstream riparian state of the Indus River,650 which crosses 
China, India, and Afghanistan upstream.651 During some initial diplomatic discussions with 
India, Pakistan appeared to be in line with the absolute territorial integrity doctrine. Soon 
after the discussions, the country turned around and proposed the two countries may agree 
upon an ‘equitable apportionment’ of all the streams they shared.652  
Even if this doctrine received slightly more support than its predecessor, it 
was proven not to be just and equitable.653  Making the connection between the Harmon 
and the Absolute Territorial Integrity doctrines, McCaffrey654 concluded that both were 
factually myopic and legally ‘anarchic’, because they ignored other states’ rights on a 
shared watercourse. Besides, the two doctrines ignored that sovereignty entailed both rights 
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and duties. Birnie & Boyle655 concluded that they were both useless because they received 
only limited support whether from states practice, or the jurisprudence and the scholars.656  
Following these two unsuccessful doctrinal attempts, some other conceptual 
frameworks evolved progressively. In most of the cases, the new doctrines including the 
limited territorial sovereignty and the community of interest doctrines built on the ashes of 
these two preceding failures. 
4.2.4 The limited territorial sovereignty doctrine  
The third theory to discuss is the limited territorial sovereignty doctrine, sometimes 
referred to as the doctrine of equitable utilisation, or also the “sovereign equality and 
territorial integrity” doctrine. The limited territorial sovereignty doctrine entitles each 
riparian state, whether upstream or downstream, to equitably and reasonably use the waters 
of a transboundary watercourse that flow through its territory, without upsetting the right 
to use the same flow of waters by the other riparian states.657 In other words, all riparian 
states of an international watercourse have the same rights (and duties) towards its flows. 
That is the reason why some authors have seen in this doctrine a conciliation between the 
absolute territorial sovereignty and the absolute territorial integrity doctrines.658 For 
Schroeder-Wildberg,659 the principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation of shared 
water resources, and the obligation not to cause significant harms were integral parts of the 
limited territorial sovereignty doctrine.  
After the broad recognition of the inapplicability of the two precedent 
doctrines, states resorted to the United Nations Charter and treaties practice to define a new 
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doctrine that would recognise states' equality towards shared water resources.660 The 
limited territorial sovereignty doctrine was the result of this quest. That is why, it is 
generally believed that the limited territorial sovereignty doctrine has its origins in the 
principle of sovereign equality of states, as set out in paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the United 
Nations Charter. Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter provides: 
“The Organisation and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, 
shall act in accordance with the following Principles. 1. The Organisation is based 
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” 661   
Under the limited territorial sovereignty doctrine, the exclusive rights which are 
traditionally claimed by both the upstream and the downstream states find themselves 
restricted by the recognition of equal rights to both groups.662 Both the genesis and 
formulation of this doctrine have caused it to be seen as the prevailing theory in the field 
of transboundary watercourses.663  
From a treaties practice perspective, the limited territorial sovereignty 
doctrine was adopted in most of the treaties passed in recent years. Examples here may be 
the 1995 Agreement on the cooperation for the sustainable development of the Mekong 
River basin,664 the 1995 SADC protocol on shared watercourse systems,665 and the 2002 
framework agreement on the Sava River basin, which have all made express reference to 
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the limited sovereignty doctrine.666 Apart from states practice, a good majority of scholars 
have shown support to this doctrine, in spite of a disapproval from some.667 
4.2.5 The common management/community of interests doctrine 
The common management/community of interests doctrine is the last theory to be discussed 
in this section. This doctrine envisions international river basins as highly integrated and 
cooperative entities, whereby shared natural resources including waters are not approached 
from the traditional rudimentary upstream-downstream states dichotomy fashion, but 
rather, as natural units of integrated and interdependent natural resources and living things. 
Under the community of interests doctrine, river basins have to be regarded as a whole 
integrated thing, and thereby managed accordingly.668 Water resources belong to the 
community and are divided among all the river basin states by way of a treaty. For 
Allouche,669 the basin states thus cooperate between them on a multitude of issues, 
including water management, with the view of maximising the collective good not only of 
the water resources within the river basin but also the good of its dwellers and of the 
ecosystems that are found there. 
The community of interests doctrine was given an early authoritative 
endorsement as far back as 1929, by the PCIJ in the River Oder case mentioned above.670 
Though the case concerned issues of rights of navigation, the judgment of the PCIJ 
concluded as follow:  
“This community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common 
legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian 
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states in the use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any 
preferential privilege of anyone riparian state in relation to the others.”671  
In addition to the PCIJ, the doctrine received significant support from scholars, including 
the ILA.672  Some regional organisations also adopted the “community of interest” theory, 
among which the European Union, for which, argued Moellenkamp673, the principle was 
the core spirit of the community concerning the shared waters of the community. Likewise, 
the provision of Article 2 of the 1995 “Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems of the 
SADC” is based on the community of interest theory.674  
From the perspective of a state, old and recent treaty practices have revealed 
significant adherence to the community of interests doctrine. The “1905 Treaty of Karlstad 
between Sweden and Norway” provides in its Article 4 the following:  
“The lakes and watercourses which form the frontier between the two states or which are 
situated in the territory of both or which flow into the said lakes and watercourses shall be 
considered as common.”675 
Article 1(2) of the 1992 “Agreement on the Establishment of a Permanent Water 
Commission between Namibia and South Africa” provides among other things that the 
Commission’s objective is: “to act as a technical adviser to the Parties on matters relating 
to the development and utilisation of water resources of common interest to the Parties”.676  
The community of interests doctrine recommends the establishment of basin-
wide mechanisms to formulate and implement basin-wide policies that aim at managing a 
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basin’s resources. Allouche677 explains that under this doctrine, the basin states would 
cooperate on a multitude of issues, including water management, ecosystem protection, to 
name but a few, with the view of maximising the collective good.678 The management of 
transboundary watercourses in the Economic Commission for Europe zone seems to have 
followed this recommendation.679  
Despite being considered (to some extent) as an idealistic approach by some 
modern opinions, the community of interests doctrine received support from the ICJ in the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, in 1997.680 In this case, the ICJ reaffirmed the relevance of 
the “community of interest doctrine” by recognising the existence of a community of 
interest in all the uses that may be made of any international watercourse.681 Referring to 
the earlier River Oder case, the ICJ further declared:  
“Modern development of international law has strengthened this principle for non-
navigational uses of international watercourses as well, as evidenced by the 
adoption of the Convention of 21 May 1997 on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses by the United Nations General Assembly.”682 
Based on the community of interest principle, the Court then concluded:  
“Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming control of a shared resource, and 
thereby depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of the 
natural resources of the Danube ... failed to respect the proportionality which is 
required by international law.”683 
McCaffrey684 stressed that the above statement supports the possibility for the community 
of interest doctrine to be referred to as a legal principle that forms the basis for the formation 
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of substantial obligations for riparian states.685 To a certain extent, this common 
management theory is gradually becoming a standard due to the growing recognition in the 
international law of the physical and ecological unity of river basins.686 The modern types 
of environmental challenges, the impacts of climate change on waters and other natural 
resources, and the biological interdependences of ecosystems, all dictate new outlooks on 
the international law of the transboundary watercourses and river basins. 
The ongoing development of the so-called “ecosystems approach” for the 
protection of the environment, including water resources seems to carry a glimmer of hope 
in this regard. Such an approach is likely to catalyse the speed of the legal recognition of 
the physical and ecological unity of river basins both at the international and national levels, 
and by doing so, states may see the opportunity to place more emphasis on the 
establishment of joint management institutions.687 The 1997 UNWCC that will be 
discussed in ample detail later,688 actively encourages watercourse states to enter into 
interstates agreements for arrangements concerning the management of shared water 
resources.  
4.2.6 The connection between states sovereignty and water resources  
As explains Hunter,689 a thoughtful understanding of the above doctrines requires 
questioning the two crucial concepts of “territorial sovereignty” and “territorial integrity” 
which were already explained above.690 Attempts to approach the transboundary water 
resources of a river basin as a common good are generally hampered because of the 
conception of states regarding their national sovereignty over water resources.  
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There are worldwide 310 international river basins, through which rivers 
that cross over state’s territorial boundaries are shared between many sovereign states.691 
These boundary-crossing rivers are exceptional types of resources because they have 
different sections thereof under different state’s sovereignties.692 Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to a state to develop a passionate relationship vis-à-vis its water resources, 
which it considers as a national asset, due to the fact that such a resource is located within 
its national territorial limits. Having understood this, it becomes natural to find that a state 
and its people would try by all means to apply to such a resource their privilege of 
possession and duty of protection. In these conditions, States’ relationships with their water 
resources lead to what Allouche693 qualified as “water nationalism”.  
The whole problem of sharing international watercourses is that, in 
exercising its national sovereignty over a shared water resource, a riparian state should 
consider it as a national obligation to respect and preserve the right of the other riparian 
state vis-à-vis the same water resource. In this view, a State’s approach to the concept of 
sovereignty will largely determine its choice vis-à-vis the legal principles to govern its 
shared water resources. Mcintyre694 noticed that States’ trend was to agree with one 
principle and disagree with the other in order to preserve what they consider as their 
national interests vis-à-vis an international watercourse. For the same author, States by 
doing so often seek to turn the situation to their advantage,695 under the cover of states 
sovereignty over water resources, for which the 1997 UNWCC has eventually represented 
the first attempt of codification in the field of the non-navigational uses of transboundary 
water resources. 
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4.3 Principles of the international law of transboundary watercourses 
4.3.1 Introducing the “principles of law” 
Article 38 (3) of the Statute of the ICJ evoked above, enjoins the court to: “apply the general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations”.696 A principle of law is commonly defined as: 
“an authoritative legal standard of general application, requiring either action or inaction, and 
used by courts and administrative tribunals as a norm in deciding the legal significance of the 
facts presented in particular cases”.697 Unlike the rule of law that is for the most practical and 
binding, the principles of law are general, in the sense that they potentially apply to all 
members of a community and indistinctly through the activities they undertake.698 Whereas 
some principles reflect customary law, others may reflect some emerging legal obligations, 
or otherwise, be recognised as legal principles which are still at a lesser development 
status.699 Principles of law are sometimes used in courts of justice, to decide which one of 
two or more contending applicable rules should be applied in particular cases.700  
In the history of treaties, general principles of law used to be proclaimed in 
the preambles of the instruments.701  It was only recently that these general principles 
started to be incorporated into the operative parts of the treaties and conventions.702 Such 
incorporation constitutes sufficient proof of the increasing importance that states have 
given to the principles of law. Both Articles 3 of the UNFCCC and Articles 3 of the 1992 
Convention on Biodiversity, are a few examples that illustrate the incorporation of a 
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treaty’s principles in the body of the treaty.703 Under climate change circumstances, it is 
critical for water law principles to offer a certain degree of flexibility in their observance 
and application.704 This is because of the uncertainties that accompany climate change. 
Water law principles that are enshrined in the 1997 UNWCC are briefly introduced and 
discussed below, followed with concluding paragraphs that offer a discussion concerning the 
considered principle with respect to the current context of climate change.   
Three “substantive” principles and a few “procedural” principles incumbent 
upon riparian states of transboundary water systems are discussed below. The “substantive” 
principles include the obligation to equitably and reasonably utilise an international 
watercourse; the obligation not to cause significant harm to other riparian states and the 
obligation to cooperate. The “procedural” principles include the obligation to regularly 
exchange data and information, the obligation to notify the other riparian states concerning 
planned measures with possible adverse effects on the shared water resource, and the 
obligation to peacefully settle water-related disputes.   
4.3.2 The principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation 
4.3.2.1 Statement of the principle 
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation of international watercourse is a user-
oriented obligation, which entitles riparian states with the right (and the duty as well) to a 
reasonable and equitable share of a transboundary water resource.705  The waters in concern 
are those the riparian state would draw within its own territory.706 Whether equated with 
the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty,707 or perceived as "operationalising the 
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concept of sustainable development,"708 the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation 
remains to date the “fundamental rule”, the "key principle", and the "cornerstone" of the 
international law of transboundary watercourses.709  
Article 5 of the 1997 UNWCC titled “Equitable and reasonable utilisation and 
participation” provides: 
“1.Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilise an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international 
watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to 
attaining optimal and sustainable utilisation thereof and benefits therefrom, taking 
into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with 
adequate protection of the watercourse.  2. Watercourse States shall participate in 
the use, development, and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable 
and reasonable manner. Such a participation includes both the right to utilise the 
watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and development thereof, 
as provided in the present Convention.” 710  
McCaffrey711 claims the principle to be born of the many cases in which the United States 
Supreme Court had to decide regarding interstates apportionment of shared water 
resources. The USA decisions were then supported by some federal courts across the globe, 
early in the 20th century.712  
The first significant study to focus on the legal implications of sharing 
transboundary watercourses was undertaken by Professor H.A. Smith from London, which 
study was published in a book entitled ‘The Economic Use of International Rivers, released 
in 1931.713 After reviewing and studying several water treaties and transboundary water 
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conflicts, Smith noticed the existence of a broad recognition of water rights to downstream 
states, and consistent reference to the principle of equitable utilisation.714 After being 
practised by states in water treaties in several regions of the globe, the principle took its 
first steps towards a codification under the ILA New York Resolution of 1958.715 The 
second Article of the 1958 New York Resolution maintained the right of a co-riparian state 
to be entitled to a reasonable and equitable share from any benefit derived from the use of 
a shared water resource.716 The principle would be later discussed in Kyoto, in 1964,717 
before being engraved in the 1966 Helsinki Rules.  
The equitable and reasonable utilisation principle was formulated using a 
flexible style. There was no normative definition attached to it. Some authors have viewed 
in such a flexibility a weakness in the principle, in particular after the application of the 
principle in the entire regime of the 1997 UNWCC.718 Yet, others have argued that such 
flexibility was indispensable in the 1997 UNWCC, given the framework nature of this 
convention.719 A framework convention needs to be flexible enough in order to be applied 
in a variety of circumstances. 
Adjacent to Article 5 is Article 6, which provides factors that are relevant to 
equitable and reasonable utilisation.720 In providing for these factors, this provision has 
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equitable entitlement: The legal assessment model (2005); Kaya I, Equitable Utilisation: The Law of Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (2003); ILC the 1994 Draft Articles of the 1997 UNWCC 
(1994). 96-100. 
719 Rieu-Clarke et al. (note 277 above; 12); Tanzi & Arcari (note 279 above) ; A. Rieu-Clarke A & F.R. 
Loures ‘Still Not in Force : Should State Support the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention ? (2009) 18(2) Rev 
of Eur Com & Int’l Env L, 185, 191. 
720 See Article 6 of the 1997 UNWCC. 
 
 
played a pivotal role in the development of the customs of international watercourses, 
especially in matters concerning environmental protection.721 
Besides its endorsement in Article 5 and the related provisions of the 1997 
UNWCC, the principle is present in most of the modern multilateral instruments and 
declarations on the transboundary watercourses. For instance, Article 2.2(c) of the 
Convention of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) on the 
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes of 1992; also, 
Article 2 of the 1995 SADC protocol on shared watercourses, for instance, provide for the 
equitable and reasonable utilisation principle.722 The 1966 Helsinki Rules and the 2004 Berlin 
Rules also have included the principle, in its Articles 4, 5, 7, 10, and 29 (4),  and in Articles 
10.1, 12, 13, 14, and 16.723  
4.3.2.2 The sub-concept of “equitable utilisation” 
The concept of equitable utilisation refers to equity, which is a well-incorporated concept 
in international environmental law.  In its broad sense, equity refers to the quality of being 
fair or impartial.724 Besides its reference by the UN law of the sea,725 the concept of equity 
is present in numerous multilateral treaties including the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD).726 Article 1 on the aims of the CBD prescribes “the fair and equitable 
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sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources”. In the field of 
shared water resources, “equity” has to be seen through the lenses of both Equitable 
Utilisation of shared natural resources and equitable share of the costs and benefits that 
may arise from the management of shared watercourses.727 
In general, there are two types of equity that deserve particular attention.728  
These are the intergenerational and intragenerational equity.729 Intergenerational equity 
considers equity in its verticality, meaning that humans have to be being fair or impartial 
towards the future generations because we 'hold the natural and cultural environment of the 
Earth in common with both the members of the past, the present, and the future 
generations.730 The Intragenerational equity approaches equity in its horizontality. It 
considers that humans have to be fair or impartial towards all the generations that are 
presently on earth.731 The general wording of Article 5 and 6 of the 1997 UNWCC suggests 
that the convention has taken into account the two dimensions of the “Equity” concept. 
4.3.2.3 Sub-concept of “reasonable utilisation”  
Similar to the ambiguity noticed above concerning the concept of equity, there seems to 
also be some ambiguity in the determination of what constitutes “reasonable utilisation” 
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and what does not.732 “Reasonable” is broadly defined as an action based on, or using good 
judgment and, therefore, fair and practical.733 Reasonable utilisation of a shared 
watercourse is a utilisation that is based on sound judgments. In the field of shared waters, 
“reasonable” appears to be a subjective concept, because the use of shared waters, which a 
riparian state may see as “reasonable” might be seen as “non-reasonable” for another 
riparian, and vice versa. Therefore, the determination of the reasonableness concerning the 
use of a transboundary watercourse will necessitate the existence of active water 
cooperation between the riparian states, to help these agree on standards regarding what 
can be regarded as reasonable utilisation of a shared water resource.734  
The ILC briefly explains the modus operandi of a state’s claim for 
unreasonableness regarding the utilisation of a shared watercourse:  
"The plaintiff state starts with the presumptive rule in its favour that every State is 
bound to use the waters of rivers flowing within its territory in such a manner as 
will not cause substantial injury to a co-riparian State. Having proved such 
substantial injury, the burden then will be upon the Defendant State to establish an 
appropriate defence, except in those cases where damage results from extra-
hazardous pollution and liability is strict. This burden falls on the Defendant State 
by implication from its exclusive sovereign jurisdiction over waters flowing within 
its territory.”735 
After that the plaintiff state would have proven the existence of substantial injuries on its 
side, the proof to establish that the utilisation of the shared waters was equitable and 
reasonable would rest on the shoulders of the state whose use of the waters is reported to 
be causing significant harm to others.736 This rule applies in all the cases, except those 
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where the reported injury results from some extra-hazardous sources.737 Nevertheless, the 
guidance that is found in most of the law texts and cases, plus the prescriptions of some 
international customs in the field of transboundary water resources enable a better 
apprehension of the fairness and reasonableness of the use of international rivers.  
4.3.2.4 Application of the equitable and reasonable utilisation principle by international 
and regional jurisdictions 
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation is formulated with terms that are 
flexible and non-definite. Because of such flexibility, the application of this principle in the 
resolution of actual water conflicts has strongly depended on the analysis of the 
particularities of each disputed watercourse by the appointed judges. The notorious 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case738 between the Republic of Hungary and Czechoslovakia (now 
Slovakia), offers one of the most authoritative illustrations in this regard.  
The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case was triggered by the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros project on the Danube River.739 On September 16, 1977, these two countries 
signed a treaty, which instituted an integrated joint project for hydroelectric power 
generation, flood control, and navigation.740 The project further included an investment 
program. Each country was supposed to carry out the project in its territory and at its 
expense. The conflict began when, on May 13, 1989, Hungary unilaterally suspended the 
project operations on its portion of the Danube River, causing Czechoslovakia to replicate 
with the unilateral implementation of its ‘Variant C’ of the project.741 The ‘Variant C’ of 
the project was one of the alternatives the country has for the development of the concerned 
section of the Danube River.742  
The implementation of the ‘variant C’ of the project by Czechoslovakia 
caused a significant decrease in the overall flow of the Danube River downstream, thus 
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harming Hungary. In front of such a challenge, Hungary became obliged to consider the 
project as “environmentally unsound”, and therefore take an appropriate action, which for 
the country was the unilateral termination of the 1977 Treaty.743 On its side, the 
Czechoslovakian government claimed the project to be environmentally sound, showing 
themselves willing to resolve any environmental issue, which may have arisen, under the 
frame of the 1977 Treaty, which Hungary unilaterally terminated. 
The matter was brought to the ICJ. The ICJ considered the case and released 
its decision four years later, on September 25, 1997. The Court held that both 
Czechoslovakia/Slovakia and Hungary were authors of wrongful acts, and therefore in 
breach of their international obligations. The ICJ’s judgment was pronounced took into 
account the International law of transboundary watercourses, and particularly Article 5(2) 
of the 1997 UNWCC, which erects into obligation the duty for riparian states to equitably 
and reasonably utilise a transboundary watercourse. This is among other things, what 
substantially the ICJ held:  
“Re-establishment of the joint regime will also reflect in an optimal way the 
concept of common utilisation of shared water resources for the achievement of the 
several objectives mentioned in the Treaty, in concordance with Article 5, 
paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses”.744  
Besides the pronouncement relating to the equitable and reasonable utilisation principle, 
the judgment rendered by the ICJ on the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case has also clarified 
several other issues in the field of transboundary watercourses, including the obligation that 
lays on riparian states not to cause harms to each other, and the obligation to cooperate.745 
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4.3.3 The “no significant harm” principle 
4.3.3.1 Statement of the principle 
The principle of “No significant harm” is one of the widely recognised principles in the field 
of environmental law.746  It is particularly crucial in the field of international water law. Some 
scholars see in the “No significant harm” principle an emanation of the doctrine of limited 
territorial sovereignty.747 According to the no significant harm principle, no state within an 
international river basin is allowed to use the section of the transboundary watercourse in its 
jurisdiction in a way that could cause any significant harm to any other co-riparian state. 
Harms to a co-riparian state may concern the state’s environment, safety, 
population’s health, whether human, animal or vegetal.748  Article 7 of the 1997 UNWCC 
provides: 
“1.Watercourse States shall, in utilising an international watercourse in their 
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm 
to other watercourse States. 2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to 
another watercourse State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the 
absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard 
for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to 
eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of 
compensation.” 749   
The no significant harm principle was already present in the 1911 Madrid 
Declaration and the 1966 Helsinki Rules.750 It is also present in current Multilateral 
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Environmental Agreements (MEA) and Declarations, such as in Article 3 of the 1992 CBD, 
in principles 21 and 22 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, and in principles 2, 4, 13, and 
24 of the 1992 Rio Declaration.751 Furthermore, this principle has received steady support 
from the international tribunals in almost all the cases pronounced so far. McCaffrey752 
claimed that there is to date no known decision from any international court that supports 
any contrary rule to the no-harm principle.  
Despite such a broad recognition, there are some unresolved fundamental 
questions with respect to the no significant harm principle. These fundamental questions 
are attached to the “significant” and the “harm” qualifiers of the principle. The first is “what 
is the scope of the qualifier ‘significant’”; and the second refers to the threshold from which 
a “harmful” occurrence becomes “significant”. In order to be significant states have argued 
that the level of the harm will need to be high, but not merely perceptible,753 because if a 
harm is merely perceptible, it will be considered insignificant if a disagreement arises 
between states.754 For Rieu-Clarke,755 an occurrence must be more than carrying a mere 
“adverse effect” to qualify as “harm”. It has to be a real impairment for the use or otherwise 
has some detrimental consequences on the environment or the socio-economic dimensions 
of the harmed state. The example here includes public health harms, damages on properties, 
industries, or agriculture. In all these cases, the significant character of harm has to be 
established by some pieces of evidence that are objective, which pieces of evidence would 
be determined on an individual basis.756 
Concerning harmful occurrences under the 1997 UNWCC, some of them 
may be tolerated in certain circumstances, provided they do not cross the threshold of 
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becoming “significant”.757 Notwithstanding the other provisions of the 1997 UNWCC, a 
riparian state is not to be held responsible for causing harm to another (in the event of a 
state complaint), provided it proves that it has taken all appropriate measures to avoid such 
harm to happen.758 With such twists and concessions accompanying the no-harm claim, the 
possibility for a demanding state to legally establish that a defending state has caused it 
significant harm becomes very limited. 
4.3.3.2 Application of the principle in the jurisprudence  
The Lake Lanoux arbitration case referred to has maintained that ‘there is a rule prohibiting 
the upper riparian state from altering the waters of a river in the circumstances calculated 
to do serious injury to the lower riparian state’.759 Apart from the Lake Lanoux case, two 
more examples can be advanced of topical applications at the regional level. The first is 
from the Declaration of Asunción of June 1971 in Southern America, whereas the second 
is in the treaty on boundary waters between the US and Canada. Paragraph 2 of the 
Declaration of Asunción of June 1971, signed between Argentina and Brazil provided: 
“in successive international rivers, where there is no dual sovereignty, each state 
may use the waters in accordance with its needs provided that it causes no 
appreciable harm to any other state of the La Plata Basin.”760 
Under this provision, it transpires that both Argentina and Brazil have accepted a regime 
with some form of limited territorial sovereignty, due to the obligation not to cause 
appreciable harm to the other. The second example is drawn from the Boundary Waters 
Treaty between the US and Canada, signed in 1909, and that referred to many water law 
principles, including the no-harm principle. The US-Canada Boundary Waters Treaty 
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provides none of the two countries could make water a diversion or obstruction that is likely 
to injure the other state without the latter’s prior consent.761 
Similar to the 1971 Asunción Declaration, the 1909 USA and Canada 
boundary waters treaty has limited the territorial sovereignty of both signatories after signing 
the mutual obligation not to cause any injury to the each other without prior consent’.762  
4.3.4 The principle of cooperation  
4.3.4.1 Statement of the principle 
The 1997 UNWCC establishes a general Principle of Cooperation in transboundary 
watercourses setups.  Article 8 of the Convention stipulates: 
“1.Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial 
integrity, mutual benefit, and good faith in order to attain optimal utilisation and 
adequate protection of an international watercourse. 2. In determining the manner 
of such cooperation, watercourse States may consider the establishment of joint 
mechanisms or commissions, as deemed necessary by them, to facilitate 
cooperation on relevant measures and procedures in the light of experience gained 
through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms and commissions in various 
regions.”763 
The principle of cooperation is one of the most fundamental for the international law of 
transboundary watercourses. Due to its broad scope, the principle intertwines with almost 
all the other principles of this field.764  
According to the United Nations, water cooperation refers to “the peaceful 
management and use of freshwater resources at local, national, regional and international 
levels among various players and sectors.”765 Biswas claimed that water cooperation would 
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be the principal challenge of the 21st Century,  because of the impacts of climate change on 
water resources and the necessity for adaptation and sustainable management of 
transboundary watercourses.766 In this view, the 1997 UNWCC obliges states to consider 
taking into account “sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit, and good faith” 
every time they would engage in water cooperation, in order to achieve optimal utilisation 
and adequate protection of their shared watercourses.”767  
4.3.4.2 Joint management institutions  
Biswas’768 above claim concerning water cooperation is also justified by the necessity to 
harmonise and sometimes coordinate states’ effort in the field of climate change adaptation, 
for a sustainable management of shared watercourses. In general, water cooperation 
requires the establishment of joint management institutions, whose mandate includes the 
regulation of all the uses of the transboundary watercourses of the region covered by the 
institution.769 Under Article 8(2) of the 1997 UNWCC, however, there seems to be no 
explicit legal obligation to establish such joint management institutions whether at 
watercourse or at river basin levels.  
Article 8(2) above provides “In determining the manner of such cooperation, 
watercourse States may consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions…”.770 
The treaty uses the word “may”, which means that it does not intend any binding rule behind 
the provision. States have therefore the latitude to appreciate the necessity or not to establish 
joint management institutions at river basin or watercourse levels.771  
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However, the unbinding character of Article 8(2) does not mean that the 
1997 UNWCC has not granted proper attention to joint mechanisms for water management. 
The overall spirit of the 1997 UNWCC remains its openness and flexibility in order to give 
enough space to riparian states to decide which system works better in their particular 
contexts. Although it actually obliges state consultations in certain circumstances, Article 
8, which is in line with Article 24, may as well be seen as recommending states to ‘enter 
into consultations’ with each other to consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or 
commissions, as they would think necessary, concerning the management of their 
international watercourses. In that regard, the sixth ILC Special Rapporteur observed:  
“The management of international watercourse systems through joint institutions 
is not only an increasingly common phenomenon but also a form of cooperation 
between watercourse States that is almost indispensable if anything approaching 
optimum utilisation and protection of the system of waters is to be attained.”772 
Effective implementation of the 1997 UNWCC will mostly rest upon the establishment of 
some degree of joint institutional arrangements for better coordination of the management of 
a shared watercourse, whether bilateral or multilateral ar watercourse or river basin levels.773 
4.3.4.3 Discussing the necessity of water cooperation at the transboundary level 
There is at the transboundary level a global consensus on the necessity for riparian states 
to cooperate around their shared waters. A recent deliberation of the UN Security Council 
during an open debate on water, peace, and security recalled the same.774 The then UN 
Secretary-General, Mr Ban Ki-moon, stressed the determining character that cooperation 
around water resources would play towards the future of peace and security at the global 
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level. What motivated Mr Ban Ki-moon was the scope of the looming climate change-
related water crisis: 
“By 2050, at least one in four human beings will live in a country where the lack 
of freshwater is chronic or recurrent. Climate change will only aggravate these 
difficulties, especially in basins shared by several countries. It is particularly 
important to coordinate water management for the more than 260 international 
watercourses and transboundary aquifers, which are at least as numerous… Water 
challenges affect us all. Let us use this Security Council meeting to highlight the 
value of water as a reason for cooperation, not conflict. And let us commit to 
investing in water security as a means to ensure long-term international peace and 
security.”775 
Somewhat in the same direction as the Secretary-General, Bokova776 
claimed that cooperation over water resources at a local, national, and regional scales was 
the only possible way forward if humanity ever expects to overcome the many challenges 
surrounding water resources in the climate change era that the world has entered in. With 
the rise of climate change pressure on water resources, the interconnections that already 
exist between water resources and politics tend to become more complex.777 While the 
water-climate nexus poses a global safety problem as explained above,778 abundant 
literature has confirmed that states' propensity to cooperate is stronger than their propensity 
to conflict over shared water resources.779  
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4.3.4.4 Application of the principle in judicial decisions 
Two “historical cases” can be referred to as examples of the application of the principle of 
cooperation in judicial decisions by international tribunals. These cases comprise the Lake 
Lanoux arbitration case between France and Spain, and the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case 
between Hungary and Czechoslovakia/Slovakia. Both cases were discussed earlier.780 In 
the Lake Lanoux case, the court called upon both countries to effectively cooperate around 
the shared Lake, in order to better respect and take into account the interests and rights of 
the downstream riparian states in the projects of upstream states on a shared watercourse.781   
Likewise, in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, the ICJ’s decision reads the re-establishment 
of joint regimes as an optimal way of common utilisation of shared watercourses.782 
Both the Lake Lanoux arbitration case and the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
settlement illustrate the application of the cooperation principle through judicial decision, 
as both cases have acknowledged the necessity to cooperate around transboundary 
watercourses because of the existence of a “community of interest” attached to this 
particular type of context.783 
4.3.5 The other principles of international water law  
The other relevant principles to be briefly outlined in this thesis are the principle of regular 
exchange of data and information, the principle of notification concerning planned 
measures with possible adverse effects, and the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. 
These less impactful principles, sometimes even controversial, were proposed to a greater 
extent by either the ILA or the IIL.784 They are now all codified under the 1997 UNWCC, 
and therefore form part of the international conceptual framework to govern transboundary 
watercourses and issues relating to them.  
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4.3.5.1 Principles of regular exchange of data and information 
Articles 9 of the 1997 UNWCC introduces the principle of regular exchange of data and 
information that riparian states may detain concerning a transboundary watercourse.785 Yet, 
the principle was already applied by treaties before the 1997 UNWCC, but often in a non-
binding form, whether in water treaties or in declarations of principles. Article 9 (1) of the 
1997 UNWCC provides:   
“1.Pursuant to article 8, watercourse States shall on a regular basis exchange 
readily available data and information on the condition of the watercourse, in 
particular, that of a hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological 
nature and related to the water quality as well as related forecasts.”786 
Under this provision, the exchange of the “readily available data and information” on the 
“condition” of a shared watercourse constitutes an international obligation for riparian 
states. 
Articles VI to VIII of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, for instance, or Articles 2 
to 5 of the 1995 SADC protocol on shared watercourse systems, or even the 1992 UNECE 
Watercourses Convention, in its Articles 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16, have all made reference 
to the principle of exchange of data and information.787 The Declarations that have considered 
the principle include the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment (principles 13, 
22, and 24),788 the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (principles 7, 9, 
12, 13, 17 and 27),789 and the1966 Helsinki Rules (Articles XXIX and XXXI). 
                                                 
 
785 Articles 5 (2), 8, 9, 11, 12, 24.1, 25.1, 27, 28(3), and 30 of the 1997 UNWCC refered to these principles.  
786 Artcile 9 (1) of the 1997 UNWCC. 
787 The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty is available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTs/Volume%20419/volume-419-I-6032-English.pdf , accessed on 
11 September 2019. The 1995 SADC protocol on shared watercourse systems available at 
http://www.samsa.org.za/Documents/SADC_Protocol_on_Shared_Watercourses.pdf , accessed on 11 
September 2019; the 1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention available at 
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/pdf/watercon.pdf , accessed on 11 September 2019. 
788 See Principles 13, 22, and 24 of The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment. 





Considering the fact that issues regarding water resources are increasingly 
politicised, the fear around this principle of exchange of data and information is that states 
may not completely comply with this obligation.790 This is because information or data on 
water resources that are regarded as strategic by a state may not be easily shared with the 
other riparian states, as most of the States consider several types of information to be 
strategic.791 Such strategic information and data are sometimes related to shared water 
resources, in which case, the 1997 UNWCC do not put any obligation on any state to share 
such information. .of the 1997 UNWCC provides:  
“Nothing in the present Convention obliges a watercourse State to provide data or 
information vital to its national defence or security. Nevertheless, that State shall 
cooperate in good faith with the other watercourse States with a view to providing 
as much information as possible under the circumstances.”792 
This principle of regular exchange of data and information and that of water cooperation 
are intertwined because States would smoothly exchange water data and information within 
a pre-establish water cooperation framework, than without, as per Article 8 of the 1997 
UNWCC discussed earlier.793 
4.3.5.2 Principles of notification concerning planned measures with possible adverse 
effects 
Beyond the obligation to regularly exchange data and information, riparian States are 
obliged to notify each other concerning any planned measure on the shared watercourse. A 
state would further cooperate with the other riparian states for any development on a shared 
watercourse that may have adverse effects.794 Adverse effects that are mentioned here are 
                                                 
 
790 See the final report of the Australian ‘NSW strategic water information and monitoring plan’ available at 
https://www.industry.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/153806/NSW-strategic-water-information-
and-monitoring-plan-final-report.pdf , accessed on 12 July 2019. 
791 W. Yu ‘Benefit sharing in international rivers: findings from the Senegal River Basin, the Columbia River 
Basin, and the Lesotho highlands water project." Working Paper 1 (2008). 
792 Article 31 of the 1997 UNWCC. 
793 McCaffrey (d) (note 388 above; 86). 
794 UNGAS Sixth Committee (51st Session) ‘Summary Record of the 12th Meeting of the Working Group 
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses’ (7 October 1996) UN Doc 
 
 
either present or future effects of such a development.795 Articles 11 and 12 of the 1997 
UNWCC provide:  
“11. Watercourse States shall exchange information and consult each other and, if 
necessary, negotiate on the possible effects of planned measures on the condition 
of an international watercourse. 12. Before a watercourse State implements or 
permits the implementation of planned measures which may have a significant 
adverse effect upon other watercourse States, it shall provide those States with 
timely notification thereof. Such notification shall be accompanied by available 
technical data and information, including the results of any environmental impact 
assessment, in order to enable the notified States to evaluate the possible effects of 
the planned measures.”796 
The logical consequence of the provision above is that every riparian state of a 
transboundary watercourse is entitled to prior notice and consultation in case of any project 
“which is likely to have a substantial adverse effect on the shared watercourse”. In this 
circumstance, being notified becomes a right for a riparian state, especially if the proposed 
project is likely to cause to it an adverse effect . On the basis of the precautionary principle, 
such an obligation exists even if the context gives the impression that there not any 
possibility of significant harm, as per Article 6 of the 1997 UNWCC.797 Yet there is a 
significant degree of unpredictability associated with the determination of what effect 
qualifies as adverse and what does not, in order to implement Articles 11 and 12 above. 
Although generally accepted by states and endorsed in several bilateral and 
multilateral instruments and declarations, the prior notification principle is opposed by 
                                                 
 
A/C.6/51/SR.12 at 4-12; Committee on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, ILA, Chapter 4 of the 
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers’ (1966). 
795 Birnie & Boyle (note 386 above; 322). 
796 Articles 11 and 12 of the 1997 UNWCC. 
797 The Precautionary principle is a key principle in International Environmental Law. It begun to appear in 
international legal instruments in the 1980s. The Core of the Precautionary principle is reflected in principle 
15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development mentioned earlier (see note 776 above). It 
proclaims: “where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not 
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”.  
 
 
some riparian states.798 From the very beginning of the process of negotiation of the 1997 
UNWCC, it is reported that the principles under Articles 11 to 18 of the 1997 UNWCC 
were opposed by some riparian states that are positionally upstream.799 During the adoption 
of the 1997 UNWCC, Ethiopia, Rwanda, with twenty-four other states would abstain from 
voting, whereas Turkey and two other states would vote against the 1997 UNWCC.800 
Nevertheless, the ILA clarified the controversial character of the principles by a statement 
the organisation made, which it referred to as the “Complementary Rules Applicable to 
International Water Resources”, adopted in Seoul, South Korea, in 1986. In this statement, 
the ILA explained:  
“When a basin State proposes to undertake or to permit the undertaking of a project 
that may substantially affect the interests of any co-basin State, it shall give such 
State or States notice of the project. The notice shall include information, data, and 
specifications adequate for assessment of the effects of the project.”801  
It is believed that the opposing States mentioned above were most reluctant 
to the principles of law under Articles 11 to 18 of the 1997 UNWCC because of their content, 
which they did not correctly understand at least, at a first stage.802 That is why the ILA had 
to issue a declarative clarification aimed at helping these states better understand the content 
and the modus operandi of these principles in order to improve states cooperation and 
adherence to these principles. Despite these efforts, the observation is that  Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
and Turkey were not part of the 1997 UNWCC at the time of the entry into force.803   
                                                 
 
798 The opposing states include Ethiopia and Rwanda for the Nile River basin, and Turkey for the Tigris–
Euphrates River basin. See details in Birnie & Boyle (note 386 above; 319). 
799 Ibid. Birnie & Boyle. 
800 Ibid.; See section 4.4. below. See annexe1 below of the list of states at the adoption of the 1997 UNWCC. 
801 S. Bogdanovic International Law of Water Resources: Contribution of the ILA (1954-2000)’ (2001), 364. 
802 Ibid. at 365. 
803 List of countries party to the 1997 UNWCC available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
12&chapter=27&lang=en  , accessed on 10 June 2019. 
 
 
4.3.5.3 Principles of peaceful settlement of disputes 
This section could not finish without discussing the issue of water conflicts, to which the 
regime of the 1997 UNWCC gives an important place. The peaceful settlement of water-
related disputes calls all riparian states of transboundary watercourses to settle issues on 
shared watercourses by peaceful means, in the hypothesis of states failing to reach an 
agreement by negotiation. From a transboundary water law perspective, “dispute” can 
involve a range of situations, stretching from minor disagreements to serious 
controversies.804 Dispute implies “a disagreement on a point of law, a fact, a conflict of 
legal views or of interests between at least two persons.”805 It requires at least two opposing 
sides, which have to “‘hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the 
performance or non-performance of certain’ international obligations.”806 The existence of 
a dispute is determined whether by particular facts, or by any statements or documents that 
may be exchanged between the parties, or by any exchanges made in multilateral settings, 
or at last by the conduct of the parties.807  
The lengthy Article 33 of the 1997 UNWCC provides for peaceful 
settlements of disputes over transboundary watercourses. Paragraph 1 of Article 33  of the 
1997 UNWCC provides: 
“In the event of a dispute between two or more parties concerning the interpretation 
or application of the present Convention, the parties concerned shall, in the absence 
of an applicable agreement between them, seek a settlement of the dispute by 
peaceful means in accordance with the following provisions.”808 
 
                                                 
 
804 S.C. McCaffrey (k) ‘Water disputes defined: characteristics and trends for resolving them’ in Resolution 
of International Water Disputes (2003), 49–51. 
805 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Objection to the Jurisdiction of the Court, (Germany v. United 
Kingdome) (1924) P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, 6. 
806 See Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. 
Colombia.), I.C.J. Preliminary Objections (2016), 27; See Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Romania, I.C.J Advisory Opinion (1950), 74. 
807 See Obligations concerning negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear 
disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), I.C.J Preliminary Objections (2016), 19–20. 
808 Article 33 (1) of the 1997 UNWCC. 
 
 
Dispute resolution in matters pertaining to transboundary waters is different 
from dispute resolution in matters relating to water resources at national level. Mechanisms 
for dispute resolution in international settings reflect mechanisms of general international 
law.809 In international law, state sovereignty remains the fundamental element in dispute 
settlement, as they have to remain in control of the process, even after consenting to the 
mechanisms to resolve a dispute. Globally accepted conflicts resolution mechanisms 
includes “legal mechanisms”, and “Assisted Negotiations or Third party involvement”. The 
legal mechanisms comprise arbitration and adjudication procedures.810  
In arbitration procedures, the arbitrators and the procedure they apply are 
chosen by the parties that act in all confidentiality, whereas in adjudication procedures, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) appoints judges to the matter, whereas parties have no 
discretion over the composition of the court, nor any control over its rules of procedures. 
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN. It has its own rules of procedure, to which 
the parties are to abide. 
The third party involvement mechanism implies that the conflicting states 
choose to make use of a neutral individual, a state, or an international organisation. Third 
party involvement can consist of a range of mechanism, including: the facilitation/good 
offices,811 mediation, fact finding/inquiries, and conciliation. Good offices are attempts to 
influence the opposing parties to enter into negotiations. It facilitates the dialogue between 
them, making it possible to them to meet and discuss.812  Good offices does so through, for 
instance, providing a venue for the discussions to take place. Good offices do not have any 
active role in terms of the content of the discussions. Its role habitually ends once the parties 
start negotiating.  
                                                 
 
809 See Articles 2(3) and 33 of the UN Charter 
810 Ibid. 
811 See generally Salman M.A. Salman, Good Offices and Mediation and International Water Disputes, in 
Resolution of International Water Disputes 155, 158. 
812 S.C. McCaffrey (k) ‘Water disputes defined: characteristics and trends for resolving them’ in Resolution 
of International Water Disputes (2003), 49–51. 
 
 
Mediation mechanisms consist of a neutral third party between the 
conflicting parties, which has an active participation in the negotiation process.813 The 
parties generally agree on a mediator whom they chose. The mediator is involved in 
communication between the parties, finding common grounds, clarifying issues, drafting 
proposals, etc. He is generally entitled to make suggestions to the conflicting parties to find 
and adopt a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict. A fact finding mechanism is 
conducted either by a panel of experts or by a single one.814 The role of the experts is to 
investigate and make impartial findings on the disputed facts, and eventually suggest to the 
parties the terms of settlement of the conflict.  
A conciliation mechanism is an impartial third party. It is often a formal, 
institutionalised and impartial commission.815 Its mission is to investigate and objectively 
establish the facts of the conflict, and find the applicable law. A conciliation mechanism 
may also submit proposals to the parties as a solution to the conflict, or even as a way 
towards such a solution.816 
The principle of peaceful settlement of disputes is incorporated in the 
majority of modern treaties on international waters and proclaimed in notorious 
declarations touching environmental matters including shared water resources.  The 1992 
CBD for instance, or the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, the 1995 SADC protocol on shared 
watercourse systems, the 1995 Mekong Agreement, and the 1992 Convention on the 
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes” of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe,817 to name but a few, have all made reference 
to the principle of peaceful settlement of water disputes.818 Well-known declarations 






817 The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe is hereinafter referred to as the “UNECE”. The 
1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 
is hereinafter referred to as the “1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention”.  
818 See Article 27, Annexe II of the 1992 CBD; Article IX, Annexure F, G of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty; 
Article 7 of the 1995 SADC protocol on shared watercourse systems; Articles 18.C, 24.F, 34, 35 of the 1995 
Mekong Agreement; Article 22, IV of the 1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention. 
 
 
include the 1966 Helsinki Rules, the 1992 Rio Declaration, and the 2004 Berlin Rules on 
Water Resources.819 
There is an ongoing court case concerning the Silala River in southern 
America, which opposes Chile and Bolivia since June 6, 2016.820 This case is expected to 
apply the 1997 UNWCC over the status and the use of the waters of the Silala River.821 
There is a great expectation that the conclusion of the Silala River case in the coming years, 
would enrich the list of judicial decisions rendered in transboundary matters which so far 
seems to be meagre in comparison to cases rendered in some other fields.822 
4.3.6 The connection between the principles of transboundary water law  
The principles of international law that govern the transboundary watercourses as discussed 
above are closely interrelated.823 For McCaffrey,824 such interrelations are inherent to the 
complex nature of the rights and obligations that are placed on riparian states because of 
the transboundary character of these water resources. The same author825 noticed that 
compliance with one of these principles could have a significant influence on the 
compliance vis-à-vis the others, and vice versa. The case to be discussed is the connections 
between the “no significant harm” principle and the “equitable and reasonable utilisations” 
principle, which are both intertwined in various ways.826 Article 7 of the 1997 UNWCC 
                                                 
 
819 Articles XXVI and XXXVII of the 1966 Helsinki Rules; Principle 26 of the 1992 Rio Declaration; Articles 
72–73 of the 2004 Berlin Rules. 
820 See Unofficial Press Release, International Court of Justice: ‘Chile Institutes Proceedings against Bolivia 
with Regard to a Dispute Concerning the Status and Use of the Waters of the Silala’ No. 2016/16 (June 6, 
2016), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/162/19018.pdf , accessed on 7 October 2018; See Rossi (note 47 
above; 56). 
821 With the Silala case pending before the International Court of Justice, there is great expectation that in the 
coming years, the list of judicial decisions rendered in transboundary waters issues will increase the 
contribution which so far is meager in this field.  
822 Rossi (note 47 above; 55). 






obliges riparian states not to cause significant harm to each other, whereas Article 5 obliges 
them to equitably and reasonably utilise transboundary watercourses.   
The ILC 1994 draft Articles of the 1997 UNWCC has clarified the relations 
that are between the “no significant harm” and the “equitable and reasonable utilisations” 
principles. The ILC’s commentary concerning Article 7 of the 1997 UNWCC reads: 
“Where, despite the exercise of due diligence, significant harm is caused to another 
watercourse 
State, the State whose use causes the harm shall, in the absence of agreement to 
such use, consult with the State suffering such harm over:  
(a) The extent to which such use is equitable and reasonable taking into 
account the factors listed in article 6; 
(b) The question of ad hoc adjustments to its utilization, designed to 
eliminate or mitigate any such harm caused and, where appropriate, the 
question of compensation.”827  
The above precision from the 1994 Draft Articles shows that a State that has 
diligently complied with Article 5 of the 1997 UNWCC  may nevertheless be accused of 
breaching the convention’s Article 7. In such a case, even though the plaintiff State may prove 
the existence of harm, it must foremost check if the defendant state did not comply with its 
obligation under Article 5, to equitably and reasonably utilise the shared water resource. In the 
case of positive compliance with Article 5 by the defendant state, a charge of breaching a 
conventional obligation may not be retained against it, neither would such a State undergo any 
condemnation.828  
The defending state, however, would not content itself with such an absence 
of liability. It would not merely walk away free of any corrective action; the defending 
State would need to take actions in the sense of mitigating or reducing or to the possible 
extent totally suppressing the harm that was unintentionally caused to the plaintiff State.829 
The conclusion here is twofold: i. The use of shared water resources by one riparian state can 
                                                 
 
827 ILC the 1994 Draft Articles of the 1997 UNWCC (1994), 102.  
828 McCaffrey (d) (note 388 above; 91). 
829 Ibid.; See Article 7.2. of the 1997 UNWCC. 
 
 
cause significant harm to another, even if such use is equitable and reasonable;830 ii. there is 
no breach of the obligation under Article 7 of the 1997 UNWCC if a defendant state will 
prove its due diligence in observing Articles 5 and 6 of the 1997 UNWCC, provided the 
plaintiff’s claim is based on harms stemming from water use by the defendant state.831 
A further illustration of the intertwined character of the legal principles of 
international water law is provided by the pivotal role played by the obligation to cooperate 
under the 1997 UNWCC. The implementation of almost all the other principles of the 
convention depends on the existence of states cooperation.832 The ILC emphasised this 
affirmation while recognising that it was not possible to imagine any other development 
concerning the convention happening without cooperation. In that regard, the ILC made 
the following comment concerning Article 8 of the 1997 UNWCC on ‘General Obligation 
to Cooperate’: 
“Article 8 lays down the general obligation of watercourse States to cooperate with 
each other in order to fulfil the obligations and attain the objectives set forth in the 
draft articles. Cooperation between watercourse States with regard to their 
utilisation of an international watercourse is an important basis for the attainment 
and maintenance of an equitable allocation of the uses and benefits of the 
watercourse and for the smooth functioning of the procedural rules contained in 
part three of the draft.”833 
Water cooperation relates to both the “no significant harm” and the 
“equitable and reasonable utilisation” principles in several ways. Various studies and 
treaties have repeatedly stressed the importance of state cooperation first if one seeks to 
achieve equitable and reasonable utilisation of transboundary watercourses.834 Aso, 




832 Rieu-Clarke et al. (note 277 above;123). 
833 See the provision Article 8(1) of the 1997 UNWCC. See ILC the 1994 Draft Articles of the 1997 UNWCC 
(1994), 106. 
834 See, for instance, Articles 24 and 30 of the Mekong River basin agreement, Articles 3 and 4 of the 2000 
Revised SADC Protocol, and Articles 3 and 4 of the 2002 Framework Agreement of the Sava River basin. 
See also the 1944 USA-Mexico Water Treaty; 1964 Columbia Treaty between USA and Canada; and Articles 
 
 
riparian States that have already developed working water cooperation will naturally refrain 
from causing any harm to each other, in comparison, for instance, to the riparian states that 
have not yet developed such a cooperation framework.  
4.4 The United Nations Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses of May 21, 1997 
The factors and information associated with the genesis of the 1997 UNWCC were 
discussed in section 3.3.6 above. This section focuses on the legal aspects thereof.    
4.4.1 Adoption and legal form 
The 1997 UN-Watercourses Convention is the instrument that has codified the global 
norms in the field of transboundary watercourses.835 The convention was adopted on May 
21, 1997, in  New York, USA, and entered into force on August 17, 2014.836 Its adoption 
was a global expression to see the development of an international legal framework to 
govern the use of the waters of the transboundary watercourses.837 The 1997 UNWCC is a 
framework convention. It includes thirty-seven articles and four parts, plus an annexe that 
is dedicated to disputes Settlement. Most of the provisions of the Convention are drafted in 
binding terms, with the summons “states shall” being omnipresent.838 The convention’s 
style has remained general, vague, and balanced, leaving enough room for States practice 
and interpretation to contextualise its substantial and procedural obligations.  
In the period that preceded the adoption of the 1997 UNWCC, states’ 
expectation was that the convention would help improve the management of shared water 
resources. One common anticipation from downstream and upstream states was that the 
                                                 
 
VI–VIII of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. There is also the preamble of the 1961 IDI Salzbug Resolution, 
and  Article 5 of the Montreal Rules on Water Pollution in an International Drainage Basin. 
835 S.C. McCaffrey (c) The Evolution of International Law relating to Transboundary waters (2017), 205; E.B. 
Weiss The Evolution of International Law (2007) 331 Recueil des c, 165; McCaffrey (j) (note 289 above; 17). 
836 See note 790 above.  
837 C. Tagus ‘La Convention sur le droit relatif à l’utilisation des cours d’eau internationaux à des fins autres 
que la navigation : Interprétations et Perceptions’ (2014), 6 ; available at http://www.ihei.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/M%C3%A9moire-2014.pdf , accessed on 27 July 2019. 
838 See for instance Articles 3,5,7,6(2), 8(1), 9, 10(2) of the 1997 UNWCC. 
 
 
convention would take into consideration all the claims related to the complex process of 
sharing transboundary waters.839 After the adoption of the convention, the expectations then 
turned towards seeing States ratifying the convention for its entry into force. Having 
considered all these series of state’s expectations, McCaffrey840 argued that the adoption of 
the 1997 UNWCC could be looked at as a victory. The convention affirms the sovereignty 
of each state on the waters that are present on its territory and provides a global framework 
in which all states could a priori find their account, whether upstream or downstream.841 
4.4.2 The objective of the convention  
The 1997 UNWCC does not have a provision expressly dedicated to its objective. However, 
its preamble states that  
“The Parties to the present Convention… Taking into account the problems 
affecting many international watercourses resulting from, among other things, 
increasing demands and pollution, Expressing the conviction that a framework 
convention will ensure the utilisation, development, conservation, management, 
and protection of international watercourses and the promotion of the optimal and 
sustainable utilisation thereof for present and future generations, Affirming the 
importance of international cooperation and good-neighbourliness in this 
field…”842 
The objective of the Convention, therefore, is to ensure the utilisation, the development, 
the conservation, the management, and the protection of international watercourses, and 
also ensure the promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilisation thereof, for the present 
and future generations, having in mind the capital character of the international cooperation 
and good neighbourliness among countries. 
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840 McCaffrey (j) (note 289 above; 187). 
841 Article 8 (1) of the 1997 UNWCC. 
842 The Preamble of the 1997 UNWCC. 
 
 
4.4.3 The convention’s core principles 
Five principles are generally regarded as the most substantial in the international regime of 
transboundary watercourses.843 These principles include:  
i. The equitable and reasonable utilisation principle;  
ii. The obligation not to cause significant harm;  
iii. The obligation to cooperate; and  
iv. The notification of other states regarding planned measures; 
v. Peaceful dispute settlement. 
These principles are enshrined in Articles 5 to 10 of the 1997 UNWCC and were discussed 
in the previous section.844  
4.4.4 The convention’s slow ratification process and delayed entry into force 
The 1997 UNWCC entered into force after almost seventeen years of opening to 
ratification, following the 35th state ratification, pursuant to Article 36 of the convention.845 
Besides, there were 23 years of negotiation that led to its adoption, bringing to 44 the 
number of the years needed for the emergence of the current international regime of 
transboundary watercourses. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam became the Convention’s 
35th ratifying state, after submitting its instrument of accession on May 19, 2014.846 That is 
the reason why, on its comment on the 1997 UNWCC, Salman847 observed that the 
Convention’s entry into force was “only the climax of a very long, difficult and complex 
process”. 
However, the treaty’s delayed entry into force received considerable 
attention from scholars, who generally set out to find the reasons behind such a 
                                                 
 
843 McCaffrey (a) (note 145 above; chapter 5). 
844 See section 4.3.5 above. 
845 Article 36 of the 1997 UNWCC provides: “1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth 
day following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations...” 
846 For details, see note 785 above. 
847 S. Salman ‘Entry into force of the UN Watercourses Convention: why should it matter?’ (2015) 1 (31) Int 
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phenomenon, especially after the broadly successful treaty adoption.848 Table 3 below 
offers a comparative analysis of the timeframe between the adoption and entry into force 
of some environment-related treaties.  
For the World Wildlife Foundation (WWF),849 many states were 
experimenting the phenomenon of “treaty congestion” at the time of the adoption of the 
1997 UNWCC; that is the reason why they could not give to it the necessary political 
attention. As argued by Anton,850 treaty congestion is a phenomenon that is caused by the 
appearance of too much law, at a too fast speed. The WWF851 further indicated that the lack 
of a specific institution such as a secretariat to the 1997 UNWCC, which would be tasked 
with advocating for the Convention’s fast entry into force was an additional reason for its 
lethargy. For Bošnjaković,852 the delay reflects the existence of tensions around the regime 
of the treaty. For this author, the delay further shows that states fundamental divergences 
that characterised the treaty’s negotiations process were not fully resolved at the time of 
the adoption of the treaty. However, the reasons for the convention’s delayed entry into 
force might as well be elsewhere, as will be discussed in the next section.  
                                                 
 
848 See section 4.4.5 below. 
849 The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is a NPO whose mission is to conserve nature and reduce the most 
pressing threats to the diversity of life on Earth. See for more details: https://www.worldwildlife.org/about , 
accessed on 15 May 2019.  
850 Anton, Don. Treaty Congestion'in International Environmental Law (2012), 2. 
851 The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is a NPO whose mission is to conserve nature and reduce the most 
pressing threats to the diversity of life on Earth. See for more details: https://www.worldwildlife.org/about , 
accessed on 15 May 2019.  




Table 3: Time spent between the adoption and the entry into force of some MEA 
 












90th day following the 30th 
instrument of ratification, 






115 197 Dec. 1996 ~2 years 90th day follow. the 50th … 
UNFCCC855 4 June 1992 165 197 
21 Mar. 
1994 





195 186 4 Nov. 2016 ~1 year 
30th day following the 55th 
…party representing 55 










90th day follow. the 20th … 
UN-Water 
Conv.858 





90th day follow. the 35th … 
Source: This thesis own comparison of information.  
 
From the above table, it becomes evident that states poorly support the 1997 
UNWCC, even from the time of its adoption. It also becomes palpable that states poor 
                                                 
 
853  See the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity at https://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf , 
accessed on 12 July 2019. 
854 See the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification at : 
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accessed on 12 July 2019. 
857 See the Vienna Convention on the Protections of the Ozone layer at 
http://mountainlex.alpconv.org/images/documents/international/convention_ozone_layer.pdf , accessed on 
12 July 2019. 
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support caused the lack of interest in treaty ratification, thus delaying the treaty’s entry into 
force. Whereas 14 years were necessary to gather 35 ratifications for the entry into force of 
the 1997 UNWCC, it only took a few months to the 2015 Paris Agreement to realise the 
same performance. Also, from a figure of 103 signatures for treaty adoption to obtaining 
only 36 ratifications after 14 years, there must be some reasons behind that might need 
further investigation.  
4.4.5 States’ reluctance to ratify or join the convention 
Some of the immediate questions that naturally come when one is analysing the regime of 
transboundary watercourses are “why the states that voted for the adoption of the 1997 
UNWCC have been after that generally reluctant to its ratification?”859 a further question 
may also be “Did any significant change occur either to the convention or to some states 
after the adoption of the 1997 UNWCC, and which caused states to distance themselves 
from the convention?”860 Whatever the answers to these two questions, the decrease of 
States’ support to the 1997 UNWCC as observed so far does not reflect what was States’ 
aspiration during the negotiation phase of this treaty. Scholars have expressed different 
views in that regard.861  
Stoa,862  for instance, thought that states might have changed their positions 
vis-à-vis the 1997 UNWCC right after its adoption, whereas Salman863 went far and 
advanced six reasons, which he thinks were the explanation of States’ drawback from the 
1997 UNWCC. Salman’s first reason relates to the relationship between the equitable and 
reasonable use principle (Article 5) and the no significant harm principle (Article 7). As 
mentioned earlier, downstream riparians states tend to favour the no-harm principle 
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because it protects the actual uses of shared waters against the new ones, and protects the 
downstream states from significant impacts that may result from upstream States’ projects.  
Conversely, upstream riparian states have a tendency to view the 1997 
UNWCC as biased and mostly in favour of the downstream riparians.864 Upstream States’ 
conviction is based on the prescription of Article 6 of the 1997 UNWCC, which poses an 
obligation to a riparian State not to cause significant harm to the others. In this regard, 
Salman865 noticed that States that opposed the 1997 UNWCC and those that abstained from 
voting for it were mainly upstream states vis-à-vis the waterbodies they belong.866 Seeing 
that it is generally the downstream states that are plaintiffs, the upstream States felt in 
Article 6 above a lack of equilibrium that favoured the downstream States. In general, 
upstream states lean towards favouring the equitable and reasonable utilisation principle 
because it gives them more latitude to utilise the shared watercourse, even for activities that 
may have non-significant impacts downstream.  
On the other hand, downstream states also complained about the 1997 
UNWCC.867 Their fears were based on the same provisions of Articles 5 and 7. They 
claimed that the convention was in favour of the upstream riparians.868 Downstream states 
argued that the regime created by the 1997 UNWCC was subordinating the no significant 
harm principle to the equitable and reasonable use principle, thus favouring the upstream 
states.869  They further claimed that under the 1997 UNWCC’s regime, upstream states 
could be free from any international responsibility if they could prove to have observed due 
diligence and complied with Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, even if there may exist 
allegations from downstream states of harmful conducts. For Salman, 870 although this issue 
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867 Salman (note 860 above; 8). 
868 Ibid.; Downstream states such as Egypt, France, Pakistan or Peru abstained from voting for the convention. 
See annexe 1 below on the category of votes by states during the adoption of the 1997 UNWCC.  
869 Salman (note 860 above; 8). 
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was debated and solved under the working group tasked at negotiating the convention, it 
seems as if the plaintiff states lost the conviction that the compromise that they accepted 
during the negotiations would work for their interests.  
These two positions, however, are not representative of the opinions of the 
majority of States, whether upstream or downstream. States, whether upstream or 
downstream, voted for the convention in a way or another after a definite consideration of 
the content and the implication of these two provisions. The main issue here relates to state 
inaccuracy in the perception and interpretation of Articles 5 and 7 of the 1997 UNWCC.871 
A significant number of countries that voted in favour of the adoption of the 1997 UNWCC 
are downstream states. Countries such as the Netherlands, Portugal, and South Africa are 
in this category. This implies that the perception by some downstream countries that the 
Convention was biased and in favour of upstream countries is inaccurate and a mere 
misrepresentation of the truth.872 However, such a misrepresentation that has significantly 
contributed to states’ reluctance from the 1997 UNWCC.873 
The second factor advanced by Salman relates to the perception by upstream 
riparian states that the notification process established by Articles 12-19 of the 1997 
UNWCC was in favour of downstream riparian states because it provides them with a sort 
of “veto power” over upstream projects.874 This conception is also erroneous because it is 
based on the idea that the harm that is regulated under Article 7 can only travel downstream 
but not upstream. The reality is that downstream states as well can harm the upstream ones. 
For example, a poor upstream state can be harmed by a potential foreclosure from future 
uses of the shared watercourse.875 The Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia is a typical case of an 
upstream state being harmed by a downstream state by way of a potential foreclosure of 
any future development on a shared watercourse. 876  In other words, an upstream state can 
be prohibited from developing its share of water in a transboundary watercourse tomorrow, 
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if a more prosperous downstream state has already implemented earlier some developments 
on the shared watercourse.  
The third factor that has led to states' reluctance from ratifying the 1997 
UNWCC is how its regime has dealt with the existing transboundary water agreements.877 
Some riparian states that already had water agreements in place think that the 1997 
UNWCC has failed to give full recognition to those existing treaties.878 The unhappy states 
have built such a conviction on the fact that the 1997 UNWCC suggests that the country 
parties may consider harmonising their existing agreements in the sense of aligning them 
with the Convention’s principles. On the other side, riparian states that were left out by the 
existing treaties were not happy, too, because they believed that the 1997 UNWCC should 
have subjected all the previous water treaties to its provisions by requiring from treaties a 
consistency with the overall regime it has established.879 However, this reason, as the two 
previous ones, find their roots in the lack of accurate understanding of the provisions of the 
1997 UNWCC.  
Thinking on Salman’s third factor, the 1997 UNWCC does not affect any 
existing rights or obligations stemming from bi- or multilateral treaties on shared watercourses 
signed before its adoption and entry into force.880 Water agreements that are in force remain 
so, depending on the will of its signing States. Nonetheless, the 1997 UNWCC does ask the 
signing parties to consider, if they deem it necessary, to harmonise such existing treaties with 
the principles that are proclaimed in the Convention. Such an approach is reflexive of the 
flexibility of the 1997 UNWCC, which goes to the extent of allowing watercourse states to sign 
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agreements that contextualise its provisions and make their individual water treaties fit the 
specific characteristics of their international watercourses.881 
The fourth reason relates to the dispute settlement mechanism under the 
1997 UNWCC.882 Whereas some riparian states view in this mechanism a too weak dispute 
settlement tool because of its lack of any binding character, others see in it a compulsory 
mechanism.883 These State’s concern revolves around the finding procedure established 
under the 1997 UNWCC, which for them,  interferes with the general principle of a state’s 
sovereignty to choose its dispute settlement procedure.884 Being a framework convention, 
the 1997 UNWCC does provide for a primary mechanism for determining the facts of the 
dispute, and after that, leaves the process to the parties to agree or disagree on suitable 
conflict resolution methods. The only obligation which the convention establishes, in this 
case, is that parties are to submit their dispute to an impartial fact-finding process for the 
sake of dispute resolution rather than putting undue burden over states.885 
The Fifth factor that has caused states reluctance vis-a-vis the 1997 
UNWCC’s regime is the apprehension by some States that by joining the convention, they 
would lose part of their sovereignty over the transboundary watercourse; the inclusive 
definition of “international watercourse” under the 1997 UNWCC has also reinforced this 
perception.886 A few states already criticised the 1994 draft convention for its failure to 
expressly refer to the state’s sovereignty over the part of a transboundary watercourse located 
in its territory. For Salman,887  states that develop such a perception indicate a failure to grasp 
the basics of the contemporary international law of shared water resources. To raise higher 
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or praise states sovereignty beyond what the 1997 UNWCC already did would have equated 
to giving a new credit either to the absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine or perhaps to the 
absolute territorial integrity one, depending on how downstream and upstream states would 
have understood such a provision.    
The idea of a global treaty on transboundary watercourse was indeed the 
vow of all states.888 Nevertheless, the application of such a treaty is what perhaps posed a 
problem. As claims Guzman889  "all states agree that cooperation is necessary, but they after 
that disagree on how this cooperation would take place". A majority of States agreed on the 
principle of having a global instrument that would regulate riparian states' relationships and 
in the meantime, regulate their relationships with their shared watercourse. However, it 
appears as if, at the end of the negotiation process, a majority of them could not be satisfied 
with the outcome. 
Even before considering the relatively small number of states’ signatures to 
adopt the 1997 UNWCC, there exist some other significant factors, which are further 
indications of the malaise around the 1997 UNWCC; a malaise that should have been 
addressed. Thirty-one States did not attend the 1997 UNWCC adopting session, whereas 
27 that were present abstained from voting, and 3 voted against the convention. Such a 
significant stand away move was from the beginning a sign that something essential already 
stalled, which the negotiation process perhaps was unable to notice or address.  
A negative vote constitutes an act of rejection of any convention, whereas 
an abstention may mean in certain circumstances a rejection of a convention’s regime.890 
The physical absence of a state’s delegates from the voting session can be diversely 
interpreted, but in the end, it generally suggests a lack of interest to the matter which is 
being voted.891 However, it must be stressed that not all states have an interest in the topic 
of the non navigational uses of transboundary water resources. This is the case for island 
states, for instance. It is therefore understandable that a category such as the island states 
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would not show a great interest to the voting process of the 1997 UNWCC, to the extent of 
not being present for its adoption.  
For Rieu-Clarke, 892 however, there is a great need to improve the issue of 
the legal regime of transboundary watercourses; and "if nothing is done in that view,  it is 
likely that states will not be able to cooperate over shared watercourses, and will instead 
manage their shared watercourses in a fragmented way”. Fragmented approaches to the 
management of transboundary water resources are no longer recommended because they 
are considered ineffective to address the contemporary issues surrounding transboundary 
water resources, including the impacts of climate change.893 
Before closing this section, it is appropriate to briefly outline the 
“Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes” of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe of 1992, because its 
regime will be evoked in chapter 7 below through the cases study of the Danube and Rhine 
watercourses. 
4.5 The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes of March 17, 1992 
The  1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention was adopted at Helsinki, on March 17, 1992. 
It entered into force four years later, in 1996.894 The Convention was prepared with the 
assistance of the UNECE, whose secretariat arranged a draft for nearly two years.895 The 
Convention aims at ensuring sustainability in the use of transboundary water resources by 
facilitating states' cooperation.896 The 1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention was initially 
conceived to address the needs of the UNECE countries. The UNECE region is 
characterised by abundant rainfalls and dense hydrographic networks of domestic and 
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transboundary watercourses.897 The environmental degradation and water pollution that 
became a major concern in the early 1990s within the UNECE space reflected on the 
UNECE 1992 Watercourse Convention, whose regime focuses on the protection of the 
environment and the waters of the region.898  
In 2003, the  1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention was amended to allow 
accession to any UN member state, which accessibility would become effective from 
March 2016.899 This opening meant that two UN multilateral agreements would cover the 
same subject matter, thus bringing in the field of international water law an unprecedented 
situation, regarding the operationality of such a potentially dualistic regime.900 Some 
authors have evoked the possibility of applying the lex posterior derogat priori rule, 
according to which a new treaty derogates an old one.901 In that sense, they have claimed 
that the 1997 UNWCC would be derogatory to the 1992 UNECE Watercourses 
Convention. However, it has been demonstrated that, in the event of provisions 
compatibility between these two conventions, the lex posterior derogat priori rule would 
not be operative, being that the two treaties are rather complementary to each other.902  
The relationship between these two complementary treaties is what the ILC 
qualifies as “a relationship of interpretation”.903 A case of “relationship of interpretation” 
arises when “a norm in either of two treaties is able to assist in interpreting a norm within 
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the other treaty, in the sense of its application, clarification, modification, or even its 
updating. In the case of a relationship of interpretation, both norms are “applied in 
conjunction”.904 Therefore, a relationship of interpretation is what better defines the 
relationship between the regimes under the 1997 UNWCC and the UNECE 1992 Water 
Convention.905  In other words, the systemic integration of both rules is possible.  
Tanzi,906 who earlier studied these matters, noticed certain characteristics on 
both treaties that make them complementary. For this author, even though both treaties had 
the same operational objective on subjects such as the establishment of a cooperative spirit 
and the establishment of joint institutions and structures, their approaches to issues 
regarding the non-navigational uses of the transboundary watercourses were quite different. 
Matters such as the adoption of joint bodies and related arrangements are treated differently 
in both instruments.907 Furthermore, Tanzi908 noticed that the 1997 UNWCC inclined more 
on the “economic and equity” dimensions of the non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses, whereas the 1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention rather leaned on 
environmental protection issues.  
A further area of complementarity of the two treaties comes from the fact 
that they do not all approach some specific subjects with the same level of detail. Regarding 
the principle of the equitable and reasonable use of shared waters, for instance, even if the 
two treaties have adopted it, the 1997 UNWCC seems to have displayed more details 
regarding its content and implementation, in comparison to the 1992 UNECE Watercourses 
Convention. On the other hand, the 1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention appears more 
comprehensive than the 1997 UNWCC concerning the protection of aquatic ecosystems 
and the prevention of water pollution.909  
Based on the above explanations, there seem to be no legal grounds for seeing 
as inappropriate the co-existence of both UN convention in the field of transboundary 
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watercourses. A the time of the drafting of this thesis, seventeen states were parties to both 
treaties, whereas twenty-seven states were a party only to the 1992 UNECE Watercourses 
Convention, against nineteen states that were a party only to the 1997 UNWCC.910 
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has introduced and discoursed on the conceptual and legal frameworks that 
govern the transboundary watercourses at the international level. The focus of this thesis 
being the laws that govern transboundary the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries, 
it was crucial to first discuss and understand the fundamental features of the international law 
of transboundary watercourses, to ensure a base for the thesis future thinkings. Furthermore, 
any recommendation to be formulated by this thesis at a later stage regarding the integration 
of the climate change dimension in the legal regime that governs the waters of the Congo 
River and its transboundary tributaries will need to be based on the international laws and 
principles applicable to transboundary watercourses. The United Nations codified only 
recently the international law of the non-navigational uses of transboundary watercourses 
through the adoption of the 1997 UNWCC. Before that, there was a legal vacuum in this 
field, which caused a general uncertainty concerning States’ rights and duties towards a 
transboundary watercourse. During that time, some doctrines were emitted including the 
absolute territorial sovereignty, the absolute territorial integrity, the limited territorial 
sovereignty, and the community of interest, aimed at helping states solve their claims and 
counterclaims in transboundary water matters. The advent of the 1997 UNWCC has codified 
some early principles in this field including the equitable and reasonable utilisation, the no-
significant harm, the principle of cooperation, the regular exchange of data and information 
on shared watercourses, the prior consultation of other riparian, and the principle of peaceful 
resolution of water conflict along shared watercourses. Apart from analysing some 
substantial features of the 1997 UNWCC, this chapter has also briefly introduced the 1992 
UNECE Watercourses Convention, opened to accession to all member states of the UN since 
2016, and being found substantially complementary to the 1997 UNWCC.  
The next part of this thesis will introduce the hydrography of the Congo River 
and its tributaries and describe the legal regime that governs its water resources.  
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5 HYDROGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF THE CONGO RIVER 
AND ITS TRANSBOUNDARY TRIBUTARIES  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to provide a hydrographic description of the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries. The objective of this chapter is to describe the main features of 
the Congo watercourse, in order to enhance the understanding of its particularities. After 
reviewing in the previous chapter the theoretical and legal basis of the international law of 
transboundary watercourses, a description of the hydrography of the river system under 
study was crucial before any analysis of the legal framework of such a unique 
transboundary water system. As postulates McCaffrey,911 “knowledge of the general 
characteristics of Earth’s water system is necessary for an understanding of the effect of 
legal rules governing  the use of freshwater.” Therefore, a few analyses will be undertaken 
at the end of this chapter, after that all the necessary hydrographic descriptions have been 
made. The analysis will cover selected issues related to the impacts of climate change on 
the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries. Although the description of the Congo 
water system is the primary focus of the chapter, this will not help much unless the water 
resources which are described are viewed from a slightly broader perspective. As suggest 
Lamb,912 the study of a geographical area should always be approached as inherently 
transdisciplinary, with due consideration to a range of other transversal factors. This 
chapter comprises six sections, contents of which are designed to cover its objective. The 
first section broadly presents the Congo River basin. The second presents the Congo River 
and its tributaries. The third focuses on the direct and indirect impacts of climate change 
on the waters of the Congo River. The fifth section discusses a way forward for the Congo 
watercourse, before closing with a conclusion.  
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5.2 The Congo River basin 
5.2.1 Presentation 
The Congo River basin is located in the Central African region.913 According to the 
definition of a river basin discussed earlier,914 the Congo River basin can be understood as 
the land area from which all surface run-offs that form the Congo watercourse flow from, 
before discharging themselves into the Atlantic Ocean. The Congo River basin extends from 
latitude 090 15’ N in the Central African Republic to latitude 130 28’ S in the Republics of 
Angola and Zambia, and from longitude 310 10’ E at the great African Lakes to longitude 110 
18’ E at the Atlantic Ocean.915 Map 1 below illustrates the geographical extent of the basin. 
 
Map 1: The Congo River basin: physical delineation and position in Africa 
 
 
Source: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luapula, accessed on 24 July 2019. 
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The Congo River basin includes at least ten countries which are Angola, 
Burundi, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, the DR-
Congo, Gabon, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia.916 Sources are divergent regarding the 
number of states that form the Congo River hydrographic basin, and researchers are 
inclined to include a more significant number of states, among which Uganda, South-
Sudan, and Malawi, depending on the aim of a study.917  
The river basin occupies a surface of approximately 3.8 million square 
kilometres, which covers almost the entire territorial surface of the DR-Congo, much of the 
surface of the Republic of the Congo, a vast portion of the CAR, and some portions of Angola 
and Cameroon.918 Table 4 below gives an idea of the surface areas of the countries that form 
the Congo River basin and displays the countries’ shares in the total area of the basin. 
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Table 4: Elements of the geographical profile of the States of the Congo Basin 
Source: CICOS920 
The population that lives across the basin is estimated to be around 93.2 
million inhabitants.921 For most of the riparian countries of the Congo watercourse, the 
current average annual rate of population growth, which is around 3 percent will double in 
the next 25 years.922 Such an augmentation in the basin’s population size will doubtlessly 
have repercussions on the basin’s shared water resources because an increased number of 
people will mean higher water demand and further pressures on water resources.923 
5.2.2 The legal status  
The 1885 General Act of Berlin is the statutory document that gave a legal existence to the 
Congo River basin. Article 1 of the Berlin Act begins with providing a legal definition and 
delineation to the Congo River Basin. The provisions of Article 1 of the Berlin Act reads 
as follow:   
                                                 
 
919 Ibid.  




923 Ibid.  
Country 
Total Area of 
Country (km2) 




Share of the 
country in the 
total area of the 
Basin (%)919 
The total area 
of the country 
within the 
Basin (%) 
Angola 1,246,700 285,395 7,69 22,90 
Burundi 27,834 14,574 0,48 52,40 
Cameroon 475,440 96,395 2,70 20,30 
Congo 342,000 246,977 6,90 72,20 
CAR 622,980 403,570 10,80 64,80 
Gabon 267,667 1,146 0,03 - 
RD-Congo 2,344,860 2,313,350 62,10 98,70 
Rwanda 26,340 6,464 0,10 24,50 
Tanzania 945,090 244,593 4,50 25,90 
Zambia 752,610 177,735 4,70 23,60 
Total/Mean 7,051,521 3,790,199 100.00  
 
 
“1. … This basin is bounded by the watersheds (or mountain ridges) of the adjacent 
basins, namely, in particular, those of the Niari, the Ogowé, the Shari, and the Nile, 
on the north; by the eastern watershed line of the affluents of Lake Tanganyika on 
the east; and by the watersheds of the basins of the Zambesi and the Logé on the 
south. It, therefore, comprises all the regions watered by the Congo and its 
affluents, including Lake Tanganyika, with its eastern tributaries. 2. In the maritime 
zone extending along the Atlantic Ocean from the parallel situated in 2Âo30' of 
south latitude to the mouth of the Logé. The northern boundary will follow the 
parallel situated in 2Âo30' from the coast to the point where it meets the 
geographical basin of the Congo, avoiding the basin of the Ogowé, to which the 
provisions of the present Act do not apply. The southern boundary will follow the 
course of the Logé to its source and thence pass eastwards till it joins the 
geographical basin of the Congo. 3. In the zone stretching eastwards from the 
Congo Basin, as above defined, to the Indian Ocean from 5 degrees of north latitude 
to the mouth of the Zambesi in the south, from which point the line of demarcation 
will ascend the Zambesi to 5 miles above its confluence with the Shiré, and then 
follow the watershed between the affluents of Lake Nyassa and those of the 
Zambesi, till at last, it reaches the watershed between the waters of the Zambesi 
and the Congo.” 924 
5.2.3 Population and demography 
The Congo River basin is the biggest river basin in Africa, and the second in the world after 
the Amazon basin (6,915,000 square kilometres).925 About one hundred million people 
lived in the Congo Basin in 2015.926 The people are diversely dispersed across the Congo 
River basin, with three-quarters of the population of the basin living in the DR-Congo. The 
coincidence is somewhat ordinary because the DR-Congo represents 62 percent of the 
surface of the basin. The most populated areas of the basin are along the border between 
the DR-Congo, Burundi and Rwanda on the eastern edge of the basin, and also in the sector 
between Kinshasa and Mbuji-Mayi in the western edge of the basin.927 Rwanda has the 
                                                 
 
924 See Article 1 of the 1885 Berlin General Act, available at http://21548675.weebly.com/berlin-conference-
general-act-1885.html , accessed on 10 April 2019. 
925 CICOS (note 918 above; 19). 
926 Ibid. 
927 Ibid.; Kinshasa is the capital city of the DR-Congo. Mbuji Mayi is one of major cities of the DR-Congo. 
 
 
highest density on the basin, with about 400 people per square kilometre, and is followed 
with Burundi, which has around 300 people per square kilometre. The basin’s lowest 
density is found in areas that have between eight to eleven people per square kilometre.928  
The Republic of Angola, the CAR, and the Republic of the Congo contribute 
each with about seven to ten percent of the population of the basin. whereas nearly seven 
million Tanzanians are in the Congo River basin. In general, the population in the basin is 
very young, with more than 42 percent of the population being under 14 years. The majority 
(59 percent of the population) live in rural areas. If the current demographic trend continues, 
prediction says that the basin’s population will double before the year 2035,929 which will 
result in a worsening of the pressure that is currently put on the natural resources of the 
region, including waters. Scholars strongly advise that the exploding demographics of the 
region should be taken into consideration while planning over shared water resources.930 
5.2.4 Climate 
The climate of the basin is hot and humid and characterised with abundant rainfalls on a 
large part of its surface.931 A closer focus on the microclimate of the basin reveals a wide 
variety of climates of smaller scope across smaller landscapes.932 The cases of the 
microclimates created by the influences of the Atlantic ocean westwards and the Indian 
ocean eastwards contribute to the diversification of the climate within the basin. The 
influences of the equatorial zone and those of the mountains at the eastern edge of the basin 
participates as well in the determination of some more localised climates across the basin. 
Also, the uneven extension of the basin on either side of the Equator line (5° N and 13° S 
latitude) constitutes a further contribution to the diversification of the climate of the 
basin.933 Around the Equator line, the temperatures hardly fall below 20 degree Celsius but 
do change considerably north-eastwards and south-eastwards, because of the abundant 
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930 Ibid.  
931 A. Haensler (note 35 above; 4-5). 




plateaus and of mountains, and the high altitudes. The temperature of the basin gravitates 
to an average of around 25 degrees Celsius.934  
The distribution of seasons is unequal throughout the Congo River basin; 
neither do seasons last equally. There are in general two seasons, one is the dry season, and 
the other is the rainy season. The rainy season lasts from April to the end of June (the long 
rainy season), and from September to the end of October (the short rainy season) in the 
northern part of the basin. The dry season, in turn, lasts from early November to the end of 
March (long dry season) and from early July to the end of August (short dry season).935 In 
the southern part of the Congo basin, under the Equator line, the rhythm of seasons referred 
to hereabove is reversed, thus providing to the basin a regular climate throughout its 
territory. The regularity of the climate across the basin reflects in the region’s regular water 
supply, which comes from sources northwards and southwards from both sides of the 
Equator line.936 Map 3 below gives an overview of the climatic zones of the Congo River 
basin. The bluer the colour is the wetter the climate becomes. 
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935 In the eastwards mountainous regions of the basin, two dry seasons last only one month, in January and in 
July. In the south and south-east of Katanga, the rainy season starts in mid-October and gets pro-runs until 
mid-May. In North Katanga and the South Kasai, the rains begin in early October to stop at the end of April, 
but a short dry season in the month of January. See for further details on the climate of the Congo River basin; 




Map 2: An overview of the climatic zones of the Congo River basin  
 
Source: Haensler (note 902 above; 41) 
 
5.2.5 Hydrology and precipitation 
The Congo River basin carries about 32 percent of Africa’s freshwater resources.937 Its 
main channel is the Congo River, which will be discussed in section 5.3 below. The 
northern and southern regions of Africa respectively receive 9 and 12 percent of the 
continent’s rainfall, the Congo basin receives over 35 percent of its precipitations.938 
Precipitations in the basin are 1,100 mm to 1,700 mm per year on average, with some peaks 
of 2,000 mm observed in the DR-Congo specifically.939 Some parts of the Republic of 
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Congo and the DR-Congo receive an average of more than 2,000 mm of rains per year and 
include several flood-prone areas.940  
The part of the Congo River basin that is situated in Tanzania has its lowest 
average annual rainfall estimated to approximately 1,100 mm per year, whereas the part of the 
basin that is within the DR-Congo has the basin’s highest average annual rainfall, estimated to 
almost 1,700 mm per year, suggesting more vulnerability for floods as it will be explained 
further.941 Extensive area and abundant rainfall patterns make the DR-Congo receive about 
two-thirds of all the rains of the basin, while the country contributes with roughly the same 
proportion to the total amount of the waters that flow through the Congo River basin.  
5.2.6 Rainforest and biodiversity 
Apart from its special endowment in water resources, the Congo River basin is equipped 
with a dense tropical forest cover and exceptional biodiversity, which are interrelated to 
water resources.942 The Congo River basin is home to a significant portion of the world's 
biodiversity.943 The flora at the lowland areas of the basin has more than 10,000 species of 
plants, of which 3,000 are endemic.944 Forests naturally play the role of GHG sinks, thus 
contributing to the reduction of the atmospheric stocks of GHG.945  
Forests also play a significant role in the hydrological cycle of a river basin. 
Monitoring the waters of a basin should, therefore, be extended to monitoring its forest 
cover.946 The forest cover of the Congo River basin spreads over an area of nearly 160 
                                                 
 
940 Beyene (note 38 above; 4). 
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943 B.Tchatchou et al. Changement climatique dans le Bassin du Congo: Informations et connaissances 
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million hectares. The conservation and enhancement of the basin’s environmental wealth 
are critical in contributing to the global effort to tackle climate change.  
However, the basin’s dense tropical forest and abundant water resources are 
increasingly threatened by aggravating deforestation. In the period between 2000 and 2005 
for instance, the average of the basin’s annual rate of deforestation was already approaching 
0.17 percent.947 Increasing deforestation and forest degradation are feared because they will 
have repercussions on the availability of water resources across the basin. There is a 
pressing need to halt deforestation and forest degradation across the basin and replaced 
them with forest conservation and enhancement, in order to avoid further impacts on the 
basin’s hydrology.  
Several forest concessions for industrial and commercial logging have been 
conceded by some of the countries of the basin to quite a few third operators in the timber 
industry. The concern is that these operators are often left with little state supervision, and 
nearly no adequate mechanism in place for reforestation, or sustainable forest 
management.948 There are increasing numbers of international organisations that are giving 
to the forest cover of the Congo River basin considerable attention for water and 
biodiversity conservation, with the view of reaching adequate basin’s contribution to 
climate change response.949 
If forests, in general, contribute to the sequestration of the atmospheric 
GHG, 950  as mentioned above, the Congo River basin constitutes a special case. 951  In 2017, 
a recent study on the peatlands of the “inner delta” or “cuvette centrale” of the Congo River 
has discovered that the Congo basin’s peatlands are home to some of the world’s biggest 
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underground carbon storages.952 These peatlands that measure approximately four percent 
of the Congo basin area have stored nearly 30 billion tonnes of carbon. This amount of 
stored carbon is the equivalent of almost 30 percent of the world’s reserve of tropical 
peatland carbon, and 20 years of the US emissions from fossil fuel.953 The conservation of 
these peatlands and the search for the sustainability of the hydro-forestry complex of the 
Congo River basin are increasingly regarded as matters of global concern.954 
5.3 The Congo Watercourse 
5.3.1 Historical background  
The Portuguese explorer Diego Cão discovered the mouth of the Congo River in 1482. 
After his discovery, he erected a pillar of stone on the shore of the river to mark his 
discovery.955 Because of the presence of a pillar of stone on its shore, the Congo River was 
referred to by the passer-byes in those early epochs as the “Rio de Pedrão”, meaning the 
"River Pillar".956 However, the Portuguese named it “Congo” after the name of the ancient 
Kongo kingdom, which existed upstream. The indigenous people of the Kongo kingdom 
themselves referred to the same river as the “Nzadi”, or dialectally “Nzai”, meaning "the 
river", in one of the local dialects. In the sixteenth century, the word “Nzadi” would be 
translated by the Portuguese into “Zaire”, which is the name that the late president 
Mobutu957 would choose for the DR-Congo and its River, from the year 1971 to 1997.958 
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956 The lower part of the Congo River was called “Barbila” in a distant time, whereas its upper part was called 
the “Lualaba” (or Lwalaba); see for details: Ibid. Devroey & Campenhout. 
957 Mr. Mobutu was a former president of the Demcratic Republic of the Congo, who stayed in power from 
1965 to 1997. He was born in 1930 and dyed in 1997, few months after his overthrow by the rebels troops 
of Laurent Desire Kabila. For more information on Mobutu, see 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mobutu-Sese-Seko, accessed on the 9 June 2019. 
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Henry Morton Stanley was the first European to have navigated the whole 
Congo River, from its source (the Lualaba River) to its mouth (at the Atlantic Ocean) in 
1877.959 Stanley’s expedition along the Congo River dispelled a confusion that existed in 
that epoch concerning the source of the Nile River. In that epoch, the Lualaba River was 
thought to be the source of the Nile River. Thanks to his expedition along the Congo River, 
Stanley discovered that the Lualaba was not the source of the Nile River, but instead the 
source of the Congo River, thus proving the first widespread belief to be wrong.960 
The navigable network formed by the Congo River and all its tributaries 
reach approximately 25,000 kilometres length.961 Such a considerable network of 
waterways is what for centuries connected the heart of the African continent to the rest of 
the world, through the Atlantic Ocean. Even though there is a natural barrier of stones (the 
Livingstone Falls), which is situated at the lower section of the Congo River and, which 
prevents any access inside the continent from the sea, the Congo River remains the channel 
of communication by excellence throughout the DR-Congo and the entire Congo Basin.962 
The importance of the network of waterways formed by the Congo 
watercourse was recognised early enough by the colonial powers involved in the race for 
colonies in Africa, referred to as the "Scramble for Africa".963 For them, the Congo River 
was a natural highway, which made possible penetration into the heart of Africa. There 
were no better means of communication that could connect to the inner parts of the black 
continent, and both people and goods circulated across the basin via its extensive 
hydrographic network. That is why, after deciding the colonisation of the new continent, it 
became so pressing for the European colonial powers to clarify the rights and obligations 
associated with the use of the Congo River.  
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Colonial powers eventually resolved to meet, discuss, and adopt a regime 
that could satisfy the ambitions and expectations of all, to penetrate and trade throughout 
the African continent via the Congo River and its tributaries. The meeting would be held 
in Berlin, Germany, from 1884 to 1885, under which, the decision would be taken 
concerning the internationalisation of the Congo River and its tributaries.964 The Congo 
River, therefore, would become a free zone of navigation for any ship of any nation in the 
world. Such decision to internationalise the Congo River and its tributaries was one of the 
most substantial achievements of the European colonisers because it allowed all of them to 
pursue their colonial projects and trade within the Congo River basin and deeper throughout 
the continent.  
5.3.2 Physical Description 
The Congo River measures approximately 4,700 kilometres and is the second-longest river 
of Africa after the Nile, which is 6,650 kilometres long.965 As per the definition of the 
watercourse concept under Article 2 (a) of the 1997 UNWCC,966 the Congo watercourse 
refers to the water system that is formed by the Congo River (the final outlet of the Congo 
River basin) and its tributaries, whether rivers, lakes, or underground waters, both domestic 
and transboundary. The Congo River has a flow rate estimated to approximately 45,000 
cubic metres per second and carries about 32 percent of Africa’s freshwater resources.967 It 
is ranked the continent’s water richest river, and the world’s second, after the Amazon, in 
Brazil, which is endowed with a flow rate of nearly 209.000 cubic meters per second.968 
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Shelton969 recently discovered that the Congo could be the deepest river in the world, as 
some of its sections measured more than 200 m deep.  
The sources of the Congo River are in the mountains of the great African 
rifts eastwards the territory of the DR-Congo, whereas its mouth is in the Atlantic Ocean 
south-westerwards the DR-Congo.970 From its sources south-eastwards to its mouth south-
westwards, the Congo River runs exclusively within the territory of the DR-Congo. From 
its sources, the river first flows north-westwards, and afterwards turns south-westwards, 
before discharging into the Atlantic Ocean.971 However, in a controversial fashion, some 
sources claim that the source of the Congo River could be the Chambeshi River, which is 
a smaller river originating from the north-eastern part of Zambia.972  
On its way to the Atlantic Ocean, the Congo River receives significant 
streams of waters from several tributaries of different sizes. While some of these tributaries 
are domestic, others are transboundary. The domestic tributaries originate from within the 
territory of the DR-Congo, whereas the transboundary tributaries originate from some of 
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the other nine states that constitute the Congo River basin.973 Even though there are many 
countries that form the Congo River Basin, the DR-Congo, the Republic of the Congo, the 
Central African Republic and the Republic of Angola contribute together with more than 
90 percent to the waters that flow through the Congo River.974 Because of that, they are 
regarded as the main riparian states of the Congo watercourse. 
 
Table 5: Volume of waters inflow  
in the countries of the Congo River Basin 
Source: CICOS 975 
 
As reveals table 5 above, 60 percent of the countries of the Congo River 
basin receives significant amounts of water resources from transboundary streams. The 
DR-Congo occupies the head of these states, with a rate of “dependency” on transboundary 
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Country 
Domestic water  
resources 
(km3/year) 







Angola 184,00 184,00 0 
Burundi 3,60 3,60 0 
Cameroon 273,00 285,50 4 
Congo 222,00 832,50 73 
CAR 141,00 144,40 2 
Gabon 164 164 0 
RD-Congo 900,00 1.283,00 30 
Rwanda 5,20 5,20 0 
Tanzania 82,20 91,0 10 
Zambia 80,20 105,20 24 
Total/mean 2,262,18 3,333,08  
 
 
waters estimated to about 30 percent.976 The DR-Congo is followed by Zambia that has 24 
percent of dependency on transboundary waters, whereas states such as Gabon and Rwanda 
have no dependency vis a vis any transboundary water resources.  
The tributaries of the Congo River include the Ubangi, the Sangha, (flowing 
from the North), and the Kasaï River (flowing from the South), the Lualaba, Lomami, 
Luvua, and Lukunga Rivers that flow from the South-East, and the Tanganyika Lake that 
is situated eastwards.977 The Ubangi, the Sangha, and the Kasaï Rivers westwards, and the 
Tanganyika Lake eastwards are regarded as the Congo River’s main transboundary 
tributaries.978 Table 6 below provides some hydrological characteristics of these different 
tributaries rivers. As already mentioned,979 both the Congo River and its tributaries are part 
of a vast ecosystem, which is formed by the Congo basin’s rainforest.  
 
Table 6: The Major Tributaries of the Congo River980 
 





Kasaï Transb. Angola, DRC 2,000 12,000 





Lualaba Transb. DRC 1,800 - 
Lomami Domestic DRC 1,500 837 
Luvua Domestic DRC 350 280 
Lukuga Domestic DRC 350 271 
Source: CICOS.981 
 
                                                 
 
976 The “dependency” that is observed here is rather a physical dependency than an economical dependency. 
977 On the tributaries of the Congo River, see Runge (note 971 above; 293-309). 
978 The Lukuga River is a outlet of the Tanganyika Lake. It covers nearly 350 km long with a flow rate is 
about 271 m3/s. It discharges into the Lualaba River, which is the upper section of the Congo River. History 
recalls that before the year 1878, the waters of the Lukuga River flowed into the Tanganyika Lake. Because 
of tectonic movement and perhaps the rising water level in the lake, the current of the Lukuga has shifted in 
the opposite direction, flowing towards the Congo River; Ibid. Runge. 
979 See section 5.2.1 above.  




5.3.3 The Hydrographical characteristics of the Congo River  
The Congo River’s main channel measures approximately 4,374 kilometres long,982 which 
geographers divide into three sections, namely the upper, the middle, and the lower Congo 
River.983 Even if this subdivision was initially undertaken for navigational and hydrographical 
purposes, the physical basis on which it was made makes it useful to this thesis.  
The upper Congo River section measures more than 2000 kilometres long. 
It includes the Tanganyika Lake and the Congo/Lualaba River.984 The Tanganyika Lake is 
an eastern transboundary lake that discharges into the Congo River via the Lukuga River.985 
It is situated 6°30’ S and 29°50’ E,986 stretches in an area as vast as 33,000 km², and an 
average depth of about 600 m.987 The total volume of the waters of the Tanganyika Lake is 
about 19,000 cubic meters. The Lake’s waters are approximately the sixth of the total 
volume of the world’s accessible freshwaters.988 It also has an exceptional environment, 
comprising famous endemic lineages of species of fish, and more than 1500 different plant 
and animal species, of which half can not be found anywhere else on the planet.989  
The Lualaba River is the second major tributary of the Congo River at its 
lower section.990 It is situated 2°8’52’’ N and 22°28’55’’ E and is 1,800 kilometres long.991 
The Lualaba receives its waters from the Lukuga River, which empties the waters of the 
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Tanganyika Lake into the Lualaba River.992 The Lualaba becomes the Congo River 
downstream, in the Congo River’s middle section, near the city of Kisangani.993  
The middle section of the Congo River is approximately 1500 kilometres 
long, beginning southwards at Kisangani, around the Boyoma Falls and ends at the Malebo 
Pool.994 Most of the tributaries of the Congo River drain into its flows in this middle section, 
which results into a significant increase of the volume of the river’s waters through the main 
channel of the Congo River.995 These tributaries are discussed here below; they include the 
Ubangi, the Sangha and the Kasai Rivers.  
The lower section of the Congo River is approximately 498 kilometres 
long.996  It starts at the outflow of the Malebo Pool, includes the lower Congo River rapids, 
including the Inga rapids, and runs down to the mouth of the Congo River at the Atlantic 
Ocean, Banana, in the Congo Central Province. The middle and the lower sections of the 
Congo River form a significant section of the boundaries between the DR-Congo and the 
Republic of the Congo, and the boundaries between the DR-Congo and the Republic of 
Angola.997 
5.4 The transboundary tributaries of the Congo River 
5.4.1 The Kasai River 
The Kasai River is a transboundary water system shared between the Republic of Angola 
and the DR-Congo.998 It is located on the left side of the Congo River, between 100 57’37’’ 
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S and 19018’56’’ E.999 The Kasai River is the dominant tributary of the Congo River and 
the outlet of the Kasai River basin. Approximately 27.6 percent of the Kasai River basin is 
situated in the Republic of Angola, against 62.4 percent in the DR-Congo.1000 The Kasai 
River discharges into the Congo River with a flow rate of approximately 12,000 cubic 
metres per second. 1001   
The Kasai section of the Kasai watercourse begins in the central region of 
Angola, wherefrom it flows eastwards, until reaching the boundary between the Republic 
of Angola and the DR-Congo. From this point of intersection, the Kasai then turns 
northwards, defining the boundary between the two countries in a distance of hundreds of 
kilometres before entering entirely into the territory of the DR-Congo.1002 Although there 
are many rivers of smaller sizes that cross the boundary between the DR-Congo and the 
Republic of Angola, the Kasai, Kwango and Kwilu Rivers are the most important ones.1003  
The Kasai River comprises three main tributaries that originate from the 
Republic of Angola, and that all run northwards into the territory of the DR-Congo.1004 
These include the upper section of the Kasai River, and the Kwilu, and Kwango Rivers;1005 
Once inside the territory of the DR-Congo, these two rivers discharge themselves into the 
upper section of the Kasai River to form the great Kasai River, which will in turn discharge 
in the Congo River, northeast of Kinshasa.1006 Other rivers equally crucial, such as the 
Sankuru, the Lulua, and the Fimi Rivers, also discharge into the Kasai River before it 
discharges in turn in the middle section of the Congo River.1007 Map 4 below gives an idea 
                                                 
 
999 Information available at: 
https://tools.wmflabs.org/geohack/geohack.php?pagename=Kasai_River&params=10_57_37_S_19_18_56
_E_region:AO-LSU_type:river, accessed on 14 July 2019. 
1000 E. Devroey Le Kasaï et son bassin hydrographique (1939), 10. 
1001 Ibid. 
1002 Ibid.  
1003 All these rivers bear the same names on the Angolese territory, but with slightly different spellings: 
Kwango for Cuango, Kwilu for Cuilu, Kasai for Casai on the Angolese side.  
1004 Runge (note 971 above; 296); Devroey (note 1001 above; 44). 
1005 Harrison (note 916  above; 5-6); See CICOS (note 918 above; 20). 
1006 Runge (note 971 above; 296). 
1007 Devroey (note 1001 above; 53).  
 
 
of the network formed by the transboundary rivers that flow in the DR-Congo from the 
Republic of Angola. 
Map 3: Network of streams that forme the  
Kasai sub-River basin crossing the Angolan boundary 
 
 
Source: I. Brownlie & I.R. Burns.1008 
 
Besides its water resources and its tropical rainforest, the Kasai sub-river 
basin comprises abundant reserves of diamonds. Some reports claim that 60 percent of the 
diamonds that reach Belgium come from the Kasai River.1009 However, political and public 
attention to that part of the Congo River basin was put mainly on the diamonds than on any 
other natural resource. War and security concerns were also a primary concern for that part 
of the Congo River basin, given that the Northern part of the Republic of Angola was under 
Jonas Savimbi’s rebellion for more than two decades. This further explains the relative lack 
                                                 
 
1008 I. Brownlie & I.R. Burns African boundaries: a legal and diplomatic encyclopedia (1979), 491. (Zaire is 
the former name of the current DR-Congo from the year 1971 to 1997).  
1009 Roughly 60 percent of diamonds that reach Belgium come from the Kasai River. See for more details 
on the Kasai River: Devroey (note 1001 above); See also E. Polinard Les gisements de diamant du bassin du 
Kasai au Congo Belge et en Angola (1951), available at 
http://www.kaowarsom.be/documents/MEMOIRES_VERHANDELINGEN/Sciences_naturelles_medicales/Nat.S
c.(IRCB)_T.VII,6_POLINARD,%20E._Les%20gisements%20de%20diamants%20du%20bassin%20du%20Kasa
%C3%AF%20au%20Congo%20belge%20et%20en%20Angola_1951.PDF , accessed on 10 June 2019.  
 
 
of treaties regarding transboundary water resources in this part of the Congo River 
basin.1010  
Water resources of the Kasai River system, namely the Kasai, Kwilu, and 
Kwango Rivers were covered either by conventions, or by treaties, or declarations between 
the Belgian government and Portugal for the Angolan counterpart. The Lisbon Convention 
of May 25, 1891, the Convention of July 22, 1927, for boundary alignment between the 
two states, and the declaration of March 24, 1894, are all examples of boundaries 
Agreements passed between the two states.1011  However, these Agreements were mainly 
concerned with boundary definition between the two new African states and did not cover 
any other aspect concerning water resources. These treaties that date back to the pre-
colonial and colonial epochs have never been revisited in the sense of upgrading their 
contents to the evolving context of shared water resources.1012 Table 7 below gives an 
overview of both the Kasai sub-river basin and the Kasai River and its tributaries.   
 
Table 7: the main transboundary rivers between the DR-Congo and Angola  
that discharge into the Kasai River 
                                           
River Length 
(km) 
Flow  rate 
(m3/s) 
Outlet Coordinates 
Kasai 2,153.00 12,000 Congo River 
10057’37’’S and 
19018’56’’ E 
Kwango 1013 1,800.00 2,700 Kasai River 
30 14.666’ S and 
170 22.416’ E 
Kwilu  965.00 - Kasai River 
3023’07’’ S and 
170 23’ 04’’ E 
Uamba 880.00 - Kwango River - 
Source: This thesis’ own compilation. 
                                                 
 
1010 Further details on Jonas Savimbi, see V. Brittain Jonas Savimbi, 1934–2002 (2002), 128-130. 
1011 For issues regarding treaties signed on the boundary forming waters between the DR-Congo and Angola, 
see generally: Brownlie & Burns (note 1009 above; 489-514).  These treaties can be consulted under: Treaties 
concerning the non-navigational uses of international watercourses – Africa available at 
http://www.fao.org/3/W7414B/W7414B00 , accessed on 18 July 2019.   
1012 Ibid. 




5.4.2 The Ubangi River  
The Ubangi River (spelt sometimes “Oubangui”) is a northern transboundary tributary of 
the Congo River. It extends from latitude 00°30' S to 09°16' N, and longitude 15°35' E to 
30°57' E, and covers a surface estimated to about 643,900 square kilometres.1014 The 
Ubangi River is shared between the DR-Congo, the Republic of the Congo and the CAR. 
With its 2,300 kilometres of length, the Ubangi is the longest tributary of the Congo 
River.1015  As shows map 4 below, the Ubangi is part of the northern boundary between the 
DR-Congo and the CAR, and also the north-western boundary between the DR-Congo and 
the Republic of the Congo.1016 In conjunction with the Middle section of the Congo River, 
the Ubangi forms a stretched boundary of about 2,410 kilometres between the DR-Congo, 
the Republic of the Congo and the CAR, as illustrates map 4 here below. 
 
Map 4: The network of streams that form the Ubangi Sub-River basin 
 
 
Source: https://wikivisually.com/wiki/File:Ubangirivermap.png , accessed on 24 July 2019. 
                                                 
 
1014 Information available at 
https://tools.wmflabs.org/geohack/geohack.php?pagename=Ubangi_River&params=0_30_S_17_42_E_ , 
accessed on 24 September 2019; Runge (note 971 above; 303). 
1015 Harrison (note 916  above; 6); Devroey & Campenhout (note 956  above; 24). 
1016 See Map 4 below. 
 
 
Similar to the Ubangi River, the Ubangi sub-river basin is a transboundary 
river basin that includes the DR-Congo, the Republic of the Congo, and the Central African 
Republic. A significant portion of the Ubangi River basin is located in the CAR, followed 
by the DR-Congo and the Republic of Congo. The Ubangi River receives from the DR-
Congo some important tributaries, including the Lua (131 kilometres) and the Ngiri (177 
kilometres).1017 Table 8 below gives an overview of the portions of the Ubangi River basin 
that is shared between its three riparian countries. 
 
Table 8: Repartition of the Ubangi River basin between the CAR,  
the DR-Congo and the Republic of the Congo 
Country Country Share in the basin 
size (km2) 
Percentage in the Basin 
(%) 
Central African Republic 352,000 55.00 
DR-Congo 254,800 39.00 
Republic of the Congo 37,900 6.00 
Total 643,900 100.00 
Source: Devroey & Campenhout.1018  
 
The hydrographic reconnaissance of the Ubangi River was carried out from 
the year 1910 to 1911 by the "Congo-Ubangi-Sanga" mission under the direction of the 
French Mr H. Roussilhe.1019 Roussilhe’s studies mainly concerned the determination of the 
geographical positions, topography, soundings, floods, and currents of the flow of the 
Ubangi River;1020 they also enabled the establishment of a comprehensive program of 
management to support the international navigation on this vital transportation route.1021 
However, the variations of the Ubangi’s flow, which are attributed by some to climate 
change, have significantly degraded the river’s conditions of navigability.1022  
                                                 
 
1017 Devroey & Campenhout (note 956  above; 24).  







Navigation that was once permanent on this waterway is impossible for 
several months a year. Some studies have reported a complete drying of some of the 
northern tributaries of the Ubangi River, in explanation of the drying up of the river 
itself.1023 The current drying up of the Ubangi River is a critical factor in consideration of 
the projects of water transfer from the Ubangi sub-basin to the Lake Chad basin mentioned 
downwards.1024 
5.4.3 The Sangha River  
The Sangha River is one of the main tributaries of the right bank of the Congo River. It 
originates from the Republic of the Congo and extends from latitude 1°12' 45’’ S to 16° 49' 
40’’ E.1025 The Sangha measures 790 Kilometres long, of which 710 kilometres are 
navigable and serve for the evacuation of logs in the south-western regions of CAR and the 
south-eastern regions of Cameroon.1026 It discharges in the Congo River at longitude 
15°20’E, 465 kilometres upstream of Brazzaville, on the side of the Republic of the 
Congo.1027 Entirely located in the northern hemisphere, the Sangha River basin measures 
roughly 240,000 square kilometres and covers the Republic of the Congo and 
Cameroon.1028  
                                                 
 
1023 Ibid. 
1024 See section 5.6.2 below; see also A. Tairo ’Saving River Congo from drying up’ (November 27, 2019), 
available at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/scienceandhealth/Saving-River-Congo-from-drying-
up/3073694-5364210-j2bnyg/index.html, accessed on 26 July 2019. 
1025 Information available at 
https://tools.wmflabs.org/geohack/geohack.php?pagename=Sangha_River&params=1_12_45_S_16_49_4
0_E_type:waterbody&title=Sagha+River+mouth , accessed on 19 May 2019. 
1026 CICOS (note 918 above; 19-20). 
1027 Brazzaville is the capital city of the Republic of the Congo. It’s situated 4°16′04″ S and 15°16′31″ E.  
1028 Information available at https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-
Operations/Congo-Centrafrique-Tchad-RDC_-_Etude_de_la_route_Ouesso-Bangui-N_djamena_.pdf , 
accessed on 12 May 2019. 
 
 
The most significant tributary of the Sangha River is the N'goko River,1029 
which serves as a boundary between the Republic of the Congo and Cameroon. The Sangha 
River has a maximum flow rate of approximately 3,504 cubic meters per second, which in 
general occurs during the flood periods, around October and November.1030  
 
Map 5: Network of streams that form 
the Sangha sub-River basin  
 
 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Sanghabasinmap.png ;  
accessed on 24 July 2019. 
 
5.4.4 Some additional potentialities associated with the Congo watercourse  
The Congo River is endowed with the highest diversity of freshwater fish species of the 
African continent,1031 and the second globally, after the Amazon River. Besides, 
Harrison1032 argues that such considerable biodiversity in freshwater fishes in the basin is 
possibly due to the extensive and dense hydrographic web and geomorphic stability of the 
Congo water system. Besides, the Congo River and its tributaries possess an immense 
 
 
endowment in hydro electrical energy potential, which is estimated to nearly 100,000 MW 
per year.1033 The sole Inga rapids, situated in the lower section of the Congo River, has an 
unexploited hydropower potential of more than 40,000 MW per year.1034 
The exploitation of this enormous potential is already planned but relies on 
regional cooperation for funding because the government of the DR-Congo lacks the 
necessary funds for the project.1035 Despite such a potential, the national rate of 
electrification of the DR-Congo revolves around 14 percent, against an average of 20 
percent in the whole Congo River basin, and 42 percent across the African continent.1036  
The low level of the basin’s hydropower generation is foremost a question of 
lack of adequate infrastructures. It is also the result of weak maintenance of the existing 
equipment, which is caused by the basin’s recurring political instabilities.1037 The small 
density of most of the basin’s states, dominated by its low-income rural population has 
generally hampered the development of infrastructures destined to electricity generation, 
especially in areas where electricity seems to be the most needed. For some observers, high 
operating expenses are generally unbearable to rural communities.1038  
                                                 
 
1033 Ibid. at 10. Despite such potential, the country is producing only 3,000 MW of electricity per year as of 2019.  
1034 International Rivers ‘Hydropower for Mines and Export, Not the Poor’ available at 
https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/congo%E2%80%99s-energy-divide-factsheet-3413 , accessed 
on 10 June 2019. 
1035 In February 2005, the South African national electricity company, Eskom, announced a proposal to 
dramatically increase the capacity of the Inga Dam in the lower section of the DR-Congo through an 
improvement of the existing infrastructures and the construction of a new hydroelectric dam. See for more 
details Linda van Tilburg ‘South Africa to double up on investment in Congo’s Inga 3 dam – a risky move?’ 
available at https://www.biznews.com/energy/2019/01/21/south-africa-double-power-congo-hydro-plant, 
accessed on 14 June 2019. 
1036 Despite the country’s potential, the country is producing only 3,000 MW of electricity per year as of 2010. 





5.5 Issues concerning the internationality of the Congo River 
There exists a threefold longstanding concern regarding the international status of the 
Congo River, which the insignificant political attention that has been given to the basin’s 
shared water resources since the post-independence period has not helped clarify. 
The first concern stems from the hydrographical configuration of the Congo 
River, which, from its birth south-eastwards to its discharge in the Atlantic Ocean south-
westwards, runs exclusively within the territory of the DR-Congo as illustrated by map 6 
below.1039 On its way to the Atlantic Ocean, the Congo River forms an arc that runs first 
from the south of the DR-Congo to its north, then turns westwards, and eventually 
southwards to finally discharge into the Atlantic Ocean south-westwards.1040 In that 
trajectory, the Congo does not traverse the territorial boundaries of the DR-Congo but 
instead stays within this country until its discharge into the Ocean.1041  
The second concern touches on the Congo River’s overall hydrology. 
Although running exclusively from within the DR-Congo’s territory, this river receives 
one-third of its waters from the other riparian states of the Congo River.1042 These 
transboundary sources reach the Congo River by runoffs or through some transboundary 
rivers that are the tributaries of the Congo River, as discussed in the previous sections.  In 
other words, the other riparian countries of the Congo watercourse contribute to one-third 
of the waters that flow in the Congo River, whereas the DR-Congo contributes with the 
remaining two-thirds.1043  
The third concern is that the Congo River is a boundary-forming river 
between the DR-Congo and the Republic of the Congo. The 1911 Madrid Declaration 
mentioned earlier observed that states that had a river between them as a boundary were 
“in a position of permanent physical dependence on each other, which precludes the idea 
of the complete autonomy of each State in the section of the natural watercourse under its 
                                                 
 
1039 See annexe 6 below. 
1040 See UNEP (a) (note 12 above; 41). 
1041 Ibid.   
1042 Ibid.   
1043 Ibid.   
 
 
sovereignty.”1044 Out of its 4,700 kilometres length, the Congo River forms more than 660 
kilometres of a boundary between the two Congos (from the city of Brazzaville to the 
confluent of the Congo River and the Ubangi River),1045 while the remaining of the river 
flows within the DR-Congo.  
Based on the above concerns regarding the international status of the Congo 
River, reflections have to be pushed further, as per Article 3 of the 1997 UNWCC, which 
recommends to the riparian states of shared water systems to take into account all the 
particularities of an international watercourse while planning to sign transboundary water 
treaties. In the case of the Congo River, what the particularities of the river may be, and 
what could such particularities imply in terms of the internationalisation of the Congo 
watercourse? Is it the whole Congo River that has to be regarded as having an international 
status, or only some of its sections as presented above? If only some of the Congo River’s 
sections would be considered international, which sections would these be? And upon 
which basis will such a differentiation be decided?  
The fact that the Congo-River runs exclusively within the territory of the 
DR-Congo is not a mere geographical coincidence. It was an express and positive will of 
King Leopold II of the Belgians who was the first proprietor of the territory that has become 
the DR-Congo, which he personally owned from 1885 to 1908.1046 King Leopold II wanted 
to have a possession in the heart of Africa that included the whole Congo River.1047 He 
sought the control of the whole Congo basin (although he could not have it), and was aware 
that he could not realize such a dream without first controlling the waterway constituted by 
the Congo River and its tributaries. As mentioned earlier,1048  the Congo water system was 
in the precolonial era especially, the only way of communication into the deepest parts of 
Africa.  
                                                 
 
1044 Paragraph 1 of the Declaration of Madrid of April 20, 1911”. 
1045 See section 5.2.4 above.  
1046 A.B. Keith The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act (1919), 31-41. Available at 
https://archive.org/details/belgiancongoberl00keit/page/n6 , accessed on 28 January 2019.  
1047 Ibid. at 57-65. 
1048 Ibid. at 31-41. 
 
 
After realising that the French already occupied the left bank of the Congo 
River King Leopold II understood that it was no longer possible for him to control that part 
of the Congo Basin (the left bank is the land situated at the left hand of an observer that 
have his back turned towards the mouth of the Congo River and its face turned upstream). 
King Leopold II sought, therefore, to control the whole of the region situated on the right 
bank of the Congo River, which included the Ubangi River northwards.1049 This is how 
King Leopold II managed to domesticate the Great Congo River and include it in the Congo 
Free State, which was his possession in Africa. It was in 1908 that King Leopold II passed 
to Belgium the whole Congo Free State, which then became the Belgian Congo, thus 
marking the onset of colonisation.1050   
The DR-Congo, which is the continuation of first the Congo Free State and 
then the Belgian Congo, has inherited of the Congo River situated within its national 
boundaries. However, as discussed earlier,1051 the now codified international law of 
transboundary water resources provides a legal framework to regulate matters regarding 
the transboundary watercourses. The approach of this new legal framework concerning the 
international status of the world’s transboundary rivers such as the Congo River is different 
from the historical approach that has been followed by the DR-Congo. As discussed earlier, 
Article 2.b of the 1997 UNWCC defines an international watercourse as a watercourse, 
parts of which are situated in different States.1052 Whereas Article 2.a of the same treaty 
defines a watercourse as a system of interconnected surface waters and groundwaters that 
constitute a unitary whole, as they flow into a common terminus.  
Under these two provisions, the “Congo watercourse”, which refers to “the 
Congo River and its tributaries” is indeed an international water system.1053   However, the 
Congo River which has three sections, as explained above,1054 what would be the status of 
each of these three sections? If an international status will be grafted to the whole Congo 
                                                 
 
1049 Ibid. at 57-65.  
1050 Ibid. 
1051 See section 4.4. above. 
1052 Article 2.a. of the 1997 UNWCC. 
1053 See  more explanations on the internationality of transboudary watercourses in Rieu-Clarke et al. (note 
277 above; 77). 
1054 See section 5.3.3 above. 
 
 
River, all the three sections would, therefore, be included. In other words, from its source 
to its mouth, the Congo River would be considered an international river; yet, the upper 
and the middle sections of the Congo River especially are completely immersed within the 
territory of the DR-Congo alone.  
Following the above reasoning, if the Congo River, would in these 
circumstances be declared a wholly international river, due to the fact that the river is part 
of the Congo watercourse, what then will be the status of the Congo River’s transboundary 
tributaries, especially those that originate from within the territory of only one state, and 
where they are considered “domestic rivers”? The Sangha River for instance, which was 
discussed earlier,1055 which runs through the territories of the Republics of Cameroon and 
Congo. The Sangha River discharges in the Congo River from within the territory of the 
Republic of the Congo, wherefrom this river is regarded as a domestic river, as it flows 
from Cameroon. What then will be the extent of the international status of the Sangha 
River? Will such status mean that the Sangha River is to be shared with any other riparian 
state of the Congo watercourse? Or will such status imply that the riparian states of the 
Congo watercourse, other than Cameroon and the Republic of the Congo are granted the 
right to freely use the Sangha River inside the territory of its two direct riparian states?  
All the issues raised above lead to the main question that is: “does the 
application of the 1997 UNWCC regime on transboundary watercourses imply a partial 
abolishment of the domestic status of the transboundary watercourses?” Under the regime 
of the 1997 UNWCC as seen previously,1056 a water flow, tributary, lake, or groundwater 
would have an “international” status if there exists a natural link between such a waterbody 
and the other flows that connect to the final outlet of the river basin. Such internationality 
is valid even if such a water body is to be found entirely within the territory of a single 
riparian state, despite its natural connection to the rest of the basin’s water system. Which 
means that, even if the Congo River is wholly internal vis a vis the DR-Congo as explained 
above,1057 it receives some of its waters from outside the country, from transboundary 
tributaries.  
                                                 
 
1055 See section 5.4.3 above  
1056 See section 2.4.2 above . 
1057 See section 5.3 above; See also map 6 in annexe 6 below. 
 
 
The internationality of a river is a physically established matter and not the 
result of a political decision. However, the politics of shared water resources can be rigid 
to change if the physical facts that constitute the bedrock of such politics are not clarified 
with satisfaction. As Bearden1058 observes, the decision to include in the watercourse 
concept a river’s tributaries, lakes, and any water flows or groundwaters connected to it, 
constituted an essential innovation in the 1997 UN Water Convention and its regime. 
Although many states have shown themselves sceptical about some features in the regime 
established under the 1997 UNWCC, they will nonetheless, observe it as time goes by,  and 
adjust their approach to transboundary waters treaty to match its provisions, namely its 
Article 3.1059  
Concerning the regime that governs the Congo River, much clarity will be 
provided in Chapter 6 below, which will analyse the legal regime thereof.  However, 
because of the interconnectedness explained above, an international status indeed applies 
to the Congo River, which, nevertheless, should be put into perspective.1060  
5.6 Climate change impacts on the Congo watercourse  
Scholars such as Mccartney & Smakhtin, and Brisman et al.1061 have argued that there will 
be either too little or too much water at different locations across the globe, but rarely the 
same amount of waters, as a result of climate change. While analysing the potential 
consequences of climate change on the hydrology of the Congo River Basin, Beyene et 
al.1062 discovered that there would be an increase of approximately 10 to 15 percent of the 
run-off across the basin, and an increase of 11 to 17 percent of the Congo River’s discharge 
by the year 2050. As said above,1063 these increases will be particularly high during the wet 
                                                 
 
1058 Bearden (note 268 above; 1005). 
1059 See section 4.4.5 above. 
1060 Rieu-Clarke et al. (note 277 above; 77).  
1061 M. Mccartney & V. Smakhtin Water storage in an era of climate change: addressing the challenge of 
increasing rainfall variability (2010) Blue paper, 1; Brisman et al. (note 8 above; 54). 
1062 V. Garderen et al. ‘ Climate change adaptation options for the Congo Basin countries’ In Linda & Ludwig 
(Eds.) Climate change scenarios for the Congo Basin. (2012) CSC 167, 167; Beyene et al. (note 38 above; 10). 
1063  See section 1.2 above. 
 
 
seasons, as compared to the dry seasons.1064 Besides, the same authors predicted for the end 
of the current century an increase in the basin’s run-off of approximately 23 to 27 percent, 
against an increase in the discharge of the Congo River of approximately 18 to 73 
percent.1065 These predictions reveal an increase in the availability of waters across the 
Congo river basin while there will be a decrease in water availability in most of the river 
basins in Africa.  
The above picture suggests that climate change will, in general, cause an 
increase in the frequency and intensity of drought and floods, and thus result in population 
displacements, or material damages and loss.1066 Water scarcity or drought, and other 
extreme events are also some of the primary effects of the phenomenon, channelled through 
waters. Too little or too much water can be a direct or an indirect driver of people 
displacement, material damages, as well as a range of other societal costs.1067 It is common 
knowledge that regardless of the geographical location, poor and marginalised populations 
are the more exposed and vulnerable to these adverse impacts of climate change. The next 
sections are not going to re-discuss the impacts on climate change on water resources but 
to pinpoint a category of direct and indirect impacts that are more specific to the Congo 
River and its riparian states. 
5.6.1 Direct impact 
Recently, studies have examined the impacts of climate change on the Congo River basin 
to reach a better understanding of the effects of the phenomenon in this natural resources-
rich part of the world.1068 Results of the investigations led to different conclusions, of which 
some were contradictory and others conclusive, perhaps due to a relative lack of previous 
climate-specific information on the Congo River basin.  
                                                 
 
1064 Garderen et al. (note 1063 above; 18). 
1065 Ibid. at 18-20. 
1066 See generally the Global Report on Internal Displacement (2019). Availableat http://www.internal-
displacement.org/global-report/grid2019/downloads/report/2019-IDMC-GRID-summary.pdf, accessed on 
12 July 2019. 
1067 Ibid. 
1068 See for instance A Haensler (Eds) Climate Change Scenarios for the Congo Basin (2013); Harrison (note 
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The first conclusions which will be invoked in this thesis confirm significant 
impacts of climate change on the hydrology of the region before the year 2100.1069 These 
studies suggest that there will be a general increase in the Congo River’s discharge in the order 
of 11-17 percent by the year 2050 and an increase in the basin’s run-offs in the order of 18 to 
27 percent by the end of the current century.1070 From a temperature point of view, most of the 
scenarios indicate significant warming towards the end of the current century, which will 
happen regardless of the seasons, whether dry or wet.1071 It further confirms that the annual 
warming will be between +1.5 and +3.0 degrees Celsius on average, for the optimistic scenario, 
and +3.6 and +6.0 degrees Celsius on average, for the pessimistic scenario.1072  
The study of Garderen and Ludwig,1073 which focused on the impacts of 
climate change in the Congo River Basin, brought similar results as it predicted the Congo 
River’s waters to increase by up to 10 percent in the coming decades. However, besides 
these predictions, Garderen1074 indicated that the overall run-off and river flow across the 
Congo River basin would rise, especially in the wet season, but decline in the dry season, 
despite the current transitional episode characterised with lesser water resources. For 
Garderen,1075 there is a substantial likelihood of a 50 percent increase in the run-off of the 
basin during the wet season, which makes experts fear significant flood risks, especially in 
the central and western part of the basin.  
The second scenario suggests the unlikeliness that drastic changes (in terms 
of annual rainfall levels) may occur across the basin in the foreseeable future. The scenario 
mentions, instead, significant changes of more than 30 percent in the regime of 
precipitation, which will be marked, on the one hand, with prolonged and more frequent 
periods of droughts, and on the other hand with an increased intensity of rains in most areas 
across the basin. This scenario further suggests that dry seasons will become drier, whereas 
                                                 
 
1069 F. Ludwig et al. 2013. Climate change impacts on the congo basin region. In A. Haensler et al. (eds.) 
Climate Change Scenarios for the Congo Basin  (2013), 2192-4058. 
1070 Beyene et al. (note 38 above; 18-20). 
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wet seasons will become wetter, and excludes any hypothesis of widespread water scarcity 
across the basin. Finally, this scenario recommends to the states of the Congo River basin 
to consider and plan ahead of the predicted floods, because there is a strong likelihood the 
region will be experiencing frequent floods in the western and central parts of the basin.1076 
In the same order of ideas, a recent study, which is summarised in table 9 
further, has ranked the countries of the Congo River basin among the most vulnerable 
countries on the planet regarding a series of indicators that relates to state preparedness to 
climate change.1077 This study touched the projected change of annual runoff and took into 
consideration a range of other sub-factors such as the annual character of groundwater 
recharge, the withdrawal rate of freshwaters, the water dependency ratio, the capacity of 
dams, and the access to reliable drinking water.1078 
 
                                                 
 
1076 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands Climate Change Profile Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(East) (2018), 4. available at 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DRC%2B%28east%29.pdf , accessed on 11 July 2019. 
1077 The ND-GAIN Water score captures a country’s vulnerability to climate change in terms of fresh water 
supplies. Indicators include: projected change of annual runoff, changes contemplated in the index includes 
annual groundwater recharge, fresh water withdrawal rate, water dependency ratio, dam capacity, and access to 
reliable drinking water. More information on the ND-GAIN index available at https://gain-
new.crc.nd.edu/ranking/vulnerability/water , accessed on 24 June 2019. 
1078 See The ND-GAIN Country Index in table 9 below.  
 
 
Table 9: The ND-GAIN Country Index ranking countries of the Congo River basin 
among the most vulnerable concerning the ‘water and climate change index’ 
 
Ranking 
(192 countries) Country Index level 
12 Burundi 0.198 
25 Rwanda 0.216 
30 CAR 0.228 
32 Zambia 0.230 
74 Gabon 0.300 
97 Cameroon 0.334 
124 Tanzania 0.366 
130 Angola 0.380 
161 Republic of the Congo 0.442 
163 DR-Congo 0.455 
Source: https://gain-new.crc.nd.edu/ranking/vulnerability/water, accessed on 24 June 2019. 
 
Table 10: The ND-GAIN Country Index ranking Djibouti and Sudan 
 
Ranking 
(192 countries) Country Index level 
1 Djibouti 0.042 
177 Sudan 0.692 
Source: https://gain-new.crc.nd.edu/ranking/vulnerability/water, accessed on 24 June 2019. 
 
As shown by table 10 above, the Republic of Djibouti occupies the first 
position in the ND-GAIN Country Index ranking list, in contrast to the Republic of Sudan, 
which occupies the last position. 
Despite such variances in the findings of the above studies, conclusions have 
all shown a sure consistency on the fact that problems due to excess of rainfall will mainly 
strike the central part of DR-Congo, whereas phenomena such as droughts will mostly 
 
 
occur southwards and on the edges of the basin during dry seasons.1079  Two reasons make 
the excess of rainfall that is predicted to occur in the central part of DR-Congo 
understandable: firstly, that part of the country is the remains of a prehistoric lake, which 
act as an outlet of most of the tributaries of the Congo River before their discharge into the 
Atlantic Ocean. Secondly, the coincidence of the central part of the DR-Congo with the 
cuvette Centrale, which is the lowest altitude of the Congo River basin. Due to its small 
elevation, the cuvette Centrale drains by gravitation more waters than elsewhere across the 
basin.1080 Also, because of such a low altitude, it is more likely that that part of the basin 
may suffer more floodings in comparison to the others. 
What is also clear is that difference in terms of water availability between 
the wet and dry seasons will deepen across the basin in comparison to the current 
situation.1081 The wet season will become wetter and even characterised by more intense 
and frequent extreme events. The ultimate logical conclusion would be that basin states are 
preparing to handle both extremities. The Congo basin states need to prepare for more 
unstable hydrological regimes, managing excessive amounts of water and probably storing 
waters to avoid floods during the wet seasons and ensure balanced water supply during the 
dryer seasons.1082 Human and artificial intelligence will be forced to replace the providence 
of nature, which will be increasingly lacking because of climate change. 
5.6.2 Indirect impact 
Apart from the direct impacts of climate change on the waters of the Congo River basin as 
discussed above, climate change is likely to impact the waters of the Congo River in an 
                                                 
 
1079 BBC World Service Trust ‘Democratic Republic of Congo Talks Climate: The public understanding of 
climate change’ Available at http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/MediaBroad/02-Democratic-Republic-of-
Congo-TalksClimate.pdf , accessed on 11 July 2019. JH Christensen et al. ‘Regional climate projections’ In 
S. Solomon et al. (Eds.) Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working 
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
1080 The cuvette centrale is a flat region within the DR-Congo of less than 350 to 500 m above the sea level, 
measuring some 800.000 km2 and surrounded by the Congo River. See for more details on the cuvette 
centrale: http://www.cuvettecentrale.info/frameContent/home.html , accessed on 11 July 2019.  
1081 F. Ludwig et al.  Climate change adaptation and Integrated Water Resource Management in the water 




indirect way. Indirect impacts in the sense of this section refer to the consequences 
associated with either the exportation of water resources or the transfer of significant 
amounts of water outside the Congo River basin in order to supply some remote basins or 
regions whose water resources are found to be climate change distressed.1083  
The continual depletion of the waters in some regions surrounding the 
Congo River basin north and southwards is forming around this basin a belt of aridity.1084  
Because of that, growing pressures are being put on the DR-Congo in particular, and on 
some few other riparian countries of the Congo watercourse, to accept the undertaking of 
water transfers either from the Congo River or from one of its tributaries to rescue these 
water-stressed regions. Among these water-stressed regions are the Lake Chad basin 
northwards,1085 and with a lesser extent, the southern African region, whereby there is a 
growing debate concerning the possibility to undertake a water transfer from the Congo 
River basin into the region.1086  
Water imbalance is growing in both axes for two main reasons:  first, the 
climate change phenomenon, which is reducing water availability in both axes; second, the 
advancement of the desert, which is aggravating the state of the hydrology in the two 
regions. The fear is that such situations may at an ultimate stage open ways to water 
disputes because of the pressures that are being put on the states of the Congo River basin 
to transfer part of the basin’s waters into these water imbalanced regions.1087  
                                                 
 
1083 IPCC 2014 (c) (note 10 above; 1767); See the Global Report on Internal Displacement (2019). 
1084 UNEP (a) (note 35 above; 133); This  African Atlas of water  resources has expressely identified the 
project of transfering the waters of the Congo basin as a potential risk for conflict across the continent. 
1085 Will Ross ‘Lake Chad: Can the vanishing lake be saved?’ available in https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-43500314 , accessed on 03 May 2019; Christoph Haushofer ‘DRC: Kinshasa says no to water transfer 
from Ubangi River to Lake Chad’ available at https://www.afrik21.africa/en/drc-kinshasa-says-no-to-water-
transfer-from-Ubangi-river-to-lake-chad/ , accessed on 04 May 2019. 
1086 Find information in SADC-ELMS ‘Proceedings of the Workshop on the Development of an Integrated 
Water Resources Management Plan for the Zambezi River Basin’ (1996), 2; Merrey et al. ‘Water Governance 
Futures in South Asia and Southern Africa: Déjà Vu All Over Again?’ In Freshwater Governance for the 
21st Century (2017) 229, 237;  Conley (note 35 above; 17); P. Ashton ‘Southern African water conflicts: are 
they inevitable or preventable?’ (2003) 1 (2) Wat Wheel 22, 2. 
1087 UNEP (a) (note 35 above; 133). 
 
 
Concerning the Lake Chad, experts claim that this Lake has lost almost 90 
percent of its water resources in less than fifty years and would completely disappear in a 
couple of decades if no significant action is taken.1088 Experts further predict that the 
southern region of Africa will experience a drop of approximately 10 to 30 percent of its 
rainfall volume due to climate change.1089 For each of these situations, discussions are 
pointing towards possible water transfers from the Congo watercourse.  
5.6.3 Thinking on the water-climate change nexus across the Congo River basin  
There is a pressing need to develop for the Congo River basin an adequate legal and 
institutional framework for both flood management and control (direct impacts), and water 
transfer (indirect impacts) as it will be discussed later.1090 As proposes Matchaya,1091 water 
transfers undertaken for market purposes, is a crucial idea, especially for the Congo River 
basin, because of the financial repercussions of such an enterprise. However, transferring 
the waters from the Congo watercourse will necessitate further feasibility studies. There 
are underlying issues concerning the rights that riparian states possess vis-a-vis a shared 
river’s water resources, which riparian’s rights Nundwe1092 called for clarification. 
Take, for instance, the case of the Republic of Angola, which is a riparian 
state to the Congo watercourse as described above.1093 This country does not have any 
physical link whatsoever with the Ubangi River or the Sangha River, which are two 
tributaries to the Congo River, and therefore, parts of the Congo watercourse. The only 
contact the Republic of Angola could claim to have with these two water bodies could be 
through its status as a riparian state to the Congo Watercourse, to which both rivers are 
                                                 
 
1088 UNEP (a) Africa Environment Outlook (2002), 56.  
1089 Ibid. UNEP (a); SARDC Reporting Water in Southern Africa. A Media Guide to Managing our Water 
Resources (2009), 22. Available at https://www.sardc.net/en/books/reporting-water-in-southern-africa/ , 
accessed on 19 August 2018. 
1090 Frameworks for flood are developed with ample details in chapters 6 and 7 below. 
1091 Matchaya et al. ‘An Overview of Water Markets in Southern Africa: An Option for Water Management 
in Times of Scarcity’ (2019) 5 (11) Water 1006, 1010. 
1092 C.D. Nundwe Ownership in Trans-Boundary Water Resources–A Case Study of the Zambezi Watercourse 
(unpublished LLM thesis, University of Zambia, 2015), 124.   
1093 Through the Kasai River and some of its transboundary tributaries that cross over the Angolan boundaries 
and join the DR-Congo, as per the 1997 UNWCC. See section 5.3.2 above. 
 
 
parts. The question, therefore is: will Angola have any rightful claim vis-a-vis the waters 
of Ubangi River or the benefits that may result from the Ubangi River, if these waters were 
to be transferred or exported for remuneration?  
In the same order of idea, will the CAR or the Republic of the Congo, which 
are both riparian countries to the Ubangi River, have any rightful claim vis-a-vis the waters 
of the Kasai River southwards, if waters from this river had to be transferred into the SADC 
region for instance? Perhaps, to summarise, how far can the rights of the riparian countries 
of the Congo River go regarding the waters that are to be considered common to all of 
them, and the waters that are to be considered common to only part of the riparian?1094  
The questions above connect with another, which is, at the same time, 
political and technical: “which riparian state of a transboundary watercourse should be 
included in a water treaty that only concerns a portion of a shared watercourse?” applied to 
the Congo River basin, this question becomes “which riparian state of Congo watercourse 
should be included in a water treaty that only concerns a portion of the Congo 
watercourse?” This question stands, even if there are ten states across the Congo River 
basin that have the status of riparian states of Congo watercourse,1095 which in principle 
applies to the entire Congo watercourse, according to the definition of a watercourse under 
Article 2 (a) of the 1997 UNWCC.1096  
Also, as mentioned earlier,1097 some provisions of the 1997 UNWCC, 
including Articles 3 (3) and 3 (5), enjoin states to take into consideration the physical 
characteristics of a shared watercourse and if required sign water treaties accordingly. 
Articles 3 (3) and 3 (5) of the 1997 UNWCC prescribe: 
“3.Watercourse States may enter into one or more agreements, hereinafter referred 
to as “watercourse agreements”, which apply and adjust the provisions of the 
present Convention to the characteristics and uses of a particular international 
watercourse or part thereof. 5. Where a watercourse State considers that adjustment 
and application of the provisions of the present Convention are required because of 
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1095 See section 5.5 above. 
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the characteristics and uses of a particular international watercourse, watercourse 
States shall consult with a view to negotiating in good faith for the purpose of 
concluding a watercourse agreement or agreements.” 1098 
The complex hydrography and hydrology of the Congo River and its transboundary 
tributaries lead to the issue of water ownership, which was discussed by Nundwe.1099 The 
determination of who has, or who should have certain rights (and duties) on the waters of 
the Congo River and its tributaries appears crucial for the future because it will contribute 
to establishing and consolidating states' cooperation across the basin, and avoid suspicions 
and mistrust.1100As argued by Nundwe,1101 the rights and duties concerning shared water 
resources should be known and held at the national level of any government that share a 
common transboundary water resources.  
Such an enterprise can be proven vital, especially when the shared 
watercourse becomes either scarcer or plentiful, as it will be the case across the Congo 
River basin. Subject to the principles and the rules of international water law, states indeed 
have sovereign inalienable rights over their water resources. Such inalienable rights are 
stronger and operational within a state’s jurisdiction, meaning its national territory.  
In the case of the Congo watercourse, clarification of the rights that the 
riparian states of the Congo River basin have on the waters of the Congo River seems 
crucial and may be the determining factor to settle the long-standing disagreements over 
the shared water resources of the region as mentioned earlier.1102 As advocates  Nundwe,1103  
“Negotiations and agreements regarding the sharing of trans-boundary water 
resources should include aspects of water ownership and the application of the 
beneficial use principle.” 1104 
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1099 Nundwe (note 1093 above; 124). 
1100 Ibid.  
1101 Ibid. 
1102 See section 5.5 above. 




There is an inflexible affiliation between a state and the water resources that originate from 
its national territory. Such a link continues to be felt by such a state or its inhabitants, even 
after that such waters have crossed over such a state’s territory and have become the waters 
of another riparian state.1105  
If there be no need to define water ownership in a transboundary context, 
then the use of such waters should be declared free to all, at least for the sake respecting 
the international principle of equality of people and nations.1106 Which would mean that a 
state would not exclude any other state whether riparian or not, from exercising its right 
towards the open and free to access water resource. In the case of the Congo River, even 
the countries whose territory lies outside the Congo River basin would be given free access 
to the basin’s waters.  
As far as navigation is concerned, the regime of the 1885 Berlin final Act 
discussed above illustrated well this thought of this thesis.1107 The only difference between 
this thought and the 1885 Berlin Regime is that the Berlin regime declared free navigation 
to all, whereas the fictitious regime we are discussing here would declare free access to all 
concerning the non-navigational uses of shared water resources.  
However, the above series of questions, and the difficulties they each raised, 
recalls the debates that took place at the ILC, around the issue of which riparian state to include 
in the definition of an international watercourse. The summary of the views which were 
expressed to the special rapporteur of the ILC by some states’ delegates to the ILC was as 
follow:  
“To the extent that parts of the waters in one State are not affected by or do not 
affect uses of waters in another State, they shall not be treated as being included in 
the international watercourse system. Thus, to the extent that the uses of the waters 
of the system have an effect on one another, to that extent the system is 
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international, but only to that extent; accordingly, there is not an absolute, but a 
relative, international character of the watercourse.” 1108  
The important view contained in this section was not given the due 
consideration it deserved. The view seemingly did not meet the expectations of the ILC 
special rapporteur, who squarely recommended its abandonment. It was this abandonment 
that closed the door to in-depth discussions on the view contained in the above section. The 
outcome of such a discussion could help empty all possible future questions on the 
international character of some watercourse, as it seems to be the case.1109 An in-depth 
analysis of the content of this dropped off section could have perhaps brought more lights 
around the content that was to be given to the concept of international watercourse under 
the 1997 UNWCC. 
In the case of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries, the riparian 
countries will need to develop and consolidate water cooperation through solving or 
preventing several transboundary water issues, including the ones raised in this section of 
this thesis. In the context of the Congo River basin, especially, it seems more likely that 
basin-wide water cooperation will need to consider both the sharing of the resource and, 
sharing the benefits that may emanate from the resource. As per Article 5 and 6 of the 1997 
UNWCC, there is also the duty of sharing across the basin some transboundary water 
responsibilities, such as the protection of the Congo watercourse and its sustainability.  
5.7 Conclusion  
Chapter 5 has described the fundamental characteristics of the hydrography of the Congo 
River basin, from where flows the Congo watercourse. It has also introduced and described 
the major flows that form the Congo watercourse, namely the Congo River and its major 
transboundary tributaries, which are the Ubangi, Kasai, Sangha, the Lualaba –Lukuga Rivers, 
and the Tanganyika Lake. Under Article 3 of the 1997 UNWCC, riparian countries are 
required to consider the particularities of a transboundary water system while entering into 
                                                 
 
1108 See ‘Summaries of the Work of the International Law Commission’ available at 
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water agreements. This chapter, therefore, has described the core hydrographical 
characteristics of the Congo watercourse, since these characteristics will be critical towards 
the negotiation of a climate proofed-water regime to govern the Congo water system. It has 
explored the overall hydrology of the Congo River, which receives up to one-third of its 
waters from transboundary tributaries. The internationality of the Congo River was discussed 
and confirmed, despite the birth of this river within the territory of the DR-Congo, which it 
traverses before discharging in the Atlantic Ocean. Nevertheless, this chapter has raised 
serious issues associated to an open-ended application of such internationality and has shown 
that there the middle section of the Congo River could be viewed as the starting point of the 
international section of the Congo River, since it is a boundary forming section, and in 
addition, most of the transboundary tributaries of the Congo River discharge in that middle 
section. Concerning the impacts of climate change on the water resources of the basin, this 
chapter has highlighted the Congo River basin’s vulnerability to floods in particular, 
because of the 11 to 17 percent in water availability increase across the basin. After 
discussing the hydrography and hydrology of the Congo River and its transboundary 
tributaries, the next chapter will describe and analyse the legal framework thereof, in order 







6 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK THAT GOVERNS THE 
CONGO RIVER AND ITS TRANSBOUNDARY 
TRIBUTARIES 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter attempted to provide a hydrographic description of the Congo River 
and its transboundary tributaries. This present chapter will discuss the legal framework 
thereof. This chapter also aims to identify and describe the existing agreements that apply 
to the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries before undertaking their assessment 
concerning the integration of the climate change dimension. In order to reach its objective, 
this chapter will start with a quick overview of the birth and evolution of the legal regime 
that governs the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries. The critical historical steps 
that will be described here will cover the precolonial, colonial, and post-colonial epochs, 
and lastly, the view of the contemporary form of the regime. In this chapter, a brief account 
will be given concerning a water conflict that occurred between the DR-Congo and the 
Republic of the Congo, which occurred in the 1970s, and which is often overlooked by the 
consulted sources in the account of this thesis. This chapter will, in the end, discuss the 
hydropolitics around the waters of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries, and 
explore from different perspectives the stances of the key riparian states of the Congo River 
in order to try to acquire a better understanding of the dynamics around the waters of the 
Congo River. This is because the river basins’ hydropolitics are dominant, and are often 
decisive on the forms and contents of the laws and institutions that govern the 
transboundary waters.  
This chapter is comprised of a threefold section in which the first outlines 
the historical foundations and evolution of the regime that applies to the Congo River and 
its transboundary tributaries, the second describes the current legal regime that applies to 
the Congo watercourse, and lastly, the third briefly discusses the hydropolitics at play 
around the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries.  
 
 
6.2 Historical evolution of the regime of the Congo River and its tributaries  
6.2.1 The pre-colonial period 
6.2.1.1 Overviewing some relevant factors during the pre-colonial era 
The emergence of a legal framework to govern the Congo River and its transboundary 
tributaries finds its historical origin shortly before the beginning of the colonial era.1110 An 
initial special regime was put in place to govern the Congo water system because of the 
recognition of the strategic importance of this waterway for the European explorers in 
general, and Leopold II, the King of Belgium more specifically.1111 This initial regime was 
the work of the colonisers, who tacitly applied to the Congo watercourse the regime of the 
1815 Vienna Treaty.1112 The application of the 1815 Vienna Treaty was concerned 
exclusively with the European explorers who navigated on the Congo Waterway.1113 
The legal regime that governs the waters of the Congo River would be 
developed progressively in the nineteenth century and stayed in power until the epoch of 
African independence in the twentieth century. That initial legal framework was focused 
on navigation, just like the rest of the other frameworks that governed the international 
water law at that time.1114 The extension of the regime to the non-navigational uses would 
occur in a later stage as it will be discussed.  
After the independence of the states of the basin, which occurred mostly in 
the 1960s, the managerial approaches in the field of transboundary water resources, which 
the post-colonial governments begun to take, had, in general, nothing to do with the colonial 
approaches. Also, issues such as the determination of state boundaries, the freedom of 
navigation along the international waterways, and the continuation of transboundary water 
projects inherited from colonial regimes all challenged significantly the new African states, 
as they sought to develop regional and river basins cooperation.  
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Environmental issues emerged recently, including the necessity to ensure 
the sustainable protection of shared water resources, through taking into account the 
integrated management of water resources, and the impact of climate change on freshwater 
resources.1115 The environmental issues that are mentioned above touched the sustainability 
and protection of water resources and significantly contributed to the development and 
shaping of the current legal regime that applies to the Congo watercourse.  
Discussions regarding the regime that governs the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries would begin with the Treaty of Vienna of 1815, which was tacitly 
applied on the river.1116 Following the 1815 Vienna Treaty would be the 1885 Berlin Final 
Act, which in turn, would be followed by the 1919 Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. 
The discussions follow with the Convention of 1999 which instituted a uniform regime of 
navigation on the Congo River and instituted the International Commission for the Congo, 
Oubangui and Sangha Rivers. Discussions would conclude with the 2007 addendum to the 
1999 CICOS Agreement establishing the uniform regime of navigation on the Congo River 
and its tributaries.1117  
The analysis and the assessments will be conducted with the view of 
identifying the treaty characteristics that contribute to the responsiveness of the regime that 
governs the Congo River to the predicted impacts of climate change. As indicated 
earlier,1118 the regime that will be analysed will only include the treaties signed over the 
western section of the Congo water system, which include the Kasai, the Ubangi, and the 
Sangha Rivers plus northern and western sections of the Congo River itself.1119 
Nevertheless, reference may be made during the discussion to the system formed by the 
Lake Tanganyika, the Lukuga and Lualaba Rivers, for hydrographic purposes.  
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6.2.1.2 The regime of the General Treaty of Vienna, of 1815 
It was by necessity that the 1815 Vienna Final Act was tacitly imported and applied to the 
Congo watercourse.1120  Since the discovery of the mouth of the Congo River in 1482 and 
its progressive opening to international trade, the number of Europeans who visited the 
region grew steadily and became significant in the nineteenth and twentieth century.1121 
Europeans passing by the Congo River were motivated either by colonial motives or by 
businesses because the Congo region offered promising perspectives in terms of 
international trade.1122  
There was a wealth of raw materials across the region, of which some were 
crucial to support the European Industry. Therefore, to avoid any anarchy across the basin, 
the non-native users of the Congo River, which were European in most of the cases, decided 
to import and apply on the Congo watercourse the same regime of international rivers that 
was in power in Europe. The said regime was the one instituted under the 1815 Vienna 
Final Treaty.1123  
Undoubtedly, the ultimate goal that was sought by those who imported the 
European regime to the Congo River was nothing other than to facilitate the circulation of 
the European and their goods through the River basin.1124  
Articles CVIII and CIX of the 1815 Vienna Treaty provide: 
“(CVIII) The Powers whose states are separated or crossed by the same navigable 
river, engage in regulating, by common consent, all that regards its navigation… 
(CIX) The navigation of the rivers, along their whole course, referred to in the 
preceding article, from the point where each of them becomes navigable, to its 
mouth, shall be entirely free, and shall not, in respect to commerce, be prohibited 
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to anyone; it being understood that the regulations established with regard to the 
police of this navigation, shall be respected; as they will be framed alike for all, 
and as favourable as possible to the commerce of all nations.” 1125 
The above provisions of the 1815 Vienna Final Act, instituted a regime of freedom of 
navigation and trade for all potential users of the rivers that the treaty targeted.  
The tacit extension of the 1815 Vienna’s regime on the Congo watercourse 
had the same effect on the users of the Congo as on the users of the European rivers in 
Europe, until the advent of a regime that was conceived specially for the Congo 
watercourse, which was the Berlin Final Act of 1885, which is discussed further.1126 The 
1815 Vienna regime was to be observed “along the whole course of the river”, meaning the 
main water body of the River plus all the navigable sections of its tributaries. It was thanks 
to this freedom of navigation that trade activities and commercial exchanges between 
Europe and the Congo region intensified to the extent that the Europeans became obliged 
to institute a special regime for the Congo River and its tributaries.1127  
There are generally two other reasons that can explain the above importation 
of the 1815 Vienna Treaty regime: firstly, neither the kingdoms nor the empires which were 
present in the Congo River basin had modern legal systems in place, which could be applied 
to the European sailing in the region. Even if they did have such a legal system in place, its 
application to the European explorers would have been tricky.  
In order to avoid any situation that could become uncontrollable between the 
growing size of European traders and explorers in the region, the Europeans opted for the 
importation of a regime which they were already familiar with, as they applied it and complied 
to it back in Europe.1128 As argues Yakemtchouk,1129 such a trade-off by the colonial powers 
was understandable because of the overall climate of competition that characterised the 
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“scramble for Africa”. Was it not for such a timely regime extension, it could not be surprising 
to see a European state privatising a defined river or portion of a river in Africa while subjecting 
the other European states to a regime of taxes for the use of thereof.   
The second reason is associated with the fact that from a colonial 
perspective, some areas in the regions were already under European control. The extension 
of the European territories in Africa implied that the legal frameworks that applied to the 
metropolis, in Europe, were applied as well on the European territories of Africa.1130 Areas 
such as the Congo watercourse, which were under the control of the colonial powers, were 
generally considered the extensions of the European countries.1131  
Although the regime of the 1815 Vienna Final Act applied to the waters of 
the Congo River and its tributaries, it will not be beneficial to this thesis because of its 
exclusive focus on navigation. However, the 1815 Vienna Final Act paved the way to the 
internationalisation of the Congo watercourse, as discussed above.1132 Several European 
nationalities continued using the Congo waterway without a specific law that regulates their 
activities in that part of the world until the advent of the 1885 Berlin Final Act.1133  
6.2.2 The colonial period 
6.2.2.1 The Regime of the Final Act of Berlin of 18851134 
The first piece of law to expressly govern the Congo River and its tributaries was 
doubtlessly the 1885 Berlin Final Act, which was adopted to put an end to the legal vacuum 
that prevailed in the navigation sector and opened the way to the tacit application of the 
1815 Vienna Treaty as explained above. The 1885 Berlin Final Act was adopted by the 
canonised “Berlin conference for west Africa” of 1885, sometimes referred to as the 
“Congo Conference”. Sir Otto von Bismarck, the first Chancellor of the Germans, 
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convened the conference, which lasted from November 15, 1884, to February 26, 1885, in 
Berlin, Germany.1135  
The official objective of the conference was to harmonise the views of the 
western countries on the process of African colonisation and thus avoid the outbreak of 
open conflicts between opposing colonial appetites.1136 The outcome of the conference was 
the adoption of the “Berlin Final Act of 1885”, a treaty of 38 Articles, which officially 
extended the observance of the principle of freedom of navigation on the Congo River and 
the Niger River.  
The provision below testifies that the 1885 Berlin Final Act followed the 
footsteps of the 1815 Vienna Final Act regime. It consecrated three fundamental principles: i) 
the freedom of navigation for all, ii) the freedom of commerce for all, and iii) the principle of 
neutrality.1137  As already mentioned, the first two principles were an extension of the regime 
of the 1815 Vienna Convention and the 1856 Treaty of Paris to the Congo and the Niger 
Rivers,1138 as expressly mentioned in the preamble of the 1885 Berlin, in its points 4 and 5: 
“The plenipotentiaries… Who, being provided with full powers, which have been 
found in good and due form, have successively discussed and adopted… 4. An Act 
of Navigation for the Congo, which, while having regard to local circumstances, 
extends to this river, its affluents, and the waters in its system, the general principles 
enunciated in Articles 58 and 66 of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, and 
intended to regulate, as between the Signatory Powers of that Act, the free 
navigation of the waterways separating or traversing several States - these said 
principles having since then been applied by agreement to certain rivers of Europe 
                                                 
 
1135 Representatives from 14 countries attended the Berlin conference, from November 15, 1884 to February 
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and America, but especially to the Danube, with the modifications stipulated by the 
Treaties of Paris (1856), of Berlin (1878), and of London (1871 and 1883).”1139     
The Berlin treaty further introduced the concept of “the dependencies of the waterways”, 
which was a legal innovation at the time and was applied to the Congo basin.1140 For 
Courcel,1141 one of the efforts colonial powers deployed at the Berlin conference was to 
give to its treaty extensive radiation, with doctrinal significance, and which could last and 
influence the law of international water resources. The portion of the declaration of 
principle at the introduction of the 1885 Berlin Final Act which state that "These provisions 
are recognised by the signatory powers as forming henceforth a part of international public 
law",1142 was an expression of this vision of extensive radiation. 
The regime of the 1885 Berlin Final Act later became a custom right in the 
Congo River basin and in some other river basins on the continent, before its denunciation 
at the post-independence period. Many scholars are of the view that the 1885 Berlin Final 
Act made a significant contribution to the international water law because it laid a 
foundation for both the regime of navigation and the regime of the non-navigational uses 
of international watercourses in general.1143  There is no doubt that the context of the epoch 
preferred the navigation to be in the heart of the negotiations in international affairs. That 
                                                 
 
1139 Text of the 1885 Final Act of Berlin, available at https://www.thoughtco.com/general-act-of-the-berlin-
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is also how the principle of freedom of navigation became the central issue of the 1885 
Berlin Final Act.  
It seems to be a correct timing to raise some important points here, 
concerning the early declaration of the internationality of the Congo River and its 
tributaries. Firstly, the institution of a regime of internationality over the Congo River and 
its navigable tributaries was motivated by colonial determinants and trade forces rather than 
being the fact of the hydro-morphology of the river. Secondly, such an internationalisation 
was decided not based on some African determinants, but solely and mainly on the interests 
of the colonial powers. The internationalisation of the Congo River and its tributaries was 
politically motivated. It was done with the view of forming a buffer state in Central Africa, 
to support the colonial programs and trades across the Congo region.1144 After the 
independence of the African states, some of the new African governments, including the 
governments of the states of the Congo River basin, inherited several transboundary river 
problems, which caused a significant impact on states’ stability across the region. Some of 
these issues are persistent up to the present time.  
To emphasize on the negative character of applying an extraneous solution 
to a foreign hydrographic basin Yakemtchouk1145 recalls that the geophysics of states had 
such peculiarities to the extent that principles which are applied in the case of one state or 
one river basin would sometimes prove to be quite futile or even harmful if applied as such 
to another. The regime of the 1997 UNWCC has followed suit to this approach. Article 3 
of the 1997 UNWCC recommends that riparian states take into consideration the particular 
characteristics of watercourses and river basins before signing water treaties.1146 The 
extension of a European solution on an altogether different context and hydrography was 
not without consequences in terms of the stability for the Congo River basin after state 
independences across the basin.  
In the meantime, the 1885 Berlin Final Act settled the partition of Africa and 
delimited the French and the Belgian spheres of influence across the Congo River basin. 
France occupied the French Equatorial Africa (AEF), which was situated on the right bank 
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of the Congo and the Ubangi Rivers. These two territories have respectively become the 
present Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. The Belgian occupied the 
Congo Free State on the left bank of the Congo and Ubangi Rivers. The Congo Free State 
was privately owned by Leopold II, the King of the Belgians, who handed it over to Belgium 
in 1908.1147 What seems politically relevant to mention is that even if the states of the Congo 
River basin depended on various colonial powers at that time, the supervision of the 
international regime of the Congo River was entrusted to King Leopold II, thus proving an 
earlier recognition of the leading role of the Belgian Congo within the shared basin.1148  
Similar to the 1815 Vienna Treaty, the 1885 General Act of Berlin will not 
be of great use to this research, apart from the significant role it played in the development 
of the international watercourses law.1149  
6.2.2.2 The Regime of the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919 
The evolution of international relations after World War I dictated a change in several 
things, including the general application of the principle of freedom of navigation, whether 
in Europe or Africa. Also, keeping the 1885 Berlin regime running for the Belgian Congo 
became unbearable at some point because of the increasing expenses that the regime 
represented for the country. The signatory parties of the 1885 General Act of Berlin, 
therefore, decided to meet once more in 1919 and to amend the 1885 Berlin Final Act, 
which they replaced with the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919.1150 The 
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general view of the signatory powers was to adopt a new regime that would reflect their 
desire: "To ensure, by means appropriate to modern requirements, the application of the 
general principles of civilisation as enshrined in the Berlin and Brussels Acts.”1151  
The Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919 took place at 
the Château de Saint-Germain-en-Laye. The meeting was a gathering of the 
victorious allies of World War I on one side and the Republic of German-Austria on the 
other side.1152 At the end of the conference, on September 10, 1919, the Convention of 
Saint-Germain-en-Laye would be signed to replace the 1885 Berlin Final Act. The 1919 
Saint-Germain Convention maintained the regime of freedom of navigation, trade, and the 
principle of equal treatment of the users of the Congo watercourse.  
If it is evident that the 1919 Saint-Germain Convention repealed the 1885 
Berlin Final Act, it is nonetheless true that only the states that did not adhere to the 1919 
Saint-Germain Convention were concerned.1153 Seven states in total ratified the 1919 Saint-
Germain Convention, whereas the others did not give the convention any significant 
attention.1154 History recalls that the interpretation of the Saint-Germain-en-Laye 
Convention was problematic, and for that reason, the ambition of the treaty to be a universal 
convention could not be achieved.1155  
When African countries acceded to independence, some repealed the 1919 
Saint-Germain-en-Laye Convention, others denounced it, whereas some others did not take 
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any clear, definite position, including some countries in the Congo River basin. As for the 
DR-Congo, the fact that Belgium was a signatory of the 1919 Saint-Germain Convention 
implied that its regime applied in the part of the Congo River basin that was under Belgian 
administration.1156 Similar to its two predecessors, the regime that was put in place by the 
1919 Saint-Germain Convention did not take into account the non-navigational uses of the 
Congo watercourse, and will, therefore, be of little significance to this thesis.   
6.2.2.3 The Regimes of the 1921 Barcelona Convention and the 1923 Geneva Convention 
A very brief mention will be made of the Convention and the Statute on the Regime of 
Navigable Waterways of international interest signed on April 20, 1921, in Barcelona, 
Spain, and the Convention relating to the development of hydraulic power for several States 
and the Signing Protocol, which was signed in December 9, 1923, in Geneva, 
Switzerland.1157 These two instruments are part of a group of multilateral agreements that 
were negotiated and adopted under the dissolved Society of Nations.1158 Although from a 
practical viewpoint both conventions had limited impact on regulating the transboundary 
water resources, they have somewhat contributed (especially the Geneva Convention) to 
the advent of a new era in the field of international water law by regulating a non-
navigational use of international waterways.1159 
Very few agreements were concluded between the riparian states of the 
Congo River basin. Agreements that were signed related either to the maintenance of 
waterways or to hydroelectricity production on certain frontier rivers. As for regulating the 
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non-navigational uses of the waters of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries, 
there was no significant advancement.   
6.2.3 The post-Independence period  
6.2.3.1 The early independence days and the legal vacuum in the sector 
Most of the riparian states of the Congo River gained political independence in 1960.1160 
The state’s political independence implied the abrogation of any incompatible colonial 
regime. New African states had, therefore, the liberty to either continue to apply or to 
denounce the colonial regime over transboundary waters, but as says Kamto,1161 state 
accessions to independence were generally followed by the repeal of the colonial regime. 
In practice, the repeal of the colonial regime by the new states occurred in various and 
somewhat confusing ways. While some States chose to implicitly reject the colonial 
regimes by substituting them with different regimes, a few others proceeded differently.1162 
From a theoretical viewpoint, two opposing doctrines are generally 
considered concerning states' succession: The universal succession doctrine also referred 
to as the doctrine of continuity and the clean slate doctrine.1163 The universal succession 
doctrine provides that the rights and obligations of a predecessor State that are attached to 
the territory in transfer are passed on to the Successor State. Whereas the "clean slate" 
doctrine, by contrast, provides that the Successor State substitutes its sovereignty over the 
transferred territory and replace that of the predecessor State.1164  
While the continuation or denunciation of the colonial regimes could be 
stress-free to envisage in a domestic context, things tended to be different in transboundary 
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settings. In the Congo River basin, states adopted, in general, an ambiguous position vis-à-
vis the colonial regime. The core texts which states were in concern with are the 1919 Saint-
Germain-en-Laye Convention and the 1921 Barcelona Convention; yet, the DR-Congo 
gave no fixed position on the matter and which fuelled the rumours that the country opted 
for a continuation of the colonial regime.1165  
Those rumours almost turned into conviction in the public opinion because of 
Article 6 of the transitional Constitution of the DR-Congo, which was adopted on June 25, 
1967, and provided that treaties concluded before June 30, 1960 (the DR-Congolese 
independence day) would remain valid only insofar as the legislator did not amend them.1166 
Besides, Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of the DR-Congo, declared to the Senate 
of the state, on June 30, 1960, that the treaties, conventions, and protocols that were adopted 
by Belgium on behalf of the Congo had to be thoroughly examined by the new Congolese 
government for continuation, or denunciation.1167 The analysis of these two facts suggested 
in a more significant part a survival of the colonial regime in the DR-Congo. 
However, while observers still thought that the country had perpetuated the 
colonial regime, following the above declarations from its government, the DR-Congo 
would surprise many observers by multiplying state acts of inconsistency concerning its 
succession to the colonial regime. On March 14, 1966, for instance, the country unilaterally 
adopted a “Code of navigation in internal rivers and lakes” as the state’s new piece of 
domestic law in order to regulate the navigation on the Congo River and the lakes that are 
situated within the DR-Congo.1168 No reference was made to the international status of the 
Congo River. On the contrary, the new piece of law treated the Congo River as a domestic 
flow. For Mubiala,1169 this new piece of law became a clear indication of the abandonment 
of the colonial regime by the country. Nonetheless, the public had to wait until November 
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2, 1971, when the DR-Congo representative at the UN Sixth Committee would formally 
denounce the 1885 Berlin Final Act.1170  
Unlike the ambiguous position that was adopted by the DR-Congo, some 
other states of the basin, including the Republic of the Congo and the Central African 
Republic, considered the regime of the 1919 Saint-Germain-en-Laye Convention to still be 
in place, and as the unique regulatory framework for the Congo River and its tributaries.1171 
These two countries would later denounce the 1919 Saint-Germain-en-Laye Convention, 
on the occasion of the adoption of the statutes of the Equatorial Customs Union.1172  
In the absence of States’ consensus on which regime to apply, the regime 
gap that settled entertained in the long run a confusion on the international character of the 
Congo River and its tributaries. As for the colonial regime, it can be understood that despite 
the initial ambiguity observed in the position of some states of the basin, the general attitude 
across the basin leaned more towards a regime denunciation.1173 
The Niger is the other watercourse that was targeted by the 1885 Berlin Final 
Act. The position the riparian states of the Niger took was a contrast to that of the Congo 
basin’s states. The riparian countries of the Niger River were clear from the start with regard 
to abandoning the colonial regime.1174 In a declaration dated February 16, 1963, the states 
of the Niger basin considered that the anterior status of the Niger River as per the 1919 
Saint-Germain-en-Laye Convention was incompatible with the post-independence interests 
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of the new States in the region.1175 These states thus made it clear from the start by avoiding 
any confusion regarding their intentions vis-à-vis the colonial regime over their shared 
watercourse. At the time of the drafting of this thesis, the legal framework of the Niger 
watercourse, the level and quality of cooperation among its riparian states around the 
basin’s shared water resource has been able to evolve, in comparison to the legal framework 
in place in the Congo River basin.  
The post-independence legal and political context of most of the states of 
the Congo basin were generally delicate. Most of these states seemed unprepared regarding 
the legal aspects that are associated with transboundary water resources.1176 In addition to 
the political instabilities that followed the independence of the two Congos, their opposing 
views regarding the internationality of the Congo River contributed significantly in creating 
the legal vacuum in the governance of the transboundary water resources of the basin.1177 
The opposing views regarding the internationality of the Congo River between these two 
countries happened partly because of significant misunderstandings on each side concerning 
the laws and principles of transboundary water resources that applied at that time. 
In 1971, the opposing views of both countries grew to the extent that they 
almost went to war because of a disagreement over the international status of the Congo 
River.1178 It is for two reasons that this interstate water conflict will be briefly discussed 
below. Firstly, the conflict has helped display the conception which both countries held 
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over the Congo River after they accessed independence. The same conceptions seem to 
have not much evolved ever since: the DR-Congo considers the Congo River as a domestic 
river, whereas the Republic of the Congo claims its internationality.1179 Secondly, the 
conflict gives a clue on the reason why the riparian states of the Congo watercourse have 
never succeeded putting around the Congo River a water cooperation program that works, 
in contrary for instance to the riparian states of Senegal or Niger Rivers, which, as already 
said appear to be well advanced in water cooperation.1180  
6.2.3.2 Interim regimes under partial ephemeral treaties on the Congo River   
In the absence of a definite post-independence regime as explained above, the states of the 
basin resorted to the practice of bilateral conventions in the period between independence 
and the 1990s. Only a few examples of these will be given here, because most of these 
agreements kept the same focus on navigation, and are therefore of less interest to this 
thesis. Some of these agreements nevertheless included new issues among which were 
interstate cooperation, the development or maintenance of some sections of the Congo 
watercourse and the regulation of the use of the rivers that form natural boundaries between 
the signatory states.1181 These navigation-centred regimes had only limited application to 
the non-navigational uses of the transboundary watercourse.1182  
The DR-Congo, the Republic of the Congo, and the CAR decided in 1978, 
to overcome some of the tensions between them and set in place a tripartite commission 
that would be tasked with the development of the River basin. After its establishment, the 
tripartite commission requested the support of the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa (UNECA) to conduct a global study on the possibilities of developing the entire 
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Congo River basin and study its international status.1183 The UNECA held several 
intergovernmental consultation processes aiming at developing a standard fluvial regime 
under the auspices of the United Nations.1184 The work of the Commission benefited from 
the involvement of major international and regional institutions such as the Central African 
customs and economic union (UDEAC),1185 the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS),1186 and various other technical bodies, including the UNDP. With support 
from the above-mentioned institutions, the tripartite commission drafted four technical 
agreements that never materialised because of the inaction of the three establishing states.1187 
In the same order of idea, the DR-Congo and the Republic of Angola signed 
an agreement on October 25, 1978, for the lower section of the Congo River that defines 
the boundary of both countries.1188 In Article 5 of that agreement, the Republic of Angola 
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recognised that the DR-Congo had free access to its territorial waters, islands, islets, and 
embankments for triangulation purposes, levelling, surveying liquid and solid flow 
measurement, and for the maintenance of Congolese installations. The agreement also 
included issues related to the various navigation signs on the targeted section of the river.  
In Article 6, the agreement provided for the creation of an intergovernmental 
institution called the "Commission on the Conditions of Reliability of the Waterfront", to 
function as a framework for consultation and exchange of hydrographic information for the 
improvement of airworthiness conditions on the shared watercourse.1189 The purpose of this 
institutional body was "to encourage co-operation between bodies that are specialised in 
the field of planning, developing, and maintaining of the waterways of the two States that 
concluded the treaty".1190 
As described in the previous chapter, the Congo River is generally divided 
into three sections, which are its lower, middle, and upper sections. The middle section of 
the Congo River concerns primarily three countries: the DR-Congo, the Republic of the Congo, 
and the Central African Republic. An agreement was signed between the three countries 
interested in the middle section of the Congo River, in 1978, concerning the creation of a 
tripartite commission in charge of the development of the middle section of the Congo River; 
this convention would never enter into force since the DR-Congo would not ratify it.1191  
A further example comes from the agreement that was concluded between 
the CAR and the DR-Congo, in 1986, which provided for the joint exploitation of the 
hydraulic power of the Ubangi River at Mobayi-Mbongo, in the DR-Congo.1192 The 
reputation of the hydropower production project was that the project mainly meant to 
supply the hometown of the late President Mobutu and its surroundings with electricity. 
The economic interest of the structure was questioned either by the experts of some 
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international organisations that specialised in finances or by the public opinion in the DR-
Congo.1193 The Republic of the Congo refused to join this project, whereas the World Bank 
which was solicited refused to participate in funding the project. Even the Central African 
Republic was reluctant at the beginning of the project, because of the risk of flooding and 
changes in the conditions of navigation on the Ubangi River.  
6.2.4 The conflict between the two Congos on the international status of the Congo River 
6.2.4.1 An overview of the context of the conflict 
The conflict’s origin was the change of name of the Congo River into Zaire River by a 
unilateral decision of the authorities of the DR-Congo, then also rebaptised Zaire, in 
October 1971.1194 The DR-Congo government decided to change the name of the country 
from “DR-Congo” into a new name, “the Republic of Zaire”, and in the same act, the 
government changed the name of the Congo River, as well as the currency of the country. 
“Zaire” therefore became the new name of the country, the River, and the state’s currency. 
Such unilateral change of the name of an “international” River by one riparian country did 
not please the Republic of the Congo, whose government by the mouth of its representative 
in the 1273rd meeting of the Special Committee of the United Nations on the question of 
defining aggression, protested the DR-Congo’s action.1195 The representative of the 
Republic of the Congo qualified such unilateral change of the Congo River’s name as a 
violation of the sovereignty of his country by the DR-Congo.  
The following quote is part of the report of the 1273rd meeting mentioned 
above. It gives a portion of the intervention of Mr Dede who represented the DR-Congo at 
that meeting:  
“Mr DEDE (Zaire) said that he had been instructed by his Government to inform 
the Committee of the reasons which had led his country recently to change its name 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Zaire. “Zaire” was the euphonic 
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adaptation of the word Nzadi, which meant “river”. Along its course of over 4,000 
kilometres, the river Zaire, which is the lifestream of his country, only touched a 
foreign borderline over a negligible distance of some 200 km. Juridically, therefore, 
it was an internal river. The anachronistic provisions of the 1885 Berlin Final Act, 
declaring that waterway an international river, had ceased to have effect in 1908 
when Belgium annexed the fictitious State of the Congo, and the river had become 
the public property of the State. The Convention and Statute on the Regime of 
Navigable Waterways of International Concern and Additional Protocol, adopted 
at the Barcelona Conference of 1921, to which only a small number of States had 
acceded, had merely replaced the juridical and geographical notion of an 
international river by the economic one of a waterway of international importance. 
Nevertheless, Zaire was not subject to such regulations; it maintained its status as 
an internal river, a national river. His country was therefore fully justified in 
unilaterally changing the name of a river which belonged to it and was subject only 
to its  domestic jurisdiction.”1196  
Such a stance by the representative of the DR-Congo made scholars such as 
Mutoy1197 think that this country supported the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty. 
However, Mr Foungui, who was the representative of the Republic of the Congo at the 
same meeting, prepared a rejoinder to Mr Dede and his country, which he delivered during 
the 2025th plenary meeting, on December 18, 1971. In his reply, Mr Foungui evoked both 
the 1919 Saint-Germain-en-Laye Convention and the 1885 Berlin Final Act to support the 
international status of the Congo River;1198 He also broadly concluded his statements by 
arguing that the legal status of international rivers made their flow to be a shared property 
of the river’s riparian States.1199 Mr Foungui did not take into account the particularities of 
the Congo River and its tributaries, especially the transboundary ones, since most of which 
also have, as explained above highly complex hydrography.1200 
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In the next session, the representative of the DR-Congo later contradicted 
all the claims made by Mr Foungui in the following terms: 
“The problem before us and on which we have been attached by the representative 
of the Congo is one of knowing if the river in question is an internal river or an 
international one. In the light of the provisions of the General Act of Berlin, which 
I have just presented to the Assembly, it is clear that the title which Stanley acquired 
for the benefit of his master, the King of the Belgians, was an entire title that 
covered the whole river and involved no sharing of it with any neighbour. Up until 
the present day, this status has never been modified, either by a general convention 
or by any particular convention among riparian States. The representative of the 
Congo, in reproaching us for exercising our right to rebaptize unilaterally the river, 
which is within our exclusive sovereignty and therefore within our internal 
competence, has tried thereby not only to interfere in our internal affairs but has 
committed an act which we condemn as being entirely contrary to the law.”1201 
Claiming that in the spirit and the letter, King Leopold II, the main Belgian colonial actor 
was clear that the Congo River belonged to the DR-Congo, with no intention of sharing it 
with another country.1202  
Jackson1203 argued that the cleavage between the two neighbouring countries 
was exacerbated by the ideological antagonism, which prevailed between them. The 
Republic of the Congo belonged to the socialist ideology, whereas Zaire (DR-Congo) was 
supportive of the capitalist stream.1204 As it will be briefly discussed below,1205 the 
inhibiting character of the ideological choices of the two countries over the technical 
considerations regarding the shared water resources of the basin showed the dominance of 
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the political issues over the technical ones in the field of the shared water resources of the 
region. 
6.2.4.2 Were the two Congos wrong and right at the same time? 
After analysing Mr Dede and Foungui’s statements above, it transpires that both statements 
were at the same time right and wrong. Take for a moment the position defended by 
Monsieur Foungui; after reading him, one cannot help asking the three following questions: 
first, was the internationality of the Congo River an institution of the 1885 Berlin Final Act, 
or the 1919 Saint-Germain-en-Laye Convention, or was it an international watercourse 
because of the river’s hydro-geographical characteristics? Second, after the independence 
of both states, what was the status of the transboundary tributaries of the Congo River? As 
these also were internationalised under the 1885 Berlin Final Act.1206 Thirdly, what was the 
post-independent status of the roads, rails, and other infrastructures to which the 1885 
Berlin regime granted an international status as “dependents” of the international 
waterways of the basin?1207  
The Republic of the Congo was trying to be persuasive that the Congo River 
is international, yet it based its arguments on the Colonial status which the river and its 
tributaries and dependents were given. The representative of the Republic of the Congo 
may have lost sight of the fact that such international status was granted for colonial 
purposes and in a purely colonial context, and that it was incumbent on the new states of 
the Congo basin to start afresh on new non-colonialist bases and negotiate and adopt a legal 
framework which would reflect the hydrography and the hydrology of the region, just as 
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the states of the Niger River basin did.1208 Instead, the Republic of the Congo further relied 
on the application of the standard and controversial definition of “International River” to a 
highly complex hydro-geographical context, without further analysis of the whole 
surrounding of the issue.  
If the Congo watercourse has to be considered an international watercourse, 
it will be mainly because of the following reasons, which are engraved in the 1997 UNWCC 
and in the Public International law, as already mentioned:1209 
1. The fact that part of the Congo River is a boundary forming waterbody; 
2. The fact that the Congo River is included in the Congo watercourse, according to 
the 1997 UNWCC, and as such, it connects with several transboundary tributaries. 
A river is international by law, or through its hydrographical characteristics. 
Nevertheless, what is crucial is not the qualifier of being international or not; what matters 
is the rights and duties that are attached to such an international or domestic status attached 
to a watercourse.1210  
One may wonder what did the Republic of the Congo expect through the 
recognition of the internationality of the Congo River? and what in particular this country 
may expect through such recognition for the future, because it is a fact that the Congo 
watercourse is an international water system, as per the 1997 UNWCC’s regime as already 
discussed.1211 The problem regarding the Congo River and its three-sections is that there is a 
need to specify which of these three sections is to be approached as international and which 
is to remain a domestic section of the river, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DR-Congo.  
It may be an opportunity to recall a crucial episode of the negotiation of the 
1997 UNWCC, which was mentioned earlier,1212 during one of the ILC plenary, around the 
issue of “which content to give to the international watercourse concept”. There was a 
critical section of a proposition made by some UN member states delegates to the ILC, 
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which the appointed ILC Special Rapporteur at that time abandoned. The abandoned 
proposition was reading as follows: 
“To the extent that parts of the waters in one State are not affected by or do not 
affect uses of waters in another State, they shall not be treated as being included in 
the international watercourse system.” 1213  
The states from which this proposition emanated sought to obtain a contrast between the 
parts of a watercourse that could meet the criteria of being international, and the other parts 
of the same watercourse that could not be considered as being international.    
It appears necessary to distinguish between the ecological requirement of 
approaching a whole hydrographic basin as a single unit, for sustainable preservation and 
development of the water resources, especially if such hydrographic basin is transboundary, 
and the internationalisation of all the parts of a watercourse, which in some cases may have 
unpredicted political consequences. As discussed earlier,1214 issues concerning the scope of 
international watercourses have become some of the most controversial in the regime of 
the 1997 UNWCC.  
Similar to the Republic of the Congo, the DR-Congo, on the other hand, was 
both right and wrong. The representative of the DR-Congo tried to be convincing that the 
Congo River was domestic, on the basis of the river’s hydrography, according to which the 
outlet of the Congo watercourse, which is a transboundary water system, finds itself to be 
the Congo River, which is a river that is born in one state, from where it also discharges 
into the ocean. Therefore, the question of the DR-Congo’s representative, Dede was: “How 
can such a river be international whereas it is completely locked within the territory of a 
single state?” 1215 Sir Dede lost sight of the fact that there was a significant section of the 
Congo River which formed the boundary between Republic of the Congo, the DR-Congo, 
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and that, under international law, such a water body is indeed an international river.1216 
What did the DR-Congo expect behind such a claim? 
The answer to the above question of Dede seems not as easy as asking it. If 
one admits that the Congo River is a domestic water body, based on Dede’s arguments, what 
then will the status of the one-third of transboundary waters that discharge into the Congo 
River? Besides, what about the status of the section of the Congo River that forms the 
boundary between the two Congos?  Also, taking a moment in fiction would show how the 
above questioning goes infinite. What, for instance, would become of the Congo River should 
its transboundary tributaries be rerouted from within their states of origin? Perhaps these 
states wish their rivers to remain domestic if such a choice could be offered to them.  
Nonetheless, in the affirmative hypothesis, what would then be the reaction 
of the DR-Congo vis-à-vis such rerouting of a transboundary tributary of the Congo River, 
which, in passing, should certainly be devastating for the country, because of all the 
conceivable environmental, economic and cross-sectorial consequences.1217 Although 
utopian, the above reasoning reinforces the conviction that watercourses are natural 
ecological units, and that they should be approached as such.1218 States should endeavour 
to distinct the ecological and political bases of transboundary watercourses.1219 
6.2.4.3 The need for a definitive sustainable settlement 
Concerning the Congo River and its transboundary tributary, further studies are needed on 
the hydrography and hydrology of this water system with the view of settling the issue 
regarding the international status of the Congo River. Such studies are crucial for three 
reasons: firstly, an improved knowledge regarding the hydrography and the hydrology of the 
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Congo River, which is shared among the riparian states of the basin may have significant 
incidences in terms of the establishment and the maintaining of fruitful water cooperation 
across the basin. Secondly, ample efforts are needed to determine, adopt and implement a 
suitable regime for transboundary water resources that will be reflexive of the particularities 
of the hydrography of the Congo River system. The claim (which is now codified under 
Article 3 of the UNWCC) that each watercourse has to be approached as a particular case is 
critical. Thirdly, such studies will contribute to the pressing need for improved hydrological 
data across the basin to support the basin-wide decision-making process. 
Meanwhile, the opposing conceptions of both countries discussed above 
would continue through the 1980s and even radicalise in the early 1990s. The antagonism 
between the two states would dominate their political relations, especially during the reign 
of late President Mobutu, until his overthrow by Mr Kabila on May 17, 1997, few days 
after the adoption of the 1997 UN Water Convention. The status quo of the regime of the 
Congo River and its transboundary tributary would remain unchanged until the year 1999, 
which saw the adoption of the treaty instituting a uniform water regime for the Congo, 
Ubangi, and Sangha River, as it will be discussed in the next section.  
For Mubiala,1220 two opposing factors were observed: on one side, there was 
the crucial role that was played by the section of the Congo and the Ubangi Rivers, which 
are shared by the DR-Congo, the Republic of the Congo, and the CAR. On the other side, 
there was the legal vacuum created by the independences in the region, as explained 
above.1221 The same author argued that during this period of a legal vacuum, the use of the 
shared waters seemed to be much of mutual tolerance between the riparian states than an 
actual application of the principle of freedom of navigation.1222 However, the conjunction 
of the above two factors caused sporadic navigation incidents to multiply between the ships 
of these three countries on the Congo and the Ubangi Rivers.1223 Nevertheless, the 
navigation on the Congo River continued for all its riparian states despite the vacuum, until 
the advent of the contemporary regimes on the Congo River and its tributaries. 
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6.3 The current regime of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries  
6.3.1 The applicable international legal framework 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 above have discussed the two main international conventions that 
govern the transboundary watercourses, which are the 1997 UNWCC and the 1992 UNECE 
Watercourses Convention.1224 As is the case in most international river basins, the states of 
the Congo River basin are not part of neither of these two treaties.1225 Table 11 below 
summarises the state of the adoption and ratification of the 1997 UNWCC and the accession 
of the 1992 UNECE across the Congo River basin. 
 
Table 11: Adoption and ratification of the  
1997 UNWCC and accession to the 1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention  
by the States of the Congo River basin 
   Source: United Nations Treaty Collection.1226 
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Angola Yes  - - - 0 0 
Burundi - Yes - - 0 0 
Cameroon Yes - - - 0 0 
Congo - - - Yes 0 0 
CAR - - - Yes 0 0 
Gabon Yes - - - 0 0 
RD-Congo - - - Yes 0 0 
Rwanda - - Yes - 0 0 
Tanzania - - Yes - 0 0 
Zambia Yes - - - 0 0 
 
 
Since the time of the negotiation and adoption of the 1997 UNWCC, the states 
of the Congo basin showed little and diverging interest concerning the international regime that 
was emerging because of this Convention. For the states of the Congo River basin, the 1990s, 
in general, were a volatile decade. The wind of democratisation that was blowing on the African 
continent in general and the Congo River basin, in particular, did not allow states’ meaningful 
participation during the negotiation of the 1997 UNWCC regime.  
The 1997 UNWCC has generally received very little support from states 
worldwide. Its delayed entry into force is somewhat an indication of States’disappointment 
in its regime.1227 On the day of its adoption of the 1997 UNWCC, three of the Congo basin 
states were absent, whereas two abstained from voting, and one voted against the 
convention.1228 Only four of them  voted in favour of the 1997 UNWCC, but failed thereafter 
to show any further interest in the convention. At the time of the drafting of this thesis, none of 
the riparian states of the Congo watercourse is part of the 1997 UNWCC.1229 
As for the UNECE Watercourses Convention, its global opening did not lead 
to a favorable treatment from the states of the Congo River basin.1230 None of the riparian 
states of the Congo watercourse is part of the 1992 UNECE. However, through the CICOS 
organisation, some states of the region have joined the “global network of basins working on 
climate change adaptation”, which was established by the secretariat of the 1992 UNECE 
Watercourses Convention in 2013. This global network aims at promoting water cooperation 
on adaptation in transboundary river basins.1231 Through this network, the UNECE is 
                                                 
 
1227 Ibid. 
1228 The Republic of Rwanda voted against the 1997 UNWCC. Information available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=ind&mtdsg_no=xxvii-12&chapter=27&lang=en, 
accessed on 12 July 2019. See Annexe 1 on the Category of votes by states during the adoption of the 1997 
UNWCC. 
1229 See section  4.4.5 above. 
1230 The Interest shown should take one of the forms prescribed by the law. See 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the law of the treaties.  
1231 See further details in UNECE ‘Convention of the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes, Fourth meeting of the global network of basins working on climate change 




assisting river basin organisations and riparian states of transboundary watercourses to adaptat 
to the impacts of climate change on the waters they share. River basin organisations and 
riparian states are thus encouraged to exchange experiences, discuss challenges and lessons 
learnt, and stimulate contacts between the basins’ transboudary waters experts.1232 
In parallel to staying away from the 1997 UNWCC and the 1992 UNECE 
Watercourses Convention, the states of the Congo River basin have begun developing an 
internal dynamic of water cooperation through some institutional mechanism of the 
International Commission of the Congo-Ubangi-Sangha Basin (CICOS), to be discussed in 
the next section. Such dynamic is a piece of evidence that the states of the basin have 
recognised the value of those two international Conventions even though they have not yet 
joined either of them. 
In 2018, the DR-Congo and some other states of the Central African Region 
adopted the Convention for the prevention of conflicts related to the management of shared 
water resources in Central Africa because of a context dominated by the impacts of climate 
change on water resources.1233 In its preamble, the Central African Convention on shared 
waters affirms its affiliation to both the 1997 UNWCC and the 1992 UNECE Watercourses 
Convention, event though the signing states refrained from joining the two conventions as just 
explained.  
The Central African shared waters Convention was negotiated within the 
framework of the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS), with the 
technical and financial support of the UNECE, under the Convention on the Protection and 
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, and the African Development 
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Bank.1234 Its objective is to define the fundamental principles and rules for conflict prevention 
and resolution around issues relating to the shared water resources of the Central African 
region.1235 In fact, the Central African region is endowed with nearly the half of the total 
volume of freshwaters in Africa, sixteen major transboundary rivers, five transboundary lakes 
and seventeen transboundary aquifer systems, which are shared by eleven ECCAS state 
members.1236 
At the time of the drafting of the present thesis, the Central African shared 
waters convention was not yet in power. Nevertheless, its adoption by the states of the basin 
seems to be an indication of their strong political will to implement a locally negotiated regime 
for the management the region’s significant amounts of shared water resources. 
6.3.2 The two treaties of the International Commission of the Congo-Ubangi-Sangha 
basin. 
In the sense of this thesis, the CICOS regime is the legal regime that governs the Congo 
River and part of its domestics and transboundary tributaries, especially those situated on 
the westwern hemisphere of the territory of the DR-Congo. The CICOS regime is 
comprised of two treaties. The first treaty is the “Agreement that establishes a uniform 
regime of navigation on the Congo River and the Ubangi and Sangha Rivers, and creates 
the International Commission of the Congo-Oubangui-Sangha Basin of 1999”, adopted on 
November 6, 1999, in Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo,1237 and referred to hereinafter 
                                                 
 
1234 Information available at: https://www.unece.org/info/media/presscurrent-press-
h/environment/2017/central-african-countriesapprove-regional-convention-on-transboundary-water-
cooperation-with-unece-support/doc.html, accessed on 21 November 2021. 
1235 There are key principles of international water law that form the Central African Water Convention’s core 
provisions. These are the principle of equitable and reasonable use of shared water resources; the prevention of 
water borne transboundary impacts; the establishment of water cooperation across transboundary and regional 
settings, as well as the peaceful resolution of water related conflicts. Information available at: 
https://www.unece.org , accessed on 21 November 2021. 
1236 Information available at: https://www.unece.org , accessed on 21 November 2021. 
1237 The original french denomination of this treaty is “Accord Instituant un Regime Fluvial Uniforme et 
Creant la CICOS du 6 Novembre 1999”. More details on the CICOS available at https://www.cicos.int, 
accessed on 14 July 2019. 
 
 
as the “1999 CICOS Initial Treaty”. The second treaty is the “Additive Treaty to the 1999 
Initial CICOS Treaty, adopted on February 22, 2007, in Kinshasa, DR-Congo.1238  
The 1999 CICOS Initial Treaty was signed between the DR-Congo, the 
Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and Cameroon.1239 Two reasons led 
to the adoption of this instrument. First, the political will of the states of the basin to put an 
end to the long-standing legal vacuum and ambiguity which prevailed concerning the 
transboundary waters of the basin; second, the urgent need to define a harmonised fluvial 
regime which would apply to the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries. With the 
financial support of the UNECA,1240 the CEMAC organisation that enjoys the membership 
of some of the riparian states of the Congo watercourse launched a study concerning the 
transboundary waters of the basin, and that led to the adoption of a navigation code between 
the CEMAC and the DR-Congo in April 1999, known as the “CEMAC/DR-Congo internal 
navigation code”.1241  
The CEMAC/ DR-Congo navigation Code established some navigation 
standards and rules to be applied within and between the DR-Congo, Cameroon, CAR, 
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad, which are all CEMAC countries, except the DR-
Congo. It is essential to consider the political scope that is attached to the signing of this 
CEMAC/DR-Congo internal navigation code, because, as explains Ngoma,1242 it was the 
obligatory passage before the negotiation and adoption of the 1999 CICOS Initial Treaty. 
A few months after the adoption of the CEMAC/DR-Congo navigation 
code, the heads of the states of Cameroon, CAR, the Congo, and the DR-Congo met in 
Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo, in November 6, 1999, and signed the 1999 Initial 
CICOS Treaty, which also created at the same time the International Commission on the 
Congo, Ubangi and Sangha Rivers, which is commonly referred to as CICOS.1243 The 
                                                 
 
1238 Information available at https://www.cicos.int, accessed on 14 July 2019. 
1239 Ibid.  
1240 On CEMAC and UDEAC  see note 1156 above; Medinilla (note 951 above; 6). 
1241 It is a navigation code between the CEMAC and the DR-Congo (who is not a CEMAC state member). 
The ‘CEMAC/DR-Congo internal navigation code’ is available at https://www.cicos.int/wp-
content/uploads/1-Code-de-navigation-int%c3%a9rieure-CEMACRDC.pdf , accessed on 14 July 2019.  
1242 Ngoma (note 1125 above; 366). 
1243 The CICOS was instituted by the 1999 CICOS initial Agreement. 
 
 
CICOS is a joint institution with a specific mandate over the Congo basin’s shared water 
resources, as specified in the two treaties materialising its regime.1244 The headquarters of 
the CICOS was established in Kinshasa, DR-Congo, on September 24, 2004.1245 For 
Pilarski,1246 such a choice must have been dictated by the proportions of the DR-Congo 
within the river basin, and also in the country’s significant contribution towards the total 
volume of the waters that flow through the Congo River, as already discussed. 
The initial mandate of the CICOS was to ensure freedom of navigation on 
the Congo River and its tributaries to the members state of the CICOS, whereas the 2007 
CICOS Additive Treaty gave tto this organisation the authority to apply across the Congo 
River basin the principle of Integrated Water Resources Management which was discussed 
earlier,1247 for the management of the basin’s shared water resources.  
The adoption of the 1999 Initial CICOS Treaty occurred two years after the 
adoption of the 1997 UNWCC. However, its 35 Articles were entirely navigational and did 
not include any non-navigational consideration. The state of isolation of the CAR and its 
quasi total dependence on the Congo and the Ubangi Rivers for country supply with goods 
and country exportations seem to have significantly contributed to an initial focus of the 
CICOS regime on navigational issues.1248 For Ngoma,1249 the 1999 Initial CICOS Treaty 
was instead a successor to the 1885 Berlin Final Act, from which, the author thought the 
treaty inherited both its spirit and letter.  
Despite such criticism, the 1999 CICOS Initial Treaty was for some 
observers a successful step towards the establishment of water cooperation across the 
                                                 
 
1244 See Articles 16 and 17 in the 1999 CICOS Initial Treaty and Articles 2 and 3 of the 2007 CICOS Additive 
Treaty. 
1245 The agreement between the DR-Congo and the CICOS to establish CICOS’ headquarters in Kinshasa, 
signed on September 24, 2004 is available at https://www.cicos.int , accessed on 14 July 2019. 
1246 C. Pilarski (note 1158 above; 70). 
1247 See  section 2.2.6 above. 
1248 The supply of the CAR in goods and the country’s exportations depends to a considerable extent on the 
Pointe Noire harbour on the high sea, situated in the Republic of the Congo. See for more details on the ‘Port 
autonome de point noire’ http://www.papn-cg.org/fr/accueil/ , accessed on 23 March 2019; See Map 6 
concerning the geographical positioning of the two Congos vis a vis each other.  
1249 Ngoma (note 1125 above; 366). 
 
 
Congo River basin.1250 However, with such an exclusive focus on navigation, the 1999 
CICOS Initial Treaty could not yield much results from a non-navigational viewpoint. 
There was therefore a need to readjust the mandate of this still young commision Not only 
that but also early in the decade of 2000-2010, the Integrated Water Resource Management 
strategy (IWRM) was seen as an answer to the increasing complexification of 
transboundary water issues at a global scale. Seeing that most donor agencies operating in 
the water sector adopted the IWRM as a new guiding principle for their interventions in 
transboundary contexts, the CICOS seized this opportunity to adopt the IWRM principle 
and therefore extend its mandate to the non-navigational uses of the basin’s transboundary 
watercourses.1251   
6.3.3 The non-navigational uses of the waters of the Congo River and its transboundary 
tributaries under the CICOS regime. 
The states party to the 1999 CICOS Initial Treaty decided to upgrade this 
agreement from a navigation-centred regime into becoming a treaty of broader scope, 
which would include the non-navigational uses of the waters of the Congo watercourse that 
were under administration of this 1999 CICOS Initial Treaty. The new agreement was to 
be founded on the IWRM approach. The non-navigational aspects that were to be included 
were in general those that were left behind by the 1999 CICOS Initial Treaty.1252 In 2005, 
under the impulse of the 12th Conference of the ECCAS, which was held in Brazzaville, 
with the aim of extending the mandate of the CICOS, this later would draft an annexe to its 
                                                 
 
1250 See for instance Medinilla (note 951 above; 8), who argued that the 1999 CICOS initial Treaty constituted 
“a recognition of a basin-wide community of interests”; see also Ngoma (note 1125 above; 367). 
1251 See section 2.3.6 above for more information on the IWRM approach. These donors included Multilateral, 
bilateral and NGO organisations operating in the water sector, such as the World bank, the UN, the USAID, 
and others. For further, see Chris White (June 2013) ‘Integrated Water Resources Management: What is it 
and why is it used?’ available at http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2013/06/10/integrated-water-resources-
management-what-is-it-and-why-is-it-used/ , accessed on 12 June 2019. 
1252 Articles 2 and 3 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty. 
 
 
1999 Initial Treaty, in which were addressed some non-navigational uses of the rivers of 
the treaty.1253  
With the support of the UNEP, the signing of an additive text in complement to 
the 1999 CICOS Initial Treaty would take place at the 5th ordinary session of the CICOS 
steering committee, which was held on December 13, 2007, in Yaoundé, Cameroon, where the 
CICOS’ member states reaffirmed their will to see the institution play its role as a river basin 
organisation.1254 The 2007 additive text would be adopted on February 22, 2007 , as the “2007 
Additive Treaty to the 1999 CICOS Initial Treaty”. It comprises 23 Articles and seven titles, 
and aims at “promoting the integrated management of water resources on the territory under 
the jurisdiction of the CICOS”.1255 Besides the integration of the IWRM approach, the additive 
treaty also expands the scope of the CICOS regime to all parts of the Congo River basin situated 
on the territories of the member states.1256 The additive treaty further enumerated the principles 
and objectives associated with an integrated approach to the management of water resources, 
but remained generally vague on how the IWRM approach was to be implemented throughout 
the Congo River basin.1257  
However, it was thanks to the above extension of the initial mandate of the 
CICOS that the legal framework that governs the Congo River and its transboundary 
tributaries became responsive to the climate change phenomenon. It is also through such 
mandate extension that it will be possible to assess, here below, the effectiveness of the 
CICOS regime concerning the integration of the climate change dimension.  
Titles II (Object and field of application), III (Principles and terms of use of 
the waters), and IV (Protection and preservation of the environment) of the 2007 Additive 
Treaty are more particularly crucial concerning the integration of the non-navigational uses 
of the waters of the Congo River and its tributaries. Amongst other things, the additive’s 
                                                 
 
1253 Ibid.; The French original title of this treaty is “ Additif a l’Accord Instituant un Regime Fluvial Uniforme 
et Creant la CICOS, du 6 Novembre 1999 du 22 fevrier 2007”. For further historical details consult 
concerning the 2007 CICOS Additive treaty, see http://www.cicos.int/ , accessed on 26 April 2019. 
1254 Information available at: http://www.sadieau.org/actus/communique-final-neuvieme-session-ordinaire-
comite-des-ministres-cicos , accessed on 10 July 2019. 
1255 See Artciles 2 and 3 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty. 
1256 See Article 1 (15) of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty.  
1257 Medinilla (note 951 above; 7). 
 
 
two articles under title II specify that the additive’s objective is to set the principles and 
approaches that should be observed while using the waters of the Congo River and its 
tributaries which are covered by the CICOS regime.1258  
The ten articles that comprise title III of the 2007 Additive Treaty provide 
in detail all the principles and conditions of the use of the waters covered by both the 1999 
CICOS Initial Treaty and the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty. The principles under this title 
include the equitable and rational utilisation of transboundary waters, the principles of 
cooperation, prior notification, and peaceful settlement of water conflicts.1259 Most of these 
principles were discussed earlier, and are based on the principles which are proclaimed 
under the 1997 UNWCC. 1260 
Title IV “Protection and preservation of the environment” provides, among 
other things, for the protection of the fluvial ecosystems and charges the riparian states of 
the Congo River basin to manage the shared water resources in consideration of the natural 
characteristics of the hydrosphere, including the natural equilibrums of the fluvial 
ecosystems.1261   
6.4 The hydropolitics of the Congo River basin and the CICOS regime: an overview 
6.4.1 General considerations 
Mollinga1262 once contended that water was highly political and that there was no need for 
any defender to stress or defend further what was already so obvious. The reason water 
resources have become eminently political, and politics have become preeminent in river 
basin management is linked to the level of the stakes that the resource entails. Haran1263 
                                                 
 
1258 See Articles 2 and 3 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty. 
1259 See Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty. 
1260 See section 4.3. above. 
1261 See Articles 14 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty. 
1262 P.P. Mollinga ‘Water and Politics: levels, rational choice and South Indian canal irrigation’ (2001) 33 (8-9) 
Futures 733, 752. 
1263 V. P. Haran ‘Water and hydropower cooperation in BBIN countries: Policies and way forward’ (2018)  Int 
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found out that in the colonised world, most regimes to govern shared water resources have 
not progressed due to political reasons.  
Water means life; it also means power, food, money, safety, and more. From 
a river basin perspective, the networks formed by the transboundary watercourses means 
higher potentials for trade and interstate exchanges, economic cooperation, conflict 
prevention activities, joint projects for environment protection, peacemaking programs, all 
of which are highly contributive to regional stability and security and international trade 
and development.1264  
As explained by Sanders,1265 problems, and solutions that are associated 
with shared water resources in transboundary contexts often depend directly on the 
positions of the individual riparian countries that are involved in the transboundary water 
system. This is nothing less than the truth in the case of the states of the Congo River Basin, 
whose hydropolitics are to be shortly considered. The researcher should perhaps add his 
voice to those of many other scholars who have expressed their amazement before the 
paradoxical reality of the enormous potential for the development of the Congo River basin 
against its endemic level of poverty. As far as the contribution of water resources to the 
wealth of the region is concerned, it seems natural to notice that the basin state’s 
hydropolitics have been a major limiting factor.   
Turton1266 defined hydropolitics as “the authoritative allocation of values in 
society concerning water”. The recognition of the political dimensions of water resources 
is relatively new,1267 but debates in that respect are almost over because the issue has been 
                                                 
 
1264 B. Pohl & A. Swain ‘leveraging diplomacy for resoving transboundary water problems’ in S. Islam & K. 
Madani (eds) Water diplomacy in action. Contingent approaches to managing complex water problems 
(2017), 19, 20. 
1265 UNEP (a) (note 12 above; xvi). 
1266 A. Turton ‘Hydropolitics: the concept and its limitations’ in A. Turton & R. Henwood (eds.) Hydropolitics 
in the developing world: A Southern African perspective (2002) 13-17. See also Easton’s definition of the 
concept: “The authoritative allocation of values in society” See D. Easton A systems analysis of political life. 
Ney York, Wiley (1965); See also R. Jankielsohn ‘Defining hydropolitics: the politics of water in South Africa’ 
(2012) 37 (1) J for Cont His 123, 124. 
1267 K. Wegerich & J. Warner The politics of water: A Survey (2010), 2; The World Water Council seminar 
held in Marseille in France in 2004, which was dedicated to the issue of Water and Politics was the first 
 
 
sufficiently internalised. As argues Wegerich & Warner,1268 one would be convinced about 
this level of interiorization if one could just consider the developments that have taken place 
around water resources in the last three decades.  
The rise of awareness on the looming water crisis worldwide, followed by a 
growing wind of water multilateralism, has contributed mainly to the awakening of 
conscience in the public opinion worldwide on the stakes that exist around water resources. 
States that possess significant reserves of waters, such as the riparian states of the Congo 
watercourse are no longer looking at the blue resource as a naturally flowing asset but as a 
factor of might. As would posit Cessna,1269  “water is no longer taken for granted”.  
States’ politics or even States’ absence of politics on water resources can 
explain collisions betwen states or communities over shared water resources.1270 For 
Pohl,1271 the politics surrounding shared water resources are often controlled by state power 
asymmetries. Therefore, it seems reasonable that within a single river basin, the interests 
of the riparian states may be divergent or even contradictory. States may not have the same 
apprehension and approach, for example, concerning future developments concerning a 
shared watercourse in terms of major infrastructure projects. In a context which is 
dominated by diverging interests, the emergence of a riparian state that will position itself 
as the basin’s hydro hegemon seems therefore understandable.  
It looks, therefore, timely to introduce some facts regarding the hydropolitics 
in the Congo River basin. This is because the whole CICOS regime as exposed above and 
the likelihood of ensuring successful climate change integration in the regime lays on the 
political stances of the states of the basin which are discussed below. The success, the 
                                                 
 
forum of that sort for that notable organisation. Information available at 
https://www.worldwatercouncil.org/en/publications/world-water-council-biennial-report-2004-2005, 
accessed on 20 April 2019; Scholars such as Allan, a geographer by training, and institutions such as  the 
Irrigation and Water Engineering group of the Wageningen University, made a significant contribution in 
the water sector through convincing their peers of the negative and damaging implications of ignoring 
hydropolitics.  
1268 Ibid. Wegerich & Warner. 
1269 See gerenally C. Cessna Water: No Longer Taken for Granted (1993).  
1270 Wegerich & Warner (note 1270 above; 3). 
1271 Pohl & Swain (note 1267 above; 20). 
 
 
consolidation or even the survival of the CICOS regime depends on the individual position 
of the basin’s states on the Congo watercourse, and their willingness to achieve meaningful 
water cooperation across the basin. 
There are three member states of the CICOS organisation that form the 
group of the core riparian states of the Congo River. These include the DR-Congo (62 
percent of the basin), the Central African Republic (11 percent of the basin), and the 
Republic of the Congo (7 percent of the basin).1272 These three countries depend to a greater 
extent on the waters of the Congo River and its tributaries for their economies and 
transportation. When stressing the importance of the Congo watercourse for these three 
countries, Medinilla1273 observed that even the capital cities of all three states lay on the 
fluvial axis formed by the Congo and Ubangi rivers. Of these three states, the DR-Congo 
and the Republic of the Congo seem to be the most volatile states concerning water 
cooperation at the river basin level. The hydropolitics of these two countries will need 
careful consideration because the success of any transboundary water regime that is 
applicable to the basin will depend on them to a significant extent.  
6.4.2 The position of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the largest state of the Congo River basin. Its 
national area is estimated at roughly 2,345,095 km2, while 40 percent of its population of 
about 80 million souls live in urban areas.1274 From a geographical viewpoint, the DR-
Congo is the most important country of the basin (the DR-Congo contributes to the total 
size of the Congo River basin up to 62 percent; besides, 99 percent of the total surface of 
the DR-Congo is covered by the Congo River basin).1275 The country is a mineral-rich state, 
with the potential of becoming one of the wealthiest economies on the continent, provided 
its political instabilities are settled, and its governance improved.1276  
                                                 
 
1272 Medinilla (note 951 above; 19). 
1273 Ibid. 
1274 See World Bank Group ‘DR-Congo Country overview’ available at 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview , accessed on 6 May 2019. 
1275 Medinilla (note 951 above; 19). 
1276 See World Bank Group ‘DR-Congo Country overview’ available at 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview, accessed on 6 May 2019. 
 
 
Concerning the shared water resources of the basin, the country’s current 
political instabilities and its gloomy economic situation have hampered it from entirely 
playing a leading role and federating the other states around a shared vision on the waters 
of the Congo River. The country tolerates few interferences from outsiders, including 
neighbouring countries on issues regarding the Congo River. The CICOS headquarters are 
established in Kinshasa, the capital city of the DR-Congo, doubtlessly in recognition of the 
country’s dominant position in the basin. However, the country struggled to honour its 
financial engagements in support of the budget of the functioning of the CICOS.1277  
On a more politico-legal plan, the DR-Congo did not ratify the navigation 
code, which it signed with the CEMAC in anticipation of the adoption of the 1999 CICOS 
initial treaty. The fact that the country has refused to ratify the CEMAC/DR-Congo 
navigation code is an indication of malaise regarding the content of the navigation code. 
Surprisingly, according to Medinilla, 1278 the DR-Congo has been active in utilising the 
CICOS structure (which is initially an initiative of the CEMAC) in bilateral negotiations 
with the other states of the basin.1279 Besides, from a regional viewpoint, the DR-Congo is 
not a member state of the CEMAC. The country is instead a member state of some other 
regional organisations, including the ECCAS and the SADC.  
Concerning the project of transferring waters from the Ubangi River to the 
Lake Chad that is mentioned above,1280 the DR-Congo has generally expressed its 
opposition, because of the possibility of significant environmental and economic fallouts 
of such project across the Congo River basin.1281 Although opposed to such an idea, the 
                                                 
 
1277 A rear of contributions, which the country accumulated from the year 2004 to 2013, and settled later, 
under threats from the other CICOS member states of relocation of the CICOS secretariat; see details in 
Medinilla (note 951 above; 19). 
1278 Ibid. 
1279 Ibid. 
1280 See section 5.6.2 above. 
1281 See C. Haushofer (April 26 2018 / Modified on October 1 2019): ‘DRC: Kinshasa says no to water transfer 
from Oubangui River to Lake Chad’ available at https://www.afrik21.africa/en/drc-kinshasa-says-no-to-water-
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DR-Congo seems favourable to a water transfer that would instead drain directly from the 
lower section of Congo River, at some identified sites downstream the Inga dams.1282  
The SADC community has comparable covetousness over the waters of the 
Congo River basin, as also discussed earlier.1283 In this regard, the SADC is most probably 
considering the DR-Congo as a privileged ally for future water transfers, because the DR-
Congo is a member state of the organisation. However, here also, the DR-Congo which 
joined the SADC organisation in 1999 has never signed neither ratified the SADC Protocol 
on shared watercourses of 2000.1284 However, because of the predicted water imbalances 
across the SADC region sooner, and the oversupply of waters across the Congo River basin, 
the organisation might probably be influential towards the decision of the DR-Congo to 
accept to transfer its waters southwards to supply the SADC region rather than northwards 
to replenish  the Lake Chad. 
Moreover, on April 29, 2018, the DR-Congo refused to sign the protocol of 
agreements for the creation of the Blue Fund for the Congo basin, which is an initiative that 
was launched by the Republic of the Congo, and which aims at redefining the bases for a 
sustainable management of the waters of the Congo River and its tributaries.1285 There is 
no doubt that the DR-Congo did not very much appreciate such an initiative, which the 
Republic of the Congo has started around the transboundary waters of the Congo basin, for 
which, as a riparian state this country only contributes little.1286 
                                                 
 
1282 The Inga Dams are situated at 50 31’09’’ S and 13037’19’’E, information available at 
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_type:landmark, accessed on 15 June 2019. 
1283 See section 5.6.2 above. 
1284  See more information on the looming water crisis in the SADC Region in section 5.6.2; The SADC 
Protocol on shared watercourses was adopted in August 07, 2000, and entered into force in September 09, 
2003.  Information on the SADC Protcol on watercourses and its state of ratification available at:  
1285 L. Dianzenza ‘Bassin du Congo: la RDC refuse de signer le protocole instituant le Fonds bleu’ available 
at http://www.adiac-congo.com/content/bassin-du-congo-la-rdc-refuse-de-signer-le-protocole-instituant-le-
fonds-bleu-82801, accessed on 20 June 2019. 
1286 On the contributions of the riparian states of the Congo River towards its waters, see section 5.3 above.  
 
 
6.4.3 The position of the Republic of the Congo 
The Republic of the Congo is the second case in the Congo River basin’s hydropolitics. 
The country has a national area that is estimated to 342,000 km2 and a population of about 
5,2 million people, of which more than 50 percent live in urban areas.1287 From an economic 
viewpoint, the Republic of the Congo has a strong dependence on the Congo, the Ubangi, 
and the Sangha Rivers. The Republic of the Congo is riparian to both the Ubangi and the 
Sangha Rivers. The Congo and the Ubangi Rivers flow in a distance of more than 70 
percent of the southern boundary of the Republic of the Congo with the DR-Congo. Even 
though the country represents only 7 percent of the area of the Congo River basin, its 
ambitions are higher for playing a leading role within the basin and its water resources in 
particular.1288 This hardly expressed ambition is what often provokes clashes between the 
two Congos regarding the majestic Congo River. The conflict that erupted in 1971 between 
the two countries is an illustration of this.  
The Republic of the Congo is one of the country drivers of the CICOS 
organisation; the country is active in the field of international cooperation for the sake of 
the Congo River basin and ensures steady support to the CICOS.1289 However, in December 
2016, in Marrakech, Morocco, at the occasion of the 22nd COP to the UNFCCC, the 
President of the Republic of the Congo Mr Denis Sassou N’guesso launched the initiative 
of the creation of the Blue Fund for the Congo basin which was mentioned earlier.1290 The 
aim of the Blue Fund for the Congo basin is to redefine the bases of a collaborative 
                                                 
 
1287 See World Bank Group ‘Republic of the Congo, Country overview’ available at 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/congo/overview , accessed on 6 May 2019. 
1288 See table 4 above on the “Elements of the profile of the surfaces of the States of the Congo Basin”. 
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accessed on 26 April 2019. 
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Brazzaville  Foundation ‘Congo Basin Blue Fund’ available at http://brazzavillefoundation.org/images/nos-
actions/congo-basin-blue-fund.pdf , accessed on 6 May 2019; See also M.I. Peya The Blue Fund: Mechanism 
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details on the blue fund available at http://www.fondsbleubassinducongo.org/ accessed on 25 January 2019. 
 
 
economy, which will associate rational exploitation of forests and sustainable management 
of the waters resources, including the Congo River and its tributaries.  
This gesture of the Republic of the Congo was diversely interpreted. Some 
observers saw in it the will of Brazzaville to take up a leading position among its peers of 
the Congo River basin in the control of the shared water resources, whereas others saw 
instead a will to weaken the CICOS and give a vital role to the Blue Fund for the Congo 
basin regarding the negotiations around the water resources of the Congo Basin.1291 
Regardless of whether either of these speculations will be proven right or wrong, the 
decision of the President of the Republic of the Congo to launch a Blue Fund for the Congo 
basin which targets the waters of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries, while 
the CICOS is fully operational was in itself a source of speculations and suspicions. For 
Medinilla,1292 the creation of this fund expresses the limits that the Republic of the Congo 
has traced to the CICOS as the joint institution of the Congo River basin. For the same 
author, the developement of the Blue Fund for the Congo basin will reflect a progressive 
reduction of the faith that the Republic of the Congo placed in the mandate of the CICOS.  
6.4.4 The position of the Central African Republic 
The Central African Republic (CAR) is the third hydro political case within the Congo 
River basin.1293 The country has a surface area of 622,984 km2 and has a population that is 
estimated to be some 4,6 million inhabitants.1294 The cycles of political and military 
                                                 
 
1291 Ibid. Medinilla; Follow for instance the debate regarding the relationship between CICOS and the blue 
fund by the Blue Fund’s General director, David Richmond, in December 5, 2016, available at 
http://www.adiac-congo.com/content/sir-david-richmond-les-peuples-du-bassin-du-congo-ont-le-droit-
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1292 Speech of President Paul Kagame of the Republic of Rwanda, at the heads of State gathering at the Congo 
Basin Climate Commission, on April 29, 2018. “The water resources of the Congo Basin connect our countries 
and support the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people. This makes us interdependent on many levels. 
We must therefore cooperate more in managing these shared resources, in order to safeguard food security, 
public health and economic opportunities.” Available at https://ktpress.rw/2018/04/kagame-defends-the-congo-
basin-blue-fund/, accessed on 27 June 2019. Ibid. Medinilla. 
1293 Ibid. Medinilla. 
1294 See World Bank Group ‘Republic of Central African Republic, Country overview’ available at 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cameroon/overview, accessed on 25 July 2019. 
 
 
instabilities that have settled in the country since 2013 have prevented its government from 
playing a significant role in regional matters, including in the CICOS organisation.1295 The 
country, yet, looks as if it has recovered, as of 2016, since a successful democratic election 
that brought a new leadership at the national level to power. Unlike the two Congos, the 
CAR is divided between two hydrographic basins, which are the Lake Chad basin 
northwards, and on the Congo River basin southwards.1296 Such geographical location puts 
the CAR in a delicate position because the two basins represent very diverging interests.  
The country represents 9 percent of the Lake Chad basin, even if it does not 
have any physical contact with the Lake Chad, against 11 percent of the Congo River basin. 
It provides a significant amount of waters to the Congo watercourse through the Ubangi 
River, of which it is the leading riparian state.1297 The Chari River, which is the main 
tributary of the Lake Chad, originates from the CAR and represents the inflows that 
discharge into the Lake Chad.1298 The northern part of the country, which is part of the Lake 
Chad basin, is also its most populous region. The threat represented by the progressive 
disappearance of the Lake Chad which was evoked earlier constitutes a severe threat to the 
CAR, both in security and in humanitarian terms.1299 This is part of the reasons why this 
country is willing to participate in a solution that aims at saving Lake Chad.  
The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)1300 did not initially include the 
CAR. The country only joined the Commission in 1996. The northern region of the country 
is covered by the Lake Chad basin and is looked at as a region at risk due to the progressive 
disappearance of the Lake Chad Basin. Because of that, the country is active in finding a 
solution to the tragedy around the disappearance of the Lake Chad and is under pressure 
from its peers of the LCBC to push for the project of water transfer from the Ubangi River. 
                                                 
 
1295 Medinilla (note 951 above; 19). 
1296 See for an illustration Map 4 on the Network of streams that forme the Ubangi Sub-River basin.  
1297 See details on the Ubangi River in section 5.4.2 above. 
1298 Further details on the Chari River available at https://www.britannica.com/place/Chari-River, accessed 
on 27 June 2019. 
1299 See section 5.6.2 above. 
1300 The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) was established on May 22, 1964 by the four countries that directly 
border the Lake Chad: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. The CAR joined the organisation in 1996 and Libya 
was admitted in 2008. Information available at http://www.cblt.org/en/tags/lcbc , accessed on 27 June 2019. 
 
 
The initial project of water transfers to save the Lake Chad was supposed to draw waters 
from the Ubangi River from within the CAR territory. Southwards, the country is a member 
state of the CICOS and has to align with the official position of the organisation, which has 
not yet given its acceptance regarding the transfer of the waters of the Ubangi River into 
the Lake Chad. Being at the same time the applicant (through the Lake Chad basin) and the 
bidder (through the Congo River basin) regarding this issue of water transfer, the position 
of the CAR can be confusing the tracks in future. 
6.4.5 The position of the Republic of Cameroon 
The Republic of Cameroon constitutes the last significant hydro political case within the 
Congo River basin in the present context, although this one may evolve in the future with the 
recent accession of the Republic of Angola in the CICOS. The country has a national area of 
approximately 475,442 km2, with a population of 24 million inhabitants.1301 Cameroon is a 
country part of three hydrographic basins, namely the Congo and the Niger Rivers basin, and 
the Lake Chad Basin. The share of the country in the total area of the Congo River basin and 
the Lake Chad basin is 2.70 percent and 2.0 percent respectively.1302 As for the Congo River 
basin, Cameroon’s membership is because the country holds the headwaters of the Sangha 
River, which it shares with the Republic of the Congo. Unlike the case of the Central African 
Republic, Cameroon is a founding member of the LCBC and has comparatively lesser 
interests in the Congo River basin than in the Lake Chad Basin.  
Although in geographical terms, Cameroon is only a little involved in both 
hydrographic basins, the country has managed to be politically active in each of them. 
Besides, the country is a leading player in several regional platforms, including the 
CEMAC, which significantly contributed to the idea of creating the CICOS.1303 
For the Republic of Cameroon, even if the country has only a relatively 
marginal stake in each of the above basins, the combination of these three shares becomes 
significant to the country. The combination of the shares of the country in the three river 
                                                 
 
1301 See World Bank Group ‘Republic of Cameroon, Country overview’ available at 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cameroon/overview , accessed on 25 July 2019. 
1302 Medinilla (note 951 above; 19).  
1303 See section 6.2.5.2 above. 
 
 
basins represents a significant portion of Cameroon’s national area; that is perhaps the 
reason why the country is actively engaged in all the politics and activities regarding the 
three river basins it forms part of.1304 Cameroon’s active participation in the dialogues 
regarding the three river basins allows the county to understand and control better the 
hydropolitics of the region and position itself as a key player, a favourite ally during 
negotiations and votes of significant decisions regarding all these three basins.  
6.4.6 The position of the Republic of Angola 
The case of the Republic of Angola will be mentioned briefly in this section because the 
country had just joined the CICOS in 2015.1305 The Republic of Angola has a national area 
of 1,247,000 km2, with a population of around 28.8 million inhabitants.1306 The country 
shares a significant border with the DR-Congo at the lower section of the Congo River and 
controls the headwaters of the Kasaï River, which is the main tributary of the Congo 
River.1307 Because of that, Angola may become a key player in the Congo River basin in the 
future. Besides, the Republic of Angola is also a member state of the Zambezi and the Cunene 
River basins. Both the DR-Congo and Angola are member states of the SADC community.  
For some observers, the accession of Angola to the CICOS has reinforced 
the organisation, in balance to the questionable move that the Republic of the Congo has 
taken. It has also shifted the emphasis of the CICOS a bit further away from the CEMAC 
and has pulled it towards the ECCAS and the SADC.1308 Medinilla1309 observes that the 
institutional relationship between the CICOS and the ECCAS has been the object of 
continuous interrogations since the establishment of CICOS in 1999. Nevertheless, with 
the accession of the Republic of Angola in the CICOS, which joined the DR-Congo, there 
is a higher expectation of the reinforcement of the influence of both the SADC and the 
                                                 
 
1304 Medinilla (note 951 above; 19). 
1305 Ibid.   
1306 Statistics of the year 2019. See World Bank Group ‘Republic of Angola, Country overview’ available at 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/angola/overview, accessed 07 July 2019. 
1307 The flow rate of the Kasai River is 12,000 cubic meters per second of water discharged in the Congo 
River. See section details in 5.4.1 above. 




ECCAS organisations on the CICOS, and thereby on the water resources of Congo River 
basin. It is argued that the SADC and the ECCAS’ influences on the CICOS would 
proportionally balance the influence of the CEMAC, on which the CICOS will still much 
depend on funding.1310  
6.5 Conclusion  
Chapter 6 has discussed the legal framework that governs the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries. The chapter aimed at identifying and examining the existing 
agreements that apply to the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries. These 
agreements will, at a later stage of this thesis, be assessed regarding the extent to which 
they have integrated the climate change dimension. The chapter began by outlining the 
historical evolution of the legal regime that governs the Congo River and its tributaries, 
before discussing its current stage. This was done with the view of giving a summary of 
the context that has prevailed in the birth and evolution of a legal regime that is applicable 
to the Congo River and its tributaries. Key historical steps have included the precolonial, 
colonial, and the post-colonial epochs, down to the contemporary format of the regime. In 
a later stage, this chapter has described the regime that currently governs the waters of the 
Congo River and its transboundary tributaries. The regime that was described includes the 
Agreement of 1999 that established a uniform regime of navigation on the Congo, Ubangi 
and Sangha Rivers, and created the CICOS and its additive treaty of 2007. This chapter 
has, at last, discussed the hydropolitics around the waters of the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries, and explored from different perspectives, the stances of the key 
riparian states of the Congo River. From the discussions that were undertaken in this 
chapter, the political role played by each state of the Congo basin seems to be much evident. 
Equally, much clear are the contexts that have prevailed for the construction of the current 
legal regime that governs the waters of the Congo River basin. Based on such lights, it has 
become thinkable to formulate, in a later stage, some recommendations regarding the 
improvement of the regime that this chapter has examined. 
Having discussed the legal framework that governs the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries, this thesis will, in the next phase, introduce and discuss the 
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7 CRITERIA FRAMEWORK FOR WATER TREATY 
ASSESSMENT ON TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE 
CLIMATE CHANGE DIMENSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous parts of this thesis have discussed the theoretical framework of the 
international law of transboundary water resources, and have described the hydrography 
and the legal framework that governs the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries. 
This chapter sets out to introduce and discuss a framework of criteria, referred to as  Cooley 
& Gleick’s criteria framework, which, this thesis will apply for the assessment of the legal 
regime that governs the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries as to the integration 
of the climate change dimension. Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework is a tool that 
assesses the extent to which a treaty on transboundary water resources integrates the climate 
change dimension. Its choice in this thesis is justified by its practicality, its effectiveness, 
its straightforwardness, and its simplicity to apply. Yet, the effectiveness of a transboundary 
water regime in dealing with climate change impact will be achieved not only through 
ensuring treaty flexibility in the face of changing climatic conditions, but also through 
addressing any specific challenge to be caused by the phenomenon, which challenges vary 
from one river basin to the other. In the case of the Congo River basin, predictions state 
that the impact of climate change on the basin’s hydrology will result in seasonal floods. 
Therefore, exploring the extent to which the regime that governs the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries has taken into consideration the climate change dimension, will 
require that this thesis includes a step of verification of the extent to which the Congo 
River’s regime is responsive to floods. It follows that this thesis will complement the 
application of Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework on the Congo River’s regime (to be 
discussed in this chapter) with a comparative analysis between the legal regimes that 
addresses floods in the Congo and the Rhine River basins (to be discussed in the next two 
chapters). This chapter comprises five sections. The first section introduces some general 
considerations regarding climate change and water treaties, while the following four 
sections discuss Cooley & Gleick’s fourfold criteria framework, which includes i. the 
flexible water allocation strategies and water quality standards, ii. the response strategy for 
extreme weather events, iii. the treaty amendment and review process, and iv. the joint 
institutions.   
 
 
7.1.1 General considerations 
The generations of water treaties that were negotiated before the advent of climate change 
were based, in general, on the hypothesis that water supply will remain constant in the 
future.1311 In some regions of the globe, at some epochs, issues concerning water quality 
did not preoccupy transboundary water lawmakers.1312 However, the context has now 
significantly evolved and has dictated the integration of water quality considerations in 
transboundary water treaties. As abundantly discussed throughout this thesis, predictions 
state that climate change will increasingly affect both water quantity and quality.1313 Most 
of the water treaties that were signed before the discovery of the current episode of climate 
change did not include any mechanism that could help address the impacts of the changing 
climatic conditions such as water variability on the shared water resources.1314  
Earlier enough, McCaffrey1315 predicted that water variability and instability 
would soon become usual phenomena, the reason why, concluded this author, it has become 
crucial to integrate some treaty mechanisms that create flexibility in transboundary water 
regimes, for adequate responsiveness to climate disruptions. 
In recent years, a large and growing body of literature investigated the issue 
of climate change and transboundary water laws.1316 Most of them set out to understand how 
the law in different sectors and at different levels of governance reacts to the changing 
climatic conditions and its rosary of consequences on ecosystems and natural resources, 
                                                 
 
1311 Cooley & Gleick (note 352 above; 715); Ludwig et al. (note 1082 above; 236). 
1312 On the integration of water quality into transboundary water agreements, see generally M. Köppel & D. 
F. Sprinz ‘Do Binding Beat Nonbinding Agreements? Regulating International Water Quality’ (2019)  J of 
Conf Res 1; L.L. Bennett ‘The integration of water quality into transboundary allocation agreements Lessons 
from the southwestern United States’ (2000) 24 (1) Agr Eco 113-125. 
1313 See section 5.6.1 above. 
1314 Tarlock (note 392 above; 190-191). 
1315 S.C. McCaffrey (f) ‘The need for flexibility in freshwater treaty regimes’ (2003) Nat Res for 156, 157-159. 
1316 See for instance J.W. Dellapenna ‘Book review’ Michael Kidd et al. (eds) Water and the Law: Towards 
Sustainability (2014)." (2017) 1 (8) J of Hum R & the Env 172-175; A. Earle et al.  Transboundary water 
management and the climate change debate (2015). 
 
 
including waters.1317 Bates,1318 for instance, noticed that the majority of agreements that are 
in place in transboundary river basins worldwide do not take into account the impact of 
climate change on the waters, which the agreements were adopted for. Wouters1319 made 
similar observations, but with more focus on Africa, and discovered that most of the 
continent’s transboundary water treaties did not integrate any climate change dimension.1320  
Substantial contributions were made towards the identification of critical 
features of water treaties (also referred to as treaty mechanisms) whose inclusion in treaties 
on shared water resources made theses ones to be flexible and resilient vis-à-vis the impact 
of climate change on water resources. Such mechanisms are crucial contribution towards 
treaty flexibility with regard to the unpredictable character of climate change impacts on 
water resources. Furthemore, these inbuilt flexibility mechanisms work both to improve 
water treaty design, and offer the basic features that allow treaty assessment regarding the 
integration of the climate change dimension.  
Based on the works of Drieschova et al., and Drieschova & Fischhendler,1321 
Sanchez & Roberts identified four broad-based strategies that assess environmental 
uncertainties in general, and more specifically the climate-related uncertainties. These four 
strategies include i. ignoring uncertainty; ii. a complete contracts approach; iii. an 
uncertainty minimisation strategy, and iv. an open-ended strategy. 1322 
                                                 
 
1317 For early analysis on this issue, see generally G. P.H. Gleick ‘Water and conflict’ (1993) Int’l Sec 18 (1), 
79–112; P.H. Gleick ‘How much water is there and whose is it? In: The World’s Water 2000–2001: The 
Biennial Report 9 on Freshwater Resources. Washington, DC: Island Press; P. Wouters ‘Dynamic 
Cooperation’—The Evolution of Transboundary Water Cooperation’ in M. Kidd et al. (Eds.) Water and the 
Law: Towards Sustainability (2014) 13, 63. 
1318 Bates et al. (note 3 above; 3).  
1319 Wouters (note 1320 above; 63). 
1320 Bakker & Duncan (note 33 above; 424).  
1321 A. Drieschova et al. ‘Role of Uncertainties in the Design of International Water Treaties: An Historical 
Perspective’ (2011) CC 105, 387-408; A. Drieschova & I. Fischhendler ‘A Toolkit of Mechanisms to Reduce 
Uncertainty in International Water Treaties’ (2011) The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Sanchez & Roberts 
(note 9 above, 53). 
1322 Sanchez & Roberts (note 9 above, 53). 
 
 
The ignorance of uncertainties occurs when parties purposely or 
instinctively deny the existence of uncertainties. Parties may do so whether because of a 
tradition of “risk denial”,1323 or if the treaty negotiators deliberately deny the potential 
presence of uncertainties, for the purpose of selling an agreement to the domestic 
constituencies. Under the strategy of complete contracts approach, a treaty will specify the 
obligations of each signing riparian state, under all potential scenarios, thus leaving no 
room for any ambiguity in treaty implementation or interpretation.1324 The uncertainty 
minimisation strategy leads the parties to a treaty to seek cooperation with each other to 
reduce either the impacts of a considered uncertainty, or its primary causes.1325 An open-
ended strategy leaves enough room for adjustments through the development of 
intrinsically flexible treaty mechanisms that are likely to be adapted to a wide variety of 
situations. 1326 
Rieu-Clarke & Moynihan1327 also proposed a strategy for dealing with 
uncertainties in water treaties. However, Rieu-Clarke & Moynihan’s approach leaned more 
on water allocation flexible mechanismes than on other aspects of sharing transboundary 
water resources. Owing to that, Rieu-Clarke & Moynihan’s approach will not be very useful 
to this study given the particular context of the Congo River basin. As mentioned earlier, 
in general, water allocation does not constitute a concern for the riparian states of water 
rich river basins such as the Congo River basin. 
In support to the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction for 
the period 2015–2030, the UNECE launched some guidelines for addressing water-related 
disasters and transboundary cooperation.1328 The purpose of the guidelines was to propose 
                                                 
 
1323 N.W. Adger et al. ‘Are there Social Limits to Adaptation to Climate Change?’ (2009) Climatic Change 
93, 339. 
1324 Sanchez & Roberts (note 9 above, 53). 
1325 Ibid. 
1326 Ibid. 
1327 A. Rieu-Clarke & R. Moynihan Transboundary water governance and climate change adaptation: 
International law, policy guidelines and best practice application. (2015), 32. 
1328 The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 was adopted in 2015 by the member 
States of the United Nations. Its objective is to reduce and to prevent disaster risk and losses that are related 
to lives and livelihoods, economic losses, as well as damage to infrastructures. To achieve its objective, the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction counts on greater understanding of disaster risk across the 
 
 
a set of principles and guidance for countries implementing the 2015 Sendai Framework, 
and to help those implementing the 1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention with regard to 
disaster risk management in transboundary contexts.1329 While the UNECE guidelines 
adopted a wholistic approach in addressing the management of water-related disasters, it 
generally lacked a focus on the features of water treaties for climate change adaptation. 
Fischendler1330 and McCaffrey,1331 also made significant contributions in the 
same sense. However, it was the work of Cooley & Gleick1332 (refered to as Cooley & 
Gleick’s criteria framework) that brought in a more coherent set of criteria for the 
assessment of the extent to which a treaty on transboundary water resources has integrated 
the climate change dimension. Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework is therefore the 
assessment tool which will be used in this study. Table 12 below gives a summary of the 
findings of Fischendler, McCaffrey, and Cooley & Gleick.   
 
  
                                                 
 
globe, which has to come by way of strengthening resilience of people and communities, while focusing on 
those that are most at risk than others. It also counts on decisive action to be taken by all societies, in order 
to ensure risk informed development, planning and investments across the planet. See for more details: 
UNISDR (2015). Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. Geneva. Available at 
http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/43291 , accessed on 21 October 2020. 
1329 Ibid. 
1330 I. Fischhendler ‘Legal and institutional adaptation to climate uncertainty: a study of international rivers’ 
(2004) 4 (6) Wat Pol 281, 281-302. 
1331 McCaffrey (f) (note 1318 above; 156-162). 
1332 Gleick (note 345 abovee; 711-718). 
 
 
Table 12:  Criteria frameworks for climate-proofing transboundary water treaties  
 
Fischendler, McCaffrey Criteria Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework 
Flexible allocation strategies 
Flexible water allocation strategies and 
water quality standards 
Drought provisions Response strategy for extreme events 
Amendment and review process Amendment and review process 
Joint management institutions Joint institutions 
Source: A compilation from Fischendler (2004), McCaffrey (2003) and Cooley & Gleick (2011)1333 
 
The first one to propose a flexibility mechanism for transboundary water 
treaty responsiveness to climate change was Fischendler & McCaffrey.1334 Yet, the fourfold 
treaty mechanism Fischendler & McCaffrey proposed was mostly oriented towards water 
scarcity. In other words, the two authors saw treaties adaptation to climate change, mainly 
from a water scarcity perspective. As noticed by Cooley & Gleick,1335 who were inspired 
by the work of Fischendler & McCaffrey, these two authors failed to take into consideration 
the other series of impacts that climate change may have on shared water resources, 
including floods and water quality concerns. Due to the fact that this thesis focuses on 
floods rather than droughts or other climate change impacts, as stated earlier,1336 the 
observed gaps in Fischendler and McCaffrey’s methods make these ones less suitable for 
this thesis.  
To expand the scope of the work of Fischendler and McCaffrey, Colley & 
Gleick developed a more appropriate framework, which included other potential impacts 
of climate change on shared waters such as floods. Colley & Gleick’s approach is also a 
fourfold criteria framework. It aims to check in transboundary water treaties the existence 
of i) flexible water allocation strategies and water quality standards; ii) Response strategy 
                                                 
 
1333 I. Fischhendler ‘Legal and institutional adaptation to climate uncertainty: a study of international rivers’ 
(2004) 6 (4) Water Policy 281-302; McCaffrey (f) (note 1318 above); and Cooley & Gleick (note 352 above). 
1334 Ibid.  
1335 Ibid. 
1336 See sections 1.2, 1.3. and 1.4 above.  
 
 
for extreme events; iii) Amendment and review process; iv) Joint institutions.1337 Colley & 
Gleick’s framework criteria will be the framework of reference, which this thesis will use 
in assessing the inclusion of climate change in the legal regime that governs the waters of 
the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries. 
7.1.2 Flexible water allocation strategies and water quality standards  
Water allocation is defined as “the process of distributing water supplies to meet the various 
requirements of a community”.1338 When applied to shared water resources at the 
transboundary level, water allocation can be understood as “the process of allocating water 
supplies to meet the needs and requirements of the different riparian states”. Hamner & 
Wolf1339 noticed that few treaties addressed water allocation, and attributed such gap to the 
intensely political nature of water allocation between the states. Both authors further 
noticed that among the treaties that provided for water allocation, one out of four required 
equal allocations among the riparian states, whereas the remaining three allotted to each 
riparian variable amounts of water. Fixed water allocations methods do not provide the 
needed flexibility that is required in order to adapt to changing climatic conditions.1340  
One of the most applied methods to ensure treaty flexibility concerning 
water allocation is to negotiate an agreement that will remain general. In other words, the 
agreement for water allocation has to remain a “framework” agreement and will comprise 
a provision requiring the parties to the treaty to meet periodically and conclude protocols 
concerning the use and management of the shared water resource.1341 Such proposed 
periodicity to the meeting supposes that the parties will have gathered enough updated 
information on the condition and context of the shared waters, which will make them more 
likely to adjust the sharing mechanisms in place.  
An example of treaty practice that has applied this method is the agreement 
between the governments of the Republics of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz, and Uzbekistan, 
                                                 
 
1337 Cooley & Gleick (note 352 above; 714-715). 
1338 See ‘Water allocation’ at https://www.encyclopedia.com/environment/encyclopedias-almanacs-
transcripts-and-maps/water-allocation , accessed on 17 July 2019. 
1339 Hamner & Wolf (note 341 above; 162). 




which was signed on March 17, 1998, on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the 
Syr Darya basin.1342 Article 2 of this agreement establishes a practice of signing annual 
agreements on a range of issues regarding the shared water resource.1343   
In certain circumstances, a treaty may specify that upstream riparian states 
have to deliver a minimum flow of water to the downstream states. It may also allocate 
water between riparian countries, based on a percentage of the available water flow. These 
methods help both upstream and downstream riparian states to access sufficient available 
water flows, whether in wet or drier circumstances. The only constraint perhaps would be 
that the method requires flexible infrastructures, reliable and effective operating rules that 
are rigorously observed by states, with data being regularly communicated among the 
parties of the treaty.1344  
Apart from water quantity issues, water quality concerns are also part of the 
negative impact that climate change may cause water resources in transboundary contexts. 
Water treaties have to adopt different mechanisms to address climate change impact on 
water quality. In the 1950s and the 1960s, for instance, Mexican farmers suffered because 
of omitting provisions regarding water quality in a water treaty that was signed between 
Mexico and the USA concerning the Colorado River. What happened is that the Colorado 
River became increasingly saline because of significant pollution from the American side. 
On the Mexican side, the pollution of the Colorado River resulted in the production of 
impaired crops. Because the original treaty failed to include issues regarding water quality, 
there was a need for extensive negotiations after that, which eventually resulted in the 
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Between the Governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Republic of 
Uzbekistan on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syr Darya Basin”; Article II of this agreement 
provides: “to ensure the agreed-upon operating regimes of the hydro technical facilities and the reservoirs of 
the Naryn-Syr Darya Cascade and irrigation water releases, the parties deem it necessary annually to 
coordinate and make decisions on water releases, production and transit of electricity, and compensations for 
energy losses, on an equivalent basis.” The Syr Darya Basin Agreement of March 17, 1998, available at 
http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC054530/, accessed on 12 July 2019. 
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on 12 July 2019. 
1344 Cooley & Gleick (note 352 above; 715).  
 
 
amendment of the treaty several times.1345 The new treaty enjoined the USA to deliver 
water to Mexico within the limits of certain salinity thresholds.1346 
In addressing climate change impact on water quality, different treaty 
mechanisms might be put in place, depending on the context and the effect that has 
occurred. For instance, sea-level rise and lower flow rate of a shared watercourse may 
intensify the intrusion of saltwater in deltas and affect the downstream country whose 
territory is situated at the delta of the transboundary watercourse.1347  A treaty that addresses 
water quality in such cases will differ from the one that addresses water quality because of 
industrial pollution upstream, for instance.  
Besides, there is also a possibility of water quality decline due to various 
factors, including nutrients pollution, surface water pollution, oxygen depletion, 
groundwater pollution, and the pollution of shared waters from some industrial origins.1348  
Such a situation may originate from upstream sources and cause damages downstream. 
More awareness is needed at riparian states level regarding the extent to which climate 
change will affect water quality in transboundary contexts.1349 States awareness will 
contribute to the inclusion of quality issues in water treaties. The implementation of the 
1992 UNECE watercourses treaty has made a significant contribution to improving its state 
parties’ awareness on issues regarding the quality of transboundary water resources.1350  
One of the limitations of these authors’ framework with regard to this 
particular criterion is that this one fails to consider the fact that the allocation of water 
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1348 For details on the types of water pollution see generally D. Melissa ‘water pollution, everything you 
need to know’, available at https://www.nrdc.org/stories/water-pollution-everything-you-need-know 
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resources becomes a concern for riparian countries only under certain circumstances.1351 
For instance, in contexts marked with water competition, while the resource seems not 
enough to supply all the needs and demands of the riparian, water allocation then becomes 
necessary, to ensure fair access to all the riparian. In water-rich contexts, or in non-urban 
setups, treaties practice has shown little need for defining water allocations.1352 The Treaty 
between Canada and the USA of January 17, 1961, relating to cooperative development of 
the water resources of the Columbia River basin, refrained even from defining any 
mechanism of water allocation between the two signatories, except for some reasons 
including power generation and floods control.1353  
7.1.3 Response strategy for extreme weather events 
The third method to create flexibility in water treaties is to reserve special provisions for 
unusual circumstances, such as droughts and floods. The IPCC defines an extreme weather 
event as “an event that is rare at a particular place and time of year”.1354 By definition, the 
features of what can qualify as extreme weather events may, in an absolute sense, vary from 
one context to the other. Depending on circumstances, droughts and floods can qualify as 
extreme weather events, as it will be seen in details in the next chapter of this thesis.1355 
Much of the consulted literature that addressed the issue of transboundary 
treaties and climate change emphasised on aspects other than floods. Also, treaties, 
guidelines, and other legal arrangements concerning transboundary water resources often 
ignored flood issues, apart from some rare instrument such as the “guidelines on sustainable 
flood prevention”, which was adopted by the UNECE, as early as in the year 2000, which 
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1353 See article IV of the Treaty between Canada and the United States of America relating to Cooperative 
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already considered the impact of climate change on rivers run-off.1356 The UNECE then 
invited the Parties and non-Parties to the Convention to apply its guidelines on sustainable 
flood prevention for the management of their transboundary water resources, in accordance 
with their own national contexts, as far as appropriate. Sections 17 and 18 of the guidelines, 
for instance, stipulates the following:  
“Dams, flood ways, dykes and other flood-control works, hydraulic structures and 
other water-construction works should be built, maintained and rehabilitated to 
ensure that they are safe and provide a sufficient level of flood protection, in 
keeping with applicable construction standards or the best available technology and 
taking into consideration, in particular, the impact of climate change on river run-
off. 18. However, flood protection is never absolute; only a certain level of 
protection against flooding can be guaranteed. The concept of residual risk should 
therefore be explained to the public.”1357 
With the advent of climate change and its predicted impacts in terms of wet 
places being wetter and dry places being dryer, floods will become a major threat, 
especially in downstream riparian states during wet seasons.1358  
Apart from the UNECE’s global network of basins which was mentioned 
earlier,1359 the World Meteorological Organisation and the Global Water Partnership also 
set in place a flood based programme, refered to as the Associated flood management 
Programme.1360 Its aims is to promote the concept of Integrated Flood Management (IFM) 
as the new approach to flood Management at a global scale.1361 Mechanisms that are put in 
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place by the IFM minimise losses of life from flooding, increase resilience in flood affected 
areas and communities, while maximising the efficient use of flood-prone areas.  
There are generally two ways of protecting vulnerable flood-prone zones 
from floods. The first is to control flood from where it has the potential to form, and the 
second is to control it by using structural measures around the flood-prone zones, which 
are locations where floods are likely to cause the most damages.1362 There are three types 
of structural apparatus that are involved in flood prevention and control. These include the 
development of some structural measures such as the building of dams and water reservoirs, 
the erection of levees and floodwalls, and the channelisation of the waterway.1363 For all 
these flood control strategies, problems do not arise when these structures are to be erected 
within the territory of the country that is threatened by the flood. The issue becomes 
complex when the measures for flood prevention or flood control are to be implemented in 
a preventive way within the territory of another riparian state upstream of the flood-prone 
zone.  
What generally reduces the risks that are associated with floods at river basin 
level is the establishment of coordinated flood management strategies. The example of a 
treaty that has applied this method is the 1961 Columbia River basin treaty, which provides 
that Canada (which is the upstream state in the treaty) would adjust operation in its 
hydroelectric dams in order to mitigate flooding on the US side. The agreement on the 
cooperation for sustainable development of the Mekong River basin also offers a similar 
example, as it sets a maximum river flow rate that the upstream dam operations have to 
adjust to, in order to meet the treaty’s standards.1364 However, as Cooley1365 acknowledges, 
the coordination of flood-management initiatives at river basin level is crucial, as he 
                                                 
 
1362 World Bank Group Implementing naturebased flood protection Principles and implementation guidance 
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1363 Ibid. Tingsanchali; Ibid. Sayers. 
1364 See Article 6 and 26 of the Agreement on the Cooperation for Sustainable Development of the Mekong 
River Basin available at http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/policies/agreement-Apr95.pdf , 
accessed on 19 July 2019. 
1365 Cooley & Gleick (note 352 above; 716).  
 
 
recommends the adoption of flood-management protocols to the agreements signed on 
transboundary water resources, with the view of adopting useful flood risk-mitigation tools. 
Although they are of little interest in the present research, droughts are the 
most typical extreme weather events that are dealt with by transboundary water treaties. 
The 1944 treaty concerning the Colorado River and the Rio Grande, for instance, that was 
signed between the US and Mexico, made a special provision for problems that could result 
from droughts. Article 4(B)(d) of that treaty provides that the US is entitled to receive 
specific quantities of water from the Mexican counterpart, which are estimated on annual 
average during cycles of five-years.1366 If then, an extraordinary drought causes 
deficiencies in water supply, Mexico is committed to increasing the amount of water 
delivered to the US during the following cycle of five-years.1367 In the Nile River basin, 
there is a “Permanent Joint Technical Commission” that can make recommendations 
regarding new approaches to re-organise water allocation among the interested parties of 
the basin, in reaction to an extraordinary drought that the Nile River could suffer from.1368 
7.1.4 Treaty amendment and review process 
Article 40 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of the treaties refers to the term 
"amendment" as a formal alteration of one or more provisions of a treaty, which affects all 
its parties.1369 The amendment of a treaty has to follow the same formalities that resulted 
in its original adoption and requires the consent of all the parties to the treaty.1370 Even if 
treaties have a reputation of being rigid to amendment or review, their amendment can be 
made smoother by incorporating in the body of the treaty a provision for a relaxed treaty 
amendment. The qualifier “built-in mechanisms” is sometimes used in this case, to signify 
amendment mechanisms that are incorporated in the body of a treaty from the time the 
treaty is initially adopted. Climate-proofing water treaties require the incorporation of such 
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built-in treaty amendment mechanisms because these mechanisms offer to the parties to the 
treaty enough flexibility for their adaptation to changing climatic conditions.  
In the case of unforeseen or unpredicted events which may cause 
asymmetric harm to part of the signatories of a treaty and spare the others, a water treaty 
that lacks a built-in flexibility mechanism for the amendment of the treaty will push the 
harmed state either to deviate from its treaty commitments or to withdraw from the treaty. 
For such a harmed party, keeping its commitments under the treaty may become unbearable 
following the unforeseen event.1371 The flood regime across the European Union offers one 
of the best examples in terms of built-in flexibility mechanism.1372 
Another way of facilitating treaty amendment and review process is that the 
riparian states may give to the treaty they sign a short life; to such a short life, parties will 
annex a provision for tacit renewals of the treaty after a fixed period, unless there comes an 
objection from one or more parties to suspend the execution of the obligations under the 
treaty for a specified period of time, because of some unforeseen circumstances. In this 
way, the parties to the treaty have enough liberty and flexibility to adapt to changing 
conditions and thus spare the treaty. Any significant issue around the shared water 
resources, therefore, including the unbearable consequences of climate change on one of 
the signatories of the treaty, can become the object of new discussions between the treaty 
parties, and from there, become the basis for the amendment of the treaty.1373   
The example of treaty practice that applies this technique comes from the 
Syr Darya River basin.1374 Article 12 of the Syr Darya basin treaty permits a state that is 
adversely impacted by changed circumstances to withdraw momentarily from the treaty.1375 
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1374 See the “Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and 
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Such withdrawal frees the withdrawn state from the oppressive condition in which the state 
could be in if it had to stay in the treaty despite the changing conditions on the waters and 
their unpredicted consequences on the state. 
The latter approach to which this thesis will refer is the inclusion in a water 
treaty of provisions that allow any party to terminate the agreement unilaterally. The party 
that thus terminates the agreement will have to do so following some procedures such as 
the observance of a period of notice before the termination of the treaty takes effect. Since 
States cannot at the time of signing water treaties foresee all possible negative impacts of 
climate change on the shared waters, a treaty provision that grants the right to terminate the 
treaty unilaterally would confer to them some protection against the adverse effects of any 
unexpected phenomenon.1376  
Even though some states have successfully applied this method in water 
treaties, for McCaffrey,1377 the method can be inappropriate in some cases. That is why it 
seems recommendable that the States that recourse to this method could incorporate in the 
treaty some accompanying measures aimed at avoiding eventual unlawful conduct by some 
parties. The treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which was at the origin of the 
Gabcíkovo case, and which established joint operations for construction works on the 
shared watercourse between the two signatory states, is seen as an excellent illustration of 
the inappropriateness of this method.1378  
In the Gabcíkovo case, a provision for unilateral termination of the treaty 
was incorporated in the treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which was referred 
to by Hungary to terminate the treaty, yet in a manner that was later condemned by the ICJ. 
The ICJ did not accept Hungary’s argument because its unilateral termination of the treaty 
did not reflect the spirit of the treaty, caused a prejudiced the other party, and thus triggered 
a dispute outbreak between the parties.1379  
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Conversely to the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian Treaty, which was 
focused on construction works, an agreement on water allocation, for instance, which is 
deprived of any engagements towards permanent joint structures on a shared watercourse, 
could accommodate a termination provision adequately.1380 In the case of an agreement on 
water allocation, a unilateral termination may not have as much material, financial, or 
human consequences as it can be the case with an agreement which is based on works on 
the waterway. 
7.1.5 Joint institutions 
The fourth method for integrating climate change considerations into treaties on shared 
water resources is to establish joint institutions for water management. Institutions are 
generally defined as ‘established official organisations that have an important role in 
society.’1381 A joint institution that involves all the riparian states of a watercourse can fulfil 
different roles, including the facilitation of climate change adaptation. Because of the 
natural hydrologic unity of water resources that flow through a river basin, adequate 
management of transboundary water resources requires the establishment of joint 
institutions that involve ideally all its riparian states.1382 The establishment of this kind of 
institutions that would take parts of the prerogatives of the states over their shared water 
resources is often perceived as a threat for many riparian states.1383 These states often prefer 
managing their natural resources, including waters on a state-to-state basis, without the 
interference of any supra-national institution.1384  
A key consideration, however, is to set in place appropriate institutional 
structures and legal arrangements that may approach the shared water resources for the 
maximum benefit of all the riparian states and the preservation and sustainable 
development of the resources of the said states.1385 Joint institutions such as river basin 
organisations or even the sub-institutions that a river basin organisation may help establish, 
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constitute an appropriate answer to the negative impact of climate change. The joint 
institutions that are in charge of the planning and execution of functions regarding specific 
projects on common waters may assist in the adoption of flexible responses as the needs 
may arise in case of changes in the hydrologic conditions of the shared watercourse. The 
example here comes from the 1977 agreement concerning mutual assistance in the 
construction of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros system, whose Article 15 regarding the 
Protection of Water quality on the Danube River provides: 
“The Contracting Parties shall ensure, by the means specified in the joint 
contractual plan, that the quality of the water in the Danube is not impaired as a 
result of the construction and operation of the System of Locks.”1386  
The legal empowerment of joint institutional mechanisms or bodies is crucial. 
McCaffrey1387 claims that legal empowerment allows joint institutions either to make the 
necessary adjustments in a treaty regime or to recommend to the treaty parties to undertake 
the necessary steps for treaty adjustments.  
In that sense, the legal empowerment of the joint institutional mechanism 
also offers excellent flexibility for adapting to changing conditions, including from climatic 
stressors. A joint technical body may, in some cases, develop a standard hydrological model 
for the shared basin and regularly make available some local climate-change scenarios for 
the riparian states.1388 In many respects, information, as harmonised and shared as those 
generated by the joint institutions, is highly contributive to adapting to climate change at 
the river basin level.  
The International Commission on the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR), for 
instance, launched in 2009 the assessment of the state of knowledge regarding climate 
change and its predicted impacts on the regime of the waters of the Rhine. The results of 
the study have proven to be very useful to the riparian states of the basin and have 
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significantly contributed to the fulfilment of the obligation to share water-related 
information among the states of the basin. A second example to provide here is the Great 
Lake Commission, including the two riparian states, namely the USA and Canada, which 
commissioned in 2018 an assessment of the impact of climate change on the great lakes for 
the benefit of both countries.1389 
7.2 Conclusion  
Chapter 7 has introduced a criteria framework for climate change-related treaty assessment, 
in order to equip this thesis with the necessary tool to enable the assessment of the regime 
that governs the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries concerning its integration of 
the climate change dimension. Among the tools that exist, such as the one proposed by 
Fischendler and McCaffrey, Cooley & Gleick’s is adopted by this thesis because it also 
assesses a treaty’s responsiveness to extreme events, unlike the Fischendler and McCaffrey’s 
tools. Cooley & Gleick’s tool verifies in transboundary water treaties the inclusion of i) 
adjustable allocation strategies and water-quality standards; ii) response strategies for 
extreme events; iii) amendment and review procedures; and at last, iv) joint management 
institutions. This thesis required a tool such as Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework because 
the predictions concerning climate change’s impacts state that there is a strong likelihood of 
periodic floods to be shortly occurring across the Congo River basin. After equipping this 
thesis with a tool that comprises a set of criteria that will be referred to for treaty assessment 
regarding the inclusion of the climate change dimension, the next chapter will focus on a few 
case studies of flood-management regimes, to illustrate the adequate manner through which 
a legal regime may address specific adverse impact of climate change on shared water 
resources such as floods. The integration of the climate change dimension in a treaty is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to ensure that the impacts of climate change are dealt 
with at the river basin scale. Event though the integration of the climate change dimension in 
a treaty ensures a treaty’s flexibility and stability in the face of changing climatic conditions, 
the predictions regarding the specific impact of climate change on a given river basin, such 
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as floods, will need to be addressed accordingly, in order to obtain a maximal response and 
ensure an adequate protection from the impacts of climate change on the basin’s waters.  
 
 
8 FLOOD MANAGEMENT REGIMES: CASE STUDIES  
8.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter has considered Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework for the 
assessment of the responsiveness of transboundary water treaties to the climate change 
phenomenon. This chapter sets out to study a few selected flood management regimes 
across the globe, including the flood management regimes that are in place in the Rhine 
and the Danube Rivers. This chapter aims to discover the extent to which the legal 
frameworks that govern transboundary watercourse treaties in the selected river basins have 
addressed the impact of climate change on the shared water resources. The motivations 
behind the case studies that are undertaken in this chapter are threefold: firstly, the finding 
that the inclusion of climate change in a water treaty is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for regime’s responsiveness to climate change. A mere mention of climate change 
in a water treaty will have little impact if it is not completed with further steps that 
specifically address the predicted impact of climate change, whether it is floods (as is the 
case in the Congo River basin), or droughts. Secondly, the Rhine and Danube River basins 
share strong similarities with the Congo River basin concerning the likelihood of floods 
because of climate change.1390 Thirdly, these two rivers have adequately put in place a flood 
management regime, which may contribute to the development of an adequate flood 
management regime in the Congo River basin. Fourthly, the Danube River basin case study 
indicates that while providing the necessary flood protection to a flood-prone area, adequate 
flood management infrastructures can gather significant amounts of extra waters that can 
be diverted to or transferred elsewhere. This chapter will firstly discuss the flood 
management regime which is in place in the Rhine River basin and after that, and secondly, 
explore the Danube-Main-Rhine interbasin water transfer scheme that transfers excessive 
waters from a flood-prone area located in the Danube River basin into a water-imbalanced 
area which is located in the Rhine River basin. A short conclusion will then close this 
chapter’s discussions. 
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8.2 Generalities on floods  
8.2.1 Definition  
Flood is a natural phenomenon, and it usually happens on a seasonal basis, with varying 
intensity. Flood is generally defined as “The overflowing of the normal confines of a stream 
or other body of water, or the accumulation of water over areas not normally 
submerged.”1391 The International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID)1392 
defines a flood as “A relatively high flow or stage in a river, which is markedly higher than 
the usual; also the inundation of low land that may result from there. It is a body of water, 
rising, swelling, and overflowing the land not usually thus covered.” Experts have 
identified different types of floods, including river (fluvial) floods, coastal floods, flash 
floods, pluvial floods, urban floods, sewer floods, and glacial lake outburst floods.1393 
8.2.2 Issues, Impacts, and facts about floods 
Flood is a well-known phenomenon in most societies. Over the centuries, floods have 
caused several damages, including fatalities, famines, and atrocious suffering of men and 
their properties. Some of the consequences of floods were cataclysmic.1394 The biblical 
account of the genesis reports the destruction of a civilisation referred to as antediluvian, 
from which only one man and his family were divinely preserved: Noah.1395 Some 
observers have reported that the year 2018 was exceptional in terms of extreme events, 
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including floods.1396 The UN predicts that by 2050, there will be worldwide around two 
billion people who will be vulnerable to floods,1397 as a result of several climate change-
related factors, including the rising of sea levels and the demographic expansion in flood-
prone areas.  
Contrary to situations where there are some levels of preparation, flood 
damages tend to be intense when people and societies are found unprepared.1398 There are many 
examples of high fatalities that are associated with lack of adequate preparation for floods. In 
1824, for instance, a flood took Russia by surprise and killed 200 to 600 thousand people in the 
city of St. Petersburg.1399 The St. Petersburg’s flood occurred as a result of several days of rain, 
which caused the rising of the levels of the waters in the Neva River by about 4 meters. More 
than 325 major river floods are reported to have occurred in Europe alone, from 1980 to 
date,1400 with the majority of them taking place after the year 2000.  
However, with floods, things are not always negative; floods can sometimes 
turn out to be positive and beneficial,1401 especially if a flood is manageable.  
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A recent study has found out that there was annually a loss of 60-70 million 
US dollars because of flood damages, against 8 to 10 billion dollars of possible benefits 
from flood control. For instance, floods can mean significant economic opportunities, or 
environmental and social benefits are often unnoticed.1402 Floodwaters can be harvested 
and stored to serve for irrigation purposes later. Excessive waters inflowing during a wet 
season can be stored to compensate for a dryer season.1403 There are several examples of 
flood control across the globe that are made for this purpose.1404  
There are generally two ways of organising the protection of vulnerable 
flood-prone zones. The first is to control the flood from where it has the potential to form, 
as it was done in the above Turkey and Iraq case. The second way is to control the 
phenomenon by building structural measures around the flood-prone zones, at places where 
the flood is likely to cause the most damages.1405 In order to be effective, some flood 
measures have to be applied to the possible extent to the entire river basin, through 
cooperation between upstream and downstream countries. This was the case for the flood 
management mechanism put in place under the 1949 Treaty of friendship and good 
neighbourly relations between Turkey and Iraq. Turkey being the upstream riparian, and 
Iraq being the downstream riparian, the agreement was to build on the Turkey territory 
some water retention structures that are aimed at protecting Iraq from floods.  
As observed by several reports and scholars,1406 the capability to manage 
floodwaters will become crucial in many geographical locations because of climate change. 
This is, as said Colley,1407 in order to balance the excessive rainfall during the rainy seasons 
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and the dryer conditions during the dry season.1408 Climate change, as discussed above, will 
cause wet seasons to be wetter and dry seasons to be dryer. 
8.3 Reasons for choosing the Danube and the Rhine River basins 
 
The reason for choosing the flood management regime which is in place in the Rhine and 
the Danube River basins is mainly found in the third objective of this thesis.1409 This study 
is expected to formulate some relevant recommendations which will aim at improving the 
legal framework that governs the Congo watercourse for more responsiveness to the 
predicted impacts of climate change on the waters of the basin, especially the floodings.  
While it is true that there are several river basins that are confronted with 
climate-related seasonal floodings worldwide, floods do not occur everywhere on the globe 
with similar intensity and frequency. In a transboundary context, flood management 
measures will be adopted by the concerned states depending on how frequent and severe 
floods occur. This is the reason why not all the river basins of the world have put in place 
flood management regimes and measures, to which this thesis could refere for 
recommendation purpose, as it is the case with the Rhine and the Danube basins. The 
Mekong River basin, in Asia, or the Senegal in Africa, to name but a few, are all confronted 
to some extents with climate-related seasonal floodings. Yet, the flood management 
measures which are in place in those transboundary basins are not as advanced as the ones 
in place in the Rhine and Danube River basins. 
Besides, river basins which are geographically and contextually closer to the 
Congo River basin, such as the Nile northwards, or the Zambezi southwards, could not be 
selected as cases to study because they do not share similar climatic previsons with the 
Congo River basin concerning floods.1410 In the Nile River basin case, it is predicted a slight 
increase in the basin’s rainfall frequency, along with a temperature rise, yet no significant 
                                                 
 
1408 Ibid.  
1409 See Section 1.3 above. 
1410 On the previsions concerning the impacts of climate change on the waters of the Congo, the Nile and the 
Zambezi River basins, see generally: IPCC (2014) (c) (note 4 above); IPCC (2014) (b) (note 10 above); IPCC 
(2018) (f) (note 7 above).  
 
 
increase in the volume of water resources.1411 Not only that, but water scarcity is expected  
to be touching 35 percent of the Nile basin population by the year 2040.1412 Owing to that, 
the Nile basin states are urged to set in place an equitable water allocation scheme between 
them, thus showing that flood management does not constitute a future preoccupation for 
them as it is the case for the states of the Congo basin. Likewise in the Zambezi River basin, 
even tough made of several high risk flooding areas, flood management has not yet been 
prioritised, thus giving an indication of the reasons why the legal framework for flood 
management at basin level has received only little attention.1413 
As it will be discussed in the next section, the rich flood management history 
of the Rhine River basin, its climatic previsions on higher risks of floods, the working flood 
management legal framework of both basins, the successful water transfer mechanism in 
place in the Danube River basin, to name only these, are all factors that have motivated the 
consideration of both the Rhine and the Danube River basins as relevant study cases for 
this thesis.  
8.4 Case study 1: Flood management regime of the Rhine River 
8.4.1 The Rhine River in Europe 
The Rhine River is one of the chief watercourses on the European continent. It ranked third 
in Europe and ninth in Eurasia.1414 It is considered to be the most essential economic and 
cultural axis in Middle Europe.1415 The Rhine River originates from Switzerland, flows 
northwards through Germany and the Netherlands, before discharging into the North Sea. 
                                                 
 
1411 Information available at: https://qz.com/africa/1785205/climate-change-is-more-rain-but-less-water-for-
river-nile-basin/ accessed on 21 November 2020. 
1412 which represents roughly 80 million individuals. Information available at:  
https://qz.com/africa/1785205/climate-change-is-more-rain-but-less-water-for-river-nile-basin/ , accessed 
on 21 November 2020. 
1413 G.S. Sanchez “the Zambezi River basin : Water resources management”  (Unpublished Masters thesis, 
Stockholm University, 2018), 10. 
1414 Unesco‐IHE/WGC ‘International cooperation on the River Rhine’ available at 
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/cadialogue/docs/Almaty_Oct2010/Eng/Hofstra_Eng.pdf, 
accessed on 12 July 2019. 
1415 See ICPR (2013) available at www.iksr.de , accessed on 14 September 2019. 
 
 
It is water fed from a transboundary hydrographic basin of approximately 185,260 square 
kilometres, which includes nine countries, among which are Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Netherlands, and Switzerland.1416 Four of the 
nine riparians, including France, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland, represent 92 
percent of the basin’s area, whereas the remaining eight percent is shared by the other five 
countries.1417 Fifty-eight million people live in the Rhine River basin. 1418 Large European 
cities such as Rotterdam, Cologne, and Basel are situated on the banks of the Rhine.1419 
8.4.2 The Rhine River in the history of Europe  
The Rhine has been almost omnipresent in the history, politics, economy and culture of 
Europe over the last 2,000 years. The Rhine River and its tributaries are the primary fluvial 
axis in the region, which is one of the main economic zones of the European continent.1420 
The massive and stable flows of the Rhine have made possible the quasi-permanent 
navigation throughout the year on 800 kilometres of its waterway.1421 Apart from 
transportation, the services provided by the Rhine include the supply of drinking water, urban 
sanitation, power generation, industrial production, agriculture and tourism, because of which 
Cioc1422 qualified the Rhine River ‘as a classic example of a multipurpose’ waterway’. 
Because of the signing of the 1815 Vienna Treaty and its freedom of 
navigation, conditions for regional and international trade significantly improved within 
the Rhine basin. Its riparian countries developed several sectors such as hydropower 
production, Agriculture, manufacture, pharmaceutical industries, automobile and fishery to 
name but a few along the bench of the Rhine, from where they traded to all over the world. 
However, as lamented Friedrich1423 a few decades ago, all these human activities that are 
                                                 
 
1416 U.F. Uehlinger et al. The Rhine river basin (2009), 1. 
1417 Ibid. at 39-42. 
1418 Italy for instance has only 51 square kilometres in the basin. reference. See Ibid. Uehlinger at 1. 
1419 S.K. Chase ‘There Must Be Something in the Water: An Exploration of the Rhine and Mississippi Rivers' 
Governing Differences and an Argument for Change’ (2011) 29 Wis. Int'l LJ 609. 
1420 The Region covered by the Basin has a GDP estimated to some 1750 billion of US$. See Uehlinger (note 
1422 above; 2). 
1421 I.D. Frijters & J. Leentvaar Rhine case study (2003), 15.  
1422 Cioc, M. 2002. The Rhine: an eco-biography, 1815–2000. University of Washington Press, Seattle. 
1423 G. Friedrich & D. M€uller Rhine. Ecology of European Rivers (1984), 265–315. 
 
 
taking place across the basin for 200 years have severely affected the Rhine’s biodiversity 
and its ecological integrity. 
8.4.3 Hydrographical description of the Rhine River and its tributaries 
The Rhine River measures about 1,232 kilometres from its source in the Alps to its mouth 
at the North Sea. It discharges on average 2,300 cubic meters of water per second,1424 which 
it receives from approximately 35 tributaries, of which the major are the Aare, Main, 
Moselle and Neckar Rivers.1425  
The Aare River is 295 kilometres long. It emanates from Switzerland and 
has a sub-basin of approximately 17,606 square kilometres. Roughly 2.1 percent of the sub-
basin (370 square kilometres) is made of glaciers, while 28 percent are forests, and 36 
percent are agricultural lands. Annual averages of precipitation are estimated around 1,490 
mm, while the runoff is 1,003 mm. 3.4 million people live in the Aare sub-basin (192 
people/square kilometre), most of them in the Swiss landscapes.1426 The Aare River 
discharges on average some 559 m3 of water per second. Industrial activities such as power 
production and manufacturing, are the main drivers in Aare, whether in quantity or quality 
terms. Flooding is a phenomenon that has occurred in the densely populated basin for 
centuries. Predictions say that climate change will exacerbate flooding in the Aare basin, 
both in terms of frequency and intensity.1427 
The Neckar River is the second major tributary of the Rhine. It measures 
367 kilometres long and originates from the Danube-Rhine zone of the divide at the 
Schwenninger moss wetland in Germany.1428 The sub-basin of the Neckar River forms an 
area of approximately 13, 950 square kilometres, which consists of 53 percent of 
agricultural lands and 36 percent of forests. The Neckar’s annual average of precipitations 
is around 757 mm, whereas its runoff lays around 337 mm.1429 Some 5.3 million people 
                                                 
 
1424 Uehlinger (note 1422 above; 1). 
1425 Ibid. 
1426 Ibid.at 39-42. 
1427 Ibid. 
1428 Ibid.; Details on Schwenninger moss wetland are available at https://www.wt-vs.de/en/tourism/leisure-




live in the Neckar sub-basin (380 inhabitants/square kilometre), most of which live on the 
Swiss side. The Neckar River discharges on average in the Rhine River 149 cubic meter of 
waters per second. Industrial activities, navigation, agriculture, to name but a few that are 
part of the drivers of the economy of the sub-basin that affect the Neckar watercourse 
profoundly.1430  
The Main River is the third major tributary of the Rhine River. It measures 
524 kilometres long and originates from the red Main, which flows from the Franconian 
Jura in Germany.1431 The Main sub-basin measures approximately 27,251 square 
kilometres. It coincides with the northern part of the South Scrap land of Germany. Fifty-
four percent of the sub-basin is made up of agricultural lands, whereas 38 percent are 
forests. 6.6 million people live in the Main River sub-basin, which represents a population 
density of about 242 individuals per square kilometre. The annual average of precipitations 
is around 665 mm, with a runoff of 255 mm.1432 On average, the Main discharges some 
43,4 cubic meters of water per second. Industrial discharges, diffuse agricultural inputs and 
sewage treatment plants are the main challenges to water quality in the Main River basin. 
However, a program for river monitoring which was launched in 1960 has significantly 
contributed to improving water quality in the Main River.1433 
The Moselle River is the fourth major tributary of the Rhine River to be 
considered in this section. It is also an essential international waterway. The Moselle 
measures 544 kilometres long and drains from a catchment area of some 28,282 square 
kilometres that expands across France (54 percent), Germany (34 percent), Luxembourg (9 
percent) and Belgium (3 percent).1434 The Moselle River sub-basin is formed by agricultural 
lands (85 percent) mainly and forests (14 percent).1435 4.21 million people live in the sub-
basin, thus representing an average density of 150 individuals/square kilometres; the 
average of precipitation across the sub-basin is around 841 mm, against a 365 mm 
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runoff.1436 The Moselle discharges, on average, some 328 cubic meters of waters per 
second. Wastewaters from the mining, the car industry, and the coal plants are the 
significant sources of pollution for the Moselle River.1437 
8.4.4 Climate change and flood along the Rhine River 
8.4.4.1 Historical floods and adaptation measures 
Flood is an almost familiar phenomenon in the Rhine basin, to which climate change will 
only exacerbate. The ICPR estimates that the potential damages that are associated with 
floodings along the Rhine River basin are nearly 165 billion Euro.1438 The abundance of 
waters and the topography of some parts of the Rhine basin may explain its exposure to 
floods.1439 Since the Middle Ages, there were reports about frequent floods. Some of them 
were provoked by drifting ices from the Alpine region, which often caused severe damages 
in human and material terms.1440  
To protect settlements from these recurring floods, people who lived in flood-
prone areas ended up organising themselves, even if they did so with limited means of action 
and inadequate coordination capacities.1441 That is the reason why, over the years, many 
human-made changes were made on the bed of the Rhine. In general, the structures that were 
erected to regulate the flows of the Rhine and to make them more stable, regular, and 
predictable worked with satisfaction, but people lacked the adequate capacity to maintain 
them. As a result, the flood protection structures became sources of several conflicts between 
the communities, in particular after the waters from a faulty flood control system from a 
community A upstream would cause significant damages in a community B downstream.1442    




1438 Ibid.; Information available at https://www.iksr.org/de/ , accessed on 14 May 2019. 






The period between 1993 and 1995 was marked in the Rhine River basin by 
constant floods that occurred mainly in the 1993 and 1995 winters.1443 The flood of 1995 was 
particularly devastating because it caused the displacement of approximately 250,000 people 
from their homes in the Rhine delta area. The economic damages that were associated with 
the floods reached 1 billion US$.1444 It was these 1993 and 1995 floods in particular that led 
to a significant change in the flood management discourse across the European Union.1445 
The union prepared some new policies that were generally aimed at transboundary 
cooperation in the field of flood management and protection across the European territory.  
8.4.4.2 Predicted impacts  
The Rhine basin is located in a temperate climatic zone, which is naturally marked by 
recurrent weather changes.1446 The geographical location of the Rhine basin explains its 
overall climate which is characterised by rainfalls throughout the whole year and a mean 
annual temperature of 8.3 degrees Celsius.1447  Currently, climate change is causing 
significant variations on the mean runoff and snowpack in the basin.1448 In a recent study 
on climate change effects on the waters of Europe, Donnelly1449 showed that changes in the 
basin’s runoff were proportional to global warming. Under 3.0 degrees Celsius of 
temperature rise, for instance, impacts were worst and were widespread more than under 
2.0 or 1.5 degrees Celsius. The ICPR commissioned a study that found out that by the 
middle of the current century, there will be up to 20 percent higher discharges in the Rhine 
basin during winters, against up to 10 percent of lower discharges during summers, with 
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the probability of regional variations. The results of both studies suggest a higher likelihood 
of floods to occur.1450  
8.4.5 Legal instruments addressing floods in the Rhine River basin 
8.4.5.1 The Convention on the Protection and the Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes of 1992 and the United Nations Convention on the Non-
navigational uses of International watercourses of May 21, 1997 UNWCC. 
The legal instruments that address floods in the Rhine River basin are comprised of 
the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine of April 12, 1999,1451 the European Water 
Framework Directive of October 23, 2000, and the European Floods Management Directive 
of October 23, 2007.1452 Because of the objective of this thesis, the essentials of the analysis 
will focus on critical provisions for flood management that are in these instruments, 
including their implementation directives and tools, wherever it is applicable.  
As for the 1992 UNECE WCC and the 1997 UNWCC, both instruments do 
not address flood issues in a specific manner. Even the 2007 EU Directive of October 23, 
2007, on the Assessment and Management of flood risks, does not refer to both instruments 
as background Agreements. Apart from being multilateral framework conventions that are 
applicable to the field of transboundary water resources, both the 1992 UNECE WCC and 
the 1997 UNWCC have only limited applications on specific matters related to floods. The 
1992 UNECE WCC, whose focus is on transboundary water pollution, has made an express 
                                                 
 
1450 ICPR Scenarios for the Discharge Regime of the Rhine state (2011), 21. 
Available at 
https://www.iksr.org/fileadmin/user_upload/DKDM/Dokumente/Fachberichte/EN/rp_En_0188.pdf , 
accessed on 14 May 2019. 
1451Full text of the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine River of April 12, 1999 available at 
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reference to floods, but only once and in general terms. Article 11 (1) of the 1992 UNECE 
WCC titled “Joint monitoring and assessment” provides:  
“In the framework of general cooperation mentioned in article 9 of this Convention 
or specific arrangements, the Riparian Parties shall establish and implement joint 
programs for monitoring the conditions of transboundary waters, including floods 
and ice drifts, as well as transboundary impact.”1453 
This provision places the responsibility on the states that are riparian parties to 
transboundary watercourses to jointly establish and implement programs that aim at 
monitoring the conditions of transboundary waters, including floodings and their impacts 
at transboundary levels.  
As for the 1997 UNWCC, even though the agreement makes express 
reference to floods,1454 its applicability in the Rhine basin is not yet basin-wide, because 
only five of the nine riparian states of the Rhine River basin are a party to the 1997 
UNWCC.1455 Article 27 of the 1997 UNWCC, which is also the only reference expressis 
verbis to floods, reinforces further the general character of both instruments in its Article 
27, which stipulates:  
“Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, take all 
appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate conditions related to an international 
watercourse that may be harmful to other watercourse States, whether resulting 
from natural causes or human conduct, such as floods or ice conditions, water-
borne diseases, siltation, erosion, salt-water intrusion, drought or 
desertification.”1456  
Under the above provision, the 1997 UNWCC enjoins riparian states parties to adopt 
appropriate measures for flood prevention and mitigation, whether individually or jointly. 
In other words, from an international law perspective, the responsibility for flood measures 
                                                 
 
1453 Article 11 of the 1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention. 
1454 Article 27 of the 1997 UNWCC. 
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is laid on states' shoulders, whether individually or in groups, whenever circumstances 
dictate so.  
8.4.5.2 The Convention on the Protection of the Rhine of April 12, 1999. 
The Convention on the Protection of the Rhine was adopted on April 12, 1999, in Bonn, 
Germany.1457 It entered into force on January 1, 2003. The Convention was signed for an 
indefinite duration between five of the nine riparian states of the Rhine River basin, namely 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland and one representative of the 
European Commission.1458 It took the Rhine riparian states almost 50 years to reach the 
current regime, which in the view of many observers has proven successful in many 
respects, besides addressing the issue of floods.1459  
Articles 3 of the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine provides the 
objective of the convention. It shows a quasi-total focus on flooding issues. This is in 
substance what Article 3 provides:  
“The Contracting Parties shall pursue the following aims through this Convention: 
 
1. sustainable development of the Rhine ecosystem, in particular through: 
(c) maintaining, improving and restoring the natural function of the waters; 
ensuring that flow management takes account of the natural flow of solid 
matter and promotes interactions between river, groundwater and alluvial 
areas; conserving, protecting and reactivating alluvial areas as natural 
floodplains;  
(d) conserving, improving and restoring the most natural habitats possible 
for wild fauna and flora in the water, on the river bed and banks and in 
adjacent areas, and improving living conditions for fish and restoring their 
free migration;  
                                                 
 
1457 Hereinafter the Rhine Convention; Information available at:  
1458 Treaty Information available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&r
edirect=true&treatyId=634, accessed on 10 July 2019. 
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(e) ensuring environmentally sound and rational management of water 
resources; 
(f) taking ecological requirements into account when implementing 
technical measures to develop the waterway, e.g. for flood protection, 
shipping or the use of hydroelectric power; 
2. the production of drinking water from the waters of the Rhine; 
3. improvement of sediment quality in order that dredged material may be 
deposited or spread without adversely affecting the environment; 
4. general flood prevention and protection, taking account of ecological 
requirements.”1460 
The disastrous flooding of 1993 and 1995 and the activities and actions that 
followed, offered an opportunity to broaden the basin’s cooperation around flood issues. 
The ICPR, which was in place since 1950 would be tasked with bringing concrete plans 
concerning the reduction of the vulnerability to flooding in the region.  
After several developments, including various political declarations and 
position statements,1461 the “Action Plan on Flood Defense for the Rhine” would be adopted 
in January 1998.1462 The Action Plan was a phased program, aimed at improving both the 
protection of people and goods against floods while seeking to attain the ecological 
improvement of the Rhine River and its floodplains. The same Action Plan on Flood 
Defense for the Rhine would serve as the model for the drafting of the 2007 EU Floods 
Directive in provisions that dealt with similar issues.1463 
                                                 
 
1460 Article 3 of the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine of 1999. 
1461 Besides the inputs from the European Union outlined above; the Ministers of the Environment of Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands declared in Arles, on February 4, 1995 that they thought 
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1462 See generally The Action Plan on Flood Defence for the Rhine available at 
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As mentioned earlier,1464 the two multilateral treaties that provide for the 
management of transboundary watercourses have placed the responsibility of the adoption 
of whether basin-wide or country-wide flood management instruments on the shoulders of 
their state parties.  
8.4.5.3 The European Water Framework Directive of October 23, 2000 
The European Water Framework Directive establishes a framework for community action 
in the field of water policy.1465  It was adopted on October 23, 2000, and entered into force 
on December 22, 2000.1466 Its Article 1(e) stipulates that the purpose of the EU Water 
Framework Directive is to “establish a framework for the protection of inland surface 
waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater which, among other things, to 
contributes to the mitigation of the effects of floods and droughts.” Although the objective 
of mitigating the effects of floods was explicitly mentioned as one of the purposes to be 
achieved by the Water Framework Directive, only a few provisions addressed the floods 
and did so only in a general way.1467 
These provisions include Articles 4.(3)(a)(iv), 4(6), and Article 11 (5). 
Article 4.6 for instance, recognizes the particularity of floods as an extreme phenomenon 
that may cause temporary deterioration of the status of the body of a watercourse, but do 
not recognise it to be a motive for a breach of a general requirement of the directive by a 
state.1468 Article 11 also, on measures that states may put in place concerning river 
protection, creates a derogation to states to implement additional measures for river 
                                                 
 
1464 See sections 4.4 and 4.5 above. 
1465 EU Directive 2000/60/ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 
Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy (2000), 1–72, available at 
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protection more than the measures enshrined under Article 4 of the Directive if a flood was 
the cause of damage that breached states obligations under Article 4 on environmental 
measures.1469 Both provisions are persuasive examples of mechanisms in treaty provisions 
that are adapted to the specificities of a particular river basin.   
Besides the 2000 EU Water Framework Directive, several other initiatives 
from the European Union were launched, and that contributed to the adoption of The EU 
Flood Directives in 2007.1470 As argued by Sanchez,1471 the EU Flood Directive is a model 
of what states can achieve together to overcome a common threat in the field of water 
cooperation. The shared desire to overcome the challenges that flood represented to the 
communities living along the European Rivers pushed the member countries of the 
European Union to such a result.    
8.4.5.4 The EU Flood Directives of October 23, 2007 
Shortly after the adoption of the 2000 EU Water Framework Directive, the 2007 EU 
Directive for Floods followed.1472 Perhaps in the spirit of the lawmaker of the 2000 EU 
Water Framework Directive, a specific instrument to address floods was already coming, 
and because of that, he would not create an overload of the 2000 EU Water Framework 
Directive with flood provisions. The EU Flood Directives was adopted on October 23, 
                                                 
 
1469 Ibid. Article 11 (5). 
1470 See for instance Directive 2000/60/EC and international principles of flood risk management. These 
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1471 Sanchez & Roberts (note 9 above; 74). 
1472 The European Parliament and the Council of Oct. 23, 2007, Directive 2007/60/EC, On the 
Assessment and Management of Flood Risks, 2007.  
 
 
2007, and entered into force on November 26, 2007.1473 The Directive is an instrument of 
19 Articles, which is wholly focused on flood management and is applicable within the 
territory of the European Union.  
As per Article 1 of the EU Flood Management Directive, the purpose of this Directive is:  
“to establish a framework for the assessment and management of flood risks, 
aiming at  the reduction of the adverse consequences for human health, the 
environment, cultural heritage and economic activity associated with floods in the 
Community.”1474 
The EU Flood Management Directive focuses on three operational areas, including the 
preliminary flood risk assessment, in Articles 4 and 5, flood hazard maps and flood risk 
maps in Article 6, and flood risk management plans, in Articles 7 and 8. Besides, Chapter 
5, including Articles 9 and 10, provide for flood-related information and consultation 
measures. Chapter 6 touches the implementation of measures and amendments, Chapters 7 
and 8 respectively, deal with transitional measures and review mechanisms. The 2007 EU 
Flood Management Directive is one of the best examples from all over the world of 
transboundary cooperation whose focus was flood management. 
While the EU Flood Management Directives appear to be entirely relevant 
for this thesis, it seems indicative to focus on some of its crucial features, which may be 
among the most useful not only for the rest of our discussions but also for any legal regime 
that will seek to adapt to climate change in a context where floods are predicted or are even 
already prevailing. As Rieu-Clarke 1475 noticed, even if the 2007 EU Flood Management as 
a binding legal instrument applies to national and transboundary contexts within the 
European Union space, most of the measures that this instrument provides for are 
applicable to any transboundary context all over the planet. 
                                                 
 
1473 Full text of The EU Flood Directives of October 23, 2007 available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:288:0027:0034:en:PDF , accessed on 14 July 2019. 
1474 See Article 1 of The EU Flood Directives. 
1475 A. Rieu-Clarke ‘A survey of international law relating to flood management: existing practices and future 
prospects’ (2008) Nat Res J 649, 669. 
 
 
8.4.5.4.1 Obligation to conduct preliminary flood risk assessment including the drawing 
of flood hazard maps and flood risk maps 
Article 4 of the 2007 EU Flood Management Directive puts an obligation on the Rhine 
riparian states to: 
“undertake a preliminary flood risk assessment, in each river basin district, or unit 
of management referred to in Article 3(2)(b), or the portion of an international river 
basin district lying within their territory.”1476  
Such preliminary flood risk assessment must be “based on available or readily derivable 
information”, such as records and studies on long term developments, in particular impacts 
of climate change on the occurrence of floods. Furthermore, a preliminary flood risk 
assessment shall be undertaken to provide an assessment of potential risks.1477  
In a context where there is a likelihood of flood, whether because of climate 
change (as it is the case for the states of the Congo River basin), or any other reason (as it 
is the case of a naturally recurring phenomenon), riparian states are under obligation to 
conduct preliminary assessments of the situation regarding the risk to floods. Such 
preliminary assessments should include comprehensive information such as maps of the 
portion of the river basin or the sub-river basin under assessment. The preliminary 
assessments should provide as well a history of past floods in the area, which have had 
substantial impacts on the region, and further include available or updated projections 
regarding the likelihood of future floods to occur.1478  
                                                 
 
1476 See Article 4.1. of the 2007 EU Flood Management Directives: “River basin district means the area of 
land and sea, made up of one or more neighbouring river basins together with their associated groundwaters 
and coastal waters, which is identified under Article 3(1) as the main unit for management of river basins.” 
Which Article 3.1 provides “Member States shall identify the individual river basins lying within their 
national territory and, for the purposes of this Directive, shall assign them to individual river basin districts. 
Small river basins may be combined with larger river basins or joined with neighbouring small basins to form 
individual river basin districts where appropriate. Where groundwaters do not fully follow a particular river 
basin, they shall be identified and assigned to the nearest or most appropriate river basin district. Coastal 
waters shall be identified and assigned to the nearest or most appropriate river basin district or districts.” 
1477 Article 4.2. of the 2007 Flood Management Directives. 
1478 Article 4.2 the 2007 EU Flood Management Directives provides: “(a) maps of the river basin district at 
the appropriate scale including the borders of the river basins, sub-basins and, where existing, coastal areas, 
 
 
Articles 6 (1), 6 (2), 6 (3) of the Directive puts States under obligation to 
prepare either flood hazard maps or flood risk maps for areas where there exists a potential 
risk for floods to occur. The Directive maintains such an obligation even if the risk that is 
associated with the flood is only likely to occur (for floods with a low probability).1479 The 
flood hazard maps that are required by the flood management directives are expected to 
contain a range of hydrological information that helps foresee and understand the potential 
of the flood, wherever appropriate.1480  
The level of the details of the information to be included in the flood risk 
maps goes down to showing the potential adverse consequences that are associated with 
the flood scenarios as also required by the Directives.1481 The potential adverse 
consequences, in particular, are to be expressed in terms of the indicative size of the 
population that will be affected (in terms of the number of inhabitants that are affected). At 
last, the riparian states are put under the obligation to make the flood risk maps available 
to the public.1482 
                                                 
 
showing topography and land use; (b) a description of the floods which have occurred in the past and which 
had significant adverse impacts on human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity 
and for which the likelihood of similar future events is still relevant, including their flood extent and 
conveyance routes and an assessment of the adverse impacts they have entailed; (c) a description of the 
significant floods which have occurred in the past, where significant adverse consequences of similar future 
events might be envisaged; and, depending on the specific needs of Member States, it shall include: (d) an 
assessment of the potential adverse consequences of future floods for human health, the environment, cultural 
heritage and economic activity, taking into account as far as possible issues such as the topography, the 
position of watercourses and their general hydrological and geomorphological characteristics, including 
floodplains as natural retention areas, the effectiveness of existing manmade flood defence infrastructures, 
the position of populated areas, areas of economic activity and long-term developments including impacts of 
climate change on the occurrence of floods.” See Article 4.2 of the 2007 Flood Management Directives. 
1479 See Article 6.3.(a) of the 2007 Flood Management Directives. 
1480 Ibid. at Article 6.4.  
1481 Ibid.  
1482 Ibid. at Article 14. 
 
 
8.4.5.4.2 Obligation to draft flood risk management plans 
Under the EU flood Management Directive, planning for the management of the risks that 
are associated with floods is not an option but a mandatory obligation for river basin states.  
Article 7.1 of the Flood directive provides:  
“On the basis of the maps referred to in Article 6, Member States shall establish 
flood risk management plans coordinated at the level of the river basin district, or 
unit of management referred to in Article 3(2)(b), for the areas identified under 
Article 5(1) and the areas covered by Article 13(1)(b) in accordance with 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article.” 
Active participation of the river basin districts that are of interest is a crucial thing not only 
for the production of the flood risk management plan but also for the review of its 
implementation and its amendment at a later stage. In a study on the need for active 
municipal involvement in planning ahead of flood events, Porta-Sancho1483 stressed the 
central role that is played by the participation of the lower spheres of state governance, such 
as the municipalities, villages and other basic communities.  
Societies that often demand from their governing bodies higher levels of 
safety against flooding have to become part of the identification of the problem and further 
collaborate on the implementation of the agreed solution. This participation, as argued by 
Porta-Sancho,1484 is most crucial in flood-prone areas across the Rhine River basin, or the 
Congo River basin, as mentioned earlier.1485 Besides, a government’s best tools to ensure 
flood risk control remains the implementation of adequate regulatory and operational 
frameworks for flood risk management, which in substance requires the participation of the 
subjects of law and the entire societies, not only for the better appropriation of the process 
but also for ensuring a successful implementation of the Government’s tools.1486  
In order to improve flood governance, which in principle is supposed to be 
carried out, to the possible extent, in proximity with the governing structures of the flood-
                                                 
 
1483 J.R. Porta-Sancho et al. ‘The need for municipal action planning against flood risk: the risk-informed 
journey of the municipality of Oliva (Spain)’ (2016) 2 (1) VIT-Int’l J of Arch Tech & Sust  1, 67, 67. 
1484 Ibid.  
1485 See section 5.2.5 above. 
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prone areas, the EU Water Framework Directive of 2000 introduced the concept of river 
basin districts. Under this Directive, a river basin district is defined as “an area of land and 
sea, made up of one or more neighbouring river basins together with their associated 
groundwaters and coastal waters, which is identified under Article 3(1) as the main unit for 
river basin management”.1487 The EU Regime enjoins riparian states to identify any of the 
river basins or sub-river basins that lay within their national territory. Riparian states are 
required after that, to assign these river basins or sub-river basins to individual river basin 
districts that have already been identified.1488  
Small flood-prone river basins may be annexed to larger flood-prone area 
within a single river basin to form individual river basin districts wherever it seems 
appropriate to do so. From a transboundary perspective, what seems interesting is the fact 
that these river basins, sub-river basins or even individual river basin districts may include 
more than one riparian state at a time, which makes flood management to be more of a river 
basin issue than an individual riparian state. However, there are limitations at this juncture, 
as there is no obligation over states to jointly develop flood management plans.  EU member 
states are free to develop their own flood management plans if they intend to do so.  In such 
a situation, the only requirement upon EU member states is that they may co-ordinate those 
national plans with other EU member states within the same river basin district.  
The EU 2007 flood Management Directives put riparian states under 
obligation to make available to the public any flood risk management plan.1489 Plans are to 
be comprised of the conclusions that had sanctioned the preliminary assessment of flood risks 
in the area. They are also to include flood risk and hazard maps, and further specify the 
objectives of flood risk management, as well as a summary of the measures that have been 
prepared, with their intended aims while pursuing such appropriate flood risk management 
objectives.1490  
As a complementary measure, Annex A (II) of the EU 2007 flood Management 
Directives requires the riparian states to include in flood risk management plans:  
                                                 
 
1487 See Articles 2.15 and 3.1 of the EU Directive 2000/60/EC. 
1488 Ibid. Article 3.1. 
1489 Article 10.2 of the 2007 Flood Management Directives. 
1490 Ibid. Article 7.2. 
 
 
“1. a description of the prioritisation and the way in which progress in 
implementing the plan will be monitored; 
2. a summary of the public information and consultation measures/actions taken; 
3. a list of competent authorities and, as appropriate, a description of the 
coordination process within any international river basin district.”1491 
The essential character of developing flood risk preventive or corrective 
actions at a local scale cannot be overemphasised. As argued by Merz,1492 planning for 
floods at a local scale will remain one of the essential components of any flood management 
scheme. A robust example of active municipal involvement under the EU directives can be 
drawn from the Spanish regulatory framework for flood risk management.1493  
This instrument describes the procedures that are applicable in terms of 
emergency management. These procedures involve all the civil authorities whose mandates 
are concerned with issues regarding protection and urban planning.1494 Also, the Spanish 
instrument requires all municipalities whose flood risks are medium or high, to develop 
local action plans for flood risk management, which plans have to comply with the 
requirements of the 2007 EU flood Management Directives.1495  
At last, Article 8.3 of EU flood Management Directives encourages riparian 
states to adopt to the extent possible a single transboundary plan for flood risk 
management.1496 If the basin’s context does not allow the production of a single flood risk 
management plan, riparian states are required to adopt more localised flood risk 
management plans, which will only cover a state’s section of the international river basin 
district. 1497 The Directive further enjoins riparian states to ensure that the measures they 
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adopt in accordance with Articles 4 and 5 of the Directive, and their related provisions, 
regarding flood management, do not cause significant harm to neighbouring states.1498   
8.4.5.4.3 Obligation to exchange information and to consult other member states 
concerning significant flood-prone projects 
The EU flood Management Directive has put the EU member states under obligation to 
exchange information and consultation with the other member states on significant flood-
prone projects. Article 9 of the 2007 EU flood Management Directive provides:   
“Member States shall take appropriate steps to coordinate the application of this 
Directive and that of Directive 2000/60/EC focusing on opportunities for 
improving efficiency, information exchange and for achieving common synergies 
and benefits having regard to the environmental objectives laid down in Article 4 
of Directive 2000/60/EC.”1499 
The information exchange referred to in this provision targets particularly 
“the development of the first flood hazard maps and flood risk maps and their subsequent 
reviews”, based on Articles 6 and 14 of the flood management Directive.  
Also, in implementing the Directive, and more specifically in assessing 
flood risks potentials in areas that are located within transboundary river basin districts, 
riparian countries are put under obligation to exchange any significant information not only 
between the governments of the interested countries but also with different national and 
supranational authorities, including river basin organisations. The authorities that are 
considered in the information-sharing obligation above are the authorities whose mandates 
include flood risk concerns.1500  
As discussed earlier,1501 the observation of the principle of information 
sharing requires generally that the river basin states may establish some cooperation 
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1499 Ibid. Article 9. 
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mechanisms first. The necessity to first lay the foundations for water cooperation over a 
shared water resource is reflected in the preambles of the 2007 EU flood Directive. 
Paragraph five of the preamble proclaims: “Effective flood prevention and mitigation 
requires, in addition to coordination between the member states, cooperation with third 
countries.”1502  
Under the 2007 EU Flood Management Directives, cooperation for flood 
prevention and management extends to other countries that are not member states of the 
EU, as long as there exists the necessity to cooperate with such countries, with the view of 
reaching optimal levels of flood management. In the context of transboundary river basin 
districts which were mentioned earlier,1503 the obligation of prior information exchange 
extends to both the preparation of flood hazard maps and the preparation of flood risk 
maps.1504 This obligation adds to the one that urged riparian states to cooperate in 
designating the flood management units in transboundary river basin districts. Such flood 
management unit is the one of which the climatic previsions have already established the 
existence of a significant flood risks potential.1505 
The involvement of the public constitutes a further dimension for states’ 
obligation to the regime under study. Article 10 (1) of the 2007 EU flood Directive enjoins 
member states “to make available to the public the preliminary flood risk assessment, the flood 
hazard maps, the flood risk maps, and the flood risk management plans”, 1506 in compliance 
with the applicable legislation across the EU. Besides, member states are required to encourage 
active involvement and participation of any party that can be interested in the production, the 
amendment, or the review of the flood risk management plan.1507 In the sense of this obligation, 
states are not only required to share flood-related information, but also to encourage, incentivise 
to the possible extent, and ensure active participation of the public. 
                                                 
 
1502 Paragraph 6 of the Preambles of the 2007 Flood Management Directives 
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8.4.5.4.4 Review mechanisms  
The Review mechanism provided for in the 2007 EU flood Directive concerns the 
preliminary flood risk assessment, the flood hazard maps, the flood risk maps, and the flood 
risk management plan. Article 14 of the Directive provides as follows: 
“1. the preliminary flood risk assessment, or the assessment and decisions… shall 
be reviewed, and if necessary updated, by 22 December 2018 and every six years 
thereafter. 
2. The flood hazard maps and the flood risk maps shall be reviewed, and if 
necessary updated, by 22 December 2019 and every six years thereafter. 
3. The flood risk management plan(s) shall be reviewed, and if necessary updated… 
by 22 December 2021 and every six years thereafter. 
4. The likely impact of climate change on the occurrence of floods shall be taken 
into account in the reviews referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3.”1508 
The EU flood Directive has instituted a regime of obligations review, or if 
necessary, the update of both the preliminary flood risk assessment, the flood hazard maps, 
the flood risk maps, and the flood risk management plan.1509 As shown in Article 14 above, 
after the initial mandatory date of review or update provided by the Directive, a timeframe 
of six years is given, at the end of which there must be a process of review, or if necessary, 
the update for all the obligations referred to by Article 14. 
8.4.6 Concluding thoughts concerning the flood management regime of the Rhine River  
Three fundamental flood-related obligations lie (among other things) on the Rhine River 
basin’s states, which are under the regime that is moulded by the 2000 EU Water Directives 
and the 2007 EU Flood Management Directives. The obligations here include the 
undertaking of a preliminary flood risk assessment (which comprises the drawing of flood 
hazard and flood risk maps), the obligation to draft and execute flood risk management 
plans, and the obligation to exchange information and to consult with the other states of the 
basin regarding the projects that are likely to have possible transboundary impacts. The 
                                                 
 




flood regime applicable to the Rhine transboundary watercourse has thus offered a 
meaningful case study that has the potential to inspire other regimes elsewhere.  
Flooding is a natural phenomenon that, however, can be exacerbated either 
by direct or indirect human interventions.1510 The Rhine River has long suffered from the 
phenomenon but has shown significant resilience to it since the adoption and the 
implementation of the robust flood management regime of the European Union. As for 
paraphrasing Rieu-Clarke,1511 there is no doubt that the flood management regime that was 
instituted by the European Union has offered some of the most relevant tools and 
instruments for flood management in a transboundary context, from which, it seems evident 
that the regime that applies to the Congo River and its tributaries can have much to learn.  
8.5 Case study 2: Transferring floodwaters from the Danube to the Rhine River basin  
8.5.1 The interest of the Danube-Main-Rhine case study  
The Danube-Main-Rhine water transfer case study is the second of the present thesis. The 
case gives an illustration regarding the link that may exist between flood management and 
water transfer. The aim here is to identify some practical aspects of this project that may 
inspire flood management in the Congo River basin, faced with both flooding episodes and 
the solicitation of water transfers to save Lake Chad. The collection of the surplus of waters 
from excessive rainfalls from one flood-prone river basin as a means of flood control can 
provide additional water resources to be transferred towards a demanding river basin as a 
means of droughts control in the basin of destination.1512  
Such an approach, which has not yet been formally envisaged in the CICOS 
regime, may become one of the crucial ways of raising the required funds to design and 
implement adequate flood management regimes across the basin. However, the limitation 
of the Danube-Main-Rhine water transfer case comes from the fact that its water transfer 
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happened within the boundaries of a single country, which is Germany, and that could not 
yield further information regarding the transboundary character of such transaction.1513 
Two reasons led to the drafting of the Danube-Main-Rhine project: the 
necessity to drain the excessive amounts of waters in the south of the state of Bavaria during 
the flooding season, and divert such excessive waters northwards the same state to correct 
periodic water imbalances that prevailed in that region.1514 The transfer of waters that are 
solicited from the Congo River may serve the same purpose, meaning to organise the 
collection of the excessive waters from some flood-prone areas, and transfer of such waters 
to the outside of the basin to satisfy the request for water transfer.1515  
In this case, it may happen that all of the flood management steps that need 
to be undertaken as described above may benefit from possible water transfer fundings, and 
while improving flood management across the basin. Synergy is needed, therefore, between 
the claims for water transfer and the need to develop flood control measures across the 
Congo River basin as it was the case in the Danube-Main-Rhine.  
The Danube-Main-Rhine water transfer scheme was not done for lucrative 
purposes. The transfer was conducted by the German government and took place within 
the German territory. There was no transboundary dimension except for the observation of 
applicable provisions that are related to the transboundary harms that may be caused by 
such a project. However, the case illustrates well enough the possibility of generating 
additional resources through the establishment of adequate flood control measures. The 
flood control measures, in this case, will be aimed at harvesting the excessive seasonal 
waters across the Congo River basin, with the intention of a lucrative interbasin water 
transfer. In that sense, the case illustrates how it can be possible for a state or a group of 
states to generate additional resources from flood management operations.  
The Danube-Main-Rhine water transfer involved several riparian states from 
both sides, meaning in the basin of origin and the basin of destination. Despite such a significant 
number of interested parties, the transfer project was not opposed, thus proving a successful 
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work of negotiations and communication before the execution of the transfer.1516 The 
constructive legal response of the states in both basins had the advantage of finding across the 
basin working water cooperation, which as emphasised earlier,1517 is the critical component for 
successful transboundary or domestic enterprise that would target an international watercourse.  
This Danube-Main-Rhine water transfer illustrates a successful combination 
of flood management and water transfer. Water is collected from a flood-prone area in the 
Danube River basin to a “drought-prone area” in the Rhine River basin, through the Main 
River. The case exemplifies how floodwaters can be harvested and stored from flood-prone 
areas and transferred to drought-prone areas. The aim here is to identify some practical 
aspects of this project that may inspire flood management in the Congo River basin, which 
is faced with solicitation of water transfers to save Lake Chad. 
8.5.2 The Danube River and its hydrographic basin 
The Danube River is a transboundary watercourse that crosses the central and eastern 
regions of the European continent.1518 Its hydrographic basin covers approximately 817,000 
square kilometres, whereby live some 83 million people, of which 20 million rely on its 
waters for drinking purposes.1519 Nineteen countries in total contribute to the waters of the 
Danube River.1520 Such an enormous number of riparian states for a single river is unique 
in the world.1521 The River originates from the German Black Forest from where it flows 
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southeast, crossing or bordering ten countries before its discharge into the Black Sea 
eastward.1522 
In history, the Danube River has played a crucial role in the region as the 
main waterway of transportation for commercial and military purposes for about 2,000 
years.1523 Such a role was played naturally possibly because the Danube River is the only 
waterway that crosses Europe from the west to the east.1524 These countries include 
Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Moldova, Serbia, Slovakia, Romania, 
and Ukraine before discharging into the Black Sea. The control of the Danube River has 
played a crucial role in the history of the European continent because of the very same 
physical characteristics. Even at present, the Danube River is considered as the hub of the 
region’s development. 
From a political viewpoint, the river also plays a critical role because it 
passes through many large cities, including four capital cities of Europe, namely Belgrade, 
Bratislava, Budapest, and Vienna.1525 Several activities are developed on the banks of the 
Danube, and which contribute favourably to the development of the region. These activities 
include navigation, hydropower generation, agriculture, recreation, and the conservation of 
the natural environment.1526  
From a water pollution perspective, up to the 1980s, the quality of the waters 
of the Danube was a critical issue, because of the extent of the pollution that occurred in 
the region, which mainly originated from the basin’s dense population, its intense 
agriculture, and developed industry. It is generally believed that the coherent 
implementation of the European program of transboundary water cooperation has led to a 
significant drop in the level of water pollution across the basin. In 2018, the ICPDR 
expressed its encouragement because the Danube River was granted an EU mark for 
recognition as being ecologically suitable for about 24.7 percent.1527 
                                                 
 








8.5.2.1 Hydrological descriptions and climate change  
Being a waterway of approximately 2,850 kilometres, the Danube River is the second-
longest river in Europe.1528 The average discharge of the Danube River into the Black Sea 
is estimated to be 6,500 cubic meters per second.1529 The Danube River basin can generally 
be considered a dry region because it receives only around 450 mm of rains per year. In 
2012, the ICPDR became the first river basin institution in the world to produce a climate 
adaptation strategy.1530 This ICPDR’s study discovered the increased risk for severe 
droughts in some parts of the Danube River basin to occur.1531 It further found a strong 
likelihood that low flow and water scarcity may increase in intensity and become more 
prolonged and more frequent across the basin because of climate change.1532 In 2015 for 
instance, most parts of the Danube River basin suffered drought due to prolonged high 
temperatures, which were well above 40 degrees Celsius.1533 
8.5.2.2 The Danube-Main-Rhine project 
The German state of Bavaria is the country’s largest state. It has a surface area of 
approximately 70,548 square kilometres.1534 Both the Rhine and the Danube Rivers basin 
overlap the State of Bavaria. The state is located in the southern part of Germany and 
comprises approximately a fifth of the total surface area of the country.1535 The state has 13 
million inhabitants, and is the second-most populous state of Germany, after the North 




1530 Information available at https://www.icpdr.org/main/activities-projects/climate-change-adaptation , 
accessed on 21 July 2019. 
1531 Ibid.  
1532 Ibid. 
1533 Based on such initial assessment of climate change vulnerability at the Danube River basin scale, the 
ICPDR is assisting riparian country parties with water management information at hydrographical basin level, 
so that these countries may decide on suitable measures for cooperation on adaptation measures, based on the 
impacts that are most likely to occur. See for more information note 1473 above.  





Rhine-Westphalia state. Water resources are distributed unevenly across the state of 
Bavaria, with the South of the State being more furnished in water than the north. 1536  
There are high rainfalls and snow heaps in the mountainous regions south of 
the Bavaria state, which is within the Danube River basin.1537 The rainfalls and the melting 
of snow heaps contribute to the production of considerable runoff rates in the southern 
region of the state of Bavaria. Besides, the region is rich in groundwaters storages from the 
Alpine mountainous region. The southern region is also prone to seasonal floods.1538 
The situation northwards is almost the opposite of the south. Northern 
precipitations are lower, and groundwater storage is somewhat limited. The north is part of 
the Rhine River basin, and the Main sub-river basin, and is densely populated due to its 
advanced industrial development. The combination of these two factors has resulted in an 
imbalance between water availability and water demand, and permanent stress on the 
existing resources. To correct this situation, the state of Bavaria and the German federal 
government decided to proceed to a water transfer from the southern part of the Bavaria 
state to its northern part, in order to solve the situation of permanent water imbalance that 
prevailed northwards. The project was approved in 1970; its first phase became operational 
in 1992, whereas the second was completed in the year 2000.1539   
In order to divert the waters of the Danube into the Rhine River, the Bavaria 
state set in place a complex system formed by two sub-systems. The first is comprised of 
an existing Main-Danube canal of navigation, which naturally connects the Main River to 
the Danube River basin, some pumping stations, and diversion channels, some 
hydroelectricity power plants and open water channels, and several reservoirs for water 
storage. The amount of waters diverted is around 125 million cubic meters per year.1540 The 
second sub-system specialises in the retention, storage, and transfer of waters northwards 





1539 ICPDR The Danube River Basin District (2005), 34-35. 
1540 Ibid.  
 
 
from the flooding waters of the water-rich southern region of the Bavarian state. This sub-
system diverts around 25 millions of waters annually.1541  
The execution of the project began long enough before the adoption of the 
current regime, which applies to the transboundary waters of the region. Nevertheless, the 
project had to adapt its overall institutional and operational structure to comply with the 
regime.1542 The project conformed itself to the EU 2000 Water Directives and the 1992 
UNECE WCC for issues that relate to international responsibilities in transboundary 
matters. Key provisions of the EU 2000 Water Directives that were applied included its 
objective, which was discussed above, “to establish a framework for the protection of 
inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters, and groundwater”.1543 
The project aligned itself also to Article 5 the EU 2000 Water Framework 
Directives, which enjoins the European Union member states to ensure that for each portion 
of an international river basin which is located within their national territory, they analyze 
the characteristics of it, in portion or entirely, and that they “review the impacts of human 
activities on the status of the surface waters and groundwater.”1544 The member states of 
the union are further put under obligation to undertake and update an economic analysis of 
the uses that are made with the portion of the international watercourse within their 
territory, with the view of guaranteeing the protection of such watercourse. The Danube-
Main-Rhine water transfer project from the flood-prone part of the Bavaria State, in the 
Danube River basin southward to the drought-prone zone of the same State northwards, is 
thus justified under Article 5 above. 
8.5.3 Thinking on interbasin water transfers due to the impact of climate change  
“Interbasin water transfers” are water transfers that occur between at least two distinct 
basins.1545 An interbasin transfer is defined as ‘‘the transfer of water resources from one 
geographically distinct river catchment, or basin to another’’. To borrow the terms of 
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Mahabaleshwara,1546 while the transfer of water resources from one river basin to the other 
may be an option in some regions of the globe, it has already become the “need of the hour” 
in some others.  Countries such as India or China, or regions such as the Middle East, and 
the Southern part of Africa have a broad experience in interbasin water transfers.1547  
Until recently, interbasin transfers diverted annually some 5,400 billion 
cubic meters of waters, which represent about 14 percent of water withdrawals at the global 
level.1548 Gupta1549 indicates that all the proposed interbasin transfers, which will occur by 
the year 2025 will bring the above-cited global amount of annual interbasin water transfers 
to approximately 9,400 billion cubic meters. The transfer of water resources from one 
hydrographic basin to the other generally raises multiple cross-sectoral issues, whether 
environmental, technical or agrarian regarding property rights.  
Based on the works of various other contributors,1550 Gupta1551 proposed a 
consolidated set of criteria for the assessment of the relevancy of large interbasin water 
transfers in the contexts of the IWRM approach. Gupta’s fivefold criteria sought to confirm 
that the interbasin water transfers project was based on both actual water surplus and deficit, 
sustainability, good governance, the balance of existing rights with needs, and on sound 
science.1552  
The real surplus criterion seeks to verify whether there is “an objectively 
verifiable surplus in the donor basin, and an objectively verifiable deficit in the recipient 
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basin, and checks if there was an efficient use of water (with the best available 
technology).”1553 The sustainability criterion  is an effort to confirm whether “the transfer 
scheme is sustainable in environmental, social, and economic terms, and whether it is 
adaptive to natural and social stresses.” 1554 The good governance criterion strives to ensure 
that the transfer of water includes participatory decision-making and accountability to the 
public, including the affected people.1555  
The water right and need criterion try to confirm whether “the water transfer 
scheme respects existing rights and responsibilities (at local, national, and international levels); 
is without negative extra-territorial effects and impact on other riparian countries”. The water 
right criterion also ensures that if such impact occurs nevertheless, adequate compensation 
measures or have been agreed upon.”1556 Gupta’s1557 last criterion assesses if the transfer 
scheme is based on sound science. Sound science in the view of Gupta “implies project 
compliance with hydrological, ecological, and socio-economic relevant tests and analyses”. 
In a nutshell, the above discussion suggests the possibility of transferring 
waters from one basin to the other, provided certain conditions are met. Adequate flood 
management programmes around the Congo River and its tributaries, both the domestics 
and the transboundary may contribute to the development of water transfer programmes 
that meet Gupta’s criteria. 
8.6 Conclusion  
This chapter aimed to study flood management regimes that are in place in the Rhine and 
Danube River basins. The reason behind the two study cases revolved around the fact that 
a mere inclusion to climate change in a transboundary water regime, or its mention in a 
water treaty may not be enough for adequate regime responsiveness to the predicted impact 
of climate change. To be adequately responsive, such a regime will need to undertake 
further steps through adopting specific instruments that will aim at addressing thoroughly 
                                                 
 







the predicted impact of climate change, which in the case of shared water resources can be 
either floods or droughts. In the case of the CICOS regime, the specific instruments required 
to address the predicted impact of climate change would need to focus on flood 
management. Whereas the flood management regime in place in the Rhine River have 
discussed the relevant instruments and procedures for adequate flood management, the 
Danube-Main-Rhine interbasin water transfer has illustrated that adequate flood 
management can offer both flood protection, disaster prevention and additional water 
resources to feed an interbasin water transfer scheme. The key findings of this chapter are 
as follows: A flood management regime should include adequate mechanisms for flood 
prevention and management, whose first step is the obligation for state members to conduct 
preliminary flood risk assessments, whether individually or jointly, depending on the 
hydrography of the river basin or the sub-river basins that of concern. The preliminary flood 
risk assessments should include the drawing of flood hazard maps and flood risk maps. The 
regime should be comprised of an obligation that is laid upon the riparian states to draft 
flood risk management plans and exchange flood-related information. Riparian states 
should also be obliged to consult each other for any development that might result in 
floodings. In terms of water transfers, findings are that interbasin cooperation is useful, and 
should favour the creation of synergies between flood control and water transfers. Based 
on the findings of this chapter, the next chapter will assess the extent to which the climate 
change dimension has been integrated into the regime that governs the waters of the Congo 
River and its transboundary tributaries, which regime, this thesis refers to as the CICOS 
regime. The next chapter will first apply Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework, to assess 
the integration of the climate change dimension in the CICOS regime, and after that 
undertake a comparative analysis between the flood management regime that applies to the 
Congo River and its transboundary tributaries and the flood management regime that is 




9 ASSESSING THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE REGIME 
THAT GOVERNS THE CONGO WATERCOURSE TO THE 
PREDICTED IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE  
9.1 Introduction  
Previous chapters have discussed the generalities that are associated with the international 
law of the transboundary watercourses. They also made a hydrographic presentation of the 
Congo River and its transboundary tributaries and discussed the legal regime thereof. 
Previous discussions analysed the flood management regime that applies to the Rhine and 
the Danube River basins, with the view of providing a reference for regimes comparison 
with the regime that applies to the Congo River basin. This chapter sets out to assess the 
extent to which the legal framework that governs the Congo River and its transboundary 
tributaries has integrated the climate change dimension. The regime assessment will be 
done on the basis of Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework which was discussed in chapter 
7 above and through a comparative analysis of the regime that governs the Congo River 
and its transboundary tributaries to the flood management regime of the Rhine River basin. 
More emphasis will be put on the flood regime because floodings will represent the primary 
impact of climate change on the water resources of the Congo River basin as evidenced in 
the previous chapters. This chapter will be comprised of two sections. The first section will 
assess the responsiveness of the CICOS regime to the climate change phenomenon, whereas 
the second section will undertake a comparative assessment of the flood management 





9.2 The responsiveness of the CICOS regime to climate change  
9.2.1 Background information  
As discussed earlier,1558 the legal regime that governs the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries comprises two treaties, namely the agreement establishing a 
uniform regime of navigation on the Congo River and its Ubangi and Sangha tributaries of 
1999, and the CICOS Additive Treaty of 2007.1559 The aim of the original agreement of 
1999 was, as suggests its title, to establish a uniform regime of navigation on the Congo 
River and some of its tributaries, including the Ubangi and Sangha Rivers, and to create the 
basin commission, referred to as “the CICOS”. The aim of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty 
was to “promote the integrated management of water resources on the territory under the 
jurisdiction of the CICOS”.1560 It also expanded the scope of the CICOS regime to all the 
parts of the Congo River basin that are situated on the member states’ territory.1561  
The original agreement of 1999 was focused exclusively on navigational 
issues. The 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty constituted, therefore, an extension of the CICOS’ 
original mandate, which allowed the commission to cover some non-navigational issues 
concerning the Congo River and its tributaries as well. The Addendum of a treaty 
constitutes, by principle, an integral part of the original text, to which it either adds some 
new aspects or alters some of the existing ones. That is why the two CICOS Agreements 
are to be approached as one and referred to as the CICOS regime.1562 
Although it may be important to undertake some analysis concerning the 
impact of climate change on the shared waters of the Congo River basin from a navigational 
perspective, navigation does not constitute the primary focus of this thesis. Therefore, the 
assessment that will be conducted in this section will focus on the CICOS 2007 Additive 
Treaty because it is the part of the CICOS regime that allows the assessment of its 
effectiveness in integrating the climate change dimension. The assessment, as already 
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mentioned, will be based on Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework, which checks the 
following:  
o The existence of flexible water allocation strategies and water quality 
standards  
o The existence of strategies of response to extreme weather events 
o The existence of treaty amendment and review process 
o The existence of joint institutions 
9.2.2 Climate change and the objective of the CICOS regime  
The objective of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty can be subdivided into five sub-
objectives, of which only one has taken into account the impacts of climate change on the 
waters of the Congo River basin in a more express way. Article 2 of the 2007 CICOS 
Additive Treaty stipulates that the objective of the Treaty is to “promote the integrated 
management of water resources on the territory which is under the jurisdiction of the 
CICOS”.1563 When read together with the objective of the Additive, paragraph 2 of Chapter 
2 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty becomes: 1564    
“The objective of the current additive is to promote the integrated management of 
water resources on the territory under the jurisdiction of the Commission by way 
of defining the modalities of examination and approbation of new projects that are 
likely to affect the quality and quantity of water resources”.1565 
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Sonoda1566 and many other scholars have established clear links between the IWRM 
approach and the adaptation to climate change in the water sector, including in 
transboundary contexts. Sonoda defines the IWRM approach as: 
“a step-by-step process of managing water resources in a harmonious and 
environmentally sustainable way by gradually uniting stakeholders and involving 
them in planning and decision-making processes while accounting for evolving 
social demands due to such changes as population growth, rising demand for 
environmental conservation, changes in perspectives of the cultural and economic 
value of water, and climate change.” 1567 
Upadhyaya,1568 on his side, claimed that the predicted impacts of climate change should be 
taken into consideration while managing water resources based on the IWRM approach.  
Both Sonoda’s definition and Upadhyaya’s observation recall the 
intertwined character of both acts, namely the integration of the climate change dimension 
on one side, and the adoption of the IWRM approach on the other side, in the same legal 
regime that will govern water resources.1569 The adoption of an addendum to the 1999 
CICOS initial treaty with the specific objective of including the IWRM dimension in the 
original regime that was dedicated to navigation, shows the degree of openness of the 
negotiators of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty regarding the inclusion of the climate 
change dimension in the regime.  
In as much as the impacts of climate change on the waters of the Congo 
River are in the majority quantitative, the objective of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty 
that is mentioned above makes the CICOS regime theoretically responsive to climate 
change. As abundantly mentioned above,1570 the Congo River basin is more prone to floods 
than to any other impact from climate change. However, given the fact that climate change 
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was not the primary focus of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty, the question turns to become 
“how far has such openness to the climate change phenomenon gone”? 
9.2.3 Climate change and the legal principles that govern the CICOS regime  
Apart from being inserted in the objective of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty, the 
integration of the climate change was further reflected in the principles of the Additive 
Treaty, as testifies its Article 4, which defines the principles of the CICOS regime, which 
the parties have to observe in order to maintain their commitments under the 2007 CICOS 
Additive Treaty. Although some of these principles are rather general, others are more 
specific and seem to bring to the parties the necessary stand which they need to fast adapt 
to any changing condition on the transboundary water resources of the Congo Basin. 
These CICOS principles show strong similarities to the principles of the law 
of the non-navigational uses of the international watercourses, as proclaimed under the 
1997 UNWCC. The principles of Article 4 of the CICOS Additive Treaty that relate to 
climate change include:  
o the obligation to involve all the interested parties in the management of the water 
resource and the decision-making process. (Principle 4)1571 
o the obligation to safeguard the environment and to ensure the sustainability of the 
ecological equilibriums as well as the natural hydrologic processes. (Principle 6) 1572 
o the obligation for each contracting state to inform the other states before 
undertaking any action or any project that could have a substantial impact on the 
availability of the waters and/or the possibility for implementation of projects in 
future. (Principle 7) 1573 
o the user-buyer principle, applied to the uses of waters for economic purposes 
(Principle 6) 1574 
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Although these principles were primarily concerned with integrating the IWRM approach, 
they have some degree of compatibility with climate change; that is why their observation 
will appear crucial from a climate change viewpoint.1575  
Principle 4, for example, on the “obligation to involve all the interested 
parties in the management of the shared water resources and the decision-making process” 
is an essential procedural obligation.1576 As discussed earlier,1577 this obligation is 
comprised of the principles of cooperation and the duty to share information, and the duty 
to notify and consult the other riparian states before any significant initiative that may have 
a transboundary impact. 
The sharing of information on transboundary watercourses is generally one 
of the first steps towards the establishment of state co-operation in a river basin.1578 
However, here is one crucial factor that will need much often to be taken into account 
regarding the implementation of these principles: States, as Gross agues,1579 are often 
reluctant to share information, including water information, depending on their national 
contexts and circumstances. States would want to know what kind of information to share 
and to what extent should they share it. The Regime of the 1997 UNWCC does not put any 
obligation on the states parties to share a type of information or data which a state would 
consider to be strategic and therefore reluctant to publish.1580 Article 1 of the 1997 UNWCC 
provides: 
“Nothing in the present Convention obliges a watercourse State to provide data or information 
vital to its national defence or security. Nevertheless, that State shall cooperate in good faith 
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with the other watercourse States with a view to providing as much information as possible 
under the circumstances.”1581 
The Convention therefore only creates a narrow exception for data and 
information 'vital' to a State's national defence or security'. States are required to cooperate 
“in good faith” with the other riparian states so as to provide them with the as much 
information as possible, that will reflect their good faith with respect to the circumstances 
that require such information to be made available. However, as it will be discussed below, 
the lack of precision and guidelines for the implementation of a transboundary water 
regime, plus the lack of political will, and financial resources to generate and share water 
information can become a significant threat to the success of such a regime across a river 
basin.1582 
9.2.4 Flexible strategies for water allocation and water quality standards  
9.2.4.1 Flexible strategies for water allocation 
Water allocation is defined as “the process of distributing water supplies to meet the various 
requirements of a community”.1583 In transboundary contexts, water allocation can mean 
“the process of allocating water supplies to meet the needs and requirements of the different 
riparian states of a single watercourse”.  
As discussed earlier, it is only in certain types of contexts that the negotiation 
of mechanisms for water allocation becomes crucial among the riparian states (section 
7.1.2). These contexts include limited water resources, water shortages, droughts and high 
water demands from riparian countries in comparison to the available waters across the 
river basin. In general, all of these contexts predispose parties to compete over water 
resources. To avoid water competition requires the definition of water allocation 
mechanisms between the riparian states.  
In the Congo River basin, water availability is generally greater than water 
demand. The basin’s average of available freshwaters per capita is 20,014 cubic meters per 
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habitant per year.1584 The World Bank estimates the water stress index across the Congo 
River basin to be around 1.557 on average.1585 The index suggests that the countries of the 
Congo River basin have abundant water resources from which they only withdraw a little. 
Issues regarding water allocation are, therefore, not addressed in the CICOS regime. The 
water stress index calculates the rate of freshwater withdrawal as a proportion of available 
freshwater resources. 
In water-rich contexts, there is generally no need to engage in the definition 
of water allocations; that is why water treaties signed in these environments often address 
other issues than water allocation.1586 Hamner & Wolf1587 also noticed that only a few 
treaties addressed water allocation, and attributed such a gap to the intensely political nature 
of water allocation between the states. There are some cases where water treaties have 
conditioned the definition of any water allocation mechanism. The treaty between Canada 
and the United States of America of January 17, 1961, for instance, relating to Cooperative 
Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin refrained from defining 
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any mechanism of water allocation between the two signatories, except for some reasons 
such as power generation and flood control.1588  
Although the first part of these authors’ affirmation is correct and is based 
on facts, their interpretation of the facts seems flawed because it has considered water 
availability only from a scarcity viewpoint. Water scarce contexts, as already discussed, are 
the contexts that favour water competition, and because of that, the hydropolitics of the 
basin often complicates and politicise the signing of water treaties.  
However, even if the CICOS regime failed to explicitly address water 
allocation issues, it has laid the foundations for future developments that may lead to the 
definition of water allocation mechanisms within the part of the basin under the jurisdiction 
of the CICOS. In fact, Article 9 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty provides:  
“The contracting States, based on a proposal from the Commission, shall determine 
the priorities between the water demands of the different users, according to their 
needs and according to the availability of the resource, taking into account the good 
hydrological functioning of wetlands and the preservation of ecosystems: No user 
is immediately prioritized over others in accordance with the principles of 
integrated water resources management and those of international law. In situations 
of water shortage, priority will be given to the supply of drinking water for domestic 
needs, livestock, and the preservation of aquatic ecosystems.”1589 
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The above stipulation is the only provision of the CICOS regime to directly provide for the 
uses of the waters of the basin in quantity terms.  
Under this provisions, the CICOS regime enjoins its country parties to 
determine their priorities in the event of water demands from different water users, taking 
into account the availability of the resource, which a due consideration to the needs of the 
other states of the basin. 1590 No user is prioritized over the others. The provision also creates 
an obligation to states to consider the commission’s proposal (which is the CICOS) in doing 
so. The provision further insists that states’ decisions on water priorities have to be done 
taking into account the hydrological functioning of wetlands as well as the preservation of 
ecosystems in good and stable conditions of functioning.1591  Under the CICOS regime, no 
user is statutorily prioritized over the others in accordance with the principles of integrated 
water resources management and those of international law”. 1592 
Moreover, the provision stipulates that “in situations of water shortage, 
priority will be given to the supply of drinking water for domestic needs, livestock, and the 
preservation of aquatic ecosystems.”1593 If in the future, the member states of the CICOS 
have to determine the priorities between the water demands that will come from the 
different water users. It most probably means that the way is opened for a future definition 
of water sharing mechanisms, whether at national or at river basin levels. As specified by 
Speed,1594 the determination of water priorities leads to the definition of water allocation 
strategies. It is almost sure that there will not be indefinitely enough waters to satisfy all 
the needs across the Congo River basin. Cases such as the Tigris and Euphrates, or the 
Indus River basins are appropriate examples where water allocation keys between the states 
and the different water users were decided.1595  
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The CICOS regime has further required its state parties to take into account, 
in all their projects as touching the Congo watercourse, the hydrological functioning of 
wetlands, and the preservation of ecosystems of the whole Congo watercourse.1596 This will 
probably suggest an evaluation of the overall need for waters for the sustainable functioning 
of these wetlands and ecosystems, which will, in turn, dictate the definition of some 
thresholds in the level of water withdrawals to be made by member states.  
9.2.4.2 Water quality standards 
The CICOS regime has shown itself more concerned regarding water quality issues than 
water quantity and allocation, as already discussed.1597 Several provisions of the CICOS 
regime refer to water quality issues, even if they fail to provide for additional information 
to better define the quality referred to, or even to provide for some water quality standards 
for compliance across the region. Article 2, paragraph 2, for instance, provides:  
“The purpose of this Addendum is to promote the Integrated Water Resources 
Management in the area of competence of the Commission: through defining the 
procedures for the examination and approval of new projects that are likely to affect 
the quantity and quality of water.”1598 
Article 2, paragraph 2 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty stipulates that the 
treaty aims at achieving the promotion of the Integrated Water Resources Management 
approach through, among other things, the definition of procedures for the examination and 
approval of new projects that are likely to affect the quantity and quality of the shared water 
resources.  
Despite such a provision, the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty failed to move 
further and provide for water quality standards, to which the member states would comply. 
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The wordings of Article 2 instead suggests that member states will have to adopt these 
water quality standards in the future. Article 14, paragraph 1 provides:  
“Contracting States shall protect riparian ecosystems of the  river and its tributaries, 
and manage the resource following natural equilibriums, including those of 
wetlands, using jointly their national laws and regulations and, in the case of 
necessity, the regulatory instruments available at the Commission.”1599 
The protection of riverine ecosystems required under Article 14 above 
relates to some extent to water quality. However, the treaty does not provide for any 
guidance concerning the standard protecting actions, which states are supposed to take, but 
limit itself to referring states to their national regulations, which they are later required to 
harmonise and apply jointly (in the same Article 14):  
“The Contracting States: Shall jointly establish the list of substances whose 
presence in the waters of the river and its tributaries must be monitored, limited or 
prohibited; Jointly define common objectives and criteria concerning the quality of 
water according to the uses which are made; Work together to develop techniques 
and to introduce effective water-saving and control practices against point or 
diffuse pollution; Work towards the harmonization of national legislation relating 
to water and the environment in the area of competence of the Commission.”1600 
Most of the countries that are a party to the CICOS regime lack adequate 
environmental protection laws and regulations that are in place. Moreover, in countries 
where such laws and regulations exist, it was only recently that they were passed, especially 
those that aim at protecting the environment, including the riverine ecosystems.1601  
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Even if all the member states have these laws and regulations in place, they 
will do so according to national standards, which may as well vary from one state to the 
other. Variance in standards will pose a problem for consolidation and harmonisation of 
actions in a later stage, thus suggesting a further concern in the CICOS regime.  
The example from the European Union which was evoked earlier would 
perhaps be a timely lesson.1602 In terms of general environmental standards, and more 
specifically concerning water quality standards at the river basin scale, a top-down 
approach would be advisable rather than a bottom-up approach. A top-down approach will 
imply directives and regulations formulated at the river basin level and to be applied at the 
state or sub-state levels, whether jointly or individually, depending on circumstances,1603 
whereas a bottom-up approach will imply directives and regulations formulated at the state 
or sub-state levels, and to be considered at the river basin level.1604 
A similar observation can be made concerning Article 14, paragraph 2-3, 
under which the regime seems to limit itself in defining some “general recommendations”, 
and instead places on the state members the responsibilities regarding the definition of 
factors relating to water pollution and water quality.  Article 14 paragraph 2-3 provides: 
“The Contracting States undertake to regulate any action that is likely to change 
significantly the characteristics of the regime of the river, its tributaries and other 
associated wetlands, the health status of the waters, the biological characteristics 
and the diversity of its fauna and flora and, in general, its environment. For this 
purpose, they shall take measures to prevent, reduce or control events or conditions 
resulting from natural causes or human activities that may cause harm to other 
Contracting states, to the environment of the river, the health or safety of men.”1605 
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9.2.4.3 Regime assessment 
From the above analysis, it transpires that the CICOS regime is deprived of any flexible 
strategy for water allocation among its member states. Also, the regime refers to water 
quality standards but fails to adequately provide in that respect. Instead, the regime adopted 
a bottom-up approach, remitting to the member states the responsibility to jointly adopt the 
water quality standards to be implemented at the river basin level. Regarding flexible water 
allocation mechanisms, being that Article 9 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty enjoins 
member states “to determine the priorities between the water demands of the different users 
“based on a proposal from the Commission”,1606 it will, therefore, remain to be appreciated 
which proposal the commission will draft, adopt and submit to member states pursuant to 
the provision of Article 9 above. 
Nevertheless, the adoption of a flexible strategy for water allocation may 
stem from Article 9 above, depending on whether the CICOS’ proposal will be drafted in 
absolute or relative terms, or if it will be limited to determining some thresholds of water 
withdrawals which the states will be enjoined to observe. A proposition that will be 
formulated in absolute terms will not meet this specific criterion, neither will a proposition 
that is limited to determining maximum levels of water withdrawal, unless if associated 
with some complementary mechanisms, which will provide for a certain level of flexibility 
so that states may adjust their treaty compliance in the case of significant changes in water 
availability. Only a proposition under which the mechanisms for water allocation will be 
formulated in relative or proportional terms may make the treaty meet the requirements of 
this first criterion of Cooley & Gleick, and thus contribute to the CICOS regime’s 
responsiveness to climate change.  
9.2.5 Response strategy for extreme events 
9.2.5.1 Context presentation 
The second criterion of Cooley & Gleick is the treaty responsiveness to extreme events. An 
extreme event is defined as “an event that is rare at a particular place and time of year”.1607 
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A strategy is generally defined as the skill of planning for situations.1608 In other words, 
Cooley’s second criterion seeks in a treaty, the appropriate skill mechanisms that show a 
treaty’s preparedness for the extreme events associated with climate change.  
Article 7 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty provides:  
“The modalities of use of the waters are assessed based on the availability of the 
resource: 
o the normal situation corresponding to the satisfaction of all the needs; 
o the emergency corresponding to floods or other natural or accidental disasters; 
o the situation of shortage, corresponding to a period of unavailability of the 
resource, totally or partially, generally or localised, due to natural or accidental 
reasons not imputable to the conditions of management of the water resources.  
In the two last cases, the Commission is notified without delay by the State that 
undergoes such a situation. However, if a State is under obligation to take 
emergency measures unilaterally, it will immediately inform the other States 
and the Commission.”1609 
This provision of the CICOS regime enumerates situations that can be considered as 
disastrous or “extremes”, including floods and other accidental disasters, which the treaty 
did not specify with much clarity. Floodings are presented as “emergencies” that may affect 
water availability across the region, rather than being treated as a permanent recurring 
phenomenon.  Since floods and other extreme events are viewed as emergencies, the 
CICOS regime has limited itself in instituting a transversal regime to deal with them. This 
regime is mainly an informative one, without any measure for extreme event management.  
This is what the CICOS regime says in substance “In the two last cases 
(referring to the emergency corresponding to floods and other natural or accidental 
disasters),1610 the Commission is to be notified without delay by the State that undergoes 
such a situation. In other words, nothing is planned by the regime, in terms of event 
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prevention or management, but a state that undergoes such an extreme situation has to 
notify the Commission. In the same order of idea, a State that is under obligation to take 
emergency measures unilaterally is enjoined to inform the other states of the basin and the 
Commission.  
As understood while analysing the flood management regime of the Rhine 
River basin,1611 technical studies may consider that optimal protection of a downstream 
state from floods may be reached only if the building of flood prevention structures occurs 
in another state other than the state that is exposed to the flood. In such circumstances, 
states may need to sign treaties to permit the storage of excessive rainfall on the territory 
of an upstream riparian, in order to protect a downstream one.  
The CICOS regime seems, in this case, inappropriate because states that find 
themselves in such a situation do not find support in neither one of the CICOS Treaties and 
will have to be “build from scratch” and negotiate bilateral instruments that will result in 
creating such rights. Likewise, in a case of a necessity to create water storage structures for 
flood control or drought mitigation or any other extreme event, the provision does not give 
adequate support to member states, and these may have to depend on bilateral treaties.  
9.2.5.2 Regime assessment 
From the above analysis, it transpires that the CICOS regime is not adequately equipped 
with a strategy response for extreme events as per Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework. 
Article 7 above, of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty is the only provision of the regime 
that seemingly provides for extreme events, and only for cases related to water use 
modalities in the event of floods and droughts.  
9.2.6 Amendment and review process 
9.2.6.1 Context presentation 
The term "amendment" refers to a formal alteration of one or more provisions of a treaty, 
that affects all its parties.1612 As discussed earlier, the amendment of a treaty can become 
smoother thanks to the incorporation of a “built-in mechanism” that provides for a more 
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relaxed amendment process.1613 Climate-proofing water treaties require the incorporation 
of such built-in mechanisms because they offer signatory states enough flexibility in order 
to adapt in case of any significant changing conditions.  
Article 22 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty provides, “This additive may 
be amended in the same conditions as the Agreement, as defined in Article 32.” The 
agreement referred to (the agreement establishing a uniform regime of navigation on the 
Congo River and its Ubangi and Sangha tributaries, and creating the International 
Commission of the Congo-Oubangui-Sangha Basin of 1999) provides:  
“Any proposed amendment to this agreement shall be submitted in writing to the 
Secretary-General, who shall transmit it to the member States within thirty (30) 
days of its receipt. Comments on the proposed amendment are addressed to the 
Secretary-General in the following thirty (30) days. At the end of this period, the 
Secretary-General submits to the Committee of Ministers the proposed amendment 
as well as the comments thereon. Any amendment to this agreement shall be 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers before it enters into force.”1614 
The CICOS regime recognises the right of the member states to take the 
initiative to request a treaty amendment. Nevertheless, the regime does not specify the 
motives that could lead a state to require such an amendment. Will a treaty amendment 
request by a state address the entire Congo watercourse, or will it only attain to the state’s 
national interests? These are the categories of questions the CICOS regime fails to provide 
adequate answers for.  
9.2.6.2 Regime assessment 
Article 22 of the 2007 CICOS additive treaty shows that the CICOS regime has a built-in 
mechanism, which provides for smoother treaty Amendment or reviews. It can be concluded, 
therefore, that the amendment and review process of the CICOS regime meets Cooley & 
Gleick’s third criterion, which relates to the inclusion in treaties provisions of some flexible 
amendment and review processes. Also, the fact that the joint commission plays a significant 
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role in the treaty amendment process can be seen as a constructive aspect of the CICOS 
regime, as it gives more effectiveness and power to the joint commission as per Cooley & 
Gleick’s next criterion, which sought for actively involved joint commission in river basins 
matters. 
9.2.7 Joint institutions 
9.2.7.1 Context presentation 
The 1999 CICOS initial Treaty established the International Commission of the Congo-
Oubangui-Sangha Basin (CICOS). The CICOS was established as a joint organisation 
vested with specific statutory powers over the waters of the Congo, the Sangha, and the 
Ubangi Rivers as per its Article 16 and 17 (section 6.2.5.2). The initial mandate of the 
CICOS Commission, as discussed earlier, was focused on navigational matters,1615 which 
mandate was reinforced by the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty. Under the CICOS Additive 
Treaty, the mandate of the CICOS was extended to defend the interests of the riparian states 
of the Congo River.1616 Such mandate extension was necessary because the states of the 
basin needed a buffer institution that would perform some preliminary activities such as the 
negotiations or information sharing across the basin, in the event of major water projects 
such as water transfer or water exportation.1617  
The following provisions illustrate the will of the state members of the 
CICOS regarding the operationalisation of the CICOS as a joint institution. Article 11 of 
the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty provides:  
“Examination of applications for authorisation, their issuance, as well as the 
registration of declarations, are of the jurisdiction of the contracting States. 
However, projects that are likely to have significant impacts on shared waters 
referred to in Article 19 and defined in the nomenclature provided for in Article 10 
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above, must be the subject of an opinion from the Commission and a consultation 
of the other Contracting States before their authorisation.”1618 
This provision gives authority to both the CICOS and the contracting states of the basin to 
participate and emit an opinion that is favourable or unfavourable for every project that one 
state may conceive, and that might cause significant impacts on the water resources of the basin.  
Such primacy in the recognition of the right to participate in the decision 
process regarding the waters of the Congo River basin to the CICOS first, and then to the 
individual member states of the basin is the expression of the will of the countries party to 
the CICOS to jointly manage a significant issue regarding the basin’s water resources. 
Article 19 of the 2007 Additive also provides for similar matters:  
“Under the provisions of Article 8 of the Agreement, relating to works and 
structures, no project likely to modify significantly the characteristics of the shared 
waters: regimes, airworthiness, operability, quality, health status, biological 
diversity may be executed without first being approved by the signatory states. An 
obligation of information and mutual consultation binds the parties, regarding the 
possible impacts of these projects. To that end, projects that are submitted to 
authorisation according to the nomenclature of Article 10 are classified into three 
categories:   
1) Projects that are likely to significantly impact on two or more signatory states;  
2) Projects that do not have any significant impact outside the territory of the 
signatory states that authorise them;  
3) Projects that are derogatory.”1619 
In support of the joint character of some of the operations, the 2007 Additive treaty obliges 
member states to share any information they may hold regarding the Congo watercourse, 
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without prejudice to the provisions of its Article 31 evoked earlier.1620 It further obliges 
them to engage in mutual consultations regarding projects that are likely to cause significant 
impacts on two or more contracting states.1621  
As concludes Medinilla,1622 Article 19 above constitutes one of the most 
critical provisions of the treaty. It institutes the practice of jointly managing the basin’s 
water resources, which are faced with large infrastructure projects such as some climate 
change-related inter-basin water transfer as already mentioned.1623 However, regarding this 
particular point, the fact that the CICIOS regime requires that some major water projects 
may be decided at member states’ level, but others not, may pose a critical issue of treaty 
interpretation in future.  
It is more likely that providing more details and specificities regarding which 
category of the project would fall under states' competency and which would not could 
certainly be a better alternative. In other words, which standard threshold do member states 
have in order to decide on whether a project should depend or not on state authorisation? 
Moreover, from which threshold do they decide which projects fall in the ambit of the CICOS 
(or of the co-riparian states for a review) as provided in the regime? Also, on which basis the 
other co-riparian states may oppose a state’s unilateral decision to allow a water project?  
The CICOS regime indeed proclaims all these aspects but fails to provide 
further specifications, suggesting a regime gap in terms of treaty predictability. Climate 
change brings uncertainty, and it should not be advisable to treaties that deal with this 
phenomenon to comprise themselves some dosage of uncertainty, apart from the aspects 
that are dealt with under Cooley & Gleick’s criteria, and that aims at ensuring to treaties 
the necessary flexibility. The fact that the CICOS regime lacks specificity in these critical 
matters leaves ample space for uncertainty and speculation, which is against the spirit of 
joint management.1624  
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9.2.7.2 Regime assessment 
From the above analysis, it appears that the CICOS regime is equipped with a joint 
mechanism. This mechanism ensures that the basin’s water resources are unilaterally 
managed only up to a certain threshold, beyond which there is a necessity to consult the 
other parties for joint resource management. However, the regime generally failed to 
specify such thresholds, making ambiguous the operationality of the provisions that call for 
a consultation of the other parties for the joint management of shared water resources.  
9.2.8 Concluding thoughts on climate change and the CICOS regime  
Under climate change circumstances, it is strongly recommended that transboundary water 
treaties may integrate flexible mechanisms for dealing with the many issues that are associated 
with shared water resources at the transboundary level.1625 One should operate a careful choice 
in order to select the most appropriate mechanism among all those discussed above,1626 or even 
associate more than one mechanism, in order to ensure greater treaty flexibility and adaptation 
to climate change. Efficient choices lay within the ambit of the negotiating states; yet, the 
adequacy of a mechanism will strongly depend on the treaty purpose, and on the overall context 
that characterises the water body for which the treaty is being negotiated.1627  
Due to the diversity of contexts, a method that will fit one context may not 
fit the other forcibly. A method that would be relevant in addressing water variability in 
drought-prone contexts, for instance, may not be effective in flood-prone contexts and vice 
versa. Therefore, the climatic and hydrological context of a river basin will be highly 
determining in the choice of which mechanism should be put in place in order to ensure 
water treaty flexibility in the face of climate change.  
In the case of the Congo watercourse, choices will be guided by the 
predictions that were made about the basin and those that were discussed above, according 
to which climate change would cause excessive waters during wet seasons.1628 The outcome 
of water treaties in this context should address anticipatively the issue of how the individual 
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riparian states of the Congo watercourse will adapt to the changing conditions of water 
availability across the basin, in order to ensure more regime stability.  
A further thought concerning climate change and the CICOS regime relates 
to the inclusion of supplementary instruments in the arsenal of the basin. Apart from the 
1999 CICOS initial Treaty and the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty, adaptation to climate 
change for the shared water sector of the basin will be better achieved through the adoption 
of specific and detailed supplementary instruments, such as subsequent protocols, vertical 
programmes, or even action plans that the member states are urged to adopt depending on 
the circumstances. Article 14 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty enjoins member states to 
adopt supplementary instruments including regulation texts in order to achieve the 
objective of the Commission. The legal framework for flood management in place in the 
Rhine basin which will  be discussed in the next section offers an eloquent example, of 
regime improvement through the adoption of specific complementary instruments.  
9.3 A comparative analysis of the legal regimes for flood management in the Congo and 
the Rhine River basins  
9.3.1 General considerations 
At first glance, the nuances between the two regimes may look obvious because they 
present minimal similarities against enormous differences. From a comparative viewpoint, 
however, the analysis of both the similarities and the differences is worth being undertaken 
because it is the way of identifying the gaps in the flood management regime that is in place 
in the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries, as it will be necessary to improve it. 
The similarity between the two regimes stems from the connection they both have with 
1997 UNWCC. The two regimes seem to have adhered to the core principles of the 1997 
UNWCC.1629 Some other differences between the two regimes come from the fact that the 
Rhine River regime is equipped with a specific instrument that deals with floods, whereas 
the CICOS regime has no such an instrument. 
The 1997 UNWCC is a framework treaty that approaches floods only in a 
broad way, as one of the emergencies identified by the treaty, without any operational 
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specifications, and therefore with little practical usefulness.1630 The difference between the 
two regimes stems from the fact that the Rhine River basin is equipped with an instrument 
that deals specifically with floods. This specific instrument dedicated to floods 
complements the general instruments that are also applicable to flood issues, such as the 
1997 UNWCC.  
Unlike the Congo River basin, which has limited experience with floods, the 
Rhine has suffered from floods for centuries,1631 and has thus accumulated a long flood 
management experience, which the basin has communicated to the European Union during 
the drafting of the 2007 Flood Management Directives.1632 Although the 2007 EU Flood 
Management Directive is a regional instrument and has, because of that, included several 
other river basins’ experiences, the Rhine’s contribution has been recognised in particular 
for the drafting of the flood management regime that is applied across the European 
Union.1633  
In both river basins, the regimes for flood management are drawn from two 
categories of instruments, namely the general and the particular instruments. While the 
Rhine regime has evolved and is comprised of both the specific and the general instruments 
in order to deal with floods, the regime in the Congo River has remained rudimentary and 
is comprised of only a few general instruments. The CICOS regime addresses flood under 
these general provisions. Table 13 below overviews the main general instruments of both 
river basins.   
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Table 13: The General instruments which are referred to 
by the regimes of the Rhine and Congo River basins for flood management 
 
Parameter of comparison The Rhine River basin The Congo River basin 
 
Reference to General 
Instruments 
1.The Convention on the 
Protection and the Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes of 
1992;  
2. The UN Convention on the 
Non-navigational uses of 
International watercourses of 
May 21, 1997 UNWCC;1634  
3. The Convention on the 
Protection of the Rhine of April 
12, 1999;  
4. The European Water 
Directive of October 23, 
2000.1635  
1. The UN Convention on 
the Non-navigational uses of 
International watercourses 
of May 21, 1997 UNWCC.  
2. The 1999 agreement 
establishing a uniform 
regime of navigation on the 
Congo, the Sangha, and the 
Ubangi Rivers, and creating 
the International 
Commission on the Congo, 
Ubangi and Sangha 
Rivers.1636 
3.  The 2007 CICOS 
Additive Treaty.1637 
Source: This thesis’ own compilation. 
 
From the summary provided by table 13 above, it is understood that the 
Rhine River flood management regime is drawn from about four main general instruments, 
whereas the Congo regime is drawn from three. Some of these general instruments are 
framework instruments that provide for a range of issues in which floods are only a part of. 
Framework instruments, as specifies Bodansky,1638 are procedural by destination and do 
not address specific matters in depth. They aim to create the appropriate legal framework 
under which more substantive and concrete instruments would be adopted, such as 
protocols, directives or others, for the achievement of the objectives of the framework 
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instrument.1639 Provision for floods with much in-depth and details would have caused 
these instruments to lose their framework character.1640  
The next section will analyse first the similarities, and then the differences 
between the two regimes, and after that, discuss some relevant particularities that are 
associated with the regime comparison that will be undertaken. 
9.3.2 Regimes similarity 
The similarity between the two regimes comes mainly from the 1997 UN Convention on 
the Non-navigational uses of the International watercourses, which is the only multilateral 
instrument that both regimes have related to as far as floodings are concerned. The 
Preamble of the 1999 CICOS Initial Treaty, for instance, refers to the 1997 UNWCC and 
declares the CICOS treaty’s willingness to comply with the regime which is under the 1997 
UNWCC. Article 27 of the 1997 UNWCC on the Prevention and mitigation of harmful 
conditions provides: 
“Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, take all 
appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate conditions related to an international 
watercourse that may be harmful to other watercourse States, whether resulting 
from natural causes or human conduct, such as flood or ice conditions, water-borne 
diseases, siltation, erosion, salt-water intrusion, drought or desertification.”1641 
This Article 27 is the only written express reference to flood in the entire body of the 1997 
UNWCC. This provision lays an obligation on watercourse States to individually, or 
wherever appropriate to take jointly all the appropriate prevention or mitigation measures 
that are related to a transboundary watercourse to avoid harmful activities to other 
watercourse states that may result in floods and the like.1642  
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Both regimes seem to have taken into consideration this provision, as they 
all provide for the avoidance of floods that may occur in a state B as a result of activities 
that are undertaken in a state A. For instance, Articles 11 and 19 of the 2007 CICOS 
Additive Treaty and Article 7.4 of the EU 2007 Flood Management Directive provide in 
the same sense as Article 27 above.1643  
Besides the above general instruments, both river basins have specific 
conventions that are applicable only on any one of them. The Convention on the Protection of 
the Rhine of April 12, 1999, applies only to the Rhine River, whereas the two CICOS 
conventions apply to the parts of the Congo River and its tributaries which are covered by both 
CICOS treaties.1644 All of these instruments contribute to the formation of the flood regime in 
each of these basins. Article 3 of the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine river, for 
instance, recognises in broad terms, flood as one of the issues on which the convention would 
be focused on, whereas Article 7 (2) of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty approaches floods as 
an emergency. 
9.3.3 Regime differences  
The differences between the CICOS regime and the Rhine regime come mainly from the 2007 
EU Flood Management Directives, which is an instrument that specifically governs flood issues 
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the second applicable general scoped-multilateral treaties, that has addressed floods in broad terms. Article 
11 of the 1992 UNECE Watercourse Convention puts an obligation on the riparian states of transboundary 
watercourses to establish and implement joint programs that aim at monitoring the conditions of the 
transboundary watercourse, including floods and ice drifts, and monitor the likelihood of transboundary 
impacts from such watercourse; See Articles 11, 19 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty; See also Article 7.4 
of the EU 2007 Flood Management Directive. 
1644 On the parts of the Congo River that is covered by the CICOS treaties, the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty 
has extended both the mandate and the territorial application of the CICOS as a basin organisation. Article 1 
(15) of the the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty provides "Territory of competence of the Commission" means: 
“the whole parts of the Congo river basin located in the territories of the contracting States.” (The original 
french is « Territoire de compétence de la Commission » : “l'ensemble des parties du bassin hydrographique 
du fleuve situées sur les territoires des Etats contractants.”). 
 
 
across the Rhine River basin.1645 The CICOS regime has not yet adopted such an instrument. 
Under the 2007 EU Flood Management Directives, the Rhine’s regime has implemented 
concrete and substantial flood management procedures that are likely to inspire the design of 
flood management regimes for other river basins. Table 14 below provides a summary of the 
specific instruments that are designed to address flood in both regimes. 
A second instrument to be mentioned concerning the Rhine River regime is 
the 2000 EU Water Directives. The 2000 EU Water Directives contain some provisions that 
contribute to the flood management regime. Its Articles 2.15 and 3.1, for instance, are referred 
to in the obligation to establish flood risk management plans as per Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the 
2007 EU Flood Management Directives.1646 The 2000 EU Water Directives is indeed a 
specific instrument if approached from a water resources perspective. It becomes a general 
instrument if approached from a flood perspective, as it is the case under the Rhine River 
flood regime.1647 
Table 14: Specific instruments and provisions  
to address flood in the Rhine and Congo River basins  
 
Parameter of comparison The Rhine River basin regime The Congo River regime 
Existence of a specific 
instrument that addresses 
flood issues. 
The EU Flood Directives of 
October 23, 2007. 
There is no flood specific 
instrument in place. 
Existence of an obligation to 
conduct preliminary flood 
risk assessments. 
The 2007 EU Flood Directive 
Management. 
Article 3(2) (b), Article 4, 
Article 6 (1), (2), (3); 10 (2).   
This obligation does not exist. 
Existence of an obligation to 
prepare flood hazard maps and 
flood risk maps. 
 
The 2007 EU Flood Directive 
Management. 
Articles 6 (1), (2), (3) create 
an obligation to prepare flood 
hazard maps and flood risks. 
This obligation does not exist. 
Existence of an obligation to 
establish flood risk 
management plans. 
The 2007 EU Flood Directive 
Management. 
Article 3(2) (b), Article 5(1), 
Article 6, Article 7.1, Article 
This obligation does not exist. 
                                                 
 
1645 See section 8.3.5 above. 
1646 See section 8.3.5.4.2. 
1647 Explain the nuances between the general instruments and the specific instruments. 
 
 
Parameter of comparison The Rhine River basin regime The Congo River regime 
8, Article 13 (1) (b), Annexe 
A (II). 
The 2000 EU Water 
Directives  
Article 2.15, Article 3.1. 
Existence of an obligation to 
exchange information and 
consult the other riparian 
states in case of significant 
water projects. 
The 2007 EU Flood Directive 
Management. 
Article 4(3), Article 5(1), 
Articles 6, 9, and 14. 
This obligation does not exist. 
Review mechanism  
The 2007 EU Flood Directive 
Management; Article 14. 
This obligation does not exist. 
Source: This thesis’ own compilation. 
 
The regime which is defined by the 2007 European Floods Management 
Directives, and the 2000 EU Water Directives which is applied in the Rhine River basin is 
regarded as one of the most elaborated flood management regimes worldwide.1648  
Having the most advanced regime for flood management, in comparison to 
the Congo River, the Rhine’s regime will offer the necessary parameters for regime 
comparison. In other words, the analysis of the differences between the two regimes will 
practically revolve around the enumeration and analysis of the characteristics of the flood 
management regime in place in the Rhine River basin and after that discuss their application 
in the Congo River basin. Being that section 8.2.5.4 above already described some of the 
characteristics that will be evoked in this section, the analysis to undertake here will, 
therefore, be oriented towards discussing the applicability of the Rhine flood management 
regime in the Congo River basin.  
Rhine’s flood management regime can be summarised as follow:  
i. the obligation to conduct a preliminary flood risk assessment; 
ii. the obligation to prepare flood hazard maps and flood risk maps; 
                                                 
 
1648 The regime defined by the 2007 European Floods Management Directives, and the 2000 EU Water 
Directives, regarded as one of the most elaborated flood management regime worldwide does not apply on 
the Rhine River alone but also on the entire European Union space. 
 
 
iii. the obligation to draft flood risk management plans;  
iv. the obligation to exchange information and to consult; 
v. the obligation to review mechanisms relating to flood management plans. 
9.3.3.1 The obligation to conduct preliminary flood risk assessments 
Article 4 of the Flood Directive creates an obligation for riparian states to undertake a 
preliminary flood risk assessment “in each river basin district, or unit of management of an 
international river basin district lying within their territory.”1649 The flood risk assessment 
referred to in this section is to be undertaken at “river basin district” level, which means:  
“The area of land and sea, made up of one or more neighbouring river basins 
together with their associated groundwaters and coastal waters, which is identified 
under Article 3(1) as the main unit for management of river basins.”1650 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of “river basin district” is an innovation of 
the EU Water Directive.1651 As such, it is central in the Rhine River flood management 
regime.1652 Because of the context differences that exist between the Rhine and the Congo 
Rivers, the concept of river basin district may not find the opportunity to be applied in the 
Congo basin. However, with a little readjustment, the concept can be transposed into the 
reality of the Congo River basin. If through the river basin district concept, one assumes that 
the aim of the EU was to split a single river basin into smaller natural units with the view of 
reaching an optimal operational unit for flood management, the equivalent of river basin 
districts could be in the Congo River basin what this thesis refers to as “sub-river basins”, or 
even a “sub-sub-river basins”, depending on the contexts.1653  
States that are riparian of a single watercourse are required to cooperate and 
find these operational subdivisions for optimised flood management. In this sense, finding 
the optimal operational entity for flood management becomes part of the mandate of a 
                                                 
 
1649 See integral text of Article 4.1. of the 2007 Flood Management Directives in note 1418 above. 
1650 Article 2(15) and Article 3(1) of the EU 2000 Water Directives. 
1651 See sections 8.3.5.4.1 and 8.3.5.4.2 above. 
1652 Ibid. 
1653 Factors such as the size of a sub-river basin or a sub-sub river basin, its complexity, as well as its 
vulneraibility to floods may constitute the factors that will determin wheter a sub-river basin or a sub-sub 
river basin are to be viewed as the equivalent of a “river basin district”.  
 
 
preliminary flood risk assessment. Such finding has to be done from the start because many 
of the activities and actions in liaison with flood management may need further legal 
enablement, in case, for instance, the optimal unit for flood management is situated in a 
transboundary area.  
The hydrographic descriptions of the Congo watercourse have been 
undertaken, and most of the basin’s sub-river basins and sub-sub-river basins are 
identified.1654 What is not yet done is the flood risk assessment, in the sense of the Rhine’s 
basin regime, for reaching the level of drafting a plan for flood management. Articles 4, 5, 
and 6 of the 2007 EU Flood Management Directives provide for the organisation of the 
preliminary flood risk assessment. In the spirit of these provisions, the preliminary 
assessment has to include:  
o Maps of the river basin district at the appropriate scale (including the borders of river 
basins, sub-basins, topography, land use, etc.); 1655 
o A description of floods, which (a) have occurred in the past, (b) had significant adverse 
impacts on human health, environment, cultural heritage, economic activity, and (c) for 
which the likelihood of similar future events is still relevant (including their flood 
extent and conveyance routes/assessment of adverse impacts);1656 
o Depending on the specific needs of the Member State, an assessment of potential 
adverse consequences of future floods, taking into account as far as possibly other 
issues. These could include topography, watercourses and their 
hydrological/geomorphological characteristics, floodplains as natural retention areas, 
the effectiveness of existing human-made flood defence infra-structures, populated 
areas, areas of economic activity, and long-term developments (including the impacts 
of climate change on the occurrence of floods).”1657  
The preliminary assessments of the vulnerability of a region to floods imply surveys, 
studies such as the undertaking of cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis of the 
                                                 
 
1654 See generally chapter 5 of this thesis. 
1655 Article 4.2.a of the 2007 Flood Management Directives. 
1656 Ibid. 
1657 Ibid. Articles 4.2.c, 4.2.d, and Articles 5 and 6; see UNECE Transboundary Flood Risk Management: 
Experiences from the UNECE Region (2009), 18. 
 
 
necessary actions regarding flood, and the mapping floodplain.1658 It also includes a history 
of past floods in the area, particularly those that had significant impacts on the considered 
area, with updated projections regarding the likelihood of future floods.1659 In a flood-prone 
context such as the one climatic predictions says some parts of the Congo River basin will 
become, conducting preliminary flood risk assessments should be put on a high level of 
priority from both national and sub-national authorities. Flood risk assessments across the 
basin should not be an option but urgency for the states of a river basin for which there are 
predictions of a high likelihood of floods.  
A recent report from the Rhine basin shows that all the country parties to the 
Rhine protection Convention had complied with this obligation and have completed 
preliminary flood risk assessments. In the Congo River basin, to undertake preliminary 
flood risk assessment seems to be urgent, because of the predicted impact of climate change 
in the region. Such assessment will help to identify zones of high, moderate and lower risks 
across the region in order to plan and organise for adequate answers.1660  
Planning and responding to floods is indeed a time and resources consuming 
activity, which is best addressed preventively. Failing to plan for floods can reveal to be 
more devastating, time and resource consuming than planning and preparing ahead. This is 
all the truer in the densely populated urban areas of the Congo River basin, whereby floods 
will most probably not have the same consequences as in flood plains or in the forests or 
underpopulated rural contexts.  
As mentioned earlier, climate change will cause floods to become more 
regular and intense, and sometimes happening in several locations of the Congo basin at 
the same time, depending on some hydrographical and topographical determinants.1661 
Cities such as Kinshasa in the DR-Congo are particularly exposed because they are 
characterised by predominant unplanned urbanisation, and by radical changes in land-use 
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1659  Article 4.2 of the 2007 Flood Management Directives. 
1660 Ibid. Article 6.4. 
1661 See section 5.6.1 above; H. Nasiri et al. ‘An overview to flood vulnerability assessment methods’ (2016) 
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patterns, urban sprawling and overpopulation.1662 Also, they have poor watersheds 
management, whereas there are significant enlargements and aggravation of the surfaces 
that are impermeable.1663   
Perhaps, a way of avoiding the difficulty that is associated with the phase of 
“compulsory” flood-risk evaluation in weak economies contexts, such as in the Congo 
River, could be to undertake sub-basin assessments instead of considering the assessment 
of a basin as a whole. Carrying sub-basin assessments could prove to be even much 
appropriate and relevant because most transboundary sub-basins of the basin involve only 
two or three riparian states. In this case, negotiating agreements on floods can be less 
restrictive than on the assumption that more states were involved. Treaties with fewer 
parties are generally easier to negotiate, sign, implement and monitor, in comparison to 
treaties with a bigger number of states.1664  
The part of the Congo River basin under the CICOS regime comprises three 
transboundary sub-river basins, which are the Ubangi River, the Sangha River, and the 
Kasai. Early discussions revealed that not all the parts of the basin are exposed to floods 
with equal vulnerability.1665 Approaching flood issues by sub-river basins could help focus 
on the most urgent ones. The findings reported above indicated that the highest regions at 
risk for floods in the Congo River basin are the regions surrounding the central cuvette, 
upwards the city of Kinshasa. Floods in such localisations will most probably have 
repercussions on the city of Kinshasa, which is situated downwards the designated flood-
prone area. In this particular example, a flood risk assessment that focuses on sub-river 
basin will cover only the sub-basins of Kasai and Sangha Rivers, and to some extent the 
Lake Tanganyika, as well as the Ubangi and the Lualaba Rivers upstream.  
                                                 
 
1662 Information available at 
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/sabinet/account/2015/00000015/00000001/art00008 , accessed on 
24 July 2019. 
1663 Ibid.; see also Nasiri (note 1607 above). 
1664 On treaty practices by states, whether bilateral or multilateral, see section 3.3 above.  
1665 See sections 5.2.5 and 5.6.1 above. 
 
 
Studies on the Congo River basin are generally scarce, especially the up to 
date information on the basin’s hydrology and hydrography.1666 Much of the information 
that exists on the impacts of climate change on the waters of the Congo river are regional 
studies.1667 Such a rarity of information and data on the basin suggest a need for much 
studies on the Congo River basin, sub-basins, and sub-sub basins.  
9.3.3.2 The obligation to prepare flood hazard and flood risk maps 
Article 6 of the 2007 Flood Management Directives creates an obligation to prepare flood 
hazard maps and flood risk maps in the Rhine River basin. Such provision which does not 
exist in the regime that is in place in the Congo River basin may appear crucial for the 
region and its inhabitants. Articles 6 of the 2007 Flood Management Directives provides: 
“1. Member States shall, at the level of the river basin district, 
or unit of management referred to in Article 3(2)(b), prepare 
flood hazard maps and flood risk maps, at the most appropriate 
scale for the areas identified under Article 5(1).1668 
2. The preparation of flood hazard maps and flood risk maps 
for areas identified under Article 5 which are shared with other 
Member States shall be subject to prior exchange of information 
between the Member States concerned. 
3. Flood hazard maps shall cover the geographical areas 
which could be flooded according to the following scenarios: 
(a) floods with a low probability, or extreme event scenarios; 
(b) floods with a medium probability (likely return period 
≥ 100 years); 
                                                 
 
1666 Ibid. 
1667 See sections 1.5 and 1.6 above. 
1668 Article 5 of the 2007 Flood Management Directives provides “ (1) On the basis of a preliminary flood 
risk assessment as referred to in Article 4, Member States shall, for each river basin district, or unit of 
management referred to in Article 3(2)(b), or portion of an international river basin district lying within their 
territory, identify those areas for which they conclude that potential significant flood risks exist or might be 
considered likely to occur. (2). The identification under paragraph 1 of areas belonging to an international 
river basin district, or to a unit of management referred to in Article 3(2)(b) shared with another Member 
State, shall be coordinated between the Member States concerned.”  
 
 
(c) floods with a high probability, where appropriate.”1669 
“Flood hazard maps” and “flood risk maps” are maps that display areas that are likely to 
be flooded and for which a certain degree of risk is particularly attached.1670 These areas 
have different degrees of exposure to flood; there are those with low, medium, and high 
probability to be flooded.1671 The 2007 EU Flood Directives require that basin States may 
prepare these flood hazard and flood risk maps, focussing first on areas where a potential 
risk of floods to occur exists. In the above scale, these areas could be the ones with a high 
probability of being flooded. Nevertheless, the 2007 Flood Directive maintains such an 
obligation even if the risk to flood has only a “low probability” of occurring.1672  
Flood hazard and flood risk maps are to be made available to the public, 
according to Article 14 of the EU Flood Directive.1673 Flood hazard maps must contain a 
range of hydrological information that can help foresee and understand the potential of the 
flood in every place that has a significant likelihood of floods.1674 In a considered area, the 
level of the details to be included in the maps comprises mapping and listing of the potential 
adverse consequences that are associated with floods.  
The necessity to prepare flood hazard maps and flood risk maps will grow 
higher in the Congo River basin, especially as time goes by. Given the usually limited 
capacity of the governments across the basin to fund emergencies, it should be profitable 
for the states of the basin to give importance to undertaking preventive actions long enough 
before floodings began. If floodings begin, damages will not only cause significant losses 
but also further reduce states capability of intervention.  
The European Union has recognised this state of affairs; that is why it has 
developed a comprehensive flood management instrument. The organisation has instituted 
not only the Flood Risk Assessment and Management stages but has also created an 
institution, the Central European Flood Risk Assessment and Management, to be in charge 
                                                 
 
1669 Articles 6 (1), 6 (2), 6 (3) of the 2007 Flood Management Directives. 
1670 Article 11 of the 1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention. 
1671 Articles 6 (3) of the 2007 Flood Management Directives. 
1672 Ibid. Article 6.3.(a). 
1673 Ibid. Article 14. 
1674 Ibid. Article 6.4. 
 
 
of flood risk assessment and management.1675 If customised to the context of the Congo 
River basin, such initiative may prove to be helpful and resource-saving for the states of 
the basin in general, and for the states of the transboundary river basins worldwide, where 
are found flood prone-areas in particular.  
9.3.3.3 The obligation to establish flood risk management plans 
Article 7.1 of the Flood directive enjoins member states to establish flood risk management 
plans that will be coordinated at river basin district, meaning at a smaller scale than at river 
basin. Such an obligation does not exist in the CICOS regime. Articles 7 provides:   
“Based on the Hazard Maps and flood risk maps (referred to in Article 6), Member 
States shall establish flood risk management plans which are coordinated at the 
level of the river basin district or unit of management...”1676 
In the flood management regime that applies to the Rhine River basin, the obligation to 
establish flood risk management plans follows the obligation to undertake “preliminary 
flood risk assessments”.  
The establishment of flood risk management plans will require, in particular, 
working basin-wide cooperation. Such cooperation does not necessarily need to be formal 
pre-existing water cooperation, which as we know in the case of the Congo River basin, is 
not yet in effect. The existence of basin states-general cooperation can as well be a starting 
point for discussing flood management issues at the river basin or sub-basin level.  
As argues Gilissen,1677 two things are needed, especially in a transboundary 
context in order to reduce society’s vulnerability to floods: cooperation and innovation. 
One of the outstanding examples of transboundary flood management that was reached 
thanks to existing cooperation schemes can be drawn from the 1961 Columbia River Treaty 
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https://www.keep.eu/project/5475/central-european-flood-risk-assessment-and-management-in-centrope , 
accessed on 12 August 2019. 
1676 Articles 7 and 8 of the EU 2007 Flood Management Directives. 
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between the United States and Canada.1678 In 1948, an overnight flood destroyed the town 
of Vanport, Oregon, USA.1679 Over eighteen thousand people were left with no homes.1680  
The extent of the material damage from the flood became a stimulus for the negotiation of 
a treaty on the Columbia River that would be signed in 1961.  
The flood risk assessment conducted through the Columbia River region, 
followed by the subsequent flood management plan, showed that from a geographical 
viewpoint, the best locations to build dams that would have sufficient storage capacities to 
prevent future floods in the town of Vanport were located on the Canadian territory.1681 
However, Canada lacked a reason for engaging in these dams construction; the dams were 
necessary for the USA. The Columbia River Treaty came and solved the issue. Under the 
Columbia River Treaty, Canada agreed to build three large Dams on the part of the Columbia 
River in its territory. The country further used the dams for hydroelectricity production.  
Flood risk management plans in transboundary contexts will often require 
further legal enablements that may be needed, whether at transboundary, national, or local 
levels. In the above case of USA and Canada, the negotiations of the treaty that begun in 
the 1950s could only be completed a decade later, implying several adjustments in different 
pieces of laws in order to accommodate the upcoming treaty and make possible its 
implementation.1682  
Failing to adopt basin-wide instruments of the calibre of the 2007 EU Flood 
Directives, the riparian states in the Congo basin should strive to sign bilateral treaties that 
are aimed at flood management. In river basin contexts, reaching bilateral agreements has 
                                                 
 
1678 The Columbia River Treaty was negotiated between the United States and Canada since the 1950s. 
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1679 R.W. Sandford et al. The Columbia River Treaty: A Primer. (2014), 10-11. 
1680 Ibid. 
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the inundated lands, and the cost of dislocation between lands, land uses and communities, that would be on 
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US. See Ibid. Sandford at 194.   
1682 Ibid. Sandford at 10-11. 
 
 
proven to be easier than negotiating the basin-wide ones. Bilateral agreements are “lighter” 
to negotiate, reach and manage than the multilateral ones.1683  
The following point may relate to public participation in the planning of 
flood management. Article 10(2) of the 2007 EU Flood Directive Management creates an 
obligation for the active involvement of the public in the flood management regime.   
“The Member States shall encourage the active involvement of interested parties in 
the production, review, and updating of the flood risk management plans referred 
to in Chapter IV.”1684 
The regime that is applicable to the Rhine River basin attaches great importance to public 
participation, as a matter of a stronger regime. It is also owing to such importance that the 
EU 2000 Water Framework Directive introduced earlier the concept of river basin districts, 
which was just mentioned. In the Rhine River regime, river basin districts are the central 
units for flood management.1685 The idea behind the establishment of river basin districts 
was to decentralise the management of floods by bringing it as close as possible to the 
constituencies and the people that live in areas where the floods are more likely to occur.1686  
The regime that is applicable to the Congo River, which does not have such 
provision, may find such decentralisation inspiring because it strengthens the participation 
of the public, especially the ones that are directly affected by the floods, and better 
mobilises local resources whether legal, institutional or financial, which may be available 
for flood management. However, such decentralisation may also turn out to be disastrous 
because of the lack of adequate resources across the region.  
In many countries, projects that depend on the lower spheres of governance 
may suffer lack of fundings and attention because of the lack of adequate resources, in 
comparison to projects that depend on the higher spheres of governance such as the 
national, or in some cases the provincial levels. Porto-Sancho1687 stressed on the crucial 
character of the implication of lower spheres of state governance, such as municipalities, 
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1686 Ibid. 
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villages, and other basic communities to the management of the floods that may strike their 
lands. For that author, formal strategies and cooperation are often decided by higher spheres 
of governance, whereas their implementation takes place at local levels. The necessity to 
ensure the participation of the local spheres of governance, as early as possible, in the 
planning stages of flood management is therefore required.  
Early involvement may be decisive for the future stages of flood 
management at community levels and for local governing bodies after these ones have 
appropriated the objectives of such programmes.1688 Also, skills for flood prevention and 
management will often be innovative for most of the local governing bodies and 
communities, because in most of the cases they perhaps have never been exposed to 
significant floods in the past, and because of that, their early involvement in flood 
management programmes would contribute to their appropriation of its process.1689 
9.3.3.4 The obligation to exchange information, and to consult the other riparian states 
Article 9 of the 2007 EU Flood Management Directives lays an obligation on the EU 
member states to work in coordination for the application of the Directive and to exchange 
information that contributes to the application of the Directive. Such a specific obligation 
for flood management does not exist in the CICOS regime. As said earlier, there exists in 
the CICOS regime a general obligation for information sharing, which is not to be 
compared with the flood-centred obligations that are contained in Article 9 of the 2007 EU 
Flood Management Directives. This provision stipulates that   
“Member States shall take appropriate steps to coordinate the application of this 
Directive and that of Directive 2000/60/EC focusing on opportunities for 
improving efficiency, information exchange and for achieving common synergies 
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and benefits having regard to the environmental objectives laid down in Article 4 
of Directive 2000/60/EC.”1690 
The above provision of the Rhine River regime obliges the member states to exchange 
information and conduct adequate consultations with other member states for projects that 
may represent significant risks for floods.  
There exists a general provision in the CICOS regime under Article 4 of the 
2007 CICOS Additive Treaty, which also enjoins member states to consult and share 
information. However, the content of the information to be exchanged under the Rhine 
flood regime is different and even more flood specific, compared to the information that is 
referred to in Article 4 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty, which is rather general. There 
is, therefore, not many similarities between the two provisions of the two regimes. The 
information to be exchanged under the Rhine regime refers in particular to the first stages 
of flood management, namely the information regarding the flood risk assessment, the 
flood hazard maps and the flood risk maps, including their subsequent reviews”. Paragraph 
16 of the preamble of the 2007 EU Flood Management Directive provides:  
“To prevent duplication of work, Member States should be entitled to use existing 
preliminary flood risk assessments, flood hazard and risk maps, and flood risk 
management plans for the purposes of achieving the objectives and satisfying the 
requirements of this Directive.” 
Moreover, Article 4 (3) adds: 
“3. In the case of international river basin districts, or units of management referred 
to in Article 3(2)(b) which are shared with the other Member States, Member States 
shall ensure that exchange of relevant information takes place between the 
competent authorities concerned.” 
Even the “preparation of flood hazard maps and flood risk maps”1691 on a tributary to a 
transboundary watercourse is subjected to exchange of information first, between the 
basin’s State members that are concerned by the flood hazard or risk. As claimed by 
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Folke1692 and Cosens,1693 effective adaptive governance depends not only on successful 
coordination of multilevel decision-making entities but also on active information 
exchange between institutions. The competent authorities that are concerned are enjoined 
to exchange information on flood issues for optimal flood management.  
From a transboundary perspective, riparian countries are put under 
obligation to exchange any critical information not only between the spheres of governance 
of the affected countries but also with different national and supranational authorities, 
including river basin organisations. The authorities that are considered in the information-
sharing obligation above are the authorities whose mandates include flood risk 
concerns.1694 For Beijing,1695 the regime that is applicable to the Rhine basin calls for the 
collection of updated information on floods in order to support the decision making-process 
for flood management.  
The problem of information sharing in general and in the Congo River basin, 
in particular, is all the more crucial. It is indeed advisable and even compulsory, to some 
extent, to ensure the involvement of third parties in the process of flood management. 
However, recognising a right to communities is one thing, and ensure that they exercise 
such right is another. A recent study that was undertaken by Kaufmann1696 targetting the 
participation of the European public in flood management issues revealed mixed results. 
The researcher noticed a general lack of interest in flood management issues among the 
citizens, mainly because they were little aware of flood issues. 1697  In countries such as 
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England and Sweden, Kaufmann1698 collected complaints claiming that the public 
comments were not being taken into consideration.  
All the above can constitute sound references to the CICOS regime, which 
may use some of these available good practices in order to design better information-sharing 
programs that take into account, to the possible extent, all the relevant flood-related factors.  
9.3.3.5 Review mechanisms  
Article 14 of the 2007 Flood Management Directives provides for the review mechanism, 
which the Rhine flood regime has made possible for the member states. The CICOS regime 
does not have any similar mechanism, which is focused on floods; instead, it is comprised 
of a review mechanism of general scope. Article 14 of the 2007 Flood Management 
Directives provides as follows:  
“1. the preliminary flood risk assessment, or the assessment and decisions… shall 
be reviewed, and if necessary updated, by 22 December 2018 and every six years 
thereafter. 
2. The flood hazard maps and the flood risk maps shall be reviewed, and if 
necessary updated, by 22 December 2019 and every six years thereafter. 
3. The flood risk management plan(s) shall be reviewed, and if necessary 
updated… by 22 December 2021 and every six years thereafter. 
4. The likely impact of climate change on the occurrence of floods shall be taken 
into account in the reviews referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3.” 1699 
A quick analysis of the review mechanism of the flood regime of the Rhine under Article 
14 above reveals that this provision concerns as well the periodic review of the substantial 
obligations that are created by the regime of the 2007 Flood Management Directive.  
Under the Rhine regime, both the preliminary flood risk assessment, the 
flood hazard maps, the flood risk maps, and the flood risk management plan are all subject 
to periodic reviews and updates if necessary. There is first an initial mandatory review or 
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update, after which, as showed in Article 14 above, a timeframe of six years is given, at the 
end of which there must be a process of review, or if necessary, the update of all the 
obligations that are referred to in Article 14. 
Although such a periodic review mechanism may represent weighty additional 
costs for member states, there is a particular incentive in keeping the information that is related 
to floods updated. This should particularly be the case as analysis continues to downscale the 
impacts of climate change from regional levels to more localised contexts. Efforts are also 
being undertaken to further understand climate change impact on natural resources, including 
on freshwaters at the transboundary level. Previsions of impacts may evolve as the level of 
comprehension about the phenomenon evolves. On the other side, as states evolve, both 
socially, economically and legally, the context that once prevailed and that made certain areas 
of the state to be tagged as flood-vulnerable may improve after a certain period.  
9.3.4 Concluding thoughts on the comparative analysis between the two regimes  
It is now evident that the flood management regime that is in place in the Rhine River basin 
is far advanced than the CICOS regime. To better prepare the Congo River basin for flood 
management, the basin needs an adequate flood management regime. The features of the 
Rhine River regime that have been analysed seem to be more adequate. However, the 
establishment of a robust flood management regime such as the Rhine’s implies a 
considerable investment of resources, types of equipment, studies and surveys, as discussed 
above.1700 It also requires working cooperation between the states of the basin.1701 At this 
stage, many factors that will need attention for a flood management regime across the 
Congo River basin have come to our attention. These include, but are not limited to, the 
technical and financial capabilities of the states of the basin that are required to institute 
and implement such an adequate flood management regime.  
If the European Union has been particularly active in dealing with floods, it 
was certainly not because of its robust 2007 Flood Management Directives alone. There 
was a combination of factors, including the availability of human, material and financial 
resources to support all the required stages for successful flood management. The economic 
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precarity of the riparians countries of the Congo River and the immensity of the 
geographical challenges that are awaiting them may hamper the development and 
successful implementation of strong flood management programs.  
Compared to the size of the Rhine River basin (which is 185,260 square 
kilometres), the size of the Congo River basin (which is 3.8 million square kilometres) may, 
in itself be viewed as a first challenge.1702 Also, the significantly disparate GDPs of the two 
basins, the estimation of the GDP of the states of the Rhine basin is around 4,101,629,22 
million US Dollars, whereas the estimation of the GDP of all the states of the Congo River 
basin is around some 318,885,56 million US Dollars, are a challenge.1703 
The ratio of proportions being approximately 1/20 for the basins’ sizes and 
1/13 for the basins’ GDPs, it means that for a surface that is approximately twenty times 
smaller than the Congo River basin, the Rhine River has thirteen times financial resources 
to develop its flood management programs. Besides a relatively bigger size combined with 
a smaller GDP, the Congo River basin has poor infrastructures development, which may 
also contribute to unsuccessful flood management programs.1704 This is of concern in 
particular because some areas that may be useful in terms of flood management may not be 
easily accessible due to the basin’s poor infrastructures, and because of that be hardly 
included in flood plannings. Even though there are some modern technics as for example 
the remote sensing that may assist to bypass the difficulties that are associated with limited 
accessibility across a given geographical region, physical contacts will remain compulsory 
for flood risk assessment and management.1705  
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The current climate change regime has notably advocated for a transfer of 
technology from developed countries to the developing ones, in order to support the efforts 
of these in climate change mitigation and adaptation.1706 Perhaps, the experience that has 
been accumulated by the Rhine basin states in terms of flood management and that makes 
it more advanced in that field may be transferred to the states of the Congo River through 
climate change cooperation. If such a thing occurs, it may contribute to accelerating the 
design of flood management programmes, as extensively outlined above.  
9.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has assessed the extent to which the legal framework that governs the Congo 
River and its transboundary tributaries (which is the CICOS regime), has integrated the 
climate change dimension. It has first applied Cooley & Gleick’s criteria framework on the 
CICOS regime, after what it has also undertaken a comparative analysis between the flood 
management provisions under the CICOS regime and the flood management regime that 
governs the Rhine River basin. The key findings of this chapter are as follows: firstly, the 
CICOS regime is inadequately equipped with responsive mechanisms to the impacts of 
climate change on the waters of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries, even if 
in nominal terms the regime has claimed to have taken the climate change phenomenon 
into consideration. Secondly, the CICOS regime is deprived of any flexible strategy for 
water allocation and has not sufficiently developed water quality standards for the member 
states. Also, despite climate change predictions on the Congo River basin concerning a high 
likelihood of flood to be occurring sooner, the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries 
are deprived of appropriate strategies in response to the looming floodings. Instead of 
adequate flood management provisions, the CICOS regime has only made a mere reference 
to the likelihood of floods. At last, findings are that the joint mechanism instituted by the 
CICOS regime has only a partial membership from the countries of the Congo River basin.  
The comparative analysis has shown only a few similarities between the 
CICOS regime and the Rhine River regime, but then significant differences. Both regimes 
are responsive to Article 27 of the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Non-
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navigational uses of International watercourses, which enjoins riparian states to avoid 
taking actions that may result in floodings or any other harmful conditions to the other 
riparian states. However, the two regimes have shown significant disparities because, in the 
Rhine River basin, floods are governed by a flood-specific instrument, which is the 2007 
EU Flood Management Directive, while in the CICOS regime, floods are merely mentioned 
in a general treaty provision, and have not been specifically addressed. Also, the Danube-
Main-Rhine water transfer has revealed the possibility of harvesting the surplus of rainfall 
waters in flood-prone areas, as a measure of flood management, and the transferring of such 
waters to drought-prone areas, outside a given river basin, which case may inspire a flood 




10 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1 Overview of this thesis 
This thesis is an attempt to investigate the extent to which the legal framework that governs 
the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries have integrated the climate change 
dimension.  Projections from several climate change models predict that there will be a 
general increase in the Congo River’s discharge in the order of 11-17 percent by the year 
2050 and an increase in the basin’s run-offs in the order of 18 to 27 percent by the end of 
the current century.1707 Such predictions regarding the Congo River basin are in significant 
contrast with the global predictions, according to which approximately seven percent of the 
world will be exposed to a drop of twenty percent of water availability as a result of every 
additional degree Celsius to the global temperature.1708 Excessive water and precipitations 
across the basin will result in floodings in the flood-prone areas of the Congo River basin, 
for which the legal regime that governs the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries 
has to be adjusted.   
River basins and riparian countries have to adjust their water-sharing legal 
frameworks to climate change, based on the predicted impact of climate change in their 
contexts. The IPCC and several other institutions and scholars have helped generate climate 
change predictions for the water resources of every region on the globe.1709 It is evident 
from these predictions that the impact of climate change on water resources will not be 
evenly distributed across the globe. There are regions where there will be lesser waters and 
regions where there will be excessive waters. From this thesis findings, it appears that the 
Congo River basin will be among the river basins that will experience excessive waters and 
frequent episodes of intense floodings, especially during the rainy seasons.1710 The legal 
framework that governs the waters of the Congo River basin has, therefore, to be adjusted 
to cater for such predicted climate change impacts to enable basin-wide and sub-basin flood 
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management readiness. The Congo River basin is comprised of sub-river basins of which 
some are domestic and others transboundary.  
Ten riparian countries of the Congo watercourse contribute to the waters of 
the Congo River, among which four are regarded as the major contributors and leading 
riparian countries of the Congo watercourse. These leading riparian countries include the 
Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Angola, and the DR-
Congo. Improvement of the responsiveness of the laws that govern the transboundary water 
resources of the Congo River basin to climate change will require a certain number of 
actions among which are: firstly, the involvement of the basin’s riparian states, whether in 
bilateral or in basin-wide treaties; secondly, the establishment of basin-wide, or sub-basin-
wide water cooperation, or the establishment of both; thirdly, the adjustment of the basin’s 
legal framework to make more prepared to deal with the predicted impacts of climate 
change on the shared water resources.  
All the above developments explain the reason why the investigations 
accounting for this thesis revolved around the central question: “How far has the legal 
framework that governs the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries taken into 
account the climate change phenomenon and its impact on water resources in the Congo 
River basin?” In fact, it is not enough for a treaty, a convention, or any other legal document 
to merely mention "climate change" or to make reference to any factor relating to climate 
change in its provisions for such a regime to be regarded as having incorporated the climate 
change dimension.  
In addition to the central question of this thesis, two additional sub-questions 
have significantly contributed to the steps taken through this thesis, which steps have 
culminated in the assessment of the regime that governs the waters of the Congo River and 
its transboundary tributaries in the chapter preceding this conclusion. The first question was 
an enquiry to know whether “climate change considerations have been adequately 
integrated in the existing agreements on the waters of the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries,” and the second question sought to investigate the extent to 
which  “the legal framework that governs the waters of the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries has dealt with the predicted impacts of climate change on the 
waters of the Congo River basin.” 
After discussing some key concepts of the study, this thesis has analysed the 
historical evolution of the international law of transboundary water resources before 
 
 
discussing its current stage. The descriptions of the hydrography of the Congo watercourse 
and the Congo River were done before the analysis of the legal framework that governs the 
waters of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries.  It is in this view that this thesis 
inventoried the two agreements that apply to the Congo River and its transboundary 
tributaries, namely the agreement that establishes a uniform regime of navigation on the 
Congo, Ubangi and Sangha Rivers, and which creates the International Commission of the 
Congo-Oubangui-Sangha Basin of 1999, and its Additive Treaty of 2007, which this thesis 
referred to as the “CICOS regime”.  
The assessment of the integration of climate change in the CICOS regime 
was based on Cooley & Gleick’s framework of evaluation which was discussed in chapter 
7, whereas the assessment of the extent to which the CICOS regime deals with the predicted 
impacts of climate change on the waters of basin was done through a comparative analysis 
with the flood management regime that is in place in the Rhine River basin.  
Cooley & Gleick’s fourfold framework criteria for the evaluation of the 
integration of climate change considerations in transboundary water treaties checks: 
i. the existence of flexible mechanisms for water sharing and water quality standards;  
ii. the existence of treaty provisions for extreme events; 
iii. the existence of joint mechanisms in support of joint actions on the shared waters;  
iv. the existence of in-built mechanisms for treaty review.  
In both steps of the assessments, the analysis of the CICOS regime has involved the 
applicable Multilateral Agreements for international water resources governance, namely 
the United Nations Convention on the law of the Non-Navigational Uses of the 
International Watercourses of 1997. The analysis has also included wherever available any 
basin-wide water treaty, the European Union Water Directives of 2000 and The EU Flood 
Directivess of 2007. The main conclusions regarding the assessments this thesis has 
undertaken are, therefore, as follows: 
10.2 Summary of the findings  
10.2.1 Concerning the integration of climate change in the existing agreements on the 
waters of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries 
From the analysis undertaken in this thesis, it transpires that: 
 
 
1. The CICOS regime does not have any flexible strategy required for the allocation 
of the shared water resources among its member states. The research has revealed that in 
water-rich contexts, such as the Congo River basin, water allocation between the riparian 
states is not generally a priority because the volume of water that is available is often far 
above the volume of water that is needed by the basin’s water users. However, it appears 
that, under Article 9 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty, the countries of the Congo River 
basin might adopt, in future, water allocation mechanisms between them or between the 
basin’s water users. Under Article 9 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty, member states 
are enjoined to decide on which water demands are of priority among the diverse water 
demands, based on a proposal to be issued by the CICOS in the future. Such a proposal 
may, in all likelihood be the entry point for water allocation mechanism across the CICOS 
region. Concerning water quality standards, the research has revealed that the regime 
mentions water quality but fails to provide for any standard of it. Furthermore, the CICOS 
regime has adopted a bottom-up approach, remitting to state members the responsibility to 
jointly adopt water quality standards that are to be implemented in the geographic area 
which is covered by the commission. 
 
2. This thesis has secondly revealed that the regime that governs the waters of the 
Congo River is not equipped with any strategy for response to extreme events such as 
floods. Article 7 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty is the only provision of the regime 
that mentions extreme events, yet, it does so only from one perspective, meaning the 
definition of water use modalities in the event of floods and droughts.  
 
3. This thesis has thirdly revealed that there was a “built-in” review mechanism in 
Article 22 of the 2007 CICOS Additive Treaty, which provides for smoother treaty 
amendments or reviews, hence making the CICOS regime meet Cooley & Gleick’s third 
criterion, which relates to the inclusion in the treaty provisions some mechanisms of treaty 
flexibility. 
 
4. Lastly, this thesis has shown that the CICOS regime was equipped with a joint 
mechanism, which aims at promoting interstate water cooperation. The regime’s joint 
mechanism ensures that the basin’s water resources are unilaterally managed only up to a 
certain point, beyond which there is a necessity to consult the other parties for joint 
management. However, the regime has failed to provide for the establishment of sub-river 
basin institutions, which could enhance water management and cooperation, because of the 
size of the basin and its crucial importance to the continent and to the world.   
 
 
Table 15 here below summarises the main findings which are explained 
above, concerning the application to the CICOS regime of Cooley & Gleick’s fourfold 
criteria framework.  
 
Table 15: Summary of the results from the assessment of the responsiveness of the Congo 
River’s regime to climate change, using Cooley & Gleick’s Framework Criteria 
 
Criteria Existence in the CICOS regime 
Mechanisms for flexible water allocation  Do not exist 
Extreme events provisions Do not exist 
Review mechanism Exists, but only partially 
Joint Institutions Exists, but with no sub-institutions   
Source: Thesis own compilation. 
The above analysis was developed in detail in chapter 9. It was aimed at the 
assessment of the responsiveness of the CICOS regime to climate change against Cooley 
& Gleick’s framework of criteria and was an attempt to respond to the first sub-question of 
this thesis, which is mentioned above. The assessment that was undertaken in chapter 9 and 
which has been summarised above have shown that the regime that governs the waters of 
the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries has not adequately integrated the climate 
change dimension. The analysis indicates that further efforts will be needed to achieve such 
integration of the climate change dimension.  
10.2.2 Concerning the extent to which the existing agreements that govern the waters of 
the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries has dealt with the predicted 
impacts of climate change on the hydrology of the basin 
In response to the second sub-question of this thesis, the research has, in chapter 9, 
considered undertaking a regime comparison regarding flood management. The chosen 
river basin for regime comparison was the Rhine River basin. Two reasons have motivated 
the choice of the regime that applies to the Rhine River basin. First, this Rhine River basin 
has a robust flood management regime, which is the regime adopted by the European Union 
for its state members. Second, the predictions that are made concerning the impact of 
 
 
climate change across the Rhine River basin are comparable to the predictions that are made 
on the Congo River basin. Both River basins will experience seasonal floods because of 
climate change.   
However, being that the regime that is governing the Congo River and its 
transboundary tributaries failed to have any existing flood management instrument or 
provision, there was nothing significant that could be referred to on the Congo River’s side 
for a regime comparison.  Therefore, the regime comparison undertaken turned to an effort 
to describe the core features of the Rhine regime with the view of providing for a referential 
legal framework for flood management for the Congo River.  
The core features of the Rhine’s flood management regime revolve around 
the following five obligations:  
i. the obligation to conduct a preliminary flood risk assessment; 
ii. the obligation to prepare flood hazard maps and flood risk maps; 
iii. the obligation to draft flood risk management plans;  
iv. the obligation to exchange information and to consult; 
v. the obligation to review mechanisms relating to flood management. 
The riparian states of the Rhine basin are obliged to undertake a preliminary flood risk 
assessment in each river basin district of a transboundary river basin lying within their 
territory.1711 These preliminary flood risk assessments are to be based on “available or 
readily derivable information, such as records and studies on long term developments, in 
particular impacts of climate change on the occurrence of floods”. 1712 A preliminary flood 
risk assessment “shall be undertaken to provide an assessment of potential risks”.1713 The 
available studies predicting the occurrence of floods as impacts of climate change on the 
Congo River basin are sufficient motivations for the undertaking of preliminary flood risk 
assessment across the region. 
Riparian states of the Rhine River are further obliged to prepare flood hazard 
maps and flood risk maps that aim at providing the cartographies of risks that are associated 
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with floods across the basin. Based on the preliminary flood risk assessment, the flood 
hazard and flood risk maps, the riparian states are to establish flood risk management plans 
that will be coordinated at a smaller scale than at a river basin (like for instance at the scale 
of the river basin district).1714  The 2007 EU Flood Management Directives has further laid 
an obligation on the states to work in coordination for information exchange, especially the 
information that contributes to the implementation of the 2007 EU Flood Management 
Directive. Lastly, the Rhine flood management regime has provided a review mechanism 
strategy for its country parties. 
The fact that the Rhine River’s regime has erected into obligation all the 
above steps to contribute to flood management at local and river basin levels offers a 
reliable reference to the regime that is in place in the Congo River basin, which has not yet 
developed any specific step in the sense of putting in place such a flood management system 
which is to be directed at controlling the adverse effects of climate change through 
floodings. 
The thesis has further analysed the arrangements of the Danube-Main-Rhine 
water transfer scheme that aimed at collecting the surplus of rainfall and snowmelt waters 
from the Danube River basin south of Germany to supply water to a drying part of the 
Rhine River basin which is north of Germany. The Danube-Main-Rhine water transfer 
scheme is particularly interesting as it exemplifies the possibility of combining flood 
control measures with water transfer activities. It reveals that flood control measures can 
be implemented with the view of collecting the excessive waters from a basin’s flood-prone 
areas in order to transfer them towards the water-stressed region elsewhere, apart from 
protecting these flood-prone regions from floodings.  
The Danube-Main-Rhine water transfer scheme, however,  has not yielded 
ample results from a transboundary water law perspective, because it was a German 
domestic project. Nevertheless, the solicitation of interbasin water transfer that is placed on 
the waters of the Congo River, as discussed in section 5.5.2 above can be inspired from the 
Danube-Main-Rhine scheme, because it shows the possibility of establishing a connection 
between flood control infrastructures and water transfer.  
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The States of the Congo River basin that does not have any water-sharing 
agreement in place will most probably be confronted soon with issues regarding water 
allocation or water entitlement between them due to the possibility of water transfers as 
explained above. Ashton1715 already attracted attention when he claimed that in Africa, 
water disputes were often related to accusations that shared water resources, or the benefits 
from projects such as water transfers were not shared across the basin.1716 This author’s 
findings also suggested the possibility of avoiding water conflicts by putting in place water 
agreements, which define beforehand the sharing processes of both the water resources and 
the benefits thereof.1717  
Defining water allocation among the countries of the Congo River and 
defining the allocation of the benefits that are generated from the shared water resources 
will much probably be one of the next critical steps around the waters of the Congo River 
ad its transboundary tributaries. Such prediction is based on careful consideration of the 
hydropolitics of the different states of the Congo River basin, and the incidence of such 
hydropolitics of the waters of the basin, as explained in this thesis.1718 It is for instance 
necessary to define water entitlements for all the riparian countries of the Congo River 
before undertaking any water transfer, in order to avoid water disputes between the states 
of the basin. That is why the approach that was adopted for water treaties in the Euphrates 
and Tigris River basins can inspire the negotiation of bilateral water treaties between the 
riparian countries of the Congo watercourse. 
10.3 Summary of Contributions 
The main contributions that are brought by this thesis are the following: Firstly, no previous 
study has investigated the climate change responsiveness of the regime that governs the 
Congo River and its transboundary tributaries, with an emphasis on floods, which, according 
to the climatic predictions will represent the main impact of climate change on the hydrology 
of the basin. By discussing the legal implications of such impacts, this thesis has provided a 
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timely opportunity to advance understanding of the extent of the impact of climate change 
across the Congo River basin.  
Through comparative analysis with the flood management regime that is in 
place in the Rhine River basin, this thesis has shown the inadequacy of the regime that 
governs the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries regarding flood management. 
This thesis has also shown that climate change is inadequately taken into consideration by 
the Congo River’s regime and that further efforts were needed to correct such inadequacy.  
Secondly, this thesis has shown the need and the urgency required to 
establish an adequate preventive flood management regime to be applied in the whole of 
the Congo River basin, but more particularly on the flood-prone regions that may be 
localised through flood risk assessments that have to be conducted across the basin. The 
adoption of climate-proofed water treaties that include flood management mechanisms will 
have several interests, including, firstly, the fact that these treaties will prevent rather than 
fix issues associated with floods, even at transboundary levels. Secondly, the adequate flood 
management plans that are to be established by such treaties may contribute to harvesting 
significant amounts of the extra waters from flooded areas, that will thereafter be 
transferred or exported to some of the drought-prone regions around the Congo River basin. 
Thirdly, this thesis has contributed in clarifying the legal status of the Congo 
River, which is an international river, from the fact that a considerable section of the Congo 
River forms the boundary between the DR-Congo and the Republic of the Congo, and also 
from the fact that the Congo River is the main outlet of the whole Congo River basin which 
receives one-third of its waters from riparian countries other than the DR-Congo.1719 Such 
complex hydrographical configuration of the Congo River, which has for long fuelled 
confusions around its international or domestic status has been addressed under the 1997 
UNWCC, which meanwhile enjoins riparian states to negotiate transboundary water 
treaties that are adapted to the hydrographical particularities of each international river 
basin and watercourse.  
The Congo River starts within the territorial delineations of the DR-Congo 
and does not cross over any of this country’s political boundaries, until its discharge into 
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the Atlantic Ocean, straight from within the DR-Congo, which is, as said, its country of 
birth.1720 One of the intricate features of the Congo River is that some sections may be 
approached as international, whereas others are to be approached as domestic. In this sense, 
the domestic portion of the Congo River is to be regarded as a domestic tributary that 
discharges in the portion of the Congo River that can be approached as international.  
However, a special regime needs to be negotiated between the riparian states 
of the Congo River and adopted for the section of the Congo River that is to be approached 
as an international river.1721 This is because all the sections of the Congo River, whether 
international or domestic, run exclusively within the territory of a single country, the DR-
Congo, apart from some sections of the Congo River that contribute to forming the 
boundaries between this country and the Republic of the Congo, and the Republic of 
Angola.1722 It is hoped that the growing debates and cooperation around the water resources 
of the Congo River basin that has begun will help to materialise this. 
10.4 Recommendations and further research 
After months of research, analysis and drafting concerning a climate-proofed legal regime 
to govern the waters of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries, it is humbling to 
formulate the following recommendations:  
1. The establishment of water cooperation along the Congo watercourse and 
the adoption of bilateral climate-proofed water treaties between the DR-Congo and the 
other riparian states of the Congo watercourse, which are the Republic of the Congo, the 
Republic of Angola, and the Central African Republic. The aim of such bilateral water 
treaties will be to recognize and to clarify any issue concomitant to the natural connection 
that exists between the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries, including the 
internationality of the Congo River. It is because of the particularities of the hydrography 
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of the Congo watercourse that this thesis recommends such a regime of bilateral treaties to 
govern the waters of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries. However, these 
bilateral water treaties may be supplemented at a later stage with multilateral water treaties, 
if needed. The advantage of adopting bilateral treaties is that these types of treaties allow 
better interaction and discussions between two states linked by a river.  
2. The reinforcement of the mandate of the CICOS as the Congo River basin’s 
joint institution for water management. Such reinforcement of mandate may be obtained 
through treaty amendment, in order to adequately take into consideration the predicted 
impacts of climate change on the waters of the Congo River basin. This thesis also 
recommends that States support to the CICOS may go beyond its current level. A 
reinforcement and effective CICOS mandate, coupled with stronger support from its 
member states are determining factors towards the fostering of water cooperation across the 
Congo River basin and the adoption of bilateral water treaties as recommended above. 
3. The clarification of the legal status of the Congo River and the elucidation 
of the entitlement of its waters among the river’s riparian states. From the findings of this 
thesis, the Congo River has to be approached from a dual perspective, as having both a 
domestic and an international status, and therefore managed accordingly. This is due to the 
fact that the Congo River comprises some sections that can be regarded as domestic, and 
others that can be regarded as international. This recommendation is based on the particular 
hydrography of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries, as discussed throughout 
this thesis. This thesis recommends that such a dual status becomes the basis of a new 
approach for the governance of the Congo River and its transboundary tributaries. In 
addition, the establishment of working water cooperation along the Congo watercourse as 
recommended above will facilitate discussions among the riparian states of the Congo 
watercourse around some technical and hydrographical issues such as water entitlements, 
or the sharing of any possible benefits around the waters of the Congo River. The Congo’s 
riparian states may not have the same apprehension and approach regarding these issues, 
however, it is crucial for them to discuss, negotiate and harmonise their views on them for 
the future, due to the predicted impacts of climate change on the waters and the communities 
of the basin.1723   
                                                 
 
1723 Medinilla (note 951 above; 19). 
 
 
4. The fourth recommendation of this thesis touches the 1997 United Nations 
Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Based on the 
findings of this thesis, further investigations are needed concerning the reason why the 1997 
United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
has received very little support from states after its adoption. The fact that some of the states 
that voted towards the adoption of this convention turned around after that and became 
reluctant to its ratification and its entry into force should be an interpellation to the 
international water law. In the same order of idea, there is a need for further investigations 
on states' perceptions concerning the concept of the international watercourse as defined 
and applied under the 1997 UNWCC. The International Law Commission is encouraged to 
pursue the efforts associated with the codification of the non-navigational uses of the 
international watercourses, because of the low support that the regime of the 1997 UNWCC 
has received from the state members of the United Nation Organisation.  
 
5. The fifth and last recommendation of this thesis calls for further 
investigations regarding the application of the “Equity” concept for sharing transboundary 
water resources, as enshrined under Article 5 and 6 of the 1997 UNWCC. These 
investigations have to bring forth much clarity concerning whether equity in this provision 
implies that states have rights on a shared watercourse proportionally to the volume of 
waters that they have contributed in the formation of the total volume of the shared water 
resource. Furthermore, it seemed unclear from our research how the 1997 UNWCC 
foresees the intergenerational and the intragenerational dimensions of Equity regarding the 
sharing of transboundary water resources in a context dominated by climate change impacts 
on waters; does the concept of equity under Article 5 and 6 of the 1997 UNWCC take into 
consideration the necessity to ensure water access in quality and quantity to the present and 







I. Primary sources  
I. 1. International Instruments 
 
The Barcelona Convention and Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of 
International Concern, (1921). 
The Berlin Final Act on the Congo and Niger Rivers, (1885). 
The Berlin Rules on Water Resources, (2004). 
The Charter of the United Nations Organisation, (1945). 
The Convention for the prevention of conflicts related to the management of shared water 
resources in Central Africa, (2018). 
The Dubrovnik Statement, (1956). 
The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, (2011).  
The General Treaty of Vienna of 1815, (1815). 
The IIL Resolution on the Utilization of Non-Maritime International Waters (except for 
navigation), (1961). 
The ILA Resolution on Flood Control, (1972).  
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, (1997). 
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers (1966). 
The Madrid Declaration, (1911). 
The Montreal Rules on Water Pollution in an International Drainage Basin, (1982). 
The Paris Agreement on Climate Change, (2015).  
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, (1992).  
The Salzburg Resolution, (1961). 
The Stockholm Declaration, (1972).  
The United Nations Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, (1997). 
The United Nations Economic Commission on Europe Convention on the Protection and 
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, (1992). 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (1992).  
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2669 (XXV), (1971). 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1969).  
The Warsaw Outcomes, (2013). 
 
 
I. 2. Regional and River basin instruments 
 
o The Agreement concerning mutual assistance in the construction of the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros system of locks (with schedule), of September 16, 1977. 
o The Agreement establishing a uniform regime of navigation on the Congo River and the 
Ubangi and Sangha Rivers, and creating the International Commission of the Congo-
Oubangui-Sangha Basin of 1999.  
o The CICOS Additive Treaty of 2007 to the initial CICOS Treaty of 1999.  
o The Convention on the Protection of the Rhine, Bern, 12 April 1999.  
o The Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 
2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy. 
o The Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 
2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks. 
o The Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Columbia River Basin between 
the U.S. and Canada of January 17, 1961.  
o The Convention on the Law of treaties between the United States and International 
Organizations of 1986. 
o The Agreement Between the Governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of 
the Syr Darya Basin of March 17, 1998.  
 
II. Secondary sources  
 
II. 1. International Body Documents and Reports 
FAO Atlas of Water Resources and Irrigation in Africa Food and Agriculture Organisation 
of the United Nations, Rome, (2001).  
FAO The Law of International Water Resources Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations, Legislative studies #23, (1980).  
ILA (2004) ILA Berlin Rules Dissenting opinion 2004 available at 
https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/ILA/ILABerlin
RulesDissent2004.pdf accessed on 12 October 2020. 
ILC Report on the 58th Session (UN Doc. A/61/10), (2006). 
ILC Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. 2., (1994).  
 
 
ILC Second Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, (1980). 
IPCC, 2007 (a) Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical 
Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon S., et 
al. (eds)] Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and 
New York, NY, USA.  
IPCC, 2014 (b) Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: 
Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Barros V.R. et 
al. (eds)] Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and 
New York, NY, USA. 
IPCC, 2014 (c) ‘Freshwater resources’ in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of 
Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change [Field CB et al.  (eds)] Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
IPCC, 2014 (d) Climate Change: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working 
Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change [Edenhofer O. et al. (eds)]. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
IPCC, 2014 (e) Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups 
I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change [Pachauri R.K. & Meyer L.A. (eds)], Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
IPCC, 2018 (f) Summary for Policymakers. In: Global warming of 1.5 C. An IPCC Special 
Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 C above pre-industrial levels 
and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of 
strengthening the global. Geneva, Switzerland. 
UN Centre for Natural Resources, Energy, and Transport Register of international rivers. 
(1978) Pergamon, available at 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/262?ln=en, accessed on 10 April 2019. 
UNDP, 2006 (a) Human Development Report 2006-Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and 
the global water crisis. (2006). 
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2006%20
Global%20HDR/HDR-2006-Beyond%20scarcity-Power-poverty-and-the-
global-water-crisis.pdf , accessed on 16 April 2019. 
UNDP, 2019 (b) Climate Change Adaptation and Integrated Water Resources Management 
(2019), available at http://www.cap-net.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Cap-
Net-CCA-and-IWRM.pdf, accessed on 10 April 2019. 
 
 
UNECE, (2013) Guide to Implementing the Water Convention. 
UNECE, (2000) Guidelines on Sustainable Flood Prevention. 
UNECE, (2009) Transboundary Flood Risk Management: Experiences from the UNECE 
Region, New York and Geneva, (2009). 
UNEP, 2010 (a) Africa Water Atlas Division of Early Warning and Assessment, United 
Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi. 
UNEP & UD, 2016 (b) Transboundary River Basins: Status and Trends United Nations 
Environment Programme, Nairobi, (2016). 
UNEP, 2018 (c) The Emissions Gap Report United Nations Environment Programme, 
Nairobi, (2018). 
UNESCO, 1978 (a) World Water Balance and Water Resources of the Earth The 
International Association of Scientific Hydrology, the World Meteorological 
Organization, and the UNESCO, Gentbrugge-Paris-Genève, (1978). 
UNESCO, 2012 (b) The United Nations World Water Development Report: Managing 
Water under Uncertainty and Risk, UNESCO, Paris, (2012). 
UNESCO, 2015 (c) The United NationsWorld Water Development Report: Water for a 
Sustainable World UNESCO, Paris (2015). 
UNESCO, 2019 (d) The United NationsWorld Water Development Report: Leaving No 
One Behind, UNESCO, Paris (2019). 
UNISDR, 2015 The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. Geneva: 
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. Available at 
http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/43291, accessed on 21 
October 2020.  
UNGAS Sixth Committee (51st Session) Summary Record of the 12th Meeting of the 
Working Group on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses’ (7 October 1996) UN Doc A/C.6/51/SR.12.  
UN-Water, 2004 (a) The Africa Water Vision for 2025: Equitable and Sustainable Use of 
Water for Socioeconomic Development (2004), available at 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-
Documents/african%20water%20vision%202025%20to%20be%20sent%2
0to%20wwf5.pdf, accessed on 12 April 2019. 
U.N. Water, 2010 (b) Climate change adaptation: The pivotal role of water Policy brief, 
Ginebra, Suiza, (2010), available at 
https://www.unwater.org/publications/climate-change-adaptation-pivotal-
role-water/, accessed on 12 April 2019. 
UN-Water, 2013 (c) Water Cooperation in Action: Approaches, Tools and Processes 
(2013), available at 
https://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/water_cooperation_2013/pdf, 
accessed on 12 April 2019. 
 
 
II. 2. Books 
Ashton P.J. Disputes and conflicts over water in Africa, Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd, 
(2007). 
Baer H.A. & M. Singer The anthropology of climate change: An integrated critical 
perspective, Routledge, (2018).  
Berber F.J. Rivers in International Law Stevens and Sons, London, (1959). 
Birmingham D. & Phyllis M.M. History of Central Africa. The contemporary years, since 
1960, New York, Longman, (1998).  
Birnie P.W. & Boyle A. International Law and the Environment New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, (2004). 
Boisson De Chazournes L. Fresh Water in International Law, Oxford University Press, 
(2013). 
Bonney R. The Thirty Years’ War 1618−1648, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, (2002).  
Brisman et al. Water, crime and security in the twenty-first century: Too dirty, too little, 
too much, Springer, (2018). 
Caponera D.A. (a) The Law of International water resources, (1978). 
Caponera D.A. & Nanni M. (b) Principles of water law and administration: national and 
international 2nd Ed. CRC Press, (1992). 
Caponera D.A. & Nanni M. (c) Principles of water law and administration: national and 
international 3rd Ed., Routledge, (2019). 
Casper J.K. Greenhouse gases: worldwide impacts Infobase Publishing, 2010. 
Claudia W. Sadoff et al. Africa's International Rivers: An Economic Perspective the World 
Bank, (2002). 
Davidson B. Modern Africa: A social and political history, Routledge, (2014). 
De Courcel Geoffroy L'influence de la Conférence de Berlin de 1885 sur le droit colonial 
international, les Éditions Internationales, (1935). 
Delaney J. Learning Legal Reasoning: Briefing, Analysis, and Theory, John Delaney 
Publications, (1987). 
Devroey E.J. & G.V. Campenhout (a) Le Bassin hydrographique congolais spécialement 
celui du bief maritime, G. van Campenhout, (1941). 
Devroey E.J. (b) Le Kasaï et son bassin hydrographique 1st Ed. Goemare, Bruxelles, 
(1939).  
Earle A. et al. (a) Transboundary water management and the climate change debate, 
Routledge, (2015). 




Easton D. A systems analysis of political life, Ney York, Wiley, (1965).  
Ewans M. European Atrocity, African Catastrophe: Leopold II, the Congo Free State and 
its Aftermath, Routledge, (2017). 
Fo¨rster S. et al. Europe and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the 
Onset of Partition, (1988). 
Friesen J. & Rodríguez-Sinobas L. Advanced Tools for Integrated Water Resources 
Management Vol. 3 Academic Press, (2018).  
Getches D.H. Water Law in a Nutshell 4th Ed. West Publishing Company, (1997). 
Gleick P.H. Water: the potential consequences of climate variability and change for the 
water resources of the United States. Pacific Institute for Studies in 
Development, Environment, and Security, (2000). 
Hale T. How the UNFCCC Can Drive Climate Ambition in Advance of a Treaty: Record, 
review, reinforce, recruit, Oxford: University of Oxford, (2013). 
Hertslet E. The map of Africa by treaty, Routledge, (2013). 
Hundley Dividing the Water: A Century of Controversy Between the United States and 
Mexico, Los Angeles, University of California Press, (1966) 
Isaac B. The Limits of Empire: the Roman army in the East, Oxford University Press, 
(1990). 
Kai W. & Warner J. The politics of water: A Survey, Routledge, (2010).  
Kiss A. & Shelton D. International Environmental Law 3rd Edition, Brill, (2004). 
Lammers J.G. Pollution of international watercourses: A Search for Substantive Rules or 
Principles of Law, the Hague, Brill Nijhoff, (1984). 
Leb C. Cooperation in the law of transboundary water resources Vol. 102, Cambridge 
University Press, (2013).  
McAnany P.A. & Yoffee N. (eds.) Questioning collapse: human resilience, ecological 
vulnerability, and the aftermath of empire, Cambridge University Press, 
(2009).  
Mccaffrey S.C. (a) The Law of International Watercourses, 2nd Ed. Oxford International 
Law Library, (2007). 
McCaffrey S.C., Leb C., & Denoon, R.T. (Eds) (b) Research Handbook on International 
Water Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, (2019).  
McIntyre O. (a) Environmental protection of international watercourses under 
international law, Routledge, (2016). 
Mubiala M.M. (a) L’évolution du droit des cours d’eau internationaux à la lumière de 
l’expérience africaine, notamment dans le bassin du Congo/Zaïre, Graduate 
Institute Publications, (2014). 
 
 
Newson M. Land, Water and Development: Sustainable Management of River Basin 
Systems, 2nd Ed. New York, Routledge, (1997). 
O'Connell D.P. The law of state succession Vol. 5. Cambridge University Press, (2015). 
Pakenham T. The Scramble for Africa: 1876-1912, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, (1991). 
Peya M.I The Blue Fund: Mechanism of financing and management of the Congo Basin for 
the protection of the global environment, l'Harmattan, (2018). 
Pittock A.B Climate change: Turning up the heat, Routledge, (2017). 
Rieu-Clarke A. Moynihan R. & Magsig  B-O. (a) UN Watercourses Convention: user's 
guide. IHP-HELP Centre for Water Law, Policy and Science, (2012). 
Sands P. Principle of International Environmental law 2nd Ed., Cambridge University 
Press, (2003).  
Schmeier S. Governing International Watercourses - River Basin Organizations and the 
sustainable governance of internationally shared rivers and lakes, London, 
Routledge, (2013).  
Shaw M.N. International Law 5th Ed., Grotius Publication Ltd., Llyndysul, Dyfed, (2003).  
Solomon S. Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth Power, and Civilization. Harper Collins, 
New York, (2010). 
Tanzi A. & Arcari M. The United Nations Convention on the Law of International 
Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing, Brill Nijhoff, (2001). 
Teclaff L.A. (a) The River Basin in History and Law Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, (1967).   
Teclaff L.A.  (b) Water Law in Historical Perspective W.S. Hein, Buffalo, New York, 
(1985). 
Teclaff L.A. (c) The river basin in history and law Springer Science & Business Media, 
(2012). 
Tshiyembe M. Géopolitique de paix en Afrique médiane Paris, l’Harmattan, (2003).  
Tunkin G.I, et al. Theory of international law, Harvard University Press, (1974). 
Tvedt T., McIntyre O. & Woldesadik T.K. (eds) A History of Water: Sovereignty and 
international water law, IB Tauris, (2015). 
Uehlinger Urs F., Wantzen Karl M., Leuven Rob S. et al. The Rhine River basin Tockner, 
Klement, London, (2009). 
Winsome L.J. Zaire: Continuity and political change in an oppressive state, Routledge, 
(2019). 
Wittfogel K.A. ‘Oriental despotism: A study of total power’ New Haven: Yale University 
Press, (1957). 
Wouters P., Chen H. & Nickum J.E. Transboundary Water Cooperation: Principles, 
Practice and Prospects for China and Its Neighbours, Routledge, (2018). 
 
 
Young C. & Turner T.E. The rise and decline of the Zairian state University of Wisconsin 
Press, (1985). 
II. 3. Chapters in books 
Allott A. ‘The Changing Legal Status of Boundaries in Africa: A diachronic view’ in 
Ingham K. (ed) Foreign Relations of African States (1974), London: 
Butterworth, 117-130. 
Anton D. ‘Treaty Congestion in International Environmental Law’ in Techera E.J. (ed) 
Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (2012), 
Routledge, 681-696. 
Baxter R.R. ‘The Indus Basin’ in Garretson A.H. et al. (eds) The Law of International 
Drainage Basins (1967), New York University, 451, 454. 
Beyene T. et al. ‘The potential consequences of climate change in the hydrology regime of 
the Congo River Basin’ (2013) in Haensler A. et al.  (eds) Climate Change 
Scenarios for the Congo Basin, Climate Service Centre, Hamburg, 59-104. 
Biswas A.K. ‘Management of transboundary waters: an overview’ in Varis O., Tortajada 
C., & Biswas A.K. (eds) Management of transboundary rivers and lakes 
(2008) Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1-20. 
Boisson De Chazournes L. & Tignino M. ‘Introduction’ in L.B. Chazournes, Leb C. & 
Tignino M. (eds) International Water Law Vol. I  (2013), 1-23. 
Bodansky D. (a) ‘Legally Binding versus Non-Legally Binding Instruments’ in Barrett S. et 
al. (eds) Towards a Workable and Effective Climate Regime (2015), 155-165.    
Bodansky D. (b) ‘The history of the global climate change regime’ in Luterbacher & Sprinz 
D.F. (eds) International relations and global climate change (2001), 
Cambridge, London, 23-40. 
Chikozho C. ‘Towards best-practice in transboundary water governance in Africa: 
exploring the policy and institutional dimensions of conflict and cooperation 
over water’ in Kobena T.H. et al. Rethinking Development Challenges for 
Public Policy (2012), Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 155-200. 
Cullet P. & J. Gupta ‘India: The Evolution of Water Law and Policy’ in Dellapenna J. & 
Gupta J.  (eds) The Evolution of the Law and Politics of Water 
(2009),  Springer, Dordrecht, 157-173. 
Drieschova A. & Eckstein G. ‘Cooperative Transboundary Mechanisms’ in Sanchez J.C. 
& Roberts J. (eds) Transboundary Water Governance: Adaptation to 
Climate Change (2014), IUCN, Gland, Switzerland, 51-80. 
Garderen V. et al. ‘ Climate change adaptation options for the Congo Basin countries’ in 
Linda & Ludwig (eds) Climate change scenarios for the Congo Basin (2012) 
Climate Service Centre, Hamburg, 167-209. 
 
 
Garretson A.H. ‘The Nile Basin’ in Garretson A.H. et al. (eds) The Law of International 
Drainage Basins (1967), New York University, 256-297. 
Gupta J. & J.W. Dellapenna (a) ‘The Challenge for the Twenty-First Century: A Critical 
Approach’ in Dellapenna J. & Gupta  J. (eds) The Evolution of the Law and 
Politics of Water (2009), Springer, Dordrecht, 391-410. 
Haensler et al. ‘Assessment of projected climate change signals over central Africa based 
on a multitude of global and regional climate projections’ in Haensler A. et 
al.  (eds) Climate Change Scenarios for the Congo Basin (2013), Climate 
Service Centre, Hamburg, 1-42. 
Klaphake A. & Voils O ‘Cooperation on international rivers from an economic perspective: 
the concept of benefit-sharing’ in Scheumann W. & Neubert S. Transboundary 
water management in Africa: challenges for development cooperation Vol. 
21 (2006), Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 103-172.  
Kornfeld I. ‘Mesopotamia: A History of Water and Law’ in Dellapenna J. & Gupta J.  (eds) 
The Evolution of the Law and Politics of Water (2009), Springer, Dordrecht, 
21-36. 
Lamb V. et al. ‘Introduction: Resources Politics and Knowing the Salween River’ in 
Middleton C. & Lamb V. (eds) Knowing the Salween River: Resource 
Politics of a Contested Transboundary River (2019), Springer, Cham, 1-15. 
Laster R. et al. ‘Water in the Jewish Legal Tradition’ in Dellapenna J. & Gupta J. The Evolution 
of the Law and Politics of Water (2009), Springer, Dordrecht, 53-66. 
Lipper J. ‘Equitable utilization’ in Garretson A.H. et al. (eds) The law of international 
drainage basins 15 (1967) Oceana Publications, New York, 16-26.  
Ludwig, F. et al. ‘Climate change impacts on the Congo Basin region’ in Haensler A. et al.  
(eds) Climate Change Scenarios for the Congo Basin (2013), Climate 
Service Centre, Hamburg, 105-166.  
Ludwig F. et al. ‘Perspectives on climate change impacts and water security’ in Claudia P-
W. et al. (eds) Handbook on Water Security (2016), Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 139-159.   
Lundberg J.G. et al. ‘So many fishes, so little time: an overview of recent ichthyological 
discoveries in freshwaters’ in Thieme ML et.al. (eds) Freshwater 
ecoregions of Africa and Madagascar: a conservation assessment (2005), 
Island Press, 51–63. 
McCaffrey S.C. (c) ‘The evolution of international law relating to transboundary waters’ 
in  Rieu-Clarke A. et al. Handbook of Water Law and Policy (2017) 
Routledge, 205-216. 
McCaffrey S.C. (d) ‘Intertwined general principles’ in McCaffrey et al.  (eds) Research 




Mccaffrey S.C. (e) ‘The 1997 UN Convention: Compatibility and Complementarity’ in Tanzi 
A. et al.  (eds) The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes – Its Contribution to 
International Water Cooperation (2015), Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, 51-59.  
McCaffrey S.C. (k) ‘Water disputes defined: characteristics and trends for resolving them’ 
in Resolution of International Water Disputes (2003), 41-56. 
McIntyre O. (b) ‘International water law: concepts, evolution and development’ in Anton 
Earle et al. Transboundary Water Management. Principles and Practice 
(2013) Routledge, 70-82. 
Merrey et al. ‘Water Governance Futures in South Asia and Southern Africa: Déjà Vu All 
Over Again?’ in Freshwater Governance for the 21st Century (2017) 
Springer International Publishing, 229-250. 
Nader L. ‘Civilisation and Its Negotiations’ in P. Caplan & P. Caplan (eds) Understanding 
disputes: The politics of argument (1995), 37-52. 
Paasi A ‘The changing discourses on political boundaries. Mapping the backgrounds, 
contexts and contents’ in Van Houtum H.J et al. (eds) B/ordering Space 
(2005), Ashgate Publishing Company, 17-31. 
Pohl B. & Ashok S. ‘leveraging diplomacy for resolving transboundary water problems’ in 
Shafiqul Islam & Kaveh Madani (eds) Water diplomacy in action. 
Contingent approaches to managing complex water problems (2017) 
Anthem Press, USA, 19-36. 
Runge Jürgen ‘The Congo River, Central Africa’ in A. Gupta  (ed) Large Rivers: 
Geomorphology and Management (2008) Chichester, John Wiley and Sons 
Ltd, 293-309. 
Tarlock A.D. ‘International water law and climate disruption’ in McCaffrey et al. (eds) 
Research Handbook on International Water Law (2019), Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 186-204. 
Tuckett R.P. ‘The Role of Atmospheric gases’ in Letcher T.M. (ed) Climate change: 
observed impacts on planet Earth (2015), Elsevier, Amsterdam, 3-19. 
Wengert N. ‘The River Basin Concept as Seen from a Management Perspective in the 
United States’ in Lundqvist J. et al. Strategies for River Basin Management 
(1985), Springer, Dordrecht, 299–305. 
Wouters P. ‘Dynamic Cooperation’—The Evolution of Transboundary Water Cooperation’ 
in Michael Kidd et al. (eds) Water and the Law: Towards Sustainability 
(2014), Edward Elgar Publishing, 13-64. 
 
 
III. II. 4. Journals 
Al-Ansari N. et al. ‘Geopolitics of the Tigris and Euphrates Basins’ (2018) 3 (8) Journal 
of Earth Sciences and Geotechnical Engineering, 187-222. 
Alfieri L. et al.  ‘Increasing flood risk under climate change: a pan-European assessment 
of the benefits of four adaptation strategies’ (2016) 3-4 (136) Climatic 
Change, 507-521.  
Anderson J. ‘The shifting stage of politics: new medieval and postmodern territorialities?’ 
(1996) 2 (14) Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 133-153. 
Arjoon D. et al. ‘Sharing water and benefits in transboundary river basins’ (2016) 20 (6) 
Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, 2135-2150. 
Arrhenius S. ‘On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the 
Earth’ (1897) 9 (54) Publications of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific, 
14-24.  
Ashton P.J.  ‘Southern African water conflicts: are they inevitable or preventable?’ (2003) 2 
(1) Water Wheel, 22-24. 
Barrett S. ‘Climate treaties and the imperative enforcement’ (2008) 24 (2) Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy, 239-258. 
Barrow C.J. ‘River basin development planning and management: A critical review’ (1998) 
1 (26) World development, 171-186. 
Beaumont Peter ‘The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses: its strengths and weaknesses from a water 
management perspective and the need for new workable guidelines’ (2000) 
4 (16) International Journal of Water Resources Development, 475-495. 
Beck L. et al. ‘Implications of hydro-political dependency for international water 
cooperation and conflict: Insights from new data’ (2014) 42 Political 
Geography, 23-33. 
Begg M. & S. Breheny ‘Treaty’ (2016) 4 (68) Institute of Public Affairs Review: A 
Quarterly Review of Politics and Public Affairs, 16-19. 
Bell E. & Grant B. ‘A method for assessing community flood management knowledge for 
vulnerable groups: Australia's 2010–2011 floods’ (2013) 1 (49) Community 
Development Journal, 85-110.  
Benson D., Lorenzoni I., & Cook H. ‘Evaluating social learning in England flood risk 
management: an “individual-community interaction” perspective’ (2016) 55 
Environmental Science & Policy, 326-334. 
Bhandari M.P. ‘Climate change science: a historical outline’ (2018) 1 (1) Advances in 
Agriculture and Environmental Science: Open Access, 5−12. 
 
 
Bichsel Christine ‘Water and the (infra-) structure of political rule: A synthesis’ (2016) 2 
(9) Water Alternatives, 356-372. 
Bischiniotis Konstantinos et al. ‘The influence of antecedent conditions on flood risk in 
sub-Saharan Africa’ (2018) 1 (18) Natural Hazards and Earth System 
Sciences, 271-285. 
Blois J.L. et al.  ‘Climate change and the past, present, and future of biotic interactions’ 
(2013) 6145 (341) Science, 499-504. 
Bodansky D. (c) ‘The Paris climate change agreement: a new hope?’ (2016) 110 (2) 
American Journal of International Law, 288, 319. 
Bode T.G. ‘A modern treaty for the Columbia River’ (2017) 47 (1) Environmental Law 81-
125. 
Bodle R. et al. ‘The Paris Agreement: Analysis, Assessment and Outlook’ (2016) Carbon 
and Climate Law Review, 5-22. 
Bourne C. (a) ‘The International Law Association’s Contribution to International Water 
Resources Law’ (1996) 36 (2) Natural Resources Journal, 155-216.  
Bourne C. (b) ‘The Primacy of the Principle of Equitable Utilisation in the 1997 
Watercourses Convention’ (1997) 35 Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law, 215-232. 
Brady M. et al.  ‘The Columbia River Treaty renegotiation from the perspective of contract 
theory’ (2015) 155 (1) Journal of Contemporary Water Research & 
Education, 53-62. 
Brownlie Ian & Burns Ian R. ‘African boundaries: a legal and diplomatic encyclopedia’ 
(1979) London: Hurst,  489-514. 
Brunnée J. ‘Procedure and substance in international environmental law: Confused at a 
higher level?’ (2016) 5 (6) European Society of International Law, 1–7 
Brunschwig H. ‘The Scramble for Africa. Documents on the Berlin West African 
Conference and related Subjects 1884-1885’ (1974) 61 (255) Outre-Mers. 
Revue d'histoire, 609-610. 
Burnett-Hall ‘Environmental Regulation in the United Kingdom: Its Development to the 
Present Day and Trends for the Future, Analysis and Perspective’ (1989) 12 
International Environmental Reporter, 461-470. 
Caporaso J.A. ‘Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority and 
Sovereignty’ (2000) 2 (2)  International Studies Review, 1-28. 
Chase S. K. ‘There Must Be Something in the Water: An Exploration of the Rhine and 
Mississippi Rivers' Governing Differences and an Argument for Change’ 
(2011) 29 Wisconsin International Law Journal, 609-641. 
 
 
Chishugi J. Bahati, & Alemaw B.F. ‘The hydrology of the Congo River Basin: A GIS-
based hydrological water balance model’ (2009) World Environmental and 
Water Resources Congress 2009: Great Rivers, 1-16. 
Chmutina K., Fussey P., Dainty A. et al. ‘Implications of transforming climate change risks 
into security risks’ (2018) 27 (5) Disaster Prevention and Management: An 
International Journal, 460-477. 
Cooley H. & Gleick P.H. ‘Climate-proofing transboundary water agreements’ (2011) 4 (56) 
Hydrological Sciences Journal, 711-718. 
Contartese C. ‘Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes 1992’ (2017) Elgar Encyclopedia of Environmental 
Law. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 257-268. 
Cosens B. ‘Transboundary river governance in the face of uncertainty: resilience theory 
and the Columbia River Treaty’ (2010) 30 (2) Journal of Land, Resources, 
and Environmental Law, 229-265. 
Coulibaly T., Moinul I., & Shunsuke M. ‘The 10 impact of climate change and extreme 
events on agriculture in Africa’ in Shunsuke M. (ed) Wealth, Inclusive 
Growth and Sustainability (2019), London, Routledge, 261-285.  
Craven M. ‘Between law and history: the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the logic of 
free trade’ (2015) 1 (3) London Review of International Law, 31-59. 
Dellapenna J.W. (a) ‘Book review: Kidd Michael et al. (eds) Water and the Law: Towards 
Sustainability (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2014) 416 pp’ (2017) 1 (8) 
Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, 172-175. 
Dellapenna J.W. (b) ‘The customary international law of transboundary freshwaters’ 
(2001) 1 (3-4) International Journal of global environmental issues, 264-
305.   
De Stefano L., Duncan J., Dinar S. et al. ‘Climate change and the institutional resilience of 
international river basins’ (2012) 49 (1) Journal of Peace Research, 193-209. 
Dinar S. et al. ‘Do treaties matter? Climate change, water variability, and cooperation along 
transboundary river basins’ (2019) 69 Political Geography, 162-172. 
Döll P., Trautmann T., Gerten D. et al. ‘Risks for the global freshwater system at 1.5 C and 
2 C global warming’(2018) 13 (4) Environmental Research Letters, 1-15. 
Donnelly C., Wouter G., Jafet A., et al. ‘Impacts of climate change on European hydrology 
at 1.5, 2 and 3 degrees mean global warming above preindustrial level’ 
(2017) 1-2 (143) Climatic Change, 13-26. 
Doucouliagos H. & Paldam M. ‘Conditional aid effectiveness: A meta-study’ (2010) 4 (22) 
Journal of International Development: The Journal of the Development 
Studies Association, 391-410. 
 
 
Engel H. ‘The flood events of 1993/1994 and 1995 in the Rhine River basin’ (1997) 239 
Publications-Series of Proceedings and Reports-Intern Assoc Hydrological 
Sciences, 21-32. 
Feitelson E. & Amit T. ‘A main driver or an intermediate variable? Climate change, water and 
security in the Middle East’ (2017) 44 Global environmental change, 39-48. 
Fischhendler I. ‘Legal and institutional adaptation to climate uncertainty: a study of 
international rivers’ (2004) 4 (6) Water Policy, 281-302. 
Fitzmaurice M. ‘Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses’ (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of International Law, 501-508.  
Fourier J. (a) ‘Remarques générales sur les températures du globe terrestre et des espaces 
planétaires’ (1824) 27 Annales de Chemie et de Physique, 136-167.  
Fourier J. (b) ‘Mémoire Sur Les Températures Du Globe Terrestre Et Des Espaces 
Planétaires’ (1827) 7 Mémoires de l'Académie Royale des Sciences, 569–604.  
Fry J. & Chong A. ‘International Water Law and China’s Management of its International 
Rivers’ (2016) 2 (39) British Columbia International &Comparative Law 
Review, 227-266. 
Gemeda D. O. & Akalu D.S. ‘The impacts of climate change on the African continent and 
the way forward’ (2015) 10 (7) Journal of Ecology and the Natural 
Environment, 256-262.  
Gilissen H.K, Meghan A, Beyers J.C, et al. ‘Bridges over troubled waters: an 
interdisciplinary framework for evaluating the interconnectedness within 
fragmented flood risk management systems’ (2016) 1 (25) Journal of Water 
Law, 12-26. 
Giordano M. et al. ‘A review of the evolution and state of transboundary freshwater 
treaties’ (2014) 14 (3) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics, 245-264.  
Giosan L. et al. ‘Fluvial landscapes of the Harappan civilization’ (2012) 109 (26) 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, E1688-E1694. 
Goldstein J.S. ‘Climate change as a global security issue’ (2016) 1 (1) Journal of Global 
Security Studies, 95-98.  
Goulden M.M., Declan C. & Aurelie P. ‘Adaptation to climate change in international river 
basins in Africa: A review’ (2009) 54 (4) Hydrological Sciences Journal, 
805-828. 
Gross O. ‘Cyber Responsibility to Protect: Legal Obligations of States Directly Affected 
by Cyber-Incidents’ (2015) 48 Cornell International Law Journal, 481-511. 
Gupta J. & Van Der Zaag P. (b) ‘Interbasin water transfers and integrated water resources 
management: Where engineering, science and politics interlock’ (2008) 1-2 
(33) Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Parts A/B/C, 28-40. 
 
 
Gupta J. (c) ‘History of international climate change policy’ (2010) 1 (5) Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 636-653. 
Gupta J. (d) ‘The watercourses convention, hydro-hegemony and transboundary water 
issues’ (2016) 3 (51) The International Spectator, 118-131. 
Haran V.P. ‘Water and hydropower cooperation in BBIN countries: Policies and way 
forward’ (2018) International Journal of Water Resources Development, 1-15. 
Hallema D.W., Ge Sun P.V., Caldwell SP. et al. ‘Burned forests impact water supplies’ 
(2018) 9 (1) Nature communications, 1-8.  
Herbst J. ‘The creation and matintenance of national boundaries in Africa’ (1989) 4 (43) 
International Organisation, 668-679. 
Ikome F.N. ‘Africa’s International Borders as Potential Sources of Conflict and Future 
Threats to Peace and Security’ (2012) 2012 (233) Institute of Security 
Studies Paper, 1-16. 
Jongman B. et al. ‘Declining vulnerability to river floods and the global benefits of 
adaptation’ (2015) (112) 18 Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, E2271-E2280. 
Jukrkorn N., Sachdev H., & Panya O. ‘Community-based flood risk management: lessons 
learned from the 2011 flood in central Thailand’ (2014) 184 WIT 
Transactions on Ecology and the Environment, 75-86. 
Jackson S.F. China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 
1961–1993’ (1995) 142 The China Quarterly, 388-422. 
Kabenge M., Elaru J., Wang H., & Fengting Li. ‘Characterizing flood hazard risk in data-
scarce areas, using a remote sensing and GIS-based flood hazard index’ 
(2017) 3 (89) Natural hazards, 1369-1387. 
Kamto M. ‘Le droit international des ressources en eau continentales africaines’ (1990) 36 
Annuaire français de droit international, 843-911. 
Kathleen M.A., Rhodes S.L., & MacDonnell L.J. ‘Water allocation in a changing climate: 
institutions and adaptation’ (1997) 2 (35) Climatic Change, 157-177. 
Knutti R., Rogelj J., Sedláček J., et al. ‘A scientific critique of the two-degree climate 
change target’ (2016) 1 (9) Nature Geoscience, 1-7. 
Köppel M. & Sprinz D.F. ‘Do binding beat nonbinding Agreements? Regulating International 
Water Quality’ (2019) Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1860-1888.  
Lautze J. & Giordano M. ‘Transboundary water law in Africa: Development, nature, and 
geography’ (2005) 45 Natural Resources Journal, 1053-1087. 
Lankford B. ‘Does Article 6 in the UN Watercourses Convention misdirect riparian 
countries?’ (2013) 2 (38) Water international, 130-145. 
Longwell Chester R. ‘Origin of the word climate’ (1954) 120 (3113) Science, 355-369. 
 
 
Ludwig F., Van Slobbe E. & Cofino W. ‘Climate change adaptation and Integrated Water 
Resource Management in the water sector’ (2014) 518 Journal of 
Hydrology, 235-242. 
Maluwa T. (a) ‘The origins and development of international rivers in Africa: a study of 
the international legal regimes of the Congo and the Niger rivers from 1885 
to 1960’ (1982) 3 (29)  Netherlands International Law Review, 368-400.  
Maluwa T. (b) ‘Succession to Treaties and International Fluvial Law in Africa: The Niger 
Regime’(1986) 3 (33) Netherlands International Law Review, 334-370. 
Manne A. & Richels R. ‘US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol: the impact on compliance 
costs and CO2 emissions’ (2004) 32 (4) Energy Policy, 447-454. 
Marloes H.N.B & Duncan J.A. ‘Future bottlenecks in international river basins: where 
transboundary institutions, population growth and hydrological variability 
intersect’ (2017) 42 (4) Water International, 400-424. 
Matchaya G., Nhamo L., Sibusiso N., et al. ‘An Overview of Water Markets in Southern 
Africa: An Option for Water Management in Times of Scarcity’ (2019) 5 
(11) Water, 1-16. 
Mccracken M. & Wolf A.T. ‘Updating the Register of International River Basins of the 
world’ (2019) International Journal of Water Resources Development, 1-51. 
Mccaffrey S.C.  (f) ‘The need for flexibility in freshwater treaty regimes’ (2003) Natural 
Resources Forum, 156-162. 
McCaffrey S.C. (g) ‘The Harmon doctrine one hundred years later: buried, not praised’ 
(1996) 36 Natural Resources Journal, 549–590. 
McCaffrey S.C. (h) ‘The Human Right to Water: A False Promise?´ (2016) 47 Union of 
Pacific Law Review, 221-232. 
McIntyre O. (c) ‘The emergence of an “ecosystem approach” to the protection of 
international watercourses under international law’ (2004) 1 (13) Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law, 1-14. 
McIntyre O. (d) ‘Utilization of shared international freshwater resources–the meaning and 
role of “equity” in international water law’ (2013) 38 (2) Water 
International 112, 116. 
Mollinga P.P. ‘Water and Politics: levels, rational choice and South Indian canal irrigation’ 
(2001) 33 (8-9) Futures, 733-752. 
Mubiala M. (b) ‘Le regime juridique du bassin du Congo/Zaire’ (1994) 47(5) Studia 
diplomatica, 53-120.  
Müllerson R. ‘Source of international law: New tendencies in Soviet thinking’ (1989) 83 
(3) American Journal of International Law, 494-512.  
 
 
Moellenkamp S. ‘The “WFD-effect” on upstream-downstream relations in international 
river basins? Insights from the Rhine and the Elbe basins (2007) 4 (3) 
Hydrologic & Engeneering System Scientific Discussions 1407-1423. 
Nanson G.C., Price D.M., & Short S.A. ‘Wetting and drying of Australia over the past 300 
ka’ (1992) 9 (20) Geology, 791-794. 
Nasiri H., Mohd Y.M.J., & Ali T.A.M. ‘An overview to flood vulnerability assessment 
methods’ (2016) 3 (2) Sustainable Water Resources Management, 331-336. 
Nasr H. & Neef A. ‘Ethiopia’s challenge to Egyptian hegemony in the Nile River basin: 
the case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’ (2016) 4 (21) 
Geopolitics, 969-989. 
Neary D.G., Ice G.G., & Rhett C.J. ‘Linkages between forest soils and water quality and 
quantity’ (2009) 10 (258) Forest ecology and management, 2269-2281.  
Ngoma K.C. ‘Le Régime Juridique de navigation dans le Bassin du fleuve Congo: Entre 
centralisation, application et Rejet d’un Cadre Conventionnel Régional mal 
négocié en République Démocratique Du Congo’ (2015) 2 (1) KAS African 
Law Study Library, 350-382. 
Nzongola N.G. ‘From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2004) 28 Nordic 
African Institute, 1-25. 
Olke C., Hahn T., Olsson P., et al. ‘Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems’ 
(2005) 30 Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 441-473.  
O’Neill B. C. et al. ‘IPCC reasons for concern regarding climate change risks’ (2017) 7 (1) 
Nature Climate Change, 28-38. 
Oreskes N. ‘The scientific consensus on climate change’ (2004) 5702 (306) Science, 1686-
1686. 
Pahl-Wostl C., Gupta J., & Petry D. ‘Governance and the global water system: a theoretical 
exploration’ (2008) 14 Global Governance, 419-435. 
Petersen-P., Jacob D., Veilleux J.C., & Aaron T. Wolf. ‘International water conflict and 
cooperation: challenges and opportunities’ (2017) 2 (42) Water 
International, 105-120. 
Pielke AR. ‘Misdefining “climate change”: consequences for science and action’ (2005) 8 
(6) Environmental Science & Policy, 548-561. 
Priest, S. J. et al. ‘The European Union approach to flood risk management and improving 
societal resilience: lessons from the implementation of the Floods Directive 
in six European countries’ (2016) 21 (4) Ecology and Society, 1-17. 
Porta-Sancho J.R. et al. ‘The need for municipal action planning against flood risk: the 
risk-informed journey of the municipality of Oliva (Spain)’ (2016) 2 (1) 




Rahaman M.M. ‘Principles of International Water Law : Creating Effective Transboundary 
Water Resources Management’ (2009) 1 (3) International Journal of 
Sustainable Society, 207-223. 
Rahman K. ‘Interbasin water transfer: Bangladesh perspective’ in UNESCO (ed) Interbasin 
Water Transfer. Proceedings of the International Workshop (1999), 81–95.   
Rahman R. ‘The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Dilemma 
for Lower Riparians’ (1995) 9 Ford International Law Journal, 9-24. 
Rajamani L., & Jutta B. ‘The Legality of Downgrading Nationally Determined 
Contributions under the Paris Agreement: Lessons from the US 
Disengagement’ (2017) 29 (3) Journal of Environmental Law, 537-551. 
Regilme Jr., Fulo S.S., & Hartmann H. ‘Mutual delegitimization: American and Chinese 
development assistance in Africa’ (2018) The SAIS Review of International 
Affairs (forthcoming), 1-16. 
Rollings-Magnusson S. & Magnusson R.C. ‘The Kyoto Protocol: implications of a flawed 
but important environmental policy’ (2000) Canadian Public Policy / 
Analyse de Politiques, 347-359.  
Rossi C.R. ‘The Transboundary dispute over the waters of the Silala/Siloli: Legal 
vandalism and Goffmanian Metaphor’ (2017) 53 Stanford Journal of 
International Law, 55-88.  
Roy Jankielsohn ‘Defining hydropolitics: the politics of water in South Africa’ (2012) 5 37 
Journal for Contemporary History, 123-141. 
Robinson S-A. ‘Climate change adaptation trends in small island developing states’ (2017) 
22 (4) Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 669-691. 
Ruppel O.C. & Funteh M.B. ‘Climate change, human security and the humanitarian crisis 
in the Lake Chad Basin region: selected legal and developmental aspects 
with a special focus on water governance’ (2019) Law Environment Africa 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 105-136. 
Sadoff C.W. & Grey D. ‘Beyond the river: the benefits of cooperation on international 
rivers’ (2002) 4 (5) Water policy, 389-403. 
Salman MA.S. (a) ‘The United Nations Watercourses Convention ten years later: Why has 
its entry into force proven difficult?’ (2007) 32 (1) Water International, 1-15. 
Salman M.A.S. (b) ‘The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the 2004 
Berlin Rules: perspectives on international water law’ (2007) 23 (4) Water 
Resources Development, 625-640. 
Salman MA.S. (c) ‘Entry into force of the UN Watercourses Convention: why should it 




Sayers P. et al. ‘Strategic flood management: ten ‘golden rules’ to guide a sound approach’ 
(2015) 13 (2) International Journal of River Basin Management, 137-151. 
Schiff J.S. ‘The evolution of Rhine river governance: historical lessons for modern 
transboundary water management’ (2017) 9 (3) Water History, 279-294. 
Shahin M. ‘Hydrology and water resources of Africa’ (2006) Springer Science & Business 
Media, 335-349. 
Stanković S., Vasović D., & Živković N. ‘Impacts of extreme hydrological events on 
sustainable water resources management and human well-being’ (2019) 9 
(1) Safety Engineering, 37-42. 
Stoa R.B. ‘The United Nations watercourses convention on the dawn of entry into force’ 
(2014) 47 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 1321-1370. 
Storozum M., H. Liu, Z. Qin, et al. ‘Early evidence of irrigation technology in the North 
China Plain: geoarchaeological investigations at the Anshang site, Neihuang 
County, Henan Province, China’ (2018) 33 (2) Geoarchaeology, 143-161. 
Strydom H.A. ‘The Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change’ (2010) Encyclopedia of 
Life Support Systems, 1-10. 
Tanzi A. ‘The UN Convention on International Watercourses as a Framework for the 
Avoidance and Settlement of Water law Disputes’ (1998) 11(3) Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 441-472. 
Teclaff L.A. (d) ‘The river basin concept and global climate change’ (1990) 8 Pace 
Environmental Law Review, 355-388. 
Teclaff L.A. (e) ‘Evolution of the river basin concept in national and international water 
law’ (1996) 36 Natural Resources Journal, 359-391. 
Teclaff L.A. (f) ‘Fiat or custom: the checkered development of international water law’ 
(1991) 31 Natural Resources Journal, 45–73. 
Tiller E.H. & Cross F.B. ‘What is legal doctrine’ (2006) 100 North-western University Law 
Review, 517-534. 
Tyndall J. ‘On the Absorption and Radiation of Heat by Gases and Vapours, and on the 
Physical Connection of Radiation, Absorption, and Conduction’ (1861) 4 
(22) Philosophical Magazine ser. 4, 273-285. 
Upadhyaya A ‘Integrated Water Resources Management and Climate Change Adaptation 
Strategies’ (2016) 5 (3) Irrigation Drainage System Engineer, 1-5. 
Van der Velde G. et al. ‘Living rivers: Trends and challenges in science and management’ 
(2006) 565 (1) Hydrobiologia, 359-367. 
Van Stokkom H.T.C, Smits A.J.M, & Leuven R.S. ‘Flood defence in the Netherlands: a 
new era, a new approach’ (2005) 30 (1) Water international, 76-87. 
Warner 'Going with the flow: river basins as the natural units for water management?’ 
(2008) 10 (2) Water Policy, 121-138. 
 
 
Wescoat J.L. ‘Beyond the River Basin: The Changing Geography of International Water 
Problems and International Watercourse Law’ (1992) 3 Colorado Journal 
of International Environmental Law and Policy, 301-330. 
White G.F. ‘A perspective of river basin development’ (1957) 22 (2) Law & Contemporary 
Problems, 157-187. 
Whittington D. & Song J. ‘Why Have Some Countries on International Rivers been 
Successful Negotiating Treaties? A Global Perspective’ (2004) 40 (5) Water 
Resources Research, 1-18.  
Widerberg O. & Pattberg P. ‘International cooperative initiatives in global climate 
governance: Raising the ambition level or delegitimizing the UNFCCC?’ 
(2015) 6 (1) Global Policy, 45-56. 
Winkler H ‘Measurable, reportable and verifiable: the keys to mitigation in the Copenhagen 
deal’ (2008) 8 Climate Policy, 534-547. 
Wolf A.T., Jeffrey A.N., Jeffrey J.D., et al. ‘International river basins of the world’ (1999) 
15(4) International Journal of Water Resources Development, 387-427. 
Woodhouse P. & Muller M. ‘Water governance—An historical perspective on current 
debates’ (2017) 92 World Development, 225-241. 
Woodward J.C., Welsby D.A., Duller G.A.T. et al. ‘Reach-scale river dynamics moderate 
the impact of rapid climate change on floodwater farming in the desert Nile’ 
(2013) 41 (6) Geology, 695-698. 
Yakemtchouk Romain ‘Regime International des Voies d'Eau Africaines’ (1969) 5 (2) 
Belgian Review of International Law, 480-515. 
 
II. 5. Thesis  
 
Allouche J. Water Nationalism: An Explanation of Past and Present Conflicts in Central 
Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent? (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis University of Geneva, 2005).  
Baranyai G. European water law and hydropolitics: an inquiry into the resilience of 
transboundary water governance in the European Union. (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, 2019). 
Bukasa J. Le régime international du fleuve Congo (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Paris I, 1972). 
Dinar S. ‘Treaties Principles and Pattern: Negotiation over International Rivers’ 2008, 
(Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Baltimore, 2008).  
Jägerskog A. Why states cooperate over shared water: The water negotiations in the 
Jordan River Basin. (Unpublished PhD thesis, Linköping University, 2003).  
 
 
Korhola E.R. The rise and the fall of the Kyoto Protocol (Unpublished LLM thesis, 
University of Helsinki, 2014). 
Lantera N.A. Assessing The Efficacy Of African Boundary Delineation Law And Policy: 
The Case of Ethio–Eritrea Boundary Dispute Settlement” (Unpublished 
PhD thesis, Golden Gate University School of Law, 2016).  
Longunza M.J. The contribution of developing countries in the global effort to tackle climate 
change: Analysis of the transition from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris 
Agreement (Unpublished LLM thesis, University of Kwazulu Natal, 2016).  
Maria Manuela de Franqa Doria The Principle of Co-operation in the Law of International 
Watercourses (Unpublished PhD thesis University of London, 2008). 
Nundwe C.D. Ownership in Trans-Boundary Water Resources – A Case Study of the Zambezi 
Watercourse (Unpublished LLM thesis, University of Zambia, 2015).   
Nzango C. Les barrages de l’Oubangui: de l’impact hydraulique actuel à la prospective 
environnementale (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Orleans, 2018). 
Pilarski C. La gestion partagée des ressources en eau dans le bassin du Congo: état des 
lieux et perspectives (Unpublished LLM thesis, University of Laval, 2009). 
Sanchez G.S. “the Zambezi River basin : Water resources management”  (Unpublished 
Masters thesis, Stockholm University, 2018). 
Zaiotti R. Cultures of Border Control (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 
2008). 
Zmak E.J. Weathering Climate Change: Provisions for Climate Change Resiliency in 
Transboundary River Treaties (Unpublished Masters thesis, University of 
Denver, 2018). 
 
II. 6. Academic, working and background papers & electronic sources 
 
Adelphi The Rise of Hydro-Diplomacy - Strengthening foreign policy for transboundary 
waters Climate Diplomacy Report, Berlin, (2014), Available at  
https://www.adelphi.de/en/system/files/mediathek/bilder/the_rise_of_hydro
-diplomacy_adelphi.pdf , accessed on 20 February 2019. 
Bates B.C., Kundzewicz Z.W., Wu S., et al. ‘Climate Change and Water’ Technical Paper, 
IPCC, (2008), available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283720897_Climate_Change_and_Wat
er_Technical_Paper_of_the_Intergovernmental_Panel_on_Climate_Change,  
accessed on 19 March 2019. 
Blumstein S., Pohl B., & Taenzler  D. ‘Water and climate diplomacy: Integrative 
approaches for adaptive action in transboundary river basins’ (2016) 
Working Paper Adelphi, Berlin, Germany. Available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316038846_Water_and_Climate_Diplomacy_-
_Integrative_Approaches_for_Adaptive_Action_in_Transboundary_River_Basins, 
accessed on 7 September 2019. 
 
 
Bodansky D. & Rajamani L. ‘The evolution and governance architecture of the climate 
change regime. International Relations and Global Climate Change: New 
Perspectives’ (forthcoming) 2nd Ed. (2016), available at 
file:///C:/Users/213570379/Downloads/SSRN-id2168859.pdf, accessed on 
20 February 2019. 
Boisson de Chazournes L. Freshwater and International Law: the interplay between 
universal, regional and basin perspectives (2009), available at 
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000185080, accessed on 20 
February 2019. 
Bourne C.B. ‘International water law: selected writings of Professor Charles B. 
Bourne’  Vol.1 (1997), available at 
https://www.academia.edu/461555/International_Water_Law_Selected_W
ritings_of_Professor_Charles_B._Bourne , accessed on 20 July 2019. 
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Brazil Barbuda Libyan Arab Tunisia Bulgaria Benin  
Cambodia Armenia Jamahiriya Ukraine Colombia Bhutan  
Cameroon Australia Liechtenstein United Arab Cuba Cape Verde  
Canada Austria, Lithuania Emirates Ecuador Comoros  
Chile Bahrain Luxembourg UK of G B, & Egypt Dem People’s 
Rep of Korea 
 
Denmark Bangladesh Madagascar North Ireland Ethiopia Dominican  
Finland Belarus Malawi USA France Republic  
Germany Belgium* Malaysia Uruguay Ghana El Salvador  
Greece Botswana Maldives Venezuela Guatemala Eritrea  
Grenada Brazil Malta Vietnam India Guinea  
Honduras Brunei Dar. Marshall Isl. Yemen Israel Lebanon  
Hungary Burkina-F. Mauritius Zambia Mali Mauritania  
Italy Cambodia Mexico Uruguay Monaco Myanmar  
Japan Cameroon Micronesia Venezuela Mongolia Niger  
Jordan Canada Morocco Vietnam Pakistan Palau  
Lao’s PDR Chile Mozambique  Panama St Kitts & Nev  
Latvia Costa Rica Namibia  Paraguay Saint Lucia  
Liechtenstein Ivory Coast Nepal  Peru Saint Vinc. &  
Malaysia Croatia Netherlands  Rwanda the Grenadines  
Mexico Cyprus New Zealand  Spain Senegal  
Nepal Czech Rep Nigeria*  Tanzania Solomon Islds  
Netherlands Denmark Norway  Uzbekistan Sri Lanka  
Norway Djibouti Oman   Swaziland  
Portugal Estonia Papua New   Tajikistan  
Rep of Korea Fiji* Guinea   The former  
Romania Finland Philippines   Yugoslav Rep  
Sudan Gabon Poland   of Macedonia  
Sweden Georgia Portugal   Turkmenistan  
Syrian Arab Germany Qatar   Uganda  
Republic Greece Rep of Korea   Zaire  
Tunisia Guyana Romania   Zimbabwe  
UK of G B. & Haiti Russian     
North Ireland Honduras Federation     
USA Hungary Samoa     
Uruguay Iceland San Marino     
Venezuela Indonesia Saudi Arabia     
Vietnam Iran (Islam) Sierra Leone     
 Ireland Singapore     
 Italy Slovakia     
 Jamaica Slovenia     
 Japan Sudan     
 Jordan Suriname     
 Kazakhstan South Africa     
 Kenya Sweden     
 Kuwait Syrian Arab      
 
 
Annexe 2: List of States Party to the 1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention 
Participant Signature 
Ratification, Accession (a), 
Acceptance (A), Approval 
(AA) 
Albania 18 Mar 1992  5 Jan 1994 
Austria 18 Mar 1992  25 Jul 1996 
Azerbaijan  - 3 Aug 2000 a 
Belarus  - 29 May 2003 a 
Belgium 18 Mar 1992  8 Nov 2000 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  - 3 Dec 2009 a 
Bulgaria 18 Mar 1992  28 Oct 2003 
Chad  - 22 Feb 2018 a 
Croatia  - 8 Jul 1996 a 
Czech Republic  - 12 Jun 2000 a 
Denmark 2  18 Mar 1992  28 May 1997 AA 
Estonia 18 Mar 1992  16 Jun 1995 
European Union 18 Mar 1992  14 Sep 1995 AA 
Finland 18 Mar 1992  21 Feb 1996 A 
France 3  18 Mar 1992  30 Jun 1998 AA 
Germany 18 Mar 1992  30 Jan 1995 
Greece 18 Mar 1992  6 Sep 1996 
Hungary 18 Mar 1992  2 Sep 1994 AA 
Italy 18 Mar 1992  23 May 1996 
Kazakhstan  - 11 Jan 2001 a 
Latvia 18 Mar 1992  10 Dec 1996 
Liechtenstein  - 19 Nov 1997 a 
Lithuania 18 Mar 1992  28 Apr 2000 
Luxembourg 20 May 1992  7 Jun 1994 
Montenegro   23 Jun 2014 a 
Netherlands 4  18 Mar 1992  14 Mar 1995 A 
North Macedonia  - 28 Jul 2015 a 
Norway 18 Sep 1992  1 Apr 1993 AA 
Poland 18 Mar 1992  15 Mar 2000 
Portugal 5   9 Jun 1992  9 Dec 1994 
Rep. of Moldova  - 4 Jan 1994 a 
Romania 18 Mar 1992  31 May 1995 
Russian Federation 18 Mar 1992  2 Nov 1993 A 
Senegal  - 31 Aug 2018 a 
Serbia  - 27 Aug 2010 a 
Slovakia  - 7 Jul 1999 a 
Slovenia  - 13 Apr 1999 a 
Spain 18 Mar 1992  16 Feb 2000 
Sweden 18 Mar 1992  5 Aug 1993 
Switzerland 18 Mar 1992  23 May 1995 
Turkmenistan  - 29 Aug 2012 a 
Ukraine  - 8 Oct 1999 a 
UK of GB & North. Ireland 18 Mar 1992   
Uzbekistan  - 4 Sep 2007 a 
Source: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-




Annexe 3: List of States party to the 1992 UNECE Watercourse Convention 
and the 1997 UNWCC 
 
Participant 
Ratification, Accession (a), 
Acceptance (A), Approval 
(AA) to the 1992 UNECE 
Watercourses Convention 
Ratification, Accession (a), 
Acceptance (A), Approval 
(AA) to the 1997 UNWCC 
Albania 5 Jan 1994 No 
Austria 25 Jul 1996 - 
Azerbaijan 3 Aug 2000 a - 
Belarus 29 May 2003 a - 
Belgium 8 Nov 2000 - 
Benin No 5 June 2012 a 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 2009 a - 
Bulgaria 28 Oct 2003 - 
Burkina Faso No 22 March 2011 a 
Chad 22 Feb 2018 a 26 Sept. 2012 a 
Croatia 8 Jul 1996 a - 
Czech Republic 12 Jun 2000 a - 
Denmark 2  28 May 1997 AA 30 April 2012 a 
Estonia 16 Jun 1995 - 
European Union 14 Sep 1995 AA - 
Finland 21 Feb 1996 A 23 January 1998 A 
France 3  30 Jun 1998 AA 24 Feb 2011 a 
Germany 30 Jan 1995 15 January 2007 
Greece 6 Sep 1996 2 Dec 2010a 
Guinea -B No 19 May 2010a 
Hungary 2 Sep 1994 AA 26 January 2000 AA 
Iraq No 2 July 2001a 
Ireland No 20 December 2013a 
Italy 23 May 1996 30 November 2012a 
Ivory Coast No 22 January 1999 
Jordan No 25 February 2014 
Kazakhstan 11 Jan 2001 a - 
Latvia 10 Dec 1996 - 
Lebanon  No 25 May 1999 a 
Libya No 25 June 2005 a 
Liechtenstein 19 Nov 1997 a - 
Lithuania 28 Apr 2000 - 
Luxembourg 7 Jun 1994 8 June 2012 
Montenegro 23 Jun 2014 a 24 September 2013 a 
Morocco No 13 April 2011 a 
Namibia No 29 August 2001 
Netherlands  14 Mar 1995 A 2 January 2001 A 
Niger  No  20 February 2013 a 
Nigeria No  27 September 2010 
North Macedonia 28 Jul 2015 a - 
Norway 1 Apr 1993 AA 30 September 1998 
Paraguay  No No 
Poland 15 Mar 2000 - 
Portugal 5  9 Dec 1994 22 January 2005 
Qatar No 28 February 2002 a 
Rep. of South Africa No 26 October 1998 




Ratification, Accession (a), 
Acceptance (A), Approval 
(AA) to the 1992 UNECE 
Watercourses Convention 
Ratification, Accession (a), 
Acceptance (A), Approval 
(AA) to the 1997 UNWCC 
Romania 31 May 1995 - 
Russian Federation 2 Nov 1993 A - 
Senegal 31 Aug 2018 a - 
Serbia 27 Aug 2010 a - 
Slovakia 7 Jul 1999 a - 
Slovenia 13 Apr 1999 a - 
Spain 16 Feb 2000 24 September 2009 a 
State of Palestine 16 Feb 2000 2 January 2015 a 
Sweden 5 Aug 1993 15 June 2000 a 
Switzerland 23 May 1995 - 
Syria Arab Rep. No 2 April 1998 
Tunisia No 22 April 2009 
Turkmenistan 29 Aug 2012 a - 
Ukraine 8 Oct 1999 a - 
UK of GB & Northern Ireland - 13 December 2013 a 
Uzbekistan 4 Sep 2007 a 4 September 2007 a 
Venezuela (Bolivian Rep. of) No No 
Vietnam  No 19 May 2014 a 
Yemen  No No 
Sources: This thesis’ own compilation of information that were available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
12&chapter=27&lang=en accessed on 11 June 2019. and  
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-








(in millions US$) 
GDP  
per capita 
Austria  455,736.58 51,512.9 
Belgium  531,766.94 46,556.1 
France  2,777,535.24 41,463.6 
Germany  3,996,759.29 48,195.6 
Italy  2,073,901.99 34,318.4 
Liechtenstein  6,214.63 165,028.2 
Luxembourg  69,487.92 114,340.5 
Netherlands  913,658.47 53,024.1 
Switzerland  705,501.30 82,838.9 



















Romania 29.0 97.4 21.7 239,552.52 12,301.2 9,486 
Hungary 11.6 100.0 10.1 155,703.07 15,938.8 10,541 
Serbia & 
Mont. 
11.1 90.0 9.0 50,508.37 7,234 19,815 
Austria 10.0 96.1 7.7 455,736.58 57,305.3 9,815 
Germany 7.0 16.8 9.4 3,996,759.29 48,195.6 1,878 
Bulgaria 5.9 43.0 3.5 65,132.95 9,272.6 2,734 
Slovak 
Republic 
5.9 96.0 5.2 106,472.2 19,546.9 9,265 
Bosnia & 
Herz. 
4.6 74.9 2.9 19,781.78 5,951.3 8,603 
Croatia 4.4 62.5 3.1 60,126.01 14,869.1 22,654 
Ukraine 3.8 5.4 2.7 130,832.4 3,095.2 2,868 
Czeck 
Republic 
2.9 27.5 2.8 245,225.8 23,078.6 1,283 
Slovenia 2.0 81.0 1.7 54,235.48 26,234 16,070 
Moldavia 1.6 35.6 1.1 11,309.08 3,189.4 2,726 
Switzerland 0.2 4.3 <0.1 705,501.3 82,838.9 7,464 
Albania <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 15,058.88 5,253.6 13,178 
Italy <0.1 0.2 <0.1 2,073,901.99 34,318.4 3,330 
Macedonia <0.1 0.2 <0.1   2,633 
Poland <0.1 0.1 <0.1 585,782.87 15,424 1,598 
Source: IPCDR, 2006; CIA World Factbook, 2006; World bank group 2019; WRI, 2006)  1724 
 
  
                                                 
 
1724 Mckinney (note 1528 above; 51) With some data being updated on the basis of IPCDR (2019), available 
at https://www.icpdr.org/main/, accessed on 20 April 2019; CIA World Factbook (2019) available at 
https://www.cia.gov/redirects/ciaredirect.html , accessed on 20 April 2019; World bank group data portal 
(2019), available at https://data.worldbank.org/ , accessed on 20 April 2019; WRI (2019) available at 
https://www.wri.org/ , accessed on 20 April 2019. 
 
 
Annex 6/Map 6: The Congo River born and discharged from within the territory of the DR-
Congo’s  
 
Source: https://www.britannica.com/place/Congo-River; accessed on 11 August 2019  
 
 
Annexe 7 / Map 7: The Rhine River Basin 
 
Source: Uehlinger et al. (note 1422 above, 201).
 
 
Annexe 8 / Map 8: The transboundary sub-rivers and sub-sub-river basins of the tributaries of the Congo River 
 
Source https://www.cicos.int 
